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
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VOL IX.

HARNACK'S HISTORY OF DOGMA. VOL. IV.



HISTORY OF DOGMA

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VOL. IV.



WILLIAMS & NORGATE

14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON
20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH
AND 7 BROAD STREET, OXFORD

1898

BT
21
.H33
v.4

Printed in Holland at the Motley Press.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

THE volume now issued finishes Volume II. of the original, of which a portion appears in Volume III. of the English Translation. The first chapter of this volume corresponds to Chapter VII. of Volume II. of the original, which treats of the Divinity of Christ. The remaining third volume of the German Edition will occupy three volumes in the English Translation, making seven volumes in all.

A. B. BRUCE.



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CHAPTER I.[1]

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOMOUSIA OF THE SON OF GOD WITH GOD HIMSELF.[2]

Is the Divine which appeared on the earth and has made its presence actively felt, identical with the supremely Divine that rules heaven and earth? Did the Divine which appeared on the earth enter into a close and permanent union with human nature, so that it has actually transfigured it and raised

[1] *Vide* Preface.

[2] See the Opp. Athanas., and in addition the works of the other Church Fathers of the fourth century, above all, those of Hilary, the Cappadocians and Jerome; the Church Histories of Sulpicius, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, Gelasius, the Vita Constantini of Eusebius, the Panarion of Epiphanius, and the Codex Theodosianus ed. Hænel; on the other side, the fragments of the Church History of Philostorgius; of the secular historians, Ammian in particular. For the proceedings of the Councils see Mansi Collect. Conc. v. II. and III.; Hefele, Conciliengesch. 2nd ed. v. I. and II.; Walch, Historie der Ketzereien v. II. and III.; Münscher, Ueber den Sinn der nicän. Glaubensformel, in Henke's Neues Magazin, VI., p. 334 f.; Caspari, Quellen zur Gesch. des Taufsymbols, 4 vols., 1866 ff.; Hahn, Bibliothek der Symbole, 2nd ed. 1877; Hort, On the Constantinop. Creed and other Eastern Creeds of the fourth century, 1876; Swainson, The Nicene and Apostles' Creeds, 1875; Bright, Notes on the Canons of the first four General Councils, 1882; my art. "Konstantinop. Symbol" in Herzog's R.-Encykl., 2nd ed. Besides the historical works of Baronius, Tillemont, Basnage, Gibbon, Schröckh, de Broglie, Wietersheim, Richter, Kaufmann, Hertzberg, Chastel, Schiller, Victor Schultze, and Boissier, above all, Ranke, (also Löning, Gesch. d. deutschen Kirchenrechts, vol. I.) and others, the references in Fabricius-Harless, the careful biographies of the Fathers of the fourth century by Böhringer, and the Histories of Dogma by Petavius, Schwane, Baur, Dorner (Entw. Gesch. d. L. v. d. Person Christi), Newman (Arians of the fourth century), Nitzsch, Schultz, and Thomasius may be consulted. On Lucian: see my article in Herzog's R.-Encyklop. v. VIII. 2, and in my Altchristl. Lit. Gesch. vol. I. On Arius: Maimbourg, Hist. de l'Arianisme, 1673, Travasa, Storia della vita di Ario, 1746; Hassenkamp, Hist. Arianæ controversiæ, 1845; Revillout, De l'Arianisme des peuples germaniques, 1850; Stark, Versuch einer

it to the plane of the eternal? These two questions necessarily arose out of the combination of the incarnation of the Logos and the deification of the human nature (See Vol. III., p. 289 ff.) Along with the questions, however, the answers too were given. But it was only after severe conflicts that these answers were able to establish themselves in the Church as dogmas. The reasons of the delay in their acceptance have been partly already indicated in Vol. III., pp. 167 ff. and will further appear in what follows. In the fourth century the first question was the dominant one in the Church, and in the succeeding centuries the second. We have to do with the first to begin with. It was finally answered at the so-called Second Œcumenical Council, 381, more properly in the year 383. The Council of Nicæa (325) and the death of Constantine (361) mark off the main stages in the controversy.

1. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONTROVERSY TO THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA.

At the great Oriental Council which met at Antioch about the year 268, the Logos doctrine was definitely accepted,

Gesch. des Arianism, 2 vols., 1783 f.; Kölling, Gesch. der arianischen Häresie, 2 vols., 1874, 1883; Gwatkin, Studies of Arianism, 1882. On Athanasius: Möhler, Athan. d. Gr., 1827; Voigt, Die Lehre d. Athan., 1861; Cureton, The Festal Letters of Athan., 1848; Larsow, Die Festbriefe des hl. Athan., 1852; Sievers, Ztschr. f. d. hist. Theol., 1868, I.; Fialon, St. Athanase, 1877; Atzberger, Die Logoslehre d. hl. Athan., 1880 (on this ThLZ., 1880, No. 8) Eichhorn, Athan. de vita ascetica, 1886. On Marcellus: Zahn, M. von Ancyra, 1867; Klose, Gesch. d. L. des Marcel and Photin, 1837. Reinkens, Hilarius, 1864; Krüger, Lucifer, 1886, and in the Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol., 1888, p. 434 ff.; Klose, Gesch. und Lehre des Eunomius, 1833; Rode, Gesch. der Reaction des Kaiser Julian, 1877 (also the works of Naville, Rendall and Mücke); Ullmann, Gregor v. Naz., 2nd ed. 1867; Dräseke, Quæst. Nazianz. Specimen, 1876; Rupp, Gregor v. Nyssa, 1834; Klose, Basilius, 1835; Fialon, St. Basile, 2nd edit. 1869; Rade, Damasus, 1882; Förster, Ambrosius, 1884; Zöckler, Hieronymus, 1875; Güldenpenning and Ifland, Theodosius d. Gr., 1878; Langen, Gesch. d. röm. Kirche, I. 1881. In addition the articles on the subject in Herzog's R.-Encykl. (particularly those by Möller) and in the Dict. of Christ. Biography, and very specially the article Eusebius by Lightfoot. The most thorough recent investigation of the subject is that by Gwatkin above mentioned. The accounts of the doctrines of Arius and Athanasius in Böhringer are thoroughly good and well-nigh exhaustive. The literary and critical studies of the Benedictines, in their editions, and those of Tillemont form the basis of the more recent works also, and so far they have not been surpassed.

while the "Homoousios" on the other hand was rejected.[1] The most learned man whom the East at that time possessed, Lucian (of Samosata?) took up the work of the excommunicated metropolitan, Paul of Samosata. First educated at the school of Edessa, where since the days of Bardesanes a free and original spirit had prevailed, then a follower of Paul, he got from the latter his dislike to the theology of "the ancient teachers", and with this he united the critical study of the Bible, a subject in which he became a master. He founded in Antioch an exegetical-theological school which, during the time of the three episcopates of Domnus, Timäus and Cyril, was not in communion with the Church there, but which afterwards, shortly before the martyrdom of Lucian, made its peace with the Church.

This school is the nursery of the Arian doctrine, and Lucian, its head, is the Arius before Arius. Lucian started from the Christology of Paul, but, following the tendency of the time, and perhaps also because he was convinced on exegetical grounds, he united it with the Logos Christology, and so created a fixed form of doctrine.[2] It is probable that it was only gradually he allowed the Logos doctrine to have stronger influence on the Adoptian form. This explains why it was not till towards the end of his life that he was able to bridge over his differences with the Church. He was revered by his pupils both as the teacher *par excellence,* and in his character as ascetic; his martyrdom, which occurred in the year 311 or 312, increased his reputation. The remembrance of having sat at the feet of Lucian was a firm bond of union amongst his pupils. After the time of persecution they received influential ecclesiastical posts.[3] There was no longer anything to recall

[1] See Vol. iii., pp. 40, 45.

[2] It is extremely probable that Lucian's study of Origen too had convinced him of the correctness of the Logos doctrine. We have to regard his doctrine as a combination of the doctrines of Paul and Origen. Lucian and Origen are classed together by Epiph., H. 76, 3, as teachers of the Arians.

[3] Amongst Lucian's pupils were Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, Menophantus of Ephesus, Theognis of Nicæa, Maris of Chalcedon, Athanasius of Anazarbus (?), the sophist Asterius, and Leontius, afterwards bishop of Antioch, and others. In Syria the pupils of Dorotheus—namely, Eusebius of Cæsarea and Paulinus of Tyre were

the fact that their master had formerly been outside of the Church. These pupils as a body afterwards came into conflict more or less strongly with the Alexandrian theology. So far as we know, no single one of them was distinguished as a *religious* character; but they knew what they wanted; they were absolutely convinced of the truth of their school-doctrine, which had reason and Scripture on its side. This is what characterises the school. At a time when the Church doctrine was in the direst confusion, and was threatening to disappear, and when the union of tradition, Scripture, and philosophical speculation in the form of dogma had been already called for, but had not yet been accomplished, this school was conscious of possessing an established system of doctrine which at the same time permitted freedom. This was its strength. [1]

The accounts of Lucian's Christology which have been handed down are meagre enough, still they give us a sufficiently clear picture of his views. God is One; there is nothing equal to Him; for everything besides Him is created. He has created

supporters of Arius, as were also many of Origen's admirers. As regards the other partisans of Arius who are known to us by name, we do not know whether they were pupils of Lucian or not. Egypt and Libya are represented by Theonas of Marmarica, Secundus of Ptolemais and the presbyter Georgius of Alexandria, and further, according to Philostorgius, by Daches of Berenice, Secundus of Tauchira, Sentianus of Boräum, Zopyrus of Barka and Meletius of Lykopolis. In other provinces we have Petrophilus of Scythopolis, Narcissus of Neronias, Theodotus of Laodicea, Gregorius of Berytus and Aëtius of Lydda. Philostorgius further mentions others, but he also reckons as belonging to his party those old bishops who did not live to see the outbreak of the controversy and who accordingly have been claimed by the orthodox side as well; see Gwatkin l. c., p. 31. For other names of presbyters and deacons at Alexandria who held Arian views, see the letters of Alexander in Theodoret, I. 4, and Socrates, I. 6.

[1] These pupils of Lucian must have displayed all the self-consciousness, the assurance, and the arrogance of a youthful exclusive school (*ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς δηλητηρίου φρατρίας*, says Epiphanius in one place, H. 69, 5), haughtily setting themselves far above the "ancients" and pitying their want of intelligence. Highly characteristic in this respect is the account of Alexander, their opponent, after making all allowance for the malevolent element in it; see very specially the following passage, Theodoret, H. E. I. 4): *οἱ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὰς συγκρίνειν ἑαυτοῖς ἀξιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἷς ἡμεῖς ἐκ παίδων ὡμιλήσαμεν διδασκάλοις ἐξισοῦσθαι ἀνέχονται· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν νῦν πανταχοῦ συλλειτουργῶν τινὰ εἰς μέτρον σοφίας ἡγοῦνται· μόνοι σοφοὶ καὶ ἀκτήμονες καὶ δογμάτων εὑρεταὶ λέγοντες εἶναι, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκαλύφθαι μόνοις, ἅπερ οὐδενὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον ἑτέρῳ πέφυκεν ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἔννοιαν.* One may further compare the introduction to the Thalia.

the Logos or Wisdom—who is to be distinguished from the *inner* divine Logos—out of the things that are not (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων), and sent him into the world.[1] This Logos has taken a human body though not a human soul, and accordingly all the feelings and spiritual struggles of Christ are to be attributed to the Logos. Christ has made known the Father to us, and by being man and by his death has given us an example of patience. This exhausts his work, by means of which—for so we may complete the thought—he, constantly progressing, has entered into perfect glory. It is the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, but instead of man it is a created heavenly being who here becomes "Lord". Lucian must have put all the emphasis on the "out of the things that are not" (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) and on the "progress" (προκοπή). The creaturehood of the Son, the denial of his co-eternity with the Father, and the unchangeableness of the Son achieved by constant progress and constancy, constitute the main articles in the doctrine of Lucian and his school. Just because of this he refuses to recognise in the Son the perfectly equal image of the *ousia* or substance of the Father (Philost. II. 15).[2] There can be no doubt as to the

[1] He is thus a created "God."

[2] For the proofs of what is here said regarding Lucian see my article "Lucian" in Herzog's R.-Encykl., 2nd ed. Vol. VIII. Here I give merely the following. For the close connection between Arius and Lucian we possess a series of witnesses. Alexander of Alex. says expressly in his letter to Alexander (Theodoret H. E. I. 4) that Arius started from Lucian. Arius himself in his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia describes himself and his friend as Συλλουκιανιστής; Philostorgius enumerates the pupils of Lucian, whom he regards as the friends of Arius (II. 14), and lets us see (II. 3, 13—15 and III. 15) that at the beginning of the fifth century Lucian was still regarded as the patriarch and teacher of the Arians. Epiphanius (Hær. 43. 1) and Philostorgius (l. c.) inform us that Lucian was revered by the Arians as a martyr. Epiphanius and Marius Victorinus call the Arians "Lucianists" (see also Epiph. H. 76. 3). Sozomen relates that the Fathers of Arian or semi-Arian views assembled in Antioch in the year 341 accepted a confession of faith of Lucian's (III. 5). This confession is, it is true, given by Athanasius (de synodis 23), Socrates (II. 10) and Hilary (de synod. 29) without any statement as to its having originated with Lucian; but Sozomen informs us that a semi-Arian synod which met in Caria in 367 also recognised it as Lucianist (VI. 12). According to the author of the seven dialogues on the Trinity, who was probably Maximus Confessor, the Macedonians did the same (Dial. III. in Theodoreti Opp. V. 2, p. 991 sq., ed. Schultze and Nöss). The semi-Arians also at the synod of Seleucia in 359 seem to have ascribed the Confession to Lucian (see Caspari, Alte und neue Quellen zur

philosophy to which Lucian adhered. He worked with the means supplied by the critical and dialectic philosophy of Aristotle, although indeed his conception of God was Platonic, and though his Logos doctrine had nothing in common with the teaching of Aristotle. His opponents have expressly informed us that his pupils turned to account the Aristotelian philosophy.[1] If one recollects that in the third century the Theodotian-Adoptian Christology was founded by the help of what was supplied by Aristotelianism, and that the Theodotians were also given to the critical study of the Bible,[2] the connection between Arianism and Adoptianism thus becomes clear. It is incorrect to trace the entire opposition between the Orthodox and the Arians to the opposition between Platonism and Aristotelianism, incorrect if for no other reason because a strong Platonic element is contained in what they possess in common—namely, the doctrine of God and of the Logos; but it is correct to say that the opposition cannot be understood if regard is not had to the different philosophical methods employed.[3] *In Lucian's teaching Adoptianism is combined*[4] *with the doctrine of the Logos as a creature* (κτίσμα), *and this form of doctrine is developed by the aid of the Aristotelian philosophy and based on the*

Gesch. d. Taufsymbols, p. 42 f., n. 18). Since Sozomen himself, however, questions the correctness of the view which attributes it to Lucian, and since, moreover, other reasons may be alleged against it, we ought with Caspari to regard the creed as a redaction of a confession of Lucian's. This fact too shews what a high reputation the martyr had in those circles. That Lucian's school was pre-eminently an exegetical one is evident amongst other things from Lucian's well-known activity in textual criticism, as well as from Philostorg. (III. 15).

[1] See on Arius, *e.g.*, Epiphan. H. 69 c. 69, on Aëtius, who was indirectly a pupil of Lucian (Philostorg. III. 15), the numerous passages in the Cappadocians and Epiphanius H. 76 T. III., p. 251, ed. Oehler. Besides, in almost every sentence of what is left us of the writings of Aëtius we see the Aristotelian. Philostorgius testifies to the fact that he specially occupied himself with Logic and Grammar; see above all, the little work of Aëtius in 74 theses, which Epiphanius (H. 76) has preserved for us. In his application of Aristotelianism Aëtius, however, went further than Arius, as is peculiarly evident from the thesis of the knowableness of God.

[2] See Vol. III., p. 24.

[3] Correctly given in Baur, L. v. d. Dreieinigkeit I., p. 387 ff.—not at all clear in Dorner *op. cit.* I., p. 859.

[4] It is self-evident that this combination deprived Paul's system of doctrine of all the merit which it contained.

critical exegesis of the Bible. Aristotelian Rationalism dominated the school. The thought of an actual redemption was put in the background. The Christian interest in monotheism is exhausted by the statement that the predicate "underived" attaches to one single being only. This interest in the "unbegotten begetter", and also, what is closely connected with it, the ranging of all theological thoughts under the antithesis of first cause or God, and creation, are also Aristotelian. Theology here became a "Technology", that is, a doctrine of the unbegotten and the begotten[1] which was worked out in syllogisms and based on the sacred codex.

A pupil of Lucian named Arius, perhaps a Lybian by birth, became when already well up in years, first deacon in Alexandria, and afterwards presbyter in the church of Baukalis. The presbyters there at that period still possessed a more independent position than anywhere else.[2] Owing, however, to the influence of the martyr bishop Peter (+ 311) a tendency had gained ascendency in the episcopate in Alexandria, which led to Christian doctrine being sharply marked off from the teachings of Greek philosophy (*μαθήματα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας*) the presence of which had been observed in Origen, and in general shewed itself in a distrust of

[1] According to Theodoret (Hær. fab. IV. 3) it was Aëtius himself who called theology "technology." Perhaps the most characteristic example of how this technology treated purely religious language is to be found in the benediction with which Aëtius concluded one of his works (Epiphan. H, 76. T. III., p. 222, ed. Oehler). *Ἐρρωμένους καὶ ἐρρωμένας ὑμᾶς ὁ ὢν αὐτογέννητος Θεός, ὁ καὶ μόνος ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς προσαγορευθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποσταλέντος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὑποστάντος τε ἀληθῶς πρὸ αἰώνων καὶ ὄντος ἀληθῶς γεννητῆς ὑποστάσεως, διατηρήσει ἀπὸ τῆς ἀσεβείας, ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, δι' οὗ πᾶσα δόξα τῷ πατρὶ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν.* This reminds us *mutatis mutandis* of the benediction of the modern rationalistic preacher, "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the great teacher and friend of men, be with you all." I am glad further to see that Rupp too (Gregor von Nyssa, p. 137) has connected the conception of *ἀγεννησία*, as being a central one in Eunomius, with the *πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον* of Aristotle.

[2] Spite, however, of what we know of the Meletian schism in Alexandria and of the temporary connection of Arius with it, (cf. also the schism of Colluthus) it is not very clear if the outbreak of the Arian controversy is connected with the opposition between episcopate and presbyterate (against Böhringer). The Alexandrian Presbyters were at that time actual Parochi. There are some obscure references in the letter of Alexander (Theodoret I. 4), see Gwatkin, p. 29.

"scientific" theology, while at the same time the thought of the distinction between the Logos and the Father was given a secondary place.[1] Arius nevertheless fearlessly advanced the views he had learned from Lucian. The description we get of him is that of a man of grave appearance and a strict ascetic, but at the same time affable and of a prepossessing character, though vain. He was highly respected in the city; the ascetics and the virgins were specially attached to him. His activity had been recognised also by the new bishop Alexander who began his episcopate in 313. The outbreak of the controversy is wrapped in obscurity, owing to the fact that the accounts are mutually contradictory. According to the oldest testimony it was an opinion expressed by Arius when questioned by the bishop on a certain passage of Scripture, and to which he obstinately adhered, which really began the controversy,[2] possibly in the year 318. Since the persecution had ceased, the Christological question was the dominant one in the Alexandrian Church. Arius was not the first to raise it. On the contrary he was able later on to remind the bishop how the latter had often both in the Church and in the Council of Presbyters (ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ συνεδρίῳ πλειστάκις) refuted the Valentinian Christology, according to which the Son is an emanation,—the Manichæan, according to which the Son is a consubstantial part of the Father (μέρος ὁμοούσιον τοῦ πατρός), —the Sabellian, according to which the Godhead involves the identity of the Son and Father (υἱοπάτωρ),—that of Hieracas, according to which the Son is a torch lighted at the torch of the Father, that Son and Father are a bipartite light and so on,—and how he, Arius, had agreed with him.[3] It was only after considerable hesitation and perhaps vacillation too, that

[1] See Vol. III., p. 99 ff.

[2] See Constantine's letter in Euseb., Vita Constant. II. 69; the notices in the Church historians and in Epiphanius (H. 69. 4) can hardly be reconciled with it. Along with Constantine's statements the account of Socrates is specially worthy of consideration (I. 5).

[3] Ep. Arii ad Alex. in Athanas. de synod. 16 and Epiphan. H. 69. 7. According to Philostorg. I. 3, the exertions of Arius had very specially contributed to bring about the election of Alexander as bishop, although he could then have become bishop himself.

Alexander resolved on the excommunication of Arius. It took place at a Synod held in 321 or 320 in presence of about one hundred Egyptian and Lybian bishops. Along with Arius some presbyters and deacons of Alexandria, as well as the Lybian bishops Theonas and Secundus, were deposed. This did not quieten Arius. He sought and forthwith found support amongst his old friends, and above all, got the help of Eusebius of Nicomedia. This student-friend had an old cause of quarrel with Alexander,[1] and, contrary to ecclesiastical law, had been transferred to Nicomedia by Berytus, the most influential bishop[2] at the court of the Empress, a sister of Constantine. Arius, driven out of Alexandria "as an atheist", had written to him from Palestine.[3] He was able to appeal to a number of eastern bishops, and above all, to Eusebius of Cæsarea; in fact he asserted that *all* the eastern bishops agreed with him and had on this account been put under the ban by Alexander (?). Eusebius of Nicomedia espoused the cause of Arius in the most energetic fashion in a large number of letters.[4] Alexander on his part also looked about for allies. He wrote numerous letters to the bishops, two of which have been preserved—namely, the Encyclica, *i.e.*, the official report of what had occurred,[5] and the epistle to Alexander, Bishop of Constantinople. (?)[6] In the

[1] Ep. Alexandri in Socr. I. 6 on Eusebius. Τὴν πάλαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ κακόνοιαν τὴν χρόνῳ σιωπηθεῖσαν νῦν διὰ τούτων (by letters) ἀνανεῶσαι βουλόμενος, σχηματίζεται μὲν ὡς ὑπὲρ τούτων γράφων· ἔργῳ δὲ δείκνυσιν, ὡσ ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ σπουδάζων τοῦτο ποιεῖ. His lust of power is characterised by Alexander in the words (l. c.) νομίσας ἐπ' αὐτῷ κεῖσθαι τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας.

[2] He is supposed to have been related to the Emperor. According to a letter of Constantine's of a later date (in Theodoret. H. E. I. 19) he remained faithful to Licinius and had before the catastrophe worked against Constantine.

[3] Theodoret H. E. I. 5, Epiph. H. 69 6.

[4] See the letter to Paulinus of Tyre—which is put later by some—in Theodoret, H. E. I. 6. In this letter Eusebius praises the zeal of the Church historian Eusebius in the matter and blames Paulinus for his silence. He too ought to come to the help of Arius by giving a written opinion based on the theology of the Bible. There is a fragment of a letter of Eusebius to Arius in Athanasius, de synod. 17, where there are also other letters of the friends of Arius.

[5] See Socrat. H. E. I. 6 and Athanas., Opp. I., p. 313 sq. (ed. Paris, 1689, p. 397 sq.).

[6] Theodoret, H. E. I. 4. The address is probably incorrect; the letter is written to several persons.

latter letter, which is written in a very hostile tone, Alexander sought to check the powerful propaganda of Arianism. He appealed to the bishops of the whole of Egypt and the Thebaid and further to the Lybian, Pentapolitan, Syrian, Lycio-Pamphylian, Asiatic, Cappadocian, and other bishops. Arius betook himself to Nicomedia and from there addressed a conciliatory epistle to the Alexandrian bishop which we still possess.[1] He also composed at that time his "Thalia," of whose contents which were partly in prose and partly in verse, we cannot form any very correct idea from the few fragments handed down to us by Athanasius. His supporters thought a great deal of this work while his opponents condemned it as profane, feeble, and affected.[2] A Bithynian Synod under the leadership of Eusebius decided for Arius,[3] and Eusebius of Cæsarea entered into communication with Alexander of Alexandria in the character of mediator, in order to induce him to take a more favourable view of the doctrine of the excommunicated presbyter.[4] It may have been, more than anything else, the political state of things which allowed Arius to find his way back once more to Alexandria. Under the patronage of some distinguished bishops with whom he had entered into correspondence, but who were not able to bring about any amicable arrangement with Alexander, Arius resumed his work in the city.[5] In the autumn of 323 Constantine, after his victory over Licinius, became sole ruler in the Roman Empire. The controversy had already begun to rage in all the coast-provinces of the East. Not only did the bishops contend with each other, but the common people too began to take sides, and the dispute was carried on in such a base manner that the Jews scoffed at the

[1] See note 3, p. 8.

[2] On the Thalia see Athan., Orat. c. Arian I. 2—10; de synod. 15. Philostorgius II. 2 tells us that Arius put his doctrine also into songs for sailors, millers, and travellers etc., in order thus to bring it to the notice of the lower classes. Athanasius also mentions songs. We can see from this that Arius made no distinction between faith and philosophical theology. He followed the tendency of the time. His opponents are for him "heretics."

[3] Sozom. I. 15.

[4] The letter is in the Acts of the Second Nicene Council, Mansi XIII., p. 315.

[5] Sozom. I. 15.

thing in the theatres, and turned the most sacred parts of the doctrine of the Church into ridicule.[1] Constantine forthwith interfered. The very full letter which he sent to Alexander and Arius,[2] in 323—24, is one of the most important monuments of his religious policy. The controversy is described as an idle wrangle over incomprehensible things, since the opponents are, he says, at one as regards the main point.[3] But the letter had no effect, nor was the court-bishop, Hosius of Cordova, who brought it, and who as an Occidental appeared to be committed to neither side, able to effect a reconciliation between the parties. In all probability, however, Hosius had already come to an understanding[4] in Alexandria with Alexander, and the latter shortly

[1] Euseb., Vita Const. II. 61; Socrates I. 7; Theodoret I. 6; the discord extended even into families.

[2] Vita Const. II. 64—70.

[3] Constantine wrote the letter not as a theologian, but as Emperor, which ought in fairness to be reckoned to his credit. The introduction is very skilfully worded: the Emperor trusted that he would be able with the help of the Eastern bishops to compose the Donatist schism, and now he sees the East torn by a far more destructive schism. He offers his services as mediator and accordingly takes up an absolutely impartial position. "Alexander should not have asked the questions and Arius should not have answered them; for such questions lie outside the "Law"; and above all, care ought to have been taken not to bring them to the notice of the people. The opponents, who at bottom presumably had the same convictions, ought to come to an agreement and compose their differences; this is what is done in the schools of philosophy; those who attend them dispute, but they afterwards formulate terms of agreement upon a common basis. It is only the common people and ignorant boys who quarrel about trifles." The close of the letter expresses the very great anxiety felt by the Emperor lest the grand work of restoring peace and unity entrusted to him by Providence should be hindered. He accordingly most earnestly urges peace, even if they cannot actually agree. *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas* and—reserve, is thus the watchword of the Emperor; in faith in Providence and in the conception of the Supreme Being they are certainly one: for the upholder of all has given to all a common light; differences of opinion on separate points are unavoidable and are perfectly legitimate when there is radical unity in dogma. "Restore to me my peaceful days and my undisturbed nights and do not allow me to spend what remains of my life in joylessness." The close is once more very effective: he had already started, he says, for Alexandria, but had turned back when he heard of the split; the combatants may make it possible for him to come by becoming reconciled. This letter can hardly have been written under the influence of Eusebius of Nicomedia; still Nicomedia had already before this been the starting-point of a movement for bringing about union, as the conciliatory epistle of Arius and the pacific letter of his friends prove.

[4] If according to Socrat. III. 7, he at this time agitated in Alexandria the

after took a journey to Nicomedia, thoroughly completed the understanding, talked over some other bishops there, and so prepared the way for the decision of the Council of Nicæa.[1] The Emperor was won over by Hosius after he perceived the fruitlessness of his union-policy.[2] He now summoned a General Council to meet at Nicæa, apparently on the advice of Hosius,[3] and the latter had the main share also in determining the choice of the formula proposed.[4]

But before we take up the Council of Nicæa, we must get some idea of the doctrines of the contending parties.

We still know what were the Christological formulæ of Bishop Alexander which were attacked by Arius.[5] They were the words: Ἀεὶ θέος, ἀεὶ υἱός, ἅμα πατήρ, ἅμα υἱός, συνυπάρχει ὁ υἱὸς ἀγεννήτως[6] τῷ θεῷ, ἀειγενής, ἀγενητογενής, οὔτ' ἐπινοίᾳ, οὔτ'

question about *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, it must have been in the western-orthodox sense. On the other hand, it is said (l. c.) that Hosius when in Alexandria endeavoured to refute the doctrine of Sabellius. He might thus, as a matter of fact, regard himself as a mediator, namely, between the Arian and Sabellian doctrinal propositions; see on this below. It is probable that a Synod was held in Alexandria during his stay there.

[1] This, it is true, is the account only of Philostorgius (I. 7), but there is no reason for mistrusting him.

[2] In Egypt the tumults were so serious that even the image of the Emperor was attacked (Vita Const. III. 4).

[3] This is the account given by Sulpicius Severus, Chron. II. 40; "Nicæna synodus auctore Hosio confecta habebatur."

[4] Athan. hist. Arian. 42; *οὗτος ἐν Νικαίᾳ πίστιν ἐξέθετο.* On Hosius see the lengthy article in the Dict. of Christ. Biogr. The life of this important and influential bishop covers the century between the death of Origen and the birth of Augustine.

[5] From the letter of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia.

[6] Lightfoot (S. Ignatius Vol. II., p. 90 ff.) has published a learned discussion on *ἀγένητος* (underived) and *ἀγέννητος* (unbegotten) in the Fathers up till Athanasius. Ignatius (Eph. 7) called the Son as to His Godhead "*ἀγέννητος*." In the first decades of the Arian controversy no distinction was made between the words, *i.e.*, the difference in the writing of them was not taken account of, and this produced frightful confusion. Still Athanasius saw clearly from the first that though the conception of generation might hold good of the Son, that of becoming or derivation did not; s. de synod 3: *τὸν πατέρα μόνον ἄναρχον ὄντα καὶ ἀγέννητον γεγεννηκέναι ἀνεφίκτως καὶ πᾶσιν ἀκαταλήπτως οἴδαμεν· τὸν δὲ υἱὸν γεγεννῆσθαι πρὸ αἰῶνων καὶ μηκέτι ὁμοίως τῷ πατρὶ ἀγέννητον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν ἔχειν τὸν γεννήσαντα πατέρα.* Spite of this he could say (l. c. c. 46): *τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα*—scil. *ἀγέννητος*, as if it were identical in form with *ἀγένητος*—*διάφορα ἔχει τὰ σημαινόμενα. καὶ οἱ μέν, τὸ ὂν μὲν μήτε δὲ γεννηθέν, μήτε ὅλως ἔχον τὸν αἴτιον,*

ἀτόμῳ τινὶ προάγει ὁ θεὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἀεὶ θεός, ἀεὶ υἱός, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοὺ θεοῦ ὁ υἱός; always God, always Son, at the same time Father, at the same time Son, the Son exists unbegotten with the Father, everlasting, uncreated, neither in conception nor in any smallest point does God excel the Son, always God, always Son, from God Himself the Son.

λέγουσιν ἀγέννητον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἄκτιστον; see also the tiresome distinctions in the work "de decret. synod. Nic." 28 sq. The distinction in fact between γεννᾶν, γίγνεσθαι, κτίζειν was not yet itself a definite one. At a later period there was no hesitation in asserting that the Son both as God and as Man is γεννητός; s. Joh. Damasc. I. 8: χρὴ γὰρ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ ἀγέννητον, διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς ν γραφόμενον, τὸ ἄκτιστον ἢ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἀγέννητον, διὰ τῶν δύο ν γραφόμενον, δηλοῖ τὸ μὴ γεννηθέν. From this he infers that the Father only is ἀγέννητος, while the Son as God is γεννητός and indeed μόνος γεννητός. One can see from the wonderful word of Alexander's, ἀγεννητογενής, what difficulties were created at first for the orthodox by the ἀγέν[ν]ητος. Athanasius would have preferred to banish entirely the fatal word and not to have used it even for the Father. That it, as is the case with ὁμοούσιος also, was first used by the Gnostics and in fact by the Valentinians is evident from the striking passage in the letter of Ptolemäus to Flora c. 5, which has hitherto escaped the notice of those who have investigated the subject. Ptolemäus is there dealing with the only good primal God, the primal ground of all Being and all things, with the true demiurge and Satan. He writes amongst other things: καὶ ἔσται (ὁ δημιουργὸς) μὲν καταδεέστερος τοῦ τελείου Θεοῦ, ἅτε δὴ καὶ γεννητὸς ὢν καὶ οὐκ ἀγέννητος—εἷς γὰρ ἐστιν ἀγέννητος ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα ... μείζων δὲ καὶ κυριώτερος τοῦ ἀντικειμένου γενήσεται καὶ ἑτέρας οὐσιας τε καὶ φύσεως πεφυκὼς παρὰ τὴν ἑκατέρων τούτων οὐσίαν ... τοῦ δὲ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων τοῦ ἀγεννήτου—that is thus the characteristic!—ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀφθαρσία τε καὶ φῶς αὐτοόν, ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ μονοειδὲς, ἡ δὲ τούτου (scil. τοῦ δημιουργοῦ) οὐσία διττὴν μέν τινα δύναμιν προήγαγεν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ κρείττονός ἐστιν εἰκών. μηδέ σε τὰ νῦν τοῦτο θορυβείτω, θέλουσαν μαθεῖν, πῶς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὅλων οὔσης τε καὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἡμῖν καὶ πεπιστευμένης, τῆς ἀγεννήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἀγαθῆς, συνέστησαν καὶ αὗται αἱ φύσεις, ἥ τε τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ ἡ τῆς μεσότητος, ἀνομοούσιοι αὗται καθεστῶσαι, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἔχοντος τὰ ὅμοια ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὁμοούσια γεννᾶν τε γαὶ προφέρειν· μαθήσῃ γὰρ ἐξῆς καὶ τὴν τούτου ἀρχήν τε καὶ γέννησιν. This is how Ptolemäus wrote c. 160. His words already contain the ecclesiastical terminology of the future! We also already meet with the term "σοφία ἀνυπόστατος" in a passage of his l. c. c. 1. Many passages prove, moreover, that not only the words employed later on, but also the ideas from which sprang the Church doctrine of the immanent Trinity in its subsequent form, were present in the writings of the Valentinians, as, *e.g.*, the following from Hipp. Philos. VI. 29 (Heracleon): ἦν ὅλως γεννητὸν οὐδέν, πατὴρ δὲ ἦν μόνος ἀγέννητος ... ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν γόνιμος, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ποτὲ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ τελεώτατον, ὃ εἶχεν ἐν αὐτῷ, γεννῆσαι καὶ προαγαγεῖν· φιλέρημος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν· Ἀγάπη γάρ, φησίν, ἦν ὅλος, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγάπη, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ τὸ ἀγαπώμενον ... τελειότερος δὲ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι ἀγέννητος ὢν μόνος. In what follows the whole discussion is conditioned by the problem that the begotten Æons are in their nature indeed ὁμοούσιοι with the Father, but that they are imperfect as γεννητοί and are inferior to the μόνος ἀγέννητος. Here therefore the field for the

Alexander thus maintains the beginningless, eternal co-existence of Father and Son: the Father is never to be thought of without the Son who springs from the Father. It is not improbable that Alexander was led thus to give prominence to the one side of the Logos doctrine of Origen, owing to the influence of the theology of Irenæus or Melito.[1] The doctrine which Arius opposed to this is above all dominated by the thought that God, the Only One, is alone eternal, and that besides Him there exists only what is created, and that this originates in His will, that accordingly the Son also is not eternal, but a creation of God out of the non-existent.[2] From this thesis there necessarily follows the rejection of the predicate ὁμοούσιος for the Son. Arius and his friends already before the Council of Nicæa give expression to it, incidentally indeed, but without ambiguity.[3]

The doctrine of Arius is as follows:[4]

Arian-Athanasian controversy is already marked out. But it is to be noticed further that the three terms, μονογενής, πρωτότοκος, and εἰκών contain and define the entire Valentinian Christology, which is of an extremely complicated character. (See Heinrici, die Valentin. Gnosis. p. 120). In the fourth century, however, they became the catchwords of the different Christologies.

[1] It is impossible to come to any certain decision on this point, so long as it is not proved that the pieces which are ascribed to Alexander are really his, and at the same time so long as it is uncertain if the sentences from them which also bear the names of Irenæus and Melito really belong to these writers and have been made use of by Alexander. See on this question Cotterill, Modern Criticism and Clement's Epp. to the Virgins, 1884, on this ThLZ., 1884, p. 267 f; Pitra, Analecta Sacra T. IV. pp. 196 sq., 430 sq. On this Loofs, ThLZ. 1884, Col. 572 f., and very specially Krüger, Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol. 1888, p. 434 ff.; Melito of Sardes and Alex. of Alexandria. Socrates asserts (I. 5) that Arius believed that Alexander wished to introduce the doctrinal system of Sabellius. But the Christology of Irenæus has also been understood in a "Sabellian" sense. The important address of Alexander on soul and body, in which he also treats of the Incarnation, is to be found in Migne T. 18.

[2] This was the original point of dispute. Διωκόμεθα, writes Arius to Eusebius, ὅτι εἴπομεν, Ἀρχὴν ἔχει ὁ υἱός, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἄναρχός ἐστι. Διὰ τοῦτο διωκόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι εἴπομεν, Ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐστίν.

[3] See the fragment from the Thalia in Athan. de synod. 15, the letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia to Paulinus, also that of Arius to Alexander.

[4] The fragments of the Thalia and the two letters of Arius which have been preserved are amongst the most important sources: cf. also the confession of faith of Arius in Socr. I. 26 (Sozom. II. 27). Then we have the statements of his earliest opponents, very specially the two letters of Alexander and the verbal quotations

(*a*) God, the Only One, besides whom there is no other, is alone unbegotten, without beginning and eternal; He is inexpressible, incomprehensible, and has absolutely no equal. These are the notes which express His peculiar nature. He has *created* all things out of His free will, and there exists nothing beside Him which He has not created. The expression "to beget" is simply a synonym for "to create". If it were not, the pure simplicity and spirituality of God's nature would be destroyed. God can put forth nothing out of His own essence; nor can He communicate His essence to what is created, for this essence is essentially uncreated. He has accordingly not been Father always; for otherwise what is created would not be created, but eternal.[1].

of the propositions of Arius in Athanasius; see especially ep. ad episc. Ægypt 12 and de sentent. Dionys. 23, also the Orat. c. Arian. In the third place, we can adduce the propositions laid down by the earliest Arians, or by the patrons of Arius. Opponents made little difference between them and Arius himself, and the actual facts shew that they were justified in so doing; see the letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia to Paulinus and the fragments of Arian letters in Athanas. de synod. 17, also the fragments from Asterius. Finally, we have to consider what the Church historians and Epiphanius have to tell us regarding the doctrinal propositions of Arius. There was no "evolution" of Arianism, we can only distinguish different varieties of it. Even Eunomius and Aëtius did not "develop" the doctrinal system, but only gave it a logically perfect form. Lucian had already completed the entire system, as is specially evident from the letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia to Paulinus; see also the introduction to the Thalia in Athan., Orat. c. Arian. I. 5, which, moreover, presents the character of Arius in an unfavourable light: *κατὰ πίστιν ἐκλεκτῶν Θεοῦ, συνετῶν Θεοῦ, παίδων ἁγίων, ὀρθοτόμων, ἅγιον Θεοῦ πνεῦμα λαβόντων, τάδε ἐμαθον ἤγαγε ὑπὸ τῶν σοφίης μετεχόντων, ἀστείων, θεοδιδάκτων, κατὰ πάντα σοφῶν τε· τούτων κατ' ἴχνος ἦλθον ἐγὼ βαίνων ὁμοδόξως ὁ περικλυτός, ὁ πολλὰ παθὼν διὰ τὴν Θεοῦ δόξαν, ὑπό τε Θεοῦ μαθὼν σοφίαν καὶ γνῶσιν ἐγὼ ἔγνων.*

[1] In the doctrine of God as held by Arius and his friends two main ideas appear all through as those upon which everything depends: (1) that God alone is *ἀγέννητος*; (2) that all else has been created out of nothing by God's free will. In accordance with this they get rid of everything designated as *προβολὴ ἀγέννητος, ἐρυγή, γέννημα, μέρος ὁμοούσιον, ἐξ ἀπορροΐας τῆς οὐσίας, μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα, ἓν εἰς δύο διῃρημένον*, etc.; even the old pictorial expressions "Light of Light", "Torch of Torch" are rejected, and they will have nothing to do with the transformation of an originally impersonal eternal essence or substance in God into a personally subsisting essentiality; see the epp. Arii ad Euseb. et Alexand. *Εἰ τό*; *Ἐκ γαστρός, καὶ τό· Ἐκ πατρὸς ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἥκω, ὡς μέρος τοῦ ὁμοουσίου καὶ ὡς προβολὴ ὑπό τινων νοεῖται, σύνθετος ἔσται ὁ πατὴρ καὶ διαιρετὸς καὶ τρεπτὸς καὶ σῶμα... καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα σώματι πάσχων ὁ ἀσώματος Θεός*; It was Eusebius Nic. specially in his letter to Paulinus, who developed the thought that "to beget" is equal to "to create" and he, for the rest, allows that it

(*b*) Wisdom and Logos dwell within this God as the powers (not persons) which are coincident with His substance, and are by their very nature inseparable from it; there are besides many *created* powers.[1]

(*c*) Before the world existed, God of His free will created an independent substance or hypostasis (*οὐσία, ὑπόστασις*) as the instrument by means of which all other creatures were to be created, since without it the creatures would not have been able to endure the contact of the Godhead. This Being is termed in Scripture Wisdom, also Son, Image, Word; this Wisdom, which, compared with the inner divine Wisdom, is called Wisdom only in a loose sense, has like all creatures been created out of nothing. It originates in God only in so far as it has been created by God; it is in no sense of the substance or essence of God. It has had a beginning; it accordingly did not always exist, there was a time in which it was not. That the Scriptures use the word "begotten" of this Substance does not imply that this is peculiar to it any more than is the predicate "Son"; for the other creatures are likewise described here and there as "begotten," and men are called "sons of God".[2]

the Son were begotten out of the substance of the Father the predicate *ἀγέννητος* would attach to Him, and He would possess the *ταυτότης τῆς φύσεως* with the Father. In laying down their doctrine of God, Arius and his friends express themselves with a certain amount of fervour. One can see that they have a genuine concern to defend monotheism. At the same time they are as much interested in the negative predicates of the Godhead as the most convinced Neo-platonists. On *πατήρ* see the Thalia in Athan., Orat. I. c. Arian c. 5: *οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς μόνος ἦν καὶ οὔπω πατὴρ ἦν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐπιγέγονε πατήρ.*

[1] Thalia l. c.: *δύο σοφίας εἶναι. μίαν μὲν τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ταύτης μετέχοντα ὠνομάσθαι μόνον σοφίαν καὶ λόγον· ἡ σοφία γὰρ τῇ σοφίᾳ ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ Θεοῦ θελήσει. Οὕτω καὶ λόγον ἕτερον εἶναι λέγει παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τούτον μετέχοντα τὸν υἱὸν ὠνομάσθαι πάλιν κατὰ χάριν λόγον καὶ υἱόν... Πολλαὶ δυνάμεις εἰσί, καὶ ἡ μὲν μία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν ἰδία φύσει καὶ ἀΐδιος, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὴ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μία τῶν λεγομένων δυνάμεων ἐστι καὶ αὐτός, ὧν μία καὶ ἡ ἀκρὶς καὶ ἡ κάμπη κ.τ.λ.*

[2] See the foregoing note and Thalia l. c.: *οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ υἱός, πάντων γὰρ γενομένων ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων καὶ πάντων ὄντων κτισμάτων καὶ ποιημάτων γενομένων, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γέγονε, καὶ ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ κτίζεσθαι ἔσχε καὶ αὐτὸς... Ἦν μόνος ὁ Θεὸς καὶ οὔπω ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ σοφία, εἶτα θέλησις ἡμᾶς δημιουργῆσαι, τότε δὴ πεποίηκεν*

(*d*) As regards his Substance, the "Son" is consequently an unrelated and independent being totally separated from, and different from, the substance or nature of the Father. He has neither one and the same substance together with the Father, nor a nature and constitution similar to that of the Father. If he had, then there would be two Gods. On the contrary, like all rational creatures he has a free will and is capable of change. He might consequently have been good or bad; but he made up his mind to follow the good, and continued in the good without vacillation. Thus he has by means of his own will come to be unchangeable.[1]

ἕνα τινὰ καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ σοφίαν καὶ υἱόν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργήσῃ. Ep. Arii ad Euseb.: *Πρὶν γεννηθῇ ἤτοι κτισθῇ ἤτοι ὁρισθῇ ἢ θεμελιωθῇ, οὐκ ἦν, ἀγένητος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν.* Since the Son is neither a part of the Father nor *ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινός*, he must be *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*; *θελήματι καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων ὁ υἱός.* Ep. Arii ad Alex: ... *γεννήσαντα υἱὸν μονογενῆ πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων, δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὰ ὅλα πεποίηκε ... κτίσμα τοῦ Θεοῦ τέλειον ... θελήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων κτίσθέντα, καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰληφότα καὶ τὰς δόξας συννποστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρός. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ δοὺς αὐτῳ πάντων τὴν κληρονομίαν ἐστέρησεν ἑαυτὸν ὧν ἀγεννήτως ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πηγὴ γὰρ ἐστι πάντων, ὥστε τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις ... Ὁ υἱὸς ἀχρόνως γεννηθεὶς οὐκ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ἀΐδιος ἢ συναΐδιος ἢ συναγένητος τῷ πατρὶ οὐδὲ ἅμα τῷ πατρὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ... Ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, ἀρχεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὡς Θεὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὤν.* Ep. Euseb. ad Paulin.: *κτιστὸν εἶναι καὶ θεμελιωτὸν καὶ γενητὸν τῇ οὐσίᾳ*, according to Proverbs 8: ... *Οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, πάντα δὲ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ γενόμενα.* Ep. Euseb. Nic. ad Arium.: *τὸ πεποιημένον οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γενέσθαι, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι.* Athan. Nazarb., ep. ad. Alex.: "Why do you blame the Arians because they say that the Son *κτίσμα πεποίηται ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων καὶ ἓν τῶν πάντων ἐστίν*? We are to understand by the hundred sheep of the parable all created beings, and thus the Son too is included." Georg. Laod. ep. ad. Aiex.: "Don't blame the Arians because they say *ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Isaiah too came later than his father." Georg. Laod. ep. ad. Arianos. "Don't be afraid to allow that the Son is *from* the Father; for the Apostle says that all things are *from* God, although it is certain that all things are *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*." Thalia (de synod. 15): *ἡ μόνας ἦν, ἡ δυὰς δὲ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν ὑπάρξει.* Arius for the rest seems to have considered the creation of this "Son" as simply a necessity, because God *could* not create directly, but *required* an intermediate power.

[1] Ep. Euseb. ad Paulin.: *Ἐν τὸ ἀγένητον, ἓν δὲ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ γεγονός, καθόλου τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀγενήτου μὴ μετέχον, ἀλλὰ γεγονὸς ὁλοχερῶς ἕτερον τῇ φύσει κ. τῇ δυνάμει.* The *ταυτότης τῆς φύσεως* is rejected. Ep. Arii ad Alex.: *υἱὸν ὑποστήσαντα ἰδίῳ θελήματι ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον.* Who says, therefore, that the Son is in everything like the Father introduces two "*ἀγέννητοι*." Thalia: *τῇ μὲν φύσει ὥσπερ πάντες οὕτω δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τρεπτός, τῷ δὲ ἰδίῳ αὐτεξουσίῳ, ἕως βούλεται, μένει καλός· ὅτε μέν τοι θέλει*

(*e*) Since the Son is, as regards his substance, unrelated to the Godhead,[1] he is not truly God, and accordingly has not by nature the divine attributes; he is only the so-called Logos and Wisdom. As he is not eternal, neither is his knowledge in any sense perfect; he has no absolute knowledge of God, but only a relative knowledge, in fact he does not even know his own substance perfectly, accordingly he cannot claim equal honour with the Father.[2]

(*f*) Still the Son is not a creature and a product like other creatures; he is the perfect creature, *κτίσμα τέλειον*; by him everything has been created; he stands in a special relation to God, but this is solely conditioned by grace and adoption; the bestowal of grace on the other hand, is based on the steadfast inclination of this free being to the good which was fore-

δύναται τρέπεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, τρεπτῆς ὢν Φύσεως ... As all things so far as their substance is concerned are unrelated to God and unlike Him, so too is the Logos *ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀνόμοιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ἰδιότητος. Μεμερισμέναι τῇ φύσει καὶ ἀπεξενωμέναι καὶ ἀπεσχοινισμέναι καὶ ἀλλότριοι καὶ ἀμέτοχοί εἰσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ οὐσίαι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*; they are even *ἀνόμοιοι πάμπαν ἀλλήλων ταῖς τε οὐσίαις καὶ δόξαις ἐπ' ἄπειρον. τὸν γοῦν λόγον φησὶν εἰς ὁμοιότητα δόξης καὶ οὐσίας ἀλλότριον εἶναι πολυτελῶς ἑκατέρων τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. ὁ υἱὸς διῃρημένος ἐστὶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμέτοχος κατὰ πάντα τοῦ πατρός.* Thalia (de Synod. 15): *Ἄρρητος Θεὸς ἴσον οὐδὲ ὅμοιον οὐχ ὁμόδοξον ἔχει. ὁ υἱὸς ἴδιον οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ Θεοῦ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστιν ἴσος ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁμοούσιος αὐτῷ.* The Triad is not of *ὁμοίαις δόξαις*: *ἀνεπίμικτα ἑαυταῖς εἰσιν αἱ ὑποστάσεις αὐτῶν, μία τῆς μιᾶς ἐνδοξότερα δόξαις ἐπ' ἄπειρον. Ξένος τοῦ υἱοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι ἄναρχος ὑπάρχει.* According to the letter of Eusebius to Paulinus it looks as if Eusebius held the unchangeableness of the Son to belong to his substance; he probably, however, only means that it had come to be his substance. At a later date many Arians must have attributed to the Son an original unchangeableness as a *gift* of the Father, for Philostorgius mentions as a peculiarity of the Arian bishop Theodosius that he taught (VIII. 3): *ὁ Χριστὸς τρεπτὸς μὲν τῇ γε Φύσει τῇ οἰκείᾳ.*

[1] Because of this sundering of the Father and the Son the Arians at a later date are also called "Diatomites" (Joh. Damasc. in Cotelier, Eccl. Gr. monum. I., p. 298).

[2] Thalia (Orat. c. Arian I. 6): *οὐδὲ Θεὸς ἀληθινός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος.* He is only called God, but he is not truly God, *καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ὁ πατὴρ ἀόρατος ὑπάρχει καὶ οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε γιγνώσκειν τελείως καὶ ἀκριβῶς δύναται ὁ λόγος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃ γιγνώσκει καὶ ὃ βλέπει ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἰδίοις μέτροις οἶδε καὶ βλέπει, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς γιγνώσκομεν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν. Ὁ υἱὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδε.* Euseb. Cæs. ep. ad Euphrat.: *Χριστὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὸς Θεός.* The conviction that the Son is not truly God, and that all lofty predicates attach to him only in a nuncupative sense, that he does not know the Father, is very strongly expressed in the fragment of the Thalia de synod. 15.

seen by God. Through God's bestowal of grace and by his own steady progress he has become God, so that we may now call him "only-begotten God", "strong God" and so on.[1]

(*g*) All that Scripture and tradition assert in reference to the incarnation and the humanity of this being holds good; he truly took a human body (*σῶμα ἄψυχον*); the feelings shewn by the historical Christ teach us that the Logos to whom they attach—for Christ had not a human soul—is a being capable of suffering, not an absolutely perfect being, but one who attains by effort absolute perfection.[2]

(*h*) Amongst the number of created powers (*δυνάμεις*) the Holy Ghost is to be placed beside the Son as a second, independent Substance or Hypostasis, (*οὐσία, ὑπόστασις*); for the Christian believes in three separate and different substances or persons, (*οὐσίαι, ὑποστάσεις*); Father, Son and Spirit. Arius apparently, like his followers, considered the Spirit as a being created by the Son and subordinate to him.[3]

[1] Arii Ep. ad Euseb.: *πλήρης Θεὸς μονογενῆς, ἀναλλοίωτος* (in virtue of his will). Arii ep. ad Alex.: *υἱὸν μονογενῆ ... κτίσμα τοῦ Θεοῦ τέλειον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἓν τῶν κτισμάτων, γέννημα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἓν τῶν γεννημάτων ... Πατὴρ δοὺς αὐτῷ πάντων τὴν κληρονομίαν ... Ὁ υἱὸς μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπέστη.* Thalia: *τὸν υἱὸν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ταύτης μετέχοντα ὠνομάσθαι μόνον σοφίαν καὶ λόγον ... Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ προγιγνώσκων ὁ Θεὸς ἔσεσθαι καλὸν αὐτόν, προλαβὼν αὐτῷ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν δέδωκεν, ἣν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔσχε μετὰ ταῦτα· ὥστε ἐξ ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὧν προέγνω ὁ Θεός, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν νῦν γεγονέναι πεποίηκε ... Μετοχῇ χάριτος ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς λέγεται ὀνόματι μόνον Θεός ... Θεὸς ἐνεγκεν εἰς υἱὸν ἑαυτῷ τόνδε τεκνοποιήσας· ἴδιον οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ Θεοῦ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος ...* The Son is Wisdom, Image, Reflection, Word; God cannot produce a greater than He; *Θεοῦ θελήσει ὁ υἱὸς ἡλίκος καὶ ὅσος ἐστίν, ἐξ ὅτε καὶ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπέστη, ἰσχυρὸς Θεὸς ὤν,* but he extols the greater Father. Arius ap. Athan. Orat. I. c. Arian. 9: *μετοχῇ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεοποιήθη.* It is evident from Alexander's letter to Alexander that Arius strongly emphasised the *προκοπή*, the moral progress of the Son.

[2] Owing to the general uncertainty regarding the extent of the "humanity" which prevailed at the beginning of the controversy, the latter assertion of the Arians was not so energetically combatted as the rest. That the limitation of the humanity of Christ to a body originated with Lucian, is asserted by Epiph. Ancorat. 33.

[3] In the writings of Arius *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* are used as synonymous terms. The impersonal Spirit (Logos, Wisdom) indwelling in God the Father as *Power*, was naturally considered by the Arians to be higher than the Son. On this point they appeal like the old Roman Adoptianists to Matt. XII. 31 (see Vol. III., p. 20 ff.). It is indeed not even certain whether Arius and the older Arians when they speak of a Trinity, always included the Holy Spirit. According to Athanasius de synod.

Alexander expressly notes that the Arians appeal to Scripture in support of their doctrine, and Athanasius says that the Thalia contained passages of Scripture.[1] The passages so frequently cited later on by the Arians; Deut. VI. 4, XXXII. 39; Prov. VIII. 22; Ps. XLV. 8; Mt. XII. 28; Mk. XIII. 32; Mt. XXVI. 41, XXVIII. 18; Lk. II. 52, XVIII. 19; John XI. 34, XIV. 28, XVII. 3; Acts II. 36; 1 Cor. I. 24, XV. 28; Col. I. 15; Philipp. II. 6 f.; Hebr. I. 4, III. 2; John XII. 27, XIII. 21; Mt. XXVI, 39, XXVII. 46, etc., will thus already have been used by Arius himself. Arius was not a systematiser, nor were his friends systematisers either. In this respect their literary activity was limited to letters in which they stirred each other up, and which were soon put together in a collected form. The only one amongst them before Eunomius and Aëtius who undertook to give a systematic defence of the doctrinal system, was the Sophist Asterius, called by Athanasius the advocate (*συνήγορος*) of the sects. He was a clever, clear-headed man, but he was quite unable to wipe out what was in everybody's eyes the blot on his character, his denial of the Faith during the time of persecution.[2] There were various shades of

15, we may conclude that their Trinity consisted of the following hypostases: (1) God as primordial without the Son; (2) God as Father; (3) the Son. Still this is not certain.

[1] Orat. I. c. Arian. 8.

[2] On Asterius see Athan., Orat. c. Arian. I. 30—33; II. 37; III. 2, 60; de decret. syn. Nic. 8, 28—31; de synod. 18, 19, 47. Epiphan. H. 76, 3; Socrat. I. 36; Philostorg. II. 14, 15; Hieron. de vir. inl. 94. Marcellus of Ancyra wrote against the principal work of Asterius, see Zahn, p. 41 ff. Athanasius attacked a *συντάγμάτιον* of his. One of the main theses of this book was that there are two *ἀγένητα*. Asterius also discussed 1 Cor. I. 24, and indeed he took the correct view. His explanation too of the passage John XIV. 10, is worthy of note: *εὔδηλον ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο εἴρηκεν ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲ πάλιν τὸν πατέρα, ἵνα μήτε τὸν λόγον, ὃν διεξήρχετο, ἑαυτοῦ φησιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πατρὸς δεδωκότος τὴν δύναμιν.* Upon this passage Athanasius remarks (Orat. III. 2) that only a child could be pardoned such an explanation. It is a point of great importance that Asterius, like Paul of Samosata, reckoned the will as the highest thing. Accordingly, to create of His free will is more worthy of God too than to beget (l. c. III. 60). Athanasius says that Arius himself made use of the work of Asterius, and in this connection he gives us the important statement of Asterius (de decret. 8) that created things are not able *τῆς ἀκράτου χειρὸς τοῦ ἀγεννήτου ἐργασίαν βαστάξαι*, and that on account of this the creation of the Son as an intermediary was necessary. (See Orat. c. Arian II. 24.)

opinion amongst the followers and supporters of Arius. In Arianism in its more rigid form the tradition of Paul of Samosata and Lucian predominated, in its milder form the subordination doctrine of Origen. Both types were indeed at one as regards the form of doctrine, and the elements traceable to Origen won over all enlightened "Conservatives". We may count Asterius too amongst the latter, at all events the unbending Philostorgius was not at all pleased with him, and Asterius subsequently approached near to the Semiarians.

Previous to the Council of Nicæa, the letters of the bishop Alexander are, for us at all events, the sole literary manifestos of the opposite party. The Encyklica already shews that the writer is fully conscious he has got to do with a heresy of the very worst type. The earlier heresies all pale before it; no other heretic has approached so near to being Antichrist. Arius and his friends are the enemies of God, murderers of the divinity of Christ, people like Judas. Alexander did not enter into theoretical and theological explanations. After giving a brief but complete and excellent account of the Logos doctrine of Arius, he sets in contrast with the statements contained in it, numerous passages from the Gospel of John and other quotations from Scripture.[1] The sole remarks of a positive kind he makes are that it belongs to the substance or essence of the Logos, that he perfectly knows the Father, and that the supposition of a time in which the Logos was not, makes the Father ἄλογος καὶ ἄσοφος. The latter remark, which for that matter of it does not touch Arius, shews that Alexander included the Logos or Son *in the substance of the Father as a necessary element.* The second epistle goes much more into details,[2] but it shews at the same time how little Alexander, in solving the

[1] John I. 1, 13, 18, X. 15, 30, XIV. 9, 10; Hebr. I. 3, II. 10, XIII. 8; Ps. XLV. 2; CX. 3; Mal. III. 6. The passages continued to be regarded by the orthodox as the most important.

[2] Theodoret I. 4. Exaggerations and calumnies of the worst kind are not wanting in this writing. The reproach, too, that the Arians acted like the Jews is already found here. Of more importance, however, is the assertion that the Arian christology gave countenance to the heathen ideas of Christ and that the Arians had also in view the approval of the heathen. Ebion, Artemas (see Athanas., de synod. 20) and Paul are designated their Fathers.

problem, was able definitely to oppose fixed and finished formulæ to those of the Arians. The main positions of Arius are once more pertinently characterised and refuted.

Alexander is conscious that he is contending for nothing less than the divinity of Christ, the universal Faith of the Church, when he refutes the statements that the Son is not eternal, that He was created out of the non-existent, that He is not by nature (*φύσει*) God, that He is capable of change, that He went through a moral development (*προκοπή*), that He is only Son by adoption, like the sons of God in general, and so on. [1] He not only adduces proofs from the Bible in large numbers, [2] he has unmistakably in his mind what is for him a central, religious thought. Christ must *belong to God and not to the world*, because all other creatures require such a being in order to attain to God and become the adopted sons of God. In order to make clear the possibility of such a being, Alexander uses by preference for the Son the expression which had been already preferred by Origen—"the perfect image," "the perfect reflection." But even this expression does not suffice him; it gains deeper meaning by the thought that the Son as the image of the Father at the same time first clearly expresses the peculiar character of the Father. In the Wisdom, the Logos, the Power, the "Son is made known and the Father is characterised. To say that the reflection of the divine glory does not exist is to do away also with the archetypal light of which it is the reflection; if there exists no impress or pattern of the substance of God, then he too is done away with who is wholly characterised by this pattern or express image:"—*γνωρίζεται ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ χαρακτηρίζεται. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπαυγάσμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λέγειν συναναιρεῖ καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον φῶς, οὗ ἐστιν ἀπαύγασμα... τῷ μὴ εἶναι τὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ*

[1] The two last theses are rejected in a specially emphatic manner. Alexander repeatedly complains in this connection of the procedure of Arius in taking from the Holy Scriptures only such passages as have reference to the humiliation of the Logos for our sakes, and then referring them to the substance of the Logos. "They omit the passages which treat of the divinity of the Son. Thus they arrive at the impious supposition that Paul and Peter would have been like Christ if they had always persisted in the good."

[2] John I. 1—3, I. 18, X. 30, XIV. 8, 9, 28; Matt. III. 17, XI. 27; 1 John V. 1; Coloss. I. 15, 16; Rom. VIII. 32; Heb. I. 2 f.; Prov. VIII. 30; Ps. II. 7, CX. 3 XXXV. 10; Is. LIII. 8.

Θεοῦ χαρακτῆρα συναναιρεῖται κἀκεῖνος, ὁ πάντως παρ' αὐτοῦ χαρακτηριζόμενος. While in laying down this thesis and others of a similar kind, *e.g.*, that the Son is the inner reason and power of the Father Himself, he approaches "Sabellianism," the latter doctrine is repudiated in the most decided and emphatic way. But on the other hand again, not only is the supposition of two unbegottens (ἀγεν[ν]ητα) rejected as a calumny, but he repeatedly emphasises in a striking fashion the fact that the begetting of the Son is not excluded by the application to Him of the predicate always (ἀεὶ), that the Father alone is unbegotten, *and that He is greater than the Son.*[1] Alexander thus asserts both things—namely, the inseparable unity of the substance of the Son with that of the Father[2] and their difference, and yet the one is held to be unbegotten and the other to be not unbegotten. In order to be able to maintain these contradictory theses he takes up the standpoint of Irenæus, that the mystery of the existence and coming forth of the Son is an inexpressible one even for Evangelists and angels, and is no proper object of human reflection and human statement. Even John did not venture to make any pronouncement regarding the ἀνεκδιήγητος ὑπόστασις τοῦ μονογενοῦς Θεοῦ,[3]—the ineffable substance of the only begotten God. "How could anyone waste his labour on the substance of the Logos of God, unless indeed he were afflicted with melancholy?" Πῶς ἄν περιεργάσαιτό τις τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου ὑπόστασιν, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ μελαγχολικῇ διαθέσει λῃφθεὶς τυγχάνοι.[4]

[1] From this it is plainly evident that the real point in dispute was not as to subordination and coördination, but as to unity of substance and difference of substance. That the archetype is greater than the type is for Alexander a truth that is beyond doubt. He goes still farther and says: οὐκοῦν τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ πατρὶ οἰκεῖον ἀξίωμα φυλακτέον, μηδένα τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ τὸν αἴτιον λέγοντας, τῷ δὲ υἱῷ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν τιμὴν ἀπονεμητέον, τὴν ἄναρχον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννησιν ἀνατιθέντας.

[2] The expression "ὁμοούσιος" does not occur in Alexander.

[3] On this expression, which was used by Arius, see Hort, Two Dissertations, 1876.

[4] The respective passages in the letter have so many points of contact with expressions of Irenæus (see Vol. II., pp. 230 f., 276 f.) as to make the supposition, which also commends itself for other reasons, very probable (see above, p. 14, note 1), that Alexander had read Irenæus and had been strongly influenced by him. That Irenæus was known in Alexandria, at least at the beginning of the third century, follows from Euseb., H. E. VI. 14. (Strange to say it has undoubtedly not been proved that Athanasius ever quotes from Irenæus.) Alexander shews that he is not throughout dependent on Origen.

Alexander's actual standpoint is undoubtedly plainly expressed here. He does not wish to speculate; for the complete divinity of Christ is for him not a speculation at all, but a judgment of faith, and the distinction between Father and Son is for him something beyond doubt. But he sees that he is under the necessity of opposing certain formulæ to the doctrine of Arius. These are partly vague and partly contradictory:[1] "The Son is the inner reason and power of God," "Father and Son are two inseparable things" (*δύο ἀχώριστα πράγματα*), "Between Father and Son there is not the slightest difference" (*διάστημα*), "not even in any thought" (*οὐδ' ἄχρι τινὸς ἐννοίας*), "There is only one unbegotten," "The Son has come into being in consequence of a *γένεσις καὶ ποίησις*" (an act of generation and production), "The Son has, compared with the world, an ineffable substance peculiarly his own" (*ἰδιότροπος ἀνεκδιήγητος ὑπόστασις*), "He is *μονογενὴς Θεὸς*" (only begotten God), "His Sonship is by its nature in possession of the deity of the Father" (*κατὰ φύσιν τυγχάνουσα τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος*),[2] "Father and Son are two natures in the hypostasis" (*τῇ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις*[3]), between the Underived and he who has come into being out of the non-existent there is a *μεσιτεύουσα φύσις μονογενής* (the Son) *δι' ἧς τὰ ὅλα ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος πατρὸς γεγέννηται,*" (a mediating only begotten nature by which the Father of the God-Logos has made all things out of the non-existent, and which has been begotten out of the existent Father), "The Son has not proceeded out of the Father *κατὰ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ὁμοιότητας, ταῖς τομαῖς ἢ ταῖς ἐκδιαιρέσεων ἀπορροίαις* (in the manner in which bodies are formed, by separation or by the emanation of parts divided off);"

[1] Alexander made no distinction between *οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, φύσις.*

[2] "Ον *τρόπον γὰρ ἡ ἄρρητος αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασις ἀσυγκρίτῳ ὑπεροχῇ ἐδείχθη ὑπερκειμένη πάντων οἷς αὐτὸς τὸ εἶναι ἐχαρίσατο, οὕτως καὶ ἡ υἱότης αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τυγχάνουσα τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος ἀλέκτῳ ὑπεροχῇ διαφέρει τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ θέσει υἱοτεθέντων.*

[3] On John X. 30: *ὅπερ φησὶν ὁ κύριος οὐ πατέρα ἑαυτὸν ἀναγορεύων οὐδὲ τὰς τῇ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις μίαν εἶναι σαφηνίζων, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὴν πατρικὴν ἐμφέρειαν ἀκριβῶς πέφυκεν σώζειν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρός, τὴν κατὰ πάντα ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ ἐκ φύσεως ἀπομαξάμενος καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς τυγχάνων καὶ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου ἔκτυπος χαρακτήρ.*

still we may speak of a fatherly generation! (πατρικὴ θεογονία) which certainly is beyond the power of human reason to grasp." "The expressions ἦν, ἀεὶ, etc., (was, always), used of the Son, are undoubtedly too weak, but on the other hand, they are not to be conceived so as to suggest that the Son is unbegotten (ἀγέννητος); the unbeginning genesis from the Father (ἄναρχος γέννησις παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς) is his,—"the Father is greater than the Son, to Him honour in the strict sense (οἰκεῖον ἀξίωμα) is due, to the Son the dignity that is fitting (τιμὴ ἁρμόζουσα)." [1]

These confused thoughts and formulæ contrast unfavourably with the clear and definitely expressed statements of Arius. Alexander's opponents had a better right to complain of the chameleon-like form of this teaching than he had of that of theirs. When they maintained that it offered no security against dualism (two unbegotten, [ἀγέννητα]), [2] or against Gnostic emanationism (προβολή, ἀπόρροια), or against Sabellianism (ὑιοπάτωρ), or against the idea of the corporeality of God, and that it contained flagrant contradictions, [3] they were not far wrong. But they cannot have been in the dark as to what their opponents meant to assert, which was nothing else than the inseparable, essential unity of Father and Son, the complete divinity of Christ who has redeemed us and whom every creature must necessarily have as redeemer. Along with this they taught a real distinction between Father and Son, though they could assert this distinction only as a mystery, and when they were driven to describe it, had recourse to formulæ which were easily refuted.

[1] In the Confession of Faith which Alexander had put at the close of his letter, the Spirit, the Church, and so on, are mentioned. According to Alexander, too, the Logos got only a body from Mary, who, for the rest, is called θεοτόκος (see Athan. Orat. III. 29, 33). Möhler and Newman (Hist. Treatises, p. 297) consider Athanasius as the real author of Alexander's encyclical epistle. Their arguments, however, are not convincing.

[2] Hence the reproach so frequently brought against this doctrine, that according to it Father and Son are "brothers"; see, *e.g.*, Orat. c. Arian I. 14. Paul of Samosata had already brought this reproach against *all* the adherents of the Logos doctrine. The Arians sought to make a *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that the Son is the *perfect* image of the Father, by pointing out that in this case the Son too must beget as well as the Father (Or. c. Arian. I. 21).

[3] See some of those adduced by them in Orat. c. Arian. I. 22: they are said to have pointed them out to children and women.

We may at this point give an account of the doctrine of Athanasius; for although it was not till after the Nicene Council that he took part in the controversy as an author,[1] still his point of view coincides essentially with that of Bishop Alexander. It underwent no development, and considered from the standpoint of technical theology it partly labours under the same difficulties as that of Alexander. Its significance does not lie in the nature of his scientific defence of the faith, but solely in the triumphant tenacity of the faith itself. His character and his life are accordingly the main thing. The works he composed, like all the theological formulæ he uses, were wrung out of him. The entire Faith, everything in defence of which Athanasius staked his life, is described in the one sentence: *God Himself has entered into humanity.*[2]

The theology and christology of Athanasius are rooted in the thought of Redemption, and his views were not influenced by any subordinate considerations.[3] Neither heathenism nor Judaism has brought men into fellowship with God, the point on which everything turns. It is through Christ that we are transported into this fellowship; He has come in order to make

[1] That he took an active interest in the Nicene Council is undoubted; see Theodoret I. 26, Sozom, I. 17 fin., but, above all, Apol. Athan. c. Arian. 6 and the work "de decretis." The Arians drew special attention to the influence exercised by Athanasius, when deacon, on his bishop Alexander, and Athanasius did not contradict their statements; see also Gregor Naz. Orat. 21, 14.

[2] His chief works against the Arians are the four Orationes c. Arian—his most comprehensive work, containing mainly his refutation of the Arian Bible exegesis; the fourth Oration is, however, either merely a sketch, or else it is not in its proper place along with the others; further, the treatises de decret. Nic. synodi, de sentent. Dionys. Alex., historia Arian. ad monachos, apologia c. Arian., apologia ad imp. Constantium, de synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ habitis, the Tomus ad Antioch., and in addition the festival-orations and some lengthy letters, *e.g.*, that ad Afros episcopos.

[3] To prove this it would be necessary to quote hundreds of passages. In none of his larger works has Athanasius omitted to base his anti-Arian christology on the thought of redemption, and wherever he gives this as the basis one feels that he is adducing what is his most telling argument. The manner too in which he was able, starting from this as the central point of his whole view of the subject, to justify what were purely derivative formulæ by referring them back to it, is well worthy of notice; cf. the Orat. c. Arian., espec. II. 67—70. The fact that his knowledge of scientific theology was slender is hinted at by Gregor Naz., Orat. 21. 6.

us divine, *i.e.*, to make us by adoption the sons of God and gods. But Christ would not have been able to bring us this blessing if He Himself had possessed it merely as a gift *secundum participationem*, for in this case He only had just as much as He needed Himself and so could not proceed to give away what was not His own. [1] Therefore Christ must be of the substance of the Godhead and be one with it. Whoever denies that is not a Christian, but is either a heathen or a Jew. [2] This is the fundamental thought which Athanasius constantly repeats. Everything else is secondary, is of the nature of necessary controversy. In the Son we have the Father; whoever knows the Son knows the Father. [3] This confession is at bottom the entire Christian confession. The adoration of Christ, which according to tradition, has been practised from the first, and which has not been objected to by their opponents, already, he says, decides the whole question. God alone is to be adored; it is heathenish to worship creatures. [4] Christ therefore shares in the divine

[1] Specially striking is what he says de synod. 51: Christ could not make others gods if He himself had, to begin with, been made God; if He possessed His godhead merely as something bestowed upon Him, He could not bestow it, for it would not be in His own power, and He would not have more than He needed Himself. Similarly Orat. I. 39, I. 30: *Οὐκ ἄρα καταβὰς ἐβελτιώθη ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐβελτίωσεν αὐτὸς τὰ δεόμενα βελτιώσεως· καὶ εἰ τοῦ βελτιῶσαι χάριν καταβέβηκεν, οὐκ ἄρα μισθὸν ἔσχε τὸ λέγεσθαι, υἱὸς καὶ Θεός, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς υἱοποίησεν ἡμᾶς τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐθεοποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γενόμενος αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος. Οὐκ ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ὢν ὕστερον γέγονε Θεός, ἀλλὰ Θεὸς ὢν ὕστερον γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς θεοποιήσῃ.* II. 69, I. 16: *αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ μετέχοντες τοῦ Θεοῦ μετέχειν λεγόμεθα, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ ἔλεγεν ὁ Πέτρος ἵνα γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως.*

[2] The frequent designation of the Arians as Jews and heathen, and together with this the designation "Ariomanites," were employed by Athanasius in a really serious sense; see de decret. 1—4, 27; Encycl. ad. ep. Ægypt. et Lib. 13, 14; Orat. I. 38, II. 16, 17, III, 16, 27 sq. "Abomination of the impious" XI. Festbrief, p. 122 (Larsow).

[3] Orat. I. 12: To the demand of Philip, "Shew us the Father," Christ did not reply: *βλέπε τὴν κτίσιν*, but "He who sees me, sees the Father." Orat. I. 16: *τοῦ υἱοῦ μετέχοντες τοῦ Θεοῦ μετέχειν λεγόμεθα... ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἔννοια καὶ κατάληψις γνῶσίς ἐστι περὶ τοῦ πατρός, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἰδίον εἶναι γέννημα.* I. 21.

[4] This is a point which is very frequently emphasised; see Orat. I. 10, II. 20, 24, but chiefly III. 16: *Διατί οὖν οἱ Ἀρειανοὶ τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦντες οὐ συναριθμοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων; καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι, ὥσπερ καὶ οὗτοι, τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν φεύγουσι, διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ἀπάτην, τὴν δὲ ὁμοίαν ἐκείνοις διάνοιαν ὑποκρίνονται. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ σοφὸν αὐτῶν, ὅπερ εἰώθασιν λέγειν, οὐ λέγομεν δύο ἀγέννητα,*

substance. Athanasius did not draft any system of theology or christology. The real point at issue appeared to him to be quite simple and certain. We have to put together his doctrinal system for ourselves, and the attempts to construct such a system for him is not something to be entered upon lightly. A body of theoretical propositions resulted solely from the polemic in which he was engaged and also from his defence of the "Ὁμοούσιος." Throughout, however, his thought in the final resort centres not in the Logos as such, [1] but in the Divine, which had appeared in Jesus Christ. He has no longer any independent Logos doctrine, on the contrary he is a Christologist. We accordingly give merely some of the main lines of his teaching.

1. To acknowledge that the substantial or essential element in Christ is "God," is to assert that there is nothing of the creature in this, that it does not therefore belong in any sense to what has been created. Athanasius insisted as confidently as Arius on the gulf which exists between created and uncreated. This constitutes the advance made by both in clearness. [2] Arius, however, drew the dividing line in such a way that with him

φαίνονται πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκεραίων λέγοντες· φάσκοντες γάρ· "οὐ λέγομεν δύο ἀγέννητα," λέγουσι δύο Θεοὺς καὶ τούτους διαφόρους ἔχοντας τὰς φύσεις, τὸ μὲν γενητήν, τὸ δὲ ἀγένητοι. Εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν "Ελληνες ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἑνὶ γενητῷ, οὐδ' οὕτω διαφέρουσιν Ἑλλήνων. This was the view of it which was still held at a later period also. The expression in the Vita Euthymii (Cotel. Monum. II., p. 201) c. 2, is full of meaning: *Τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ λήξαντος ὁ τοῦ Ἀρειανισμοῦ πόλεμος ἰσχυρῶς ἐκράτει.*

[1] It is very characteristic of Athanasius' way of looking at things that with him the Logos in general retires into the background, and further that he expressly declines to recognise or to define the divine in Christ from the point of view of his relation to the world or in terms of the predicate of the eternal. Image, Reflection and Son are the designations which he regards as most appropriate. See, *e.g.*, Orat. III. 28: *οὐ τοσοῦτον ἐκ τοῦ ἀϊδίου γνωρίζεται κύριος, ὅσον ὅτι υἱός ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ· υἱὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀχώριστός ἐστι τοῦ πατρός.,. καὶ εἰκὼν καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ὢν τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ πατρός.*

[2] Beyond Origen and the Origenists, who, though they too certainly make a sharp distinction between the Godhead and the creation, attribute with Philo an intermediate position to the Logos. The Eusebians held fast to this, and that is why Athanasius always treats them as Arians; for in connection with this main point the maxim in his opinion held good "Whosover is not with us is against us." See Orat. IV. 6, 7; Encycl. ad ep. Ægypt, et Lib. 20; de decret. 6, 19, 20; ad Afros 5, 6, and the parallel section in the work "de synodis."

the Son belongs to the world side, while with Athanasius He, as belonging to God, stands over against the world.

2. Since the Divine, which has appeared in Christ, is not anything created, and since there can be no "middle" substance,[1] it follows, according to the reasoning of Athanasius, that this Divine cannot in any sense be postulated as resulting from the idea of the creation of the world. God did not require any agent for the creation of the world; He creates direct. If He had required any such intervening agent in order to effect a connection with the creature that was to come into existence, this Divine could not have supplied Him with it, for it itself really belongs to His substance. *In this way the idea of the Divine, which in Christ redeemed men, is severed from the world idea;*[2] *the old Logos doctrine is discarded; Nature and Revelation no longer continue to be regarded as identical.* The Logos-Son-Christ is at bottom no longer a world principle, but, on the contrary, a salvation principle.[3]

[1] Orat. I. 15: If the Son is Son then that wherein He shares is not outside of the substance of the Father: *τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν ἐὰν ἕτερον ᾖ παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ ἴσον ἄτοπον ἀπαντήσει, μέσου πάλιν εὑρισκομένου τούτου ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἥτις ποτέ ἐστι.* In putting it thus Athanasius corrected not only an incautious expression of Bishop Alexander (see above p. 24 f.), but very specially the thesis of the Origenists of "The image and reflection which sprang from and was created out of the will" (see *e.g.*, Euseb. Demonstr. IV. 3). But Arius himself, spite of all his efforts to avoid it, also arrived at the idea of a "middle substance" between the Godhead and the creature, because according to him God had necessarily to make use of such a being in order to be able to create at all.

[2] In contrast to this it holds good of the Arians that *τὸν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων τοῖς ποιήμασι συναριθμήσωσι* (Orat. I. c. Arian. T. I., p. 342).

[3] It is this which constitutes the most significant advance made by Athanasius, the real fruit of his speculation which took its start from the thought of redemption. *The Logos of the philosophers was no longer the Logos whom he knew and adored.* The existence of the Logos who appeared in Christ is independent of the idea of the world. The creation of the world—abstractly speaking—might even have taken place without the Logos. This is the point in which he is most strongly opposed to the Apologists and Origen. No traces of this advance are to be found as yet in the works "c. Gent" and "de incarnat." See, on the other hand, Orat. II. 24, 25: *οὐ κάμνει ὁ Θεὸς προστάττων, οὐδὲ ἀσθενεῖ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐργασίαν, ἵνα τὸν μὲν υἱὸν μόνος μόνον κτίσῃ, εἰς δὲ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργίαν ὑπουργοῦ καὶ βοηθοῦ χρείαν ἔχῃ τοῦ υἱοῦ. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὑπέρθεσιν ἔχει, ὅπερ ἂν ἐθελήσῃ γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἠθέλησε καὶ ὑπέστη τὰ πάντα, καὶ τῷ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ οὐδεὶς ἀνθέστηκε. Τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα οὐ γέγονε τὰ πάντα παρὰ μόνου τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ προστάγματι, ᾧ γέγονε καὶ ὁ υἱός... ἀλογία μέν οὖν πᾶσα παρ' αὐτοῖς· φασὶ δὲ ὅμως περὶ τούτου, ὡς ἄρα*

3. Scripture and tradition know of only *one* Godhead; they, however, at the same time pronounce Christ to be God: they call the Divine which has appeared in Christ, Logos, Wisdom and Son; they thus distinguish it from God, the Father. Faith has to hold fast to this. But in accordance with this we get the following propositions:

(a) The Godhead is a unity (*μονάς*). Therefore the Divine which appeared in Christ, must form part of this unity. There is only one underived or unbegotten principle; this is the Father. [1]

(b) The very name Father implies, moreover, that a second exists in the Godhead. God has always been Father, and who-

θέλων ὁ Θεὸς τὴν γενητὴν κτίσαι φύσιν, ἐπειδὴ ἐώρα μὴ δυναμένην αὐτὴν μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκράτου χειρὸς καὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας, ποιεῖ καὶ κτίζει πρώτως μόνον ἵνα καὶ καλεῖ τοῦτον υἱὸν καὶ λόγον, ἵνα τούτου μέσου γενομένου οὕτως λοιπὸν καὶ τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι δυνηθῇ· ταῦτα οὐ μόνον εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράψαι τετολμήκασιν Εὐσέβιός τε καὶ Ἀρεῖος καὶ ὁ θύσας Ἀστέριος. As against this view Athanasius shews that God is neither so powerless as not to be able to create the creatures nor so proud as not to be willing to create them (*εἰ δὲ ὡς ἀπαξιῶν ὁ Θεὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐργάσασθαι, τὸν μὲν υἱὸν μόνον εἰργάσατο, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῷ υἱῷ ἀνεχειρίσεν ὡς βοηθῷ· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάξιον Θεοῦ· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἐν θεῷ τύφος*); he shews further from Matt. X. 29, VI. 25 f. that God cares for all things in the most direct way, and therefore has also brought them into existence. The same proof is given in de decret. 8. Athanasius thus did away with the latent dualism between the godhead and the creature which had existed in Christian theology since the time of Philo. *God is creator in the directest way.* This, however, implies that the Logos is discarded. If spite of this Athanasius not only retained the name, but also recognised the function of a mediator of creation and type of all rational beings, the reason was that he understood Scripture as implying this, and because he was not able wholly to free himself from the influence of tradition. But the Divine in Christ is no longer for him the world-reason, on the contrary it is the substance of the Father which—accidentally, as it were—has also the attributes of creative power and of the reason that embraces and holds ideas together. For Athanasius, in fact, the Son is the substance of the Father *as the principle of redemption and sanctification.* The most pregnant of his formulæ is in Orat. III. 6. in support of which he appeals to 2 Cor. V. 19: *τὸ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός, ἐν ᾧ ἡ κτίσις πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν κατηλλάσσετο.*

[1] That the Godhead is a unity, is a thought which Athanasius emphasised in the strongest way over and over again (*μονὰς τῆς θεότητος*), (2) also that there are not two underived or unbegotten principles (*ἀρχαί*), and finally (3) that the Father is the *ἀρχή*, which because of this may be identified with the *μονάς* also. He retorts the charge of Polytheism brought against him by the Arians; they, he says, adore two gods (see above, note 4, p. 27). The best summary of his view is in Orat. IV. 1: *μονάδα τῆς θεότητος ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἄσχιστον· λεχθείη μία ἀρχὴ θεότητος καὶ οὐ δύο ἀρχαί ὅθεν κυρίως καὶ μοναρχία ἐστιν.*

ever calls Him Father posits at the same time the Son; for the Father is the Father of the Son, and only in a loose sense the Father of the world and of men; for these are created, but the divine Trinity is uncreated, for otherwise it might either decrease again, or further increase in the future. [1]

(c) This Son, the offspring of the Father (*γέννημα τοῦ πατρὸς*), [2] was not, however, begotten in a human fashion as if God were corporeal. On the contrary, He has been begotten as the sun begets light and the spring the brook; He is called Son, because He is the eternal, perfect reflection of the Father, the image [3] proceeding from the substance of the Father;

[1] Orat. III. 6: *πατέρα οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι, μὴ ὑπάρχοντος υἱοῦ· ὁ μὲν τοι ποιητὴν λέγων τὸν Θεὸν οὐ πάντως καὶ τὰ γενόμενα δηλοῖ· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων ποιητής· ὁ δὲ πατέρα λέγων εὐθὺς μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς σημαίνει καὶ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ὕπαρξιν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν εἰς τὸν πατέρα πιστεύει· εἰς γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας πιστεύει, καὶ οὕτως μία ἐστὶν ἡ πίστις εἰς ἕνα Θεόν.* II. 41. De decret. 30 fin.: *λέγοντες μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τὸν Θεὸν ἀγέννητον ἐκ τῶν γενομένων αὐτὸν ποιητὴν μόνον λέγουσιν, ἵνα καὶ τὸν λόγον ποίημα σημάνωσι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἡδονήν· ὁ δὲ τὸν Θεὸν πατέρα λέγων εὐθὺς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν σημαίνει.* The Son is a second in the Godhead, see Orat. III. 4: *δύο μέν εἰσιν, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ πατήρ ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς υἱός ἐστι· καὶ ὁ υἱὸς υἱός ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς πατήρ ἐστι· μία δὲ ἡ φύσις.* IV. 1: *ὥστε δύο μὲν εἶναι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, μονάδα δὲ θεότητος ἀδιαίρετον.* The idea that the Triad must be from all eternity and be independent of the world, if it is not to be increased or diminished, is developed in Orat. I. 17. There is a strong polemic against the Sabellians in Orat. IV.

[2] In the theoretical expositions of his teaching Athanasius uses the expression *γέννημα* in preference to *υἱός*, in order to exclude the idea of human generation.

[3] "Reflection", "Image", "God of God", are the expressions which always appeared to Athanasius to be the most appropriate. He preferred the first of these in order to exclude the thought that the Son proceeded from the will of the Creator. The light cannot do otherwise than lighten, and it *always* shines or lightens, otherwise it would not be light. The archetype projects its type *necessarily*. Following Origen he puts the whole emphasis on the eternal (Orat. I. 14: *ἀΐδιός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ συνυπάρχει τῷ πατρί*) and necessary. If the Son were begotten by the will of the Father, He would be something contingent, a creation, and would have a beginning: though certainly He was not, on the other hand, begotten contrary to this will, as the Arians charge their opponents with believing (Orat. III. 62, 66), nor from some necessity superior to God, nor does the blessed Godhead undergo any kind of suffering (Orat. I. 16), on the contrary He proceeded from the substance of God *οὐ παρὰ γνώμην*. Only the expression *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας* suffices, as Athanasius over and over again makes plain; any intervention of the will here degrades the Son; for "the substance is higher than the will." See the characteristic passage Orat. III. 62: *ὥσπερ ἀντίκειται τῇ βουλήσει τὸ παρὰ γνώμην, οὕτως ὑπέρκειται καὶ προηγεῖται τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. οἰκίαν μὲν οὖν τις βουλευόμενος κατασκευάζει,*

He is called Wisdom and Logos not as if the Father were imperfect without Him, [1] but as the creative power of the Father. [2] "To be begotten" simply means completely to share by nature in the entire nature of the Father, implying at the same time that the Father does not therefore suffer or undergo anything. [3]

(d) Consequently the assertions of the Arians that the Son is God, Logos, and Wisdom in a nominal sense only, that there was a time in which the Son was not, that He has sprung from the will of the Father, that He was created out of the non-existent or out of some other substance, that He is subject to change, are false. [4] On the contrary He is (1) co-eternal with the

υἱὸν δὲ γεννᾷ κατὰ φύσιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν βουλήσει κατασκευαζόμενον ἤρξατο γίνεσθαι καὶ ἔξωθέν ἐστι τοῦ ποιοῦντος· ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἴδιόν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς γέννημα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξωθεν αὐτοῦ· διὸ οὐδὲ βουλεύεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ δοκῇ βουλεύεσθαι· ὅσῳ οὖν τοῦ κτίσματος ὁ υἱὸς ὑπέρκειται, τοσούτῳ καὶ τῆς βουλήσεως τὸ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. The Father wills the Son in so far as He loves Him and wills and loves Himself (Orat. III. 66), but in so far as "willing" involves *τὴν ἐπ' ἄμφω ῥοπήν, i.e.*, includes the ability not to will, the Son is not from the will of the Father.

[1] Athanasius rarely repeats the unguarded utterances of Bishop Alexander and others belonging to the orthodox party. The Father is for him, on the contrary, in and for Himself—if one may so put it—personal; He is *νοῦς* and He is *τῆς ἰδίας ὑποστάσεως θελητής*. In one passage in his later writings (de decret. 15) he has, however, curiously enough, argued that the Father would be *ἄλογος* and *ἄσοφος*, if the Logos were not from all eternity.

[2] In order to give meaning to the expressions "Logos", "Wisdom", Athanasius could not avoid describing the divine in Christ as the wisdom, prudence, strength, might, creative power in God, see Orat. I. 17, III. 65. Still he rarely has recourse to these terms.

[3] After the beginning of the Arian controversy, though not before it (see c. Gent. 2), Athanasius made a thorough distinction between "to beget" and "to create." "Begetting" held good of the Father only in reference to the Son. It means the production of a perfect image of Himself which, while originating in His substance, has by nature a share in the *entire* substance. That the Son shares in the *entire* substance of the Father is a thought which was constantly repeated by Athanasius, Orat. I. 16: *τὸ ὅλως μετέχεσθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἴσόν ἐστι λέγειν ὅτι καὶ γεννᾷ*. The begotten is thus *ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ γέννημα* (Orat. II. 24), which *φύσει ἔχει τὴν πατρικὴν οὐσίαν* and in fact *τελείαν*. That God does not in consequence of this suffer or undergo anything, and that there is here no question of an emanation, are points which he urges as against the Valentinians.

[4] The refutation of these propositions given by Athanasius takes a great number of forms; we may distinguish the religious-dogmatic, the dialectic-philosophic, the patristic and the biblical refutations (see Böhringer, Athanasius, pp. 210—240).

Father and (2) He is of the substance of the Father,[1] for otherwise He would not be God at all, (3) He is by His own nature in all points similarly[2] constituted as the Father, and finally He is all this, because He has *one and the same substance in common with the Father* and together with Him constitutes a unity,[3]

For Athanasius himself the religious and biblical argument is the chief thing. Besides numerous passages from the Gospel of John, Athanasius quotes specially 1 John V. 20; Rev. I. 4; Matt. III. 17, XVII. 5; Rom. I. 20, VIII. 32, IX. 5; Hebr. I. 3, XIII. 8; Ps. II. 7; XLV. 2, CII. 28, CXLV. 13; Is. XL. 28. Matt. XXVIII. 19 had for him supreme importance. Amongst the theses laid down by the Arians he had a special objection to that of the προκοπή of the Logos. Hence the strong emphasis he lays on the ἄτρεπτος.

[1] "From the Father," as Athanasius says in several passages, would be sufficient if it were not possible to say, using the words in an improper sense, that everything is from God because it has been created by God. It is because the Eusebians make capital out of this that we must avow: ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός; see de decret. 19; de synod. 33 sq.: ad Afros 5. He entirely rejects the idea of a mere unity of feeling or doctrine between the Father and the Son (*e.g.*, Orat. III. 11) for this would mean the disappearance of the Godhead of the Son.

[2] The word "ὅμοιος" means something more than our word "resembling" and something less than our word "similar"; our "similarly constituted" comes nearest it. The "ὅμοιος" alone did not satisfy Athanasius, because it implicitly involves a difference and, above all, a *distinction*, and he says, moreover, that even dog and wolf, tin and silver are ὅμοια. He, however, certainly applied the word in connection with substance (φύσις οὐσία) or with "κατὰ πάντα" (*e.g.*, de decret. 20) to the relation between Father and Son (ὁμοίωσις τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, de synod. 45). But still he found it necessary as a rule, at least at a later date, expressly to emphasise the ἑνότης—where he expresses himself in a less strict way we also find ὁμοιότης alone—and in opposition to the Homoiousians was driven to add "ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας" to "ὁμοιούσιος" in order to banish any idea of separateness. (de synod. 41). Yet he recognised at the same time (l. c. c. 53 sq.) that ὅμοιος is really an unsuitable word; for it cannot be used of substances, but only of σχήματα καὶ ποιότητες. In connection with substances we say ταυτότης. Men resemble each other in general outline and character, but in substance they are ὁμοφυεῖς; vice versa, man and dog are not unlike, but yet they are ἑτεροφυεῖς. Thus ὁμοφυές and ὁμοούσιον match each other, and in the same way ἑτεροφυές and ἑτεροούσιον. The phrase ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν always suggests a μετουσία; τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ποιότης ἐστίν, ἥτις τῇ οὐσίᾳ προσγενοιτ' ἄν. Thus it is correct to say of created spiritual beings that they resemble God, not however in substance, but only in virtue of sonship. Ὁμοιούσιος is in fact nothing, and when used of the real Son is consequently either nonsense or false.

[3] This is the key to the whole mode of conception: Son and Father are not a duality, but a *duality in unity*, *i.e.*, the Son possesses entirely the substance which the Father is; He is a unity with the unity which the Father is. Athanasius did not defend the idea of the co-ordination of the two as opposed to a subordination view, but the unity and inseparability as opposed to the theory of difference and separateness. He, however,

but "substance" in reference to God means nothing else than "Being."[1] It is not the case that the Father is one substance

expresses this as follows: in substance Father and Son are one; or, the Son has one and the same substance with the Father. Thus the expression "*μία φύσις*" is often used for both; and so we have: *οὐσίᾳ ἓν ἐστιν αὐτὸς γεννήσας αὐτὸν πατήρ* (de synod. 48). The Son has the *ἑνότης πρὸς τὸν πατέρα* (de decret. 23); He constitutes with Him a *ἀδιαίρετος ἑνότης*; there subsists between both *ἑνότης ὁμοιώσεως κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν*. He expresses his meaning most plainly in those passages in which he attaches the *ταυτότης* to Father and Son without prejudice to the fact that the Father is the Father and not the Son. Identity of substance, as Athanasius (de synod. 53) explains, is *ταυτότης*. Thus he says (Orat. I. 22): *ὁ υἱὸς ἔχει ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ταυτότητα*. In a passage of earlier date he had already said (c. Gent. 2): *δοὺς τῷ υἱῷ καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητος ἔννοιαν ναὶ γνῶσιν, ἵνα τὴν ταυτότητα σώζων κ.τ.λ.* Later on, (de decret. 23): *ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὴν ταυτότητα πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα σώζειν*, 20: *μὴ μόνον ὅμοιον τὸν υἱὸν ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὁμοιώσει ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι ... οὐ μόνον ὅμοιος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ἐστι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, καὶ ἓν μέν εἰσιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ πατήρ*. 24: *ἑνότης καὶ φυσικὴ ἰδιότης ... τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα τοῦ φωτὸς μὴ διαιρῶμεν*. Orat. IV. 5 (and elsewhere): *πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρί ... ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ πατρός ἐστι ... ἡ θεότης καὶ ἡ ἰδιότης τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστί*. Thus *ὅμοιος* is unsatisfactory not only because it does not express complete likeness, but, above all, because it does not express the unity upon which everything depends. The Son cannot, like human sons, go away from the Father, (de decret. 20) for He is in a more intimate relation to Him that a human son is to his father; He is connected with the Father not as an accident of which we might make abstraction (l. c. 12), but as *τὸ ἴδιον τῆς πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως* (Orat. III. 65) or as *τὸ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός* (frequently in de decret. Orat. I. 22), or as *ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ γέννημα*. Athanasius uses the words "*ἴδιος*", "*γνήσιος*" frequently; they give the conception of Son a more extended meaning than it naturally has, so that the Son may not appear as *ἔξωθεν ἁπλῶς ὅμοιος* and consequently as *ἑτεροούσιος* (de decret. 23). *The substantial unity of Father and Son is the fundamental thought of Athanasius.* Atzberger therefore correctly says (op. cit. p. 117) "There can be no doubt but that Athanasius conceived of the unity of the Father and the Son as a numerical unity of substance." In Orat. III. 3 ff. where he puts himself to great trouble to state the problem that two are equal to one, he says: *Εἰ καὶ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὡς γέννημα ὁ υἱός, ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὡς Θεός· καὶ ἓν εἰσιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος*. We cannot therefore help being astonished (with Zahn p. 20) to find that Athanasius declines to use the word *μονοούσιος* of the Son (see Expos. fidei 2: *οὔτε υἱοπάτορα φρονοῦμεν ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι, λέγοντες μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀναιροῦντες τό εἶναι υἱόν*); still he always says: *μίαν οἴδαμεν καὶ μόνην θεότητα τοῦ πατρός*. If the question is raised as to whether Athanasius thought of the Godhead as a numerical unity or as a numerical duality, the answer is: *as a numerical unity*. The duality is only a relative one—if we may write such an absurdity—the duality of archetype and type. That the Arians called the Catholics "Sabellians" is expressly stated by Julian of Eclan. (August., op. imperf. V. 25).

[1] *Θεότης, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ἰδίοτης τῆς οὐσίας, οἰκειότης τῆς οὐσίας (ὑποστάσεως)* are all used by Athanasius in reference to the Godhead as perfectly synonymous.

by itself and the Son another substance by itself and that these two are similarly constituted. This would do away with the unity of the Godhead. On the contrary, the Father is the Godhead; this Godhead, however, contains in it a mystery which can only be approximately conceived of by men. It conceals within itself in the form of an independent and self-acting product something which issues from it and which also possesses this Godhead and possesses it from all eternity in virtue, not of any communication, but of nature and origin,—the true and real Son, the image which proceeds from the substance. There are not two divine ousias, not two divine hypostases or the like, but *one* ousia and hypostasis, which the Father and the Son possess. Thus the Son is true God, inseparable from the Father and reposing in the unity of the Godhead, not a second alongside of God, but simply reflection, express image, Son within the *one* Godhead which cannot

He had no word by which to describe Father and Son as different subjects, and indeed he never felt it necessary to seek for any such word. We cannot call *ἰδιότης τῆς οὐσίας* anything special; for Athanasius by the very use of the word *ἰδιότης* asserted the unity of the Father and Son. *Ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία* are repeatedly described by him as identical; see de decret. 27; de synod. 41; ad Afros 4; *ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαινόμενον ἔχει ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν, ὅπερ Ἱερεμίας ὕπαρξιν ὀνομάζει λέγων... ἡ γαρ ὑπόστασις καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὑπαρξίς ἐστιν* (so still in the year 370). Tom. ad Antioch. 6: *ὑπόστασιν μὲν λέγομεν ἡγούμενοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι εἰπεῖν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν.* The divine substance is, however, nothing other than *τὸ ὄν* (pure Being); see ad Afr. l. c. and the decret. 22: Godhead is the *οὐσία ἀκατάληπτος... τὸ· Θεὸς, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος σημαίνει.* As opposed to this *φύσις* is the nature which attaches to the substance as the complex of its attributes; Athanasius distinguishes it from *οὐσία*; hence the formula often used: *κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν* (*e.g.*, de synod. 45) see also Tom. ad Antioch 6, where Athanasius after the words above quoted, continues: *μίαν δὲ φρονοῦμεν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν καὶ διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως· μίαν γὰρ θεότητα καὶ μίαν εἶναι τὴν ταύτης φύσιν πιστεύομεν.* Orat. I. 39: The Son is *φύσει κατ' οὐσίαν ταῦτα.* When, however, Athanasius asserts the numerical unity of the Ousia of Father, Son, (and Spirit) he is thinking of it both as being that which we call "substance" and also as what we call "subject", so that here again, too, what is obscure is not the unity, but the duality (triad) as in Irenæus. In de synod. 51 the conception of the Ousia as involving three substances, *i.e.*, a common genus and two co-ordinate "brothers" ranged under it, is expressly rejected as *Ἑλλήνων ἑρμηνεῖαι.* It is only the one passage: Expos. fid. 2, (see above) where Athanasius rejects *μονοούσιος*, that betrays any uncertainty on his part. It stands quite by itself. Otherwise by *οὐσία* he understands the individual or single substance which, however, as applied to God, is the fulness of all Being, a view which allows him to think of this substance as existing in wonderful conditions and taking on wonderful shapes.

and ought not to be thought of apart from reflection, express image, and Son. He has everything that the Father has, for He actually possesses the ousia of the Father; He is ὁμοούσιος,[1] of the same substance. Only He is not actually the Father, for the latter is also His source and root, the Almighty Father, the only unbegotten principle.[2]

[1] The meaning of this word will be clear from what was said in the preceding discussion. It signified oneness of substance, not likeness of substance, "unius substantiæ." Father and Son possess in common one and the same substance, substance in the sense of the totality of all that which they are. This is how Athanasius always understood the word, as Zahn (op. cit., pp. 10—32) was the first to point out in opposition to the long current erroneous interpretations of it. It is in fact equal to ταυτούσιος, the meaning which the Semiarians also attached to it (Ephiph. H. 73. 11). Athanasius neither discovered the word, nor had he any special preference for it; but he always recognised in it the most fitting expression wherewith to repel Arians and Eusebians; see on the adoption of the word into the Nicene Creed and the history of its interpretation, the discussions which follow.

[2] This is an important point in the Athanasian doctrine and balances in some degree the thoughts comprised in the word "ὁμοούσιος." From some passages it certainly appears as if the statement that the Son has everything in common with the Father (according to Holy Scripture) except the name of Father (see Orat. III. 4 fin; III. 6; de synod. 48, 49; frequently as in Orat. I. 61, the language is paradoxical to the verge of absurdity) expressed a merely nominal distinction between Father and Son. According to this, He is either identical with the Father, or a part of the Father's substance, or an attribute of God, or a kind of pendicle which has emanated from the Father; but all these modes of conception were considered at the time to be "Sabellian": they were condemned already. In order to escape them or rather because he himself considered them to be false, Athanasius in the proper place strongly emphasised the idea that the Father is the entire monad, that He is the ἀρχή for the Son too, that it is in fact the ousia of the Father which the Son has received, that thus the conception of the Father as the sole Θεὸς παντοκράτωρ maintains the unity of the Godhead. The Father is the μία ἀρχή (Orat. IV. 1); there are not two or three Fathers (III. 15); there is ἓν εἶδος θεότητος, which is the Father, but τὸ εἶδος τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ (l. c.); the Father is ὁ Θεός. He alone is αὐτὸς ὁ Θεός, He alone is the unbegotten God (Expos. fid. I); the Son is a γέννημα, even though He has not come into being. Accordingly the Father is sufficient for Himself (Orat. II. 41), and ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πατρός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καί ῥίζα καὶ πηγὴ τοῦ υἱοῦ. The "ὁμοούσιος" does not thus include any absolute co-ordination. According to Athanasius all men are ὁμοούσιοι relatively to each other, because they are ὁμογενεῖς and ὁμοφυεῖς (de synod. 52 sq,) and yet spite of this we find amongst them superiority and subordination. The same is the case here. Athanasius maintains the inseparable unity of substance of Father and Son, the unity of the Godhead; but this idea is for him applicable only in virtue of another, according to which the Father has everything of Himself while the Son has everything from the Father. *Father and Son, according to Athanasius, are not co-ordinate equal substances, but rather one single substance,*

(4) The language used of Christ in Scripture to express what is human and belonging to the creature, has, always and only, reference to the human nature which He took upon Him in order to redeem men. Since He who is by nature God took upon Him a body in order to unite with Himself what is by nature man in order that the salvation and deification of man might be surely accomplished, He also along with the body took to Himself human feelings. So complete, however, is the identity of the humanity of Christ with the nature of humanity as a whole that we may, according to Athanasius, refer the statements of Scripture as to a special endowment and exaltation of Christ, to the whole humanity. [1] Complete too, however, was the union of the Son of God with humanity, which Athanasius, like Arius up to the time of the Apollinarian controversy, usually thought of as "Flesh," "vesture of the Flesh." [2] Because the body of the Logos was really His own body—although we must discard the thought of variation, of change [3]—and because this union had become already perfect in Mary's body, [4] everything that holds good of the flesh holds

which involves the distinction of ἀρχή and γέννημα, and thus of principle and what is deduced, and in this sense involves a subordination, which, however, is not analogous to the subordination in which the creature stands to God.

[1] See Orat. I. 41: Τῆς ἀνθρωπότητός ἐστιν ἡ ὕψωσις, *i.e.*, not of the humanity of Christ, but of humanity as a whole: c. 42: When Scripture uses the word "ἐχαρίσατο·" in reference to what God does to Christ, this is not said of the Logos, but on our account: δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοῦτο πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ γέγραπται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστὸς ἀπέθανε καὶ ὑψώθη, οὕτως ὡς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται λαμβάνειν ὅπερ εἶχεν ἀεὶ ὡς Θεός, ἵνα εἰς ἡμᾶς φθάσῃ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη δοθεῖσα χάρις. The human race is thereby enriched. c. 43: By our kinship with the body of Christ we too have become a temple of God and are henceforth made sons of God, so that already in us the Lord is adored. "Therefore hath God also exalted Him"—this signifies our exaltation.

[2] So correctly Baur. I have not found Dorner's statement that the presupposition of a human soul occupies the background of the whole view of Athanasius "of the incarnation and redemption as affecting the totality of man" (op. cit. I. p. 957) to be supported by evidence. From what is alleged by Dorner it merely follows that Athanasius did not reflect on the subject. Baur, however, meanwhile goes too far when he expresses the opinion that Athanasius *designedly* left the human soul of Christ out of account; on the contrary, by the term "Flesh" he understood the whole substance of man, (see Orat. III. 30) and did not feel there was any necessity for studying the question as to the position occupied by the soul.

[3] Orat. IV. 31.

[4] Orat. IV. 32—34.

good of the Logos also, and this is true of all sufferings even,—although He was not affected by them so far as His Godhead is concerned,[1]—and Mary is the mother of God. Athanasius also refers to the incarnate Logos the *locus classicus* of the Arians, Prov. VIII. 22, 23,[2] with which Eustathius of Antioch likewise occupied himself.[3] Finally, Athanasius spoke also of a προκοπή or progress in reference to the incarnate Logos, of an increase in the manifestation of God in the body of Christ, by which he means that the flesh was more and more completely irradiated by the Godhead: τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προέκοπτεν,[4] (the human advanced in wisdom).

How are the two mutually opposed doctrines to be judged from the standpoint of history, of reason, and of the Gospel? Each party charged the other with holding doctrines which involved contradictions, and, what is of more consequence, they mutually accused each other of apostasy from Christianity, although the Arians never advanced this charge with such energy as the opposite party. We have first of all to ascertain definitely how much they had in common. *Religion and doctrine are with both thoroughly fused together*,[5] and, indeed, formally considered, the doctrine is the same in both cases, *i.e.*, the fundamental conceptions are the same. The doctrine of the pre-existent Christ, who as the pre-existent Son of God is Logos, Wisdom, and world-creating Power of God, seems to constitute the common basis. Together with this both have a common interest in maintaining the *unity* of God and in

[1] Orat. I. 45, III. 30—33.

[2] Almost the whole second oration against the Arians is devoted to the task of refuting the use made by them of this passage.

[3] Theodoret, H. E. I. 8.

[4] Orat. III. 53: Αὐξάνοντος ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τοῦ σώματος, συνεπεδίδοτο ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τῆς θεότητος φανέρωσις ... τὸ ἄνθρώπινον προέκοπτεν, ὑπεραναβαῖνον κατ' ὀλίγον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ θεοποιούμενον καὶ ὄργανον τῆς σοφίας πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν ἔκλαμψιν αὐτῆς γενόμενον,

[5] Both thus occupy the stage of development which was described in Vol. III., pp. 113—118. We may say meanwhile, and what follows will prove it, that the fusion of a theoretical doctrine with religion was more thorough in the case of Arianism than with Athanasius.

making a sharp distinction between Creator and creature. Finally, both endeavour to base their doctrines on Scripture and at the same time claim to have tradition on their side, as is evident in the case of Arius from the introduction to the Thalia. Both are, however, convinced that the final word lies with Scripture and not with tradition.

I. We cannot understand Arianism unless we consider that it consists of two entirely disparate parts. It has, first of all, a Christ who gradually becomes God, who therefore develops more and more in moral unity of feeling with God, progresses and attains his perfection by the divine grace. This Christ is the Saviour, in so far as he has conveyed to us the divine doctrine and has given us an example of goodness perfectly realised in the exercise of freedom. When Arius calls this Christ Logos it appears as if he did this by way of accommodation. The conception of Arius here is purely Adoptian. But, secondly, with this is united a metaphysic which has its basis solely in a cosmology and has absolutely no connection with soteriology. This metaphysic is dominated by the thought of the antithesis of the one, inexpressible God, a God remote from the world, and the creature. The working-out of this thought accordingly perfectly corresponds with the philosophical ideas of the time and with the one half of the line of thought pursued by Origen. In order that a creation may become possible at all, a spiritual being must first be created which can be the means whereby a spiritual-material world can be created. This cannot be the divine reason itself, but only the most complete image of the divine reason stamped on a created, freely acting, independent being. With this we have arrived at the Neo-platonic origination. Whether in order to find a means of transition to the world we are to speak of "God, the essential νοῦς of God, the created Logos," or "God, the created Logos, the world-spirit," or are to arrange the terms in some other way, is pretty much a matter of indifference, and to all appearance Arius laid little stress on this. It is the philosophical triad, or duad, such as we meet with in Philo, Numenius, Plotinus etc. These created beings which mediate between God and the creature are, however, according to Arius,

to be adored, *i.e., it is only as a cosmologist that he is a strict monotheist, while as a theologian he is a polytheist.* This again perfectly corresponds to the dominant Hellenic view. Arius in fact occupies a place, so to speak, on the extreme left, for the energetic way in which he emphasises the thought that the second ousia has been created out of the free will of God, that it is foreign to the substance of God, that as a creaturely substance it is capable of change and definable, and, above all, the express assertion that this "Logos" and "Son" is "Logos" and "Son" merely nominally, that in no sense whatever is an emanation or anything of that kind to be thought of here, but simply a *creation*, is surprising even in the sphere of Hellenic philosophy. That this created Logos which made possible the further creation has appeared in Jesus Christ and has in human vesture developed into God and has therefore not been lowered, but on the contrary has been exalted by His being man, is accordingly what constitutes the uniting thought between the two parts of the system.

In the other case, as here, the expressions "pre-existent Son of God," "Logos," "Wisdom" are plainly only an accommodation. They are unavoidable, but not necessary, in fact they create difficulties. It clearly follows from this, however, that the doctrine of Origen does not constitute the basis of the system—in so far as its Christology is concerned—and that what it has in common with the orthodox system is not what is really characteristic of it, but is on the contrary what is secondary. The Arian doctrine has its root in Adoptianism, in the doctrine of Lucian of Samosata,[1] as is proved, above all, by the strong emphasis laid on the creaturehood of the Redeemer and by the elimination of a human soul. We know what signification this had for Origen. Where it is wanting we can no longer speak of Origenism in the full meaning of the word. But it is correct that the cosmological-causal point of view of Origen, this one side of his complicated system, was appropriated

[1] See above p. 3, and in addition Athan. Orat. III. 51: The view of Lucian of Samosata is the idea of the pure creaturehood and humanity of the Redeemer ὃ τῇ μὲν δυνάμει καὶ ὑμεῖς φρονεῖτε, τῷ δὲ ὀνόματι μόνον ἀρνεῖσθε διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. This is no mere trick of logic, although the alleged motive of the correction of the Adoptianist doctrine is assuredly incorrectly described.

by Arius, that is by Lucian. Meanwhile it has to be added that it was not peculiar to Origen. He made an effort to get beyond it; he balanced the causal-cosmological point of view, according to which the Logos is a heavenly κτίσμα, by the soteriological, according to which He is the essential and recognisable image of the Father, which constitutes an essential unity with the Father. Of this there is nothing in Arius.[1]

Arianism is a *new doctrine* in the Church; it labours under quite as many difficulties as any other earlier Christological doctrine; it is, finally, in one important respect, really Hellenism which is simply tempered by the constant use of Holy Scripture. It is a new doctrine; for not only is the frank assertion of the creaturehood and changeableness of the Logos in this sharply defined form, new, spite of Origen, Dionysius Alex., Pierius and so on, but, above all, the emphatic rejection of any essential connection of the Logos with the Father. The images of the source and the brook, the sun and the light, the archetype and the type, which are almost of as old standing in the Church as the Logos-doctrine itself, are here discarded. This, however, simply means that the Christian Logos- and Son-of-God-doctrine has itself been discarded. Only the old names remain. But new too, further, is the combination of Adoptianism with the Logos-cosmology, and if the idea of two distinct Logoi and two Wisdoms is not exactly new, it is a distinction which had never before this been permitted.

Athanasius exposed the inner difficulties and contradictions, and in almost every case we may allow that he has right on his side. A son who is no son, a Logos who is no Logos, a monotheism which nevertheless does not exclude polytheism, two or three ousias which are to be revered, while yet only *one* of them is really distinct from the creatures, an indefinable being who first becomes God by becoming man and who is yet neither God nor man, and so on. In every single point we have apparent clearness while all is hollow and formal, a boyish enthusiasm for playing with husks and shells, and a

[1] We do not know whether or not Arius appealed to Origen. The later Arians undoubtedly quoted him in support of their views; they seem, however, to have appealed most readily to Dionysius of Alex. See Athan. de sentent. Dionysii.

childish self-satisfaction in the working out of empty syllogisms. [1] This had not been learned from Origen, who always had facts and definite ends in view when he speculated.

But all this might be put up with if only this doctrine were in any way designed to shew how communion with God is arrived at through Christ. This is what we must necessarily demand; for what the ancient Church understood by "redemption" was in part a physical redemption of a very questionable kind, and it would not necessarily have been anything to be regretted if anyone had emancipated himself from this "redemption." But one has absolutely nowhere the impression that Arius and his friends are in their theology concerned with communion with God. Their *doctrina de Christo* has nothing whatever to do with this question. The divine which appeared on earth is not the Godhead, but one of its creations. God Himself remains unknown. Whoever expresses adherence to the above propositions and does this with unmistakable satisfaction, stands up for the unique nature of God, but does this, however, only that he may not endanger the uniformity of the basis of the world, and otherwise is prepared to worship besides this God other "Gods" too, creatures that is; whoever allows religion to disappear in a cosmological doctrine and in veneration for a heroic teacher, even though he may call him "perfect creature," κτίσμα τέλειον, and revere in him the being through whom this world has come to be what it is, is, so far as his religious way of thinking is concerned, a Hellenist, and has every claim to be highly valued by Hellenists. [2]

The admission that the Arians succeeded in getting a grasp of certain features in the historical Christ presented to us by the New Testament, cannot in any way alter this judgment. In this matter they were far superior to their opponents; but they were absolutely unable to make any *religious* use of what they perceived. They speak of Christ as Paul of Samosata does, but by foisting in behind the Christ who was exalted to be Lord, the half divine being, logos-creature, λόγος-κτίσμα,

[1] See the tractate of Aëtius preserved in Epiphanius; but the older Arians had already acted in the same way.

[2] There are some good remarks on Arianism in Kaufmann, Deutsche Geschichte I., pp. 232, 234; also in Richter, Weström. Reich, p. 537.

they deprived the most valuable knowledge they had of all practical value. Paul could say in a general way: *τὰ κρατούμενα τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἔχει ἔπαινον· τὰ δὲ σχέτει φιλίας κρατούμενα ὑπεραινεῖται* (what was accomplished by the Logos of nature deserves no praise, but what was accomplished in the state of love is to be praised exceedingly). Such a statement was made impossible for the Arians by the introduction of cosmological speculation. What dominates Paul's whole view of the question—namely, the thought that the unity of love and feeling is the most abiding unity, scarcely ever finds an echo amongst the Arians, for it is swallowed up by that philosophy which measures worth by duration in time and thinks of a half-eternal being as being nearer God than a temporal being who is filled with the love of God. We cannot therefore finally rate very high the results of the rational exegesis of christological passages as given by the Arians; they do not use them to shew that Jesus was a man whom God chose for Himself or that God was in the man Jesus, but, on the contrary, in order to prove that this Jesus was no complete God. Nor can we put a high value on their defence of monotheism either, for they adored creatures. What is alone really valuable, is the energetic emphasis they lay on freedom, and which they adopted from Origen, but even it has no religious significance.

Had the Arian doctrine gained the victory in the Greek-speaking world, it would in all probability have completely ruined Christianity, that is, it would have made it disappear in cosmology and morality and would have annihilated religion in the religion. "The Arian Christology is inwardly the most unstable, and dogmatically the most worthless, of all the Christologies to be met with in the history of dogma."[1] Still it had its mission. The Arians made the transition from heathenism to Christianity easier for the large numbers of the cultured and half-cultured whom the policy of Constantine brought into the Church. They imparted to them a view of the Holy Scriptures and of Christianity which could present no difficulty to any one at that period. The Arian monotheism was the best transition from polytheism to monotheism. It asserted the truth that there is

[1] Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 65.

one supreme God with whom nothing can be compared, and thus rooted out the crude worship of many gods. It constructed a descending divine triad in which the cultured were able to recognise again the highest wisdom of their philosophers. It permitted men to worship a demiurge together with the primal substance, πρώτη οὐσία; it taught an incarnation of this demiurge and, on the other hand again, a *theopoiesis*, and was able skilfully to unite this with the worship of Christ in the Church. It afforded, in the numerous formulæ which it coined, interesting material for rhetorical and dialectic exercises. It quickened the feeling of freedom and responsibility and led to discipline, and even to asceticism. And finally, it handed on the picture of a divine hero who was obedient even to death and gained the victory by suffering and patience, and who has become a pattern for us. When transmitted along with the Holy Scriptures, it even produced a living piety[1] amongst Germanic Christians, if it also awakened in them the very idea to which it had originally been specially opposed, the idea of a theogony. What was shewn above—namely, that the doctrine was new, is to be taken *cum grano salis*; elements which were present in the teaching of the Church from the very beginning got here vigorous outward expression and became supreme. The approval the doctrine met with shews how deeply rooted they were in the Church. We cannot but be astonished at the first glance to find that those who sought to defend the whole system of Origen partly sided with Arius and partly gave him their patronage. But this fact ceases to be striking so soon as we consider that the controversy very quickly became so acute as to necessitate a decision for or against Arius. But the Origenists, moreover, had a very strong antipathy to everything that in any way suggested "Sabellianism"; for Sabellianism had no place for the pursuit of Hellenic cosmological speculation, *i.e.*, of scientific theology. Their position with regard to the doctrine of Athanasius was thereby determined. They would rather have kept to their rich supply of musty formulæ, but they were forced to decide for Arius.

[1] The figure of Ulfilas vouches for this; his confession of faith (Halm, § 126) is the only Arian one which is not polemical.

II. Nothing can more clearly illustrate the perverse state of the problem in the Arian-Athanasian controversy than the notorious fact that the man who saved the character of Christianity as a religion of living fellowship with God, was the man from whose Christology almost every trait which recalls the historical Jesus of Nazareth was erased. Athanasius undoubtedly retained the most important feature—namely, that Christ promised to bring men into fellowship with God. But while he subordinated everything to this thought and recognised in redemption a communication of the divine *nature*, he reduced the entire historical account given of Christ to the belief that the Redeemer shared in the nature and unity of the Godhead itself, and he explained everything in the Biblical documents in accordance with this idea.[1] That which Christ is and is for us, is the Godhead; in the Son we have the Father, and in what the Son has brought, the divine is communicated to us. This fundamental thought is not new, and it corresponds with a very old conception of the Gospel. It is not new, for it was never wanting in the Church before the time of Athanasius. The Fourth Gospel, Ignatius, Irenæus, Methodius, the so-called Modalism and even the Apologists and Origen—not to mention the Westerns—prove this; for the Apologists, and Origen too, in what they say of the Logos, emphasised not only His distinction from the Father, but also His unity with the Father. The Samosatene had also laid the whole emphasis on the unity, although indeed he was not understood.[2] But not since the days in which the Fourth Gospel was written do we meet with any-

[1] Anyone, on the other hand, who, like Arius, held to the idea of a developing and struggling Christ was not able to conceive of Him as Redeemer, but only as teacher and example. This was the situation: the Bible accounts of Christ did not favour and establish the sole idea which was held at the time regarding fellowship with God and redemption, but, on the contrary, they interfered with it.

[2] Athanasius always appealed to the collective testimony of the Church in support of the doctrine which he defended. In the work, de decret, 25 sq., he shews that the words ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας and ὁμοούσιος were not discovered by the Nicene Fathers, but, on the contrary, had been handed down to them. He appeals to Theognostus, to the two Dionysii and Origen, to the latter with the reservation that in his case it is necessary to distinguish between what he wrote γυμναστικῶς and what he wrote of a positive character. It is one of the few passages in which he has thought of Origen.

one with whom the conviction is so definite, thought out with such an assurance of victory, expressed so strongly and so simply, and of such an absolute kind, as it is with Athanasius. All the rest by introducing qualifying thoughts in some way or other, brought an element of uncertainty into their feeling of its truth, and impaired its strength. That in the age of Constantine during the greatest revolution which the Church has experienced and which was so fraught with consequences, the faith represented by Athanasius was confessed with such vigour, is what saved the Christian Church. Its faith would probably have got entirely into the hands of the philosophers, its confession would have become degraded or would have been turned into an imperial official decree enjoining the worship of the "clear-shining Godhead", if Athanasius had not been there and had not helped those who shared his views to make a stand and inspired them with courage.

But at the beginning of the Fourth Century the form of expression for the belief in the unity of the eternal Godhead and its appearance in Jesus Christ was already sketched out. It was as little allowable to think of a unity of living feeling, of will and aim alone, as of the perfect identification of the persons. The doctrines of the pre-existing Son of God, of the eternal Logos, but, above all, the view that everything valuable is accomplished in the *nature* only, of which feeling and will are an annex, were firmly established. Athanasius in making use of these presuppositions in order to express his faith in the Godhead of Christ, *i.e.*, in the essential unity of the Godhead in itself with the Godhead manifested in Christ, fell into an abyss of contradictions.

Unquestionably the old Logos doctrine too, and also Arianism, strike us to-day as being full of contradictions, but it was Athanasius who first arrived at the *contradictio in adjecto* in the full sense of the phrase. That the Godhead is a numerical unity, but that nevertheless Son and Father are to be distinguished within this unity as two—this is his view. He teaches that there is only one unbegotten principle, but that nevertheless the Son has not come into being. He maintains that the Divine in Christ is the eternal "Son", but that the Son

is as old as the Father. This Son is not to be thought of either as created, or as an attribute of God, or as an emanation or a part of God, and is therefore something wholly indefinable. The thought of a theogony is rejected as emphatically as that of a creation, and yet the thought of an active attribute is not in any sense to be entertained. The Father is perfect for Himself and is sufficient for Himself; indeed, although Father and Son have one substance, in the sense of a single nature, in common, still the Father alone is "the God", and is the principle and root of the Son also. *Quot verba, tot scandala!*

Whatever involves a complete contradiction cannot be correct, and everyone is justified in unsparingly describing the contradiction as such. This the Arians sufficiently did, and in so far as they assumed that a contradiction cannot be seriously accepted by anyone, and that therefore the view of Athanasius must at bottom be Sabellian, they were right. Two generations and more had to pass before the Church could accustom itself to recognise in the complete contradiction the sacred privilege of revelation. There was, in fact, no philosophy in existence possessed of formulæ which could present in an intelligible shape the propositions of Athanasius. What he called at one time Ousia and at another Hypostasis, was not an individual substance in the full sense of the word, but still less was it a generic conception.

If anything is clear, it is the fact that the thought of Athanasius—namely, the unity of the Godhead which rested in and appeared in Christ, could not be expressed under the traditional presuppositions of the pre-existing Son of God and the personal Logos existing from all eternity. We have here to do with the most important point in the whole question. The very same series of ideas which created the most serious difficulties for the Arians and which have been shewn to occupy a secondary place in their system, seriously hamper the doctrinal utterances of Athanasius; namely, the Logos doctrine of Origen and the cosmological-metaphysical conceptions which form the background of statements regarding an historical person. The Arians required to have a created being, created before the

world, changeable, of the same nature as men, for their Christ, and had to banish all other determinations from their conception, and so they could not make use of the Logos of Philo and the Apologists; Athanasius required a being who was absolutely nothing else than the Godhead, and so the Logos referred to did not in any sense fit in with his doctrine. *In both cases the combined Logos doctrine of Philo and Origen was the disturbing element.* And at bottom,—though unfortunately not actually,[1]—they both discarded it; Arius when he distinguishes between the Logos *nuncupativus* which Christ is, and the actual Logos of God; Athanasius when he banishes the world-idea from the content of the substance which he adores in Christ. In the view of Arius, Christ belongs in every sense to the world, *i.e.*, to the sphere of created things; in that of Athanasius he belongs in every sense to God, whose substance He shares.

Arius and Athanasius both indeed occupy the standpoint of the theology of Origen which no one could now abandon; but their religious and theological interests do not originate in it. In the gnosis of Origen everything spiritual stands to God in a two-fold relation; it is His created work and yet it is at the same time His nature. This holds good in a pre-eminent sense of the Logos, which comprises all that is spiritual in itself and connects the graduated spheres of the spiritual substances, which, like it, have an eternal duration, with the supreme Godhead. To this idea corresponds the thought that the creatures are free and that they *must* return from their state of estrangement and their Fall to their original source. Of this we find nothing either in Arius or in Athanasius. In the case of the former, the sober Aristotelian philosophy on the one hand reacts against this fundamental thought, and on the other, the tradition of the Christ who is engaged in a conflict, who increases and progresses towards perfection. In the case of

[1] They were not able, and did not dare, to discard it actually, because of John I. 1 f., on account of the Church tradition, and because of the scientific views of the time. As regards Athanasius, we have to keep in mind his idea of the Father as the ῥίζα of the Son, and his other idea, according to which the world was actually made by the Son.

Athanasius what reacts against it is the ancient belief of the Church in the Father, the Almighty Creator of all things, and in the Son in whom the Father reveals Himself and has stooped to hold fellowship with man.

It is thus not the case that the gnosis of Origen was simply halved between Arius and Athanasius; on the contrary, it underwent a fundamental correction in the teaching of both. But it was no longer possible to avoid the "*vis inertiæ*" of the gnosis of Origen, the contrary formulæ which were held together by the idea of the Logos-cosmology as the basis for Christology.[1] And now the question was which of the two was to be adopted, the Logos-κτίσμα or the Logos-ὁμοούσιος formula. The former freed from the latter was indeed deprived of all soteriological content, but was capable of intelligent and philosophical treatment—namely, rational-logical treatment; the latter taken exclusively, even supposing that the distinction between the Son and the Father and the superiority of the Father were maintained in connection with it, simply led to an absurdity.

Athanasius put up with this absurdity;[2] without knowing it he made a still greater sacrifice to his faith—the historical Christ. It was at such a price that he saved the religious conviction that Christianity is the religion of perfect fellowship with God, from being displaced by a doctrine which possessed many lofty qualities, but which had no understanding of the inner essence of religion, which sought in religion nothing but "instruction," and finally found satisfaction in an empty dialectic.

[1] Dionysius of Alexandria was a genuine pupil of Origen, for he was equally prepared to maintain the other side of the system of Origen, when his namesake pointed out to him that by his one-sided emphasising of the one side, he had lost himself in highly questionable statements. Eusebius of Cæsarea took up the same position.

[2] The Nicene Creed sanctioned it. One of its most serious consequences was that from this time onward Dogmatics were for ever separated from clear thinking and defensible conceptions, and got accustomed to what was anti-rational. The anti-rational—not indeed at once, but soon enough—came to be considered as the characteristic of the sacred. As there was everywhere a desire for mysteries, the doctrine seemed to be the true mystery just because it was the opposite of the clear in the sphere of the profane. Even clear-headed men like the later members of the school of Antioch were no longer able to escape from absurdity. The complete contradiction involved in the Ὁμοούσιος drew a whole host of contradictions after it, the further thought advanced.

It was intended that the General Church-Council which was summoned by the Emperor to meet at Nicæa should, besides settling some other important questions, compose the controversy which already threatened to produce division amongst the Eastern bishops.[1] It met in the year 325, in summer apparently. There were present about 300 (250, 270) bishops, hardly so many as 318 as asserted by Athanasius at a later time; the correctness of this latter number is open to suspicion. The West was very poorly represented;[2] the Roman bishop was not there, but he had sent two presbyters. The most important of the Eastern bishops were present. It is not clear how the business was arranged and conducted. We do not know who presided, whether Eustathius, Eusebius of Cæsarea, or Hosius. It is undoubted, however, that Hosius exercised a very important influence in the Council. The Emperor at first gave the Council a free hand,[3] though he at once put a stop to private wrangling, and he energetically interfered at the most decisive moment, and in the character of a theologian interpreted himself the formula to be adopted.[4] We may assume that at first he reckoned on the possibility that the Council would itself find some formula of agreement. He had, however, resolved, under the influence of Hosius, that in the case of this not being successfully carried out, he would enforce the formula which Hosius had agreed upon with Alexander. As

[1] For the sources and the literature referring to the Council of Nice see Herzog's R-Encykl., Vol. X. 2, p. 530 ff. The accounts are meagre and frequently self-contradictory. We do not yet possess an exhaustive study of the subject. In what follows the main points only can be dealt with. I must renounce the idea of giving here the detailed reasons in support of the views I hold. See Gwatkin, p. 36 ff.

[2] No one was present from Britain; though there were probably bishops from Illyria, Dacia, Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa and also a Persian bishop. Eusebius (Vita III. 8) compares the meeting with that described in Acts II.

[3] Sozom. I. 18; we certainly cannot form any clear picture of what took place from the account given in this passage.

[4] This follows from the letter of Eusebius of Cæsarea to his Church (Theodoret, H. E. I. 11), which we may regard as trustworthy in connection with this matter. Eusebius there distinguishes quite plainly two parties; (1) the party to which he himself belongs and (2) the party which he introduces with "*οἱ δὲ*" (*οἱ δὲ προφάσει τῆς τοῦ ὁμοουσίου προσθήκης τήνδε τὴν γραφὴν πεποιήκασιν*, the Nicene Creed follows) and which he does not describe in more definite terms than by "*αὐτοί*" (*καὶ δὴ ταύτης τῆς γραφῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὑπαγορευθείσης*).

regards the composition of the Council, the view expressed by the Macedonian Sabinus of Heraclea (Socr. I. 8), that the majority of the bishops were uneducated, is confirmed by the astonishing results. The general acceptance of the resolution come to by the Council is intelligible only if we presuppose that the question in dispute was above most of the bishops.[1] Of the "cultured" we have to distinguish three parties—namely, Arius and the Lucianists, who had Eusebius of Nicomedia for their leader; the Origenists, the most important man amongst whom was Eusebius of Cæsarea, who was already highly celebrated;[2] and Alexander of Alexandria with his following, to which the few Westerns also belonged.[3] The Arians came to the Council confident of victory; as yet nothing was prejudged; the Bishop of Nicæa himself was on their side and they had relations with the Court.

All were apparently at one in thinking that the Council could not break up without establishing a standard of doctrine, (πίστις, μάθημα.) Those in the East possessed neither a uniform nor a sufficiently authoritative symbol by which the controversy could be settled. The Lucianists accordingly—who may have been about twenty in number, not more at any rate—produced, after deliberation, a confession of faith which was communicated by Eusebius of Nicomedia and embodied their doctrine in unambiguous terms. They did this without having previously come to an understanding with the Origenists. This was a tactical blunder. The great majority of the bishops rejected this rule of faith which was decisively in favour of Arianism.[4] Even the "Conservatives" must have been unpleasantly affected by the naked statement of the Arian doctrinal system. The sup-

[1] With the exception of the bishops whom their contemporaries and our earliest informants have mentioned by name, there do not seem to have been any capable men at the Council.

[2] It is worthy of note that Eusebius in the letter just cited does not introduce the Arians as a special party, but merely hints at their existence. The middle party stood, in fact, very near to them.

[3] Athanasius (de decret. 19 sq. ad Afros 5, 6, de synod. 33—41) mixes up the two opposition-parties together.

[4] See Theodoret I. 6: fin.; he relies upon the account of Eustathius. In addition Athanas., Encycl. ad epp. Ægypt 13, de decret. 3.

porters of Arius were now in the greatest perplexity owing to the unforeseen turn which events had taken. In order to be able to keep their position at the Council at all, they, with the exception of two who remained firm, withdrew this sketch of their doctrine, and now made up their minds to follow the lead of the Origenists in order to secure at least something. Eusebius of Cæsarea now came to the front. No one was more learned than he; no one was more intimately acquainted with the teaching of the Fathers. He had good reason to hope that he would be able to speak the decisive word. If there was a general conviction that in everything it was necessary to abide by the ancient doctrine of the Church, then there seemed to be no one more fitted to define that ancient doctrine than the great scholar who was also, moreover, in the highest favour with the Emperor. His formulæ were, "the created image", "the reflection originating in the will", "the second God" etc.[1] He could, if needful, have accepted the Arian formulæ; those of Alexander he could not adopt, for he saw in them the dreaded Sabellianism which meant the death of theological science. Eusebius accordingly laid a creed before the Council.[2] He was convinced that all could and must unite on the basis supplied by it, and as a matter of fact no better conciliatory formula could be imagined.[3] Still Eusebius considered it neces-

[1] See the characteristic passage Demonstr. IV. 3: *ἡ μὲν αὐγὴ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκλάμπει. κατά τι δὲ τῆς οὐσίας συμβεβηκὸς ἀχώριστον. ὁ δὲ υἱὸς κατὰ γνώμην καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰκὼν ὑπέστη τοῦ πατρός. βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς γέγονεν υἱοῦ πατὴρ καὶ φῶς δεύτερον κατὰ πάντα ἑαυτῷ ἀφωμοιωμένον ὑπεστήσατο.*

[2] According to Eustathius (in Theodoret I. 7) the creed of the strict Arians was composed by Eusebius of Nicomedia; at least I think that it must be the latter who is referred to in what is said in that passage: *ὡς δὲ ἐζητεῖτο τῆς πίστεως ὁ τρόπος, ἐναργὴς μὲν ἔλεγχος τὸ γράμμα τῆς Εὐσεβίου προὐβάλλετο βλασφημίας. ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ ἀναγνωσθὲν αὐτίκα συμφορὰν μὲν ἀστάθμητον τῆς ἐκτροπῆς ἕνεκα τοῖς αὐτηκόοις προὐξένει, αἰσχύνην δ'ἀνήκεστον τῷ γράψαντι παρεῖχεν.* It is impossible that it can be the creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea which is referred to here, for the latter (l. c. I. 11) expressly notes that his creed after having been communicated to the Council was substantially accepted. Whether we have a right to call the creed which he produced simply "Baptismal Creed of the Church of Cæsarea," is to me questionable, judging from the introduction to it given in the letter to his Church.

[3] The creed is contained in the letter of Eusebius to his Church. See Theodoret I. 1: *Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, τὸν τῶν ἁπάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ*

sary to tack on to it an anti-Sabellian addition.[1] According to Eusebius the Creed was unanimously pronounced orthodox,[2] still the imperial will already made its influence felt here. The Arians were doubtless well pleased to get off on these terms. But Alexander and his following demanded a perfectly plain rejection of Arianism. They went about it in an extremely adroit fashion inasmuch as they accepted the basis of the Creed of Cæsarea, but demanded that its terms should be made more precise. We know from Eusebius himself that the Emperor sided with them, and so far as he was concerned resolved to incorporate in the Creed the word "*ὁμοούσιος*", which was suggested to him by Hosius.[3] But the matter was not settled by the mere insertion of a word. It was pointed out that the Creed of Cæsarea contained formulæ which might favour the Arian view. Its supporters were already put in the position of defendants. Accordingly, the Alexandrian party presented a very carefully constructed doctrinal formula which was represented as being a revised form of the Creed of Cæsarea[4] and

ἀοράτων ποιητήν, καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, ζωὴν ἐκ ζωῆς, υἱὸν μονογενῆ, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννημένον, δι' οὗ καὶ ἐγένετο τὰ πάντα, τὸν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτευσάμενόν καὶ παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἀνελθόντα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἥξοντα πάλιν ἐν δόξῃ κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς, καὶ εἰς ἓν πνεῦμα ἅγιον.

[1] *Ταύτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν πιστεύοντες, πατέρα ἀληθινῶς πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν ἀληθινῶς υἱόν, πνεῦμά τε ἅγιον ἀληθινῶς πνεῦμα ἅγιον, καθὰ καὶ ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἀποστέλλων εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μαθητὰς εἶπε·* Matt. XXVIII. 19 follows.

[2] *Ταύτης ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐκτεθείσης τῆς πίστεως οὐδεὶς παρῆν ἀντιλογίας τόπος, ἀλλ' αὐτός τε πρῶτος ὁ θεοφιλέστατος ἡμῶν βασιλεὺς ὀρθότατα περιέχειν αὐτὴν ἐμαρτύρησεν. οὕτω τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν φρονεῖν συνωμολόγησε· καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς πάντας συγκατατίθεσθαι, ὑπογράφειν τε τοῖς δόγμασι καὶ συμφωνεῖν τούτοις αὐτοῖς παρεκελεύετο* (I. 11).

[3] According to Eusebius, however, the Emperor himself added an interpretation of the *Ὁμοούσιος*. We read in the letter of Eusebius, immediately after the words cited in the foregoing note: *ἑνὸς μόνου προσεγγραφέντος ῥήματος τοῦ Ὁμοουσίου, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡρμήνευσε λέγων ὅτι μὴ κατὰ σωμάτων πάθε λέγοιτο Ὁμοούσιος, οὔτε κατὰ διαίρεσιν, οὔτε κατά τινα ἀποτομὴν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστῆναι . . . θείοις δὲ καὶ ἀπορρήτοις λόγοις προσήκει τὰ τοιαῦτα νοεῖν.* The word is thus only intended to express the mystery!

[4] Eusebius in an ill-concealed tone of reproach says *οἱ δὲ* (*i.e.*, the Alexandrians) *προφάσει τῆς τοῦ Ὁμοουσίου προσθήκης τήνδε τὴν γραφὴν* (*i.e.*, the Nicene Creed) *πεποιήκασι*, that is, they have corrected my proposed creed not only here but in other passages also.

in which some think they can recognise, in addition to the contributions of the Alexandrians, the hand of Eustathius of Antioch and of Makarius of Jerusalem.[1] (1) In place of *ἁπάντων ὁρατῶν* etc., ("of all seen things whatsoever"), there was put by preference *πάντων ὁρατῶν* ("of all seen things"), in order to exclude the creation of the Son and Spirit;[2] (2) *in place of the Logos at the beginning of the second article, the "Son" was put, so that all that follows refers to the Son;*[3] (3) the words *Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ* ("God of God") were extended to *γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ* ("begotten of the Father only begotten God of God"), but in the final discussion, however, between *μονογενῆ* and *Θεόν* the words *τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός* ("that is of the substance of the Father") were further inserted, because it was observed that otherwise the opposition party might be able to put their doctrine into the proposition;[4] (4) the unsatisfactory descriptions *ζωὴν ἐκ ζωῆς* ("life of life"), *πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως* ("the first-born of every creature"), *πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννημένον* ("begotten of the Father before all ages"), before *δι' οὗ*, etc., were deleted, and in their place the following was put: *Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο* ("true God of true God, begotten, not made, by whom all things were"). At this point, however, a further insertion was made, and this once more in the course of the discussion itself,[5] at what too was not at all a suitable place—namely, after "*ποιηθέντα*" ("made"), the words *ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί* ("of the same substance with the Father"), because it was observed that none of the other terms excluded the Arian evasions; (5) the indefinite *ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτευσάμενον* ("having lived amongst men") was replaced by the definite *'ενανθρωπήσαντα* ("having

[1] See Hort., l. c., p. 59 and my article in Herzog, R.-Encyklop., Vol. VIII., p. 214 ff.

[2] See Gwatkin, p. 41.

[3] The "Logos" is wholly absent from the Nicene Creed; after what has been adduced above this will cause as little astonishment as the fact that neither Athanasians nor Arians took any offence at its exclusion.

[4] See on this what is told us by Athanasius, l. c. The clumsy position of the words which mutilate the conception *μονογενῆ Θεὸν*, further proves that they are an insertion made at the very last.

[5] See Athanasius, l. c.

become incarnate"); and (6) finally, in order to exclude all ambiguity, the condemnation of the Arian catchwords was added on to this.[1]

The opposition parties did not yield without debates, in which the Emperor himself took part.[2] We do not know the details of the discussions, but we gather from the accounts of Athanasius that the Eusebians made still further proposals of a conciliatory kind and attempted to produce new catchwords.[3] The nature of their objections to the Alexandrian outline of doctrine may be gathered from the irenic explanation which Eusebius gave to his Church in Cæsarea as well as from the objections which later on were brought against the Nicene Creed. They fought against ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ("of the substance") and ὁμοούσιος because (1) they believed they saw in these words a materialising of the Godhead, which made it a composite substance comprising emanations or parts; because (2) they could not help seeing in the ὁμοούσιος a Sabellian definition too, and because (3) the words did not occur in Holy Scripture. This last reason was specially decisive. In many parts of the Church there was still a shrinking from the definite adoption of unbiblical terms for the expression of the Faith.[4] In addition to

[1] The doctrinal formula in accordance with this was worded as follows. (The differences above discussed between it and the Creed of Cæsarea are to be explained as the result of the influence exercised by the Jerusalem and Antiochian Creed). The textual proofs are enumerated in Walch, Bibl. symb., p. 75 sq., Hahn, § 73, 74, and Hort. l. c.;—slight variations occur—: *Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν, καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ—τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός—Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα—ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί—δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα, ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα, καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀνελθόντα εἰς [τοὺς] οὐρανούς, ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα.*

Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας· Ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι [ἢ κτιστὸν] ἢ τρεπτὸν ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ [τούτους] ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ [καὶ αποστολικὴ] ἐκκλησία.

[2] Eusebius in Theoderet, H. E. I. 11: *ἐρωτήσεις τοιγαροῦν καὶ ἀποκρίσεις ἐντεῦθεν ἀνεκινοῦντο, ἐβασανίζετο ὁ λόγος τῆς διανοίας τῶν εἰρημένων.*

[3] See Athan. de decret. 19, 20; ad Afros 5, 6.

[4] Still Gwatkin, p. 43, goes too far when he asserts that "the use of ἄγραφα in

this there was the fact that the ὁμοούσιος had before this been rejected at Antioch.[1] But the will of the Emperor decided the matter. Respect for the Emperor, his express declaration that there was a desire not to endanger the absolute spirituality of the Godhead, the wish to conclude a grand work of peace—

a creed was a positive revolution in the Church." It is quite impossible to maintain this in view, for example, of the Creed of Gregorius Thaumaturgus.

[1] See on μοούσιος, which the Gnostics were the first to use, and on its meaning and history Vol. III. 141 f., 221; above pp. 15 f., 32—35; I. 257; II. 259, 352, 354; iii. 45. On the older ecclesiastical use of οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ὑποκείμενον, above all in Origen, see the scholarly discussions by Bigg (the Christian Platonists, p. 164 ff.). "Ousia is properly Platonic, while hypostasis, a comparatively modern and rare word, is properly Stoic"... Hypokeimenon already in Aristotle means the *substantia materialis*, Ὕλη quæ determinatur per formam or οὐσία cui inhærent πάθη συμβεβηκότα... the theological distinction between the terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις is purely arbitrary." On the conception of hypostasis see Stentrup, Innsbrucker Zeitschr. f. Kath. Theologie. 1877, p. 59 ff. The question as to who brought forward the ὁμοούσιος again after it had been condemned at Antioch, is an important one. It does not occur in the letters of Bishop Alexander. Athanasius had never any special preference for the *word*. It is found only once in the Orat. c. Arian (Orat. I. 9), and in the undoubtedly conciliatory work, de synod., 41, he admits that importance does not attach so much to the word as to the thing. The conceptions "ἑνότης" and "ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας" would have served the purpose so far as he himself was concerned. Such being the state of the case one may reasonably assume that the word was not revived by any one belonging to the Eastern Church, since its rejection at Antioch must have stood in the way of this, but rather that some one in the West went back upon it, and Hosius is the only one we can think of as the likely person. This hypothesis is strengthened by the following considerations: (1) According to the testimony of Eusebius of Cæsarea there can be no doubt that the Emperor himself energetically defended the word ὁμοούσιος, but the Emperor was dependent on Hosius; (2) Athanasius (hist. Arian. 42) says of Hosius: οὗτος ἐν Νικαίᾳ πίστιν ἐξέθετο; (3) the Western-Roman doctrine was the substantial unity of Father and Son; the Alexandrian bishop was accused before the Roman bishop Dionysius on the ground that he was unwilling to use "ὁμοούσιος" and in Rome the accused excuses himself for not using it, and it is the Roman bishop who in his letter stated in energetic language the κήρυγμα τῆς μοναρχίας, the ἑνῶσθαι τῷ Θεῷ τὸν λόγον, and the οὐ καταμερίζειν τὴν μονάδα. I therefore conjecture that the word had been retained in Rome, *i.e.*, in the West, since the time of the controversy of the Dionysii, that when the occasion offered it was once more produced in the East, and that the Alexandrians then accepted the word because they themselves had no better short catchword at their command. This explains why Athanasius always treats the expression as one which was suitable so far as the actual fact to be expressed was concerned, but which as regards its form was for him a foreign term. He could not, it is true, go quite so far as Luther (Opp. reform. V., p. 506): "Quod si odit anima mea vocem homousion et nolim ea uti, non ero hæreticus. Quis enim me coget uti, modo rem teneam, quæ in concilio per scripturas definita est? Etsi Ariani male senserunt in fide, hoc

this doctrinal declaration[1] of the entire Church was, moreover, something new and imposing—induced the Conservatives, *i.e.*, the Origenists and those who did not think for themselves, to fall in with what was proposed. They all subscribed with the exception of two, and at the same time salved their consciences in different ways by mental reservations.[2] The Lucianists

tamon optime, sive malo sive bono animo, exegerunt, ne vocem profanam et novam in regulis fidei statui liceret." Finally, the statement of Socrates (III. 7) which indeed has been rejected by most, is decisive. According to this Hosius during his stay in Alexandria—before the Nicene Council—had discussed *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*. At the first glance that undoubtedly seems unworthy of belief, because it is a *ὕστερον-πρότερον*; but as soon as we remember the work of Tertullian, adv. Prax., which is the most important dogmatic treatise which the West produced previous to Augustine and which cannot have been unknown to Hosius, everything becomes clear. In this work in which Tertullian bears witness to the strong influence exercised upon him by Monarchianism spite of the fact that he is opposing it, no thought is so plainly expressed as this, that Father, Son, and Spirit are *unius substantiæ*, *i.e.*, *ὁμοούσιοι* (Vol. II., p. 259 ff.). Along with this, however, we have the idea clearly developed, that Father, Son, and Spirit are different "personæ" (see *e.g.*, c. 3: "proximæ *personæ*, consortes *substantiæ* patris", 15; "visibilem et invisibilem deum deprehendo sub manifesta et *personali distinctione* condicionis utriusque"; see also the conception of "personales substantiæ" in adv. Valent. 4). These personæ are also called by Tertullian "formæ cohærentes", "species indivisæ", "gradus" (c. 2, 8), and in fact even simply "nomina" (c. 30), and this gives his representation as much a Monarchian appearance as the appearance of an immanent Trinity (for a more detailed examination, see the appendix to this chapter). It is from this source, and also from Novatian who in his work, de trinitate, adopted the thoughts of Tertullian, that the theology of Hosius is derived. He may very probably, along with Tertullian, have already spoken of "personæ", side by side with the "unius substantiæ" which the entire West possessed belief in, in accordance with the baptismal formula, for this is what it was understood to be. (See Hilar., de trinit. II. 1. 3; Ambros. de myster. 5 fin). That his formula was: "unius substantiæ tres personæ" where persona is certainly to be conceived of rather as species or forma—not as "substance"—is very probable. The Western Hippolytus, moreover, (c. Noët. 14) also spoke of *one* God and several *prosopeia*, and so too did the Western Sabellius, and Tert. (l. c. c. 26) says bluntly: "ad singula nomina in personas singulas tinguimur." Only this point must remain undecided—namely, whether Hosius already actually translated "persona" by "*ὑπόστασις*." It is not probable, since in the so-called Creed of Sardica he used *ὑπόστασις* as = *οὐσία* (substantia). That his main catchword was *μία οὐσία* follows from what he says in his letter to Narcissus of Neronias (Euseb. c. Marcell., p. 25).

[1] This is what the Nicene Creed was primarily intended to be, and not a baptismal creed, as the anathemas prove.

[2] Theonas of Marmarika and Secundus of Ptolemais refused and were deposed and banished, and the same thing happened in the case of Arius and some presbyters. Arius was specially forbidden by the Council to enter Alexandria, Sozom I. 20.

who up till now had to all appearance been united together in an indissoluble friendship, were unprincipled enough to sacrifice their old comrade Arius.[1] He was condemned as the scapegoat, and the Emperor, anxious to protect with the strong hand the unity which had been won, gave orders that the books of Arius should be burned and that his adherents should henceforth be called "Porphyrians", *i.e.*, should be placed on a level with the worst enemies of Christ.[2] To the Alexandrian Church he wrote: *ὅ τοῖς τριακοσίοις ἤρεσεν ἐπισκόποις οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἕτερον ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ γνώμη, μάλιστά γε ὅπου τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τοιούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀνδρῶν ταῖς διανοίαις ἐγκείμενον τὴν θείαν βούλησιν ἐξεφώτισεν*[3] ("what satisfied the three hundred bishops is nothing else than the judgment of God, but most of all where the Holy Spirit being present in the thoughts of men such as

The evasions to which the Lucianists and Origenists had recourse in order to justify their conduct to themselves, can be studied in the letter of Eusebius to his Church. Eusebius interprets "*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός*" as equal to "He has His existence from the Father" (!), "*γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα*" as equivalent to "the Son is not a creature like the rest of the creatures", *ὁμοούσιος* as *ὁμοιούσιος*, meaning *μόνῳ τῷ πατρὶ τῷ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ὅμοιος* and not out of a foreign substance. The worst shift of all is undoubtedly when Eusebius writes to his Church that he has (now) rejected the formula *ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, because we ought not to use any unbiblical expressions whatsoever (but *Ὁμοούσιος* !) and because the Son did indeed exist already before His incarnation. But that was not the point at all! *Πέπονθέ τι δεινόν*, says Athanasius (de decret. 3), with justice, of this passage in the letter.

[1] They afterwards asserted no doubt that they had not subscribed the anathemas, but only the positive doctrine of the Nicene Creed (Socr. I. 14). However, Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis of Nicæa were, notwithstanding this, banished soon after; they were suspected by the Emperor of being Arians and intriguers; see the strongly hostile letter of Constantine in Theodoret I. 19.

[2] Socr. I. 9; those with Arian books in their possession were even to be punished with death.

[3] L. c. Other writings of Constantine in the same place. The synodal-epistle in Theodoret I. 9, Gwatkin, p. 50, has proved that in the respect shewn by Athanasius for the Nicene Council there is no trace "of the mechanical theory of conciliar infallibility." It is necessary to guard against exaggerated ideas of the extent to which the decree of the Nicene Council was accepted. It can be proved that in the East (see *e.g.*, Aphraates' Homilies) and still more in the West, there were numerous bishops who did not trouble themselves about the decree and for whom it had no existence. It was not till after the year 350 that men began to think over the Nicene Creed in the West, and to perceive that it contained more than a mere confirmation of the ancient Western belief in the doctrine of monarchy.

these and so ripe in years, made known the Divine will"). He persecuted the Arians, and the orthodox approved of what he did. They are thus responsible along with him for the persecution. The Arians at a later date only carried on what the orthodox had begun.

The correct faith had triumphed and—the Bishop of Alexandria.[1] The Council of Nicæa is the first step taken by the Bishop of Alexandria in aspiring to the primacy of the East.

2. TO THE DEATH OF CONSTANTIUS.[2]

NEVER again in the history of the Church has there been a victory so complete and so quickly secured as that at Nicæa, and no other decision of the Church approaches it in importance. The victors had the feeling that they had set up for all ages[3] a "warning notice against all heresies" (στηλογραφία κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων), and this estimate of the victory has continued to be the prevailing one in the Church.[4] The grand innovation, the elevation of two unbiblical expressions to the rank of catchwords of the Catholic Faith, insured the unique nature of this Faith. At bottom not only was Arianism rejected, but also Origenism; for the exclusive Ὁμοούσιος separated the Logos from all spiritual creatures and seemed thus to do away with scientific cosmology in every form.

But it was just because of this that the strife now began. The Nicene Creed effected in the East a hitherto unprecedented concord, but this was amongst its opponents, while its friends, on the other hand, felt no genuine enthusiasm for its subtle formulæ. The schismatic Meletians of Egypt made common cause with the Arians and Origenists; those of the bishops

[1] The victory of the Bishop of Alexandria may be studied above all in the Canons of Nicæa. They have not so far been treated of from this point of view.

[2] In what follows I give merely a sketch; the details belong to Church history.

[3] Athanas. ad Afros II. and elsewhere.

[4] Up to time of the Chalcedonian Creed the conceptions Homoousia and Orthodoxy were quite identical; the latter involved no more than the former. Thus the orthodoxy of Origen is for Socrates (VI. 13) undoubted, just because none of his four chief opponents (Methodius, Eustathius, Apollinaris, and Theophilus) charge him with heresy in reference to his doctrine of the Trinity.

who were indifferent or stupid were induced to oppose it by the bugbear of Sabellianism and by the unbiblical shape in which the new faith was formulated. Society was still for the most part heathen, and this heathen society openly sided with the anti-Nicenes; the Jews too, who were still influential, ranged themselves on this side. The clever sophist Asterius was able, as "travelling professor", to interest large numbers in "the one Unbegotten". But, above all, the two Eusebiuses sought again to be masters of the situation. The one necessarily strove in the first instance to regain his seat, the other to make the weight of his untouched personal authority once more felt in theology also. What their mutual relationship was is not clear; in any case they marched separately and struck unitedly.[1] The Nicomedian always thought first of himself and then of his cause; the Bishop of Cæsarea saw science and theology disappear in the movement which received its impulse from Alexandria. Both, however, had made up their minds not to part company with the Emperor if they could not otherwise succeed in managing him. The great mass of the bishops always were, in accordance with this policy, purely "imperial". With regard to the *strict* Arians, however, it must be admitted to their credit that during the whole controversy they were as little willing to accept as authoritative the decisions of the Emperors in matters of faith as were Athanasius, Hilary, and Lucifer.

When Constantine interfered in the great controversy, he had only just come to the East. He was under the guidance of Western bishops, and it was Western Christianity alone with which he had hitherto been acquainted. And so after an abortive attempt to compose the controversy, he had accomplished the "work of peace" at Nicæa in accordance with Western views. But already during the years which immediately followed he must have learned that the basis upon which he had reared it was too narrow, that, above all, it did not meet the requirements of

[1] The best investigation regarding Eusebius of Nicomedia is contained in the article in the Dict. of Chr. Biogr. We know Eusebius, it is true, almost exclusively from the picture which his opponents have drawn of him. But in his actions he has portrayed himself as an imperious prince of the Church of a secular type, for whom all means were justifiable.

the "common sense" of the East. As a politician he was prudent enough not to take any step backward, but, on the other hand, as a politician he knew that every law gets its meaning quite as much from the method in which it is carried out as from the letter of it. Feeling this—to which has to be added the presence of Arian influences at the Court—he had since about the year 328 resolved, under cover of the Nicene Creed, to reinstate the broader doctrinal system of older days whose power he had first got to know in Asia, in order to preserve the unity of the Church which was endangered.[1] But Constantine did not get the length of doing anything definite and conclusive. He merely favoured the anti-Nicene coalition to such an extent that he left to his sons a ruptured Church in place of a united one. The anti-Nicene coalition, however, had already become during the last years of Constantine's life an anti-Athanasian one. On the eighth of June, 328, Athanasius, not without opposition on the part of the Egyptian bishops,[2] had mounted the Episcopal throne in Alexandria. The tactics of the coalition were directed first of all towards the removal of the main defenders of the Nicene faith, and it was soon recognised that the youthful bishop of Alexandria was the most dangerous of these. Intrigues and slanders of the lowest kind now began to come into play, and the conflict was carried on sometimes by means of moral charges of the worst kind, and sometimes by means of political calumnies. The easily excited masses were made fanatical by the coarse abuse and execrations of the opponents, and the language of hate which hitherto had been bestowed on heathen, Jews, and heretics, filled the churches. The catchwords of the doctrinal formulæ, which were unintelligible to the laity and indeed even to most of the bishops themselves, were set up as standards, and the more successful they were in keeping up the agitation the more surely did the pious-minded turn away from them and sought satisfaction in asceticism and polytheism in a Christian garb. In every diocese, however, personal interests, struggles about

[1] If Eusebius is right the Emperor had already at Nice also advocated a broad application of the orthodox formula.

[2] The matter, so far as the particulars are concerned, is quite obscure.

sees and influence, were mixed up with the controversy, and this was the case in the West too, especially in Rome, as we may gather from the events of the year 366. Thus a series of bloody town-revolutions accompanied the movement.

In the midst of all this Athanasius alone in the East stood like a rock in the sea. If we measure him by the standard of his time we can discover nothing ignoble or mean about him. The favourite charge of hierarchical imperiousness has something naive about it. His stern procedure in reference to the Meletians was a necessity, and an energetic bishop who had to represent a great cause could not be anything else but imperious. It is certainly undeniable that for years he was formally in the wrong, inasmuch as he would not admit the validity of his deposition. He regarded it as the task committed to him, to rule Egypt, to regulate the Church of the East in accordance with the standard of the true faith, and to ward off any interference on the part of the State. He was a Pope, as great and as powerful a one as there ever has been.

When the sons of Constantine entered upon the inheritance of their father, the heads of the Nicene party in the East had been deposed or exiled; Arius, however, was dead.[1] The exiled

[1] The dates put shortly are as follows. Some three years after the Nicene Council, years which for us are absolutely dark (the letter of Constantine in Gelas., Hist. Conc. Nic. III. 1 is probably not genuine), Constantine begins to turn round. (Was this owing to the influence of Constantia and her court-clergyman?) The recall of Arius, Eusebius of Nicom. and Theognis (the latter's letter in Socrat. I. 14, is perhaps not genuine). Eusebius gains a decisive influence over the Emperor. At an Antioch synod 330. Eustathius of Antioch, one of the chief champions of the Nicene Creed is deposed (for adultery?) at the instigation of the two Eusebiuses. Arius presents to the Emperor a diplomatically composed confession of faith which satisfies him, (Socr. I. 26) is completely rehabilitated, and demands of Athanasius that he be allowed to resume his position in Alexandria. Athanasius refuses, and succeeds in making good his refusal and in clearing himself from the personal charges brought against him on the part of the Eusebians. At the Synod of Tyre 335 (not 336) held under the presidency of the Church historian Eusebius, the coalition nevertheless succeeds in passing a resolution for the deposition of Athanasius on account of certain alleged gross excesses, and in persuading the Emperor to proceed against him as a disturber of the peace, and this spite of the fact that in the year 334 Athanasius, in opposition to the Synod of Cæsarea, had convinced the Emperor of his perfect innocence and of the base intrigues of the Meletian bishops. Athanasius notwithstanding this succeeded a second time in inducing the Emperor to give his case an impartial trial, by hastening to Constantinople and making a personal statement to the Emperor, who was taken by surprise. His

bishops in accordance with a resolution [1] come to in common by the Emperors, were free to return as a body. This was the case in the latter part of the autumn of 337. But as soon as Constantius became master in his own domain he continued the policy of his father. He wished to rule the Church as the latter had done; he perceived that this was possible in the East only if the Nicene innovation, or at least the exclusive application of it, were got rid of, and he did not feel himself bound to the Nicene Creed as his father had done. One cannot but admit that the youthful monarch shewed statesmanlike insight and acted with energy, and with all his devotion to the Church he never allowed churchmen to rule as his brother did. He had not, however, the patience and moderation of his father, and though he had indeed inherited from the latter the gift of ruling, he had not got from him the art of managing men by gentle force. The brutal trait which Constantine knew how to keep in check in himself, appeared in an undisguised fashion in his son, and the development of the Emperor into an Oriental despot advanced a stage further in Constantius. [2] First of

opponents, who had meanwhile been commanded to go from Tyre to Jerusalem, now expressly declared that the doctrinal explanations given by Arius and his friends were sufficient, and already made preparations for burying the Nicene Creed in their pretentious assembly, and also for bringing to trial Marcellus, the friend of Athanasius. They were, however, summoned by the Emperor to come to Constantinople and to carry on their deliberations. Only the worst of Athanasius' opponents complied with this demand, and they succeeded by bringing forward new accusations (at the beginning of the year 336), in inducing the Emperor to banish Athanasius (to Trier). Still it is at least doubtful if the Emperor did not wish him to escape for a while from his enemies. His chair in any case was *not* filled. Marcellus, who had also appealed to the Emperor, was deposed and condemned on account of erroneous doctrine. The solemn induction of Arius into his Church—against the wish of the bishop, Alexander of Constantinople—was immediately robbed of its significance by his sudden death. The Emperor sought to carry on his energetic peace-policy by the banishment of other "disturbers of the peace," such as the Meletian leading spirit, and Paulus, the newly elected bishop of Constantinople. He died, however, in May 337, in his own opinion in the undoubted Nicene faith. His son maintained that he had himself further resolved on the restitution of Athanasius. Sources: besides the Church historians and Epiphanius, chiefly Athan. Apolog. c. Arian.; in addition, the Festival letters, the Hist. Arian. ad monach. de morte Arii ad Serapionem, Ep. ad epp. Æg. 19, and Euseb, Vita Constant. IV.

[1] On this resolution see Schiller II., p. 277 f.

[2] The best characterisation is in Ranke IV., p. 35 ff.; see also Krüger, Lucifer, p. 4 ff., Gwatkin, p. 109 sq., Schiller II., p. 245 ff.

all, Paul of Constantinople was deposed for the second time; Eusebius of Nicomedia at last secured the seat he had so long striven after. Eusebius of Cæsarea died, and his place was taken by a man deserving of little respect, Acacius, a friend of the Arians. The tumults which took place in Egypt after the return of Athanasius made it easier for his enemies, who regarded him as deposed and once more pronounced the sentence of deposition at a Synod in Atioch, to move the Emperor to proceed against him. His energetic conduct in his diocese and the violence of his Egyptian friends (Apol. c. Arian. 3—19) aggravated the situation. Constantius listened to the Eusebians, but did not sanction the choice of Bishop Pistus whom they had set apart for Alexandria. He decreed the deposition of Athanasius, and sent as bishop to Alexandria, a certain Gregory, a Cappadocian who had nothing to commend him save the imperial favour. Athanasius anticipated a violent expulsion by leaving Alexandria—in the spring of 339. He betook himself to Rome, leaving his diocese behind him in a state of wild uproar.

The Eusebians were now masters of the situation, but just because of this they had a difficult task to perform. What had now to be done was to get the Nicene Creed actually out of the way, or to render it ineffective by means of a new formula. This could only be done in conjunction with the West, and it would have to be done in such a way that they should neither seem to be giving the lie to their own vote in Nicæa—and therefore they would have to make it appear that they were attacking only the form and not the contents of the confession—nor seem to the Church in the West to be proclaiming a new faith. It is in the light of these facts that we are to regard the symbols of Antioch and the negotiations with Julius of Rome. They found themselves shut up in a position from which they could not escape without a certain amount of evasion. The *faith* of Athanasius must not be attacked any more than that of the Westerns.[1] The condemnation of the great bishop

[1] This explains why the canons of the Synod of Antioch came to enjoy a high reputation and why Hilary (de synod. 32) designated the assembly a 'synodus sanctorum.' All the same such a description is not quite intelligible; we know too little both of the character and of the proceedings of the Synod.

had thus always throughout to be based on personal accusations. As regards the doctrinal question, the whole stress had to be laid on getting the Homousios put quietly aside, on the ground that it was unbiblical and gave an inlet to Sabellianism. In this respect the doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra was very welcome to the Eusebians, for they sought, not without justice, to shew from it to what destructive results a theology which based itself on the Homousios must lead.[1] But the

[1] Marcellus is an extremely interesting phenomenon in the history of theology; he did not, however, succeed in effecting any change in the history of dogma or in creating any noteworthy number of followers. At the Council of Nicæa he belonged to the few who zealously championed the Homousios (Apol. c. Arian. 23, 32). After the Council he was, besides Eustathius, at first the sole literary representative of orthodoxy, since he wrote a comprehensive treatise περὶ ὑποταγῆς by way of reply to the work of the Arian Asterius. This work, in which he defends the unity of substance of the Logos, drew upon him from the dominant party the accusation of Sabellianism and Samosatenism. His case was dealt with at the Councils of Tyre, Jerusalem, and Constantinople, since he also personally defended Athanasius and opposed the restoration of Arius. Spite of his appeal to the Emperor he was at Constantinople deprived of his office as a teacher of erroneous doctrine, another bishop was sent to Ancyra, and Eusebius of Cæsarea endeavoured in two works (c. Marcell., de ecclesiast. theolog.) to refute him. These works are for us the source for the teaching of Marcellus. Marcellus did not recognise the common doctrinal basis of Arianism and orthodoxy; he went back behind the traditional teaching of Origen, like Paul of Samosata, and consequently got rid of the element which caused the trouble to Arianism and, in a higher degree, to orthodoxy. His doctrinal system presents, on the one hand, certain points of agreement with that of the old Apologists, though these are more apparent than real, and on the other with that of Irenæus; still it cannot be proved that there is any literary dependence. Marcellus was at one with Arius in holding that the conceptions "Son", "begotten" etc., involve the subordination of the being thus designated. But just because of this he rejected these conceptions as being inapplicable to the divine in Christ. He clearly perceived that the prevalent theology was on a wrong track owing to its implication with philosophy; he wished to establish a purely biblical system of doctrine and sought to shew that these conceptions are all used in the Scriptures in reference to *the incarnate one*, the view of most in the older days, *e.g.*, Ignatius. The Scripture supplies only *one* conception to express the eternal-divine in Christ, that of the Logos (the Logos is image or type only in connection with man created in his image): the Logos is the indwelling *power* in God, which has manifested itself in the creation of the world as δύναμις δραστική, in order then for the first time to become *personal* with the view of saving and perfecting the human race. Thus the Logos is in and for itself, in its essential nature, the *unbegotten* reason of God indwelling in God from all eternity and absolutely inseparable from him; it begins its actuality in the creation of the world, but it first becomes a personal manifestation distinct from God in the incarnation, through which the Logos as the image of the invisible God becomes visible. In Christ consequently the Logos has

Roman bishop was not to be corrupted, he did not even sacrifice Marcellus; and the creeds of Antioch which were not actually heterodox, but which were not sincere, did not at all meet with his approval. He did not concern himself with the attempt, justifiable from the point of view of the Orientals and

become a person and son of God—a person who is as surely ὁμοούσιος τῷ Θεῷ as he is the active working of God Himself. After the work has been completed, however, the Son subordinates Himself to the Father in such a way that God is again all in all, since the hypostatic form of the Logos now *ceases* (hence the title of M.'s work: περὶ ὑποταγῆς; the idea is an old one, see Vol. II.). M. confessed that he did not know what became of the humanity of Christ. The stumbling-blocks which this system presented to that age were (1) that M. called only the incarnate one Son of God, (2) that he taught no real pre-existence, (3) that he assumed the Kingdom of Christ would have an end, and (4) that he spoke of an extension of the indivisible monad. Marcellus having been recalled (337) and then expelled again from his diocese (338), like Athanasius, betook himself to Rome, and by means of a confession in which he disguised his doctrine, induced Bishop Julius to recognise his orthodoxy. (The confession is in the letter to Julius in Epiph. H. 72. 2: Zahn, Marcell. p. 70 f., vainly attempts to dispute the fact of a "disguising." In the letter he avows his belief in the Roman Creed also.) The Roman synod of the year 340 declared him to be sound in the faith. It scarcely fully understood the case; what is of much more importance is that Athanasius and consequently also the Council of Sardica did not abandon Marcellus, and the Council indeed remarked that the Eusebians had taken as a positve statement what he had uttered only *tentatively* (ζητῶν). That Athanasius spite of all remonstrances should have pronounced Marcellus orthodox, is a proof that his interest in the matter was confined to one point, and centred in the godhead of the historical Jesus Christ as resting upon the *unity of substance* with God. Where he saw that this was recognised, he allowed freedom of thought on other points. At a later period, it is true, when it became possible still more to discredit Marcellus through his pupil Photinus, there was a disagreement of a temporary kind between him and Athanasius. Athanasius is said to have refused to have intercourse with him and Marcellus is said to have dropped him. Athanasius also combatted the *theology* of M. (Orat. c. Arian. IV), though he afterwards again recognised the truth of his *faith*. Epiphanius informs us (72. 4) that he once put some questions to the aged Athanasius regarding M.: Ὁ δὲ οὔτε ὑπεραπελογήσατο, οὔτε πάλιν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπεχθῶς ἠνέχθη, μόνον δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου μειδίασας ὑπέφηνε, μοχθηρίας μὴ μακρὰν αὐτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ὡς ἀπολογησάμενον εἶχε. Marcellus' followers in Ancyra also possessed at a later date an epistle of Athanasius (Epiph. 72. 11) which was favourable to them. The East, however, stuck firmly to the condemnation of Marcellus, and so too did the Cappadocians at a later period—a proof this also of a radical difference between them and Athanasius. The further history of this matter has no place here (see Zahn op. cit. and Möller, R.-Encykl., 2nd Ed., p. 281 f.). Marcellus died in the year 373, close on a hundred years old, after that his theology had repeatedly done good service to the opponents of orthodoxy, without, however, helping them to discredit Athanasius.

of Constantius, to create for the East a doctrinal form of expression which was more in accordance with the convictions of the majority. The most important result of the operations of the Eusebians at Antioch, and the one which was of the greatest consequence, was that they had to bring themselves to renounce Arianism in order to gain over the West. Arianism was now condemned on all sides in the Church; nevertheless the Eusebians did not attain their aim.[1]

[1] The negotiations between Bishop Julius and the Eusebians assembled at Antioch (Rom. Council, autumn 340; Council at Antioch, summer and autumn 341) are from the point of view of Church politics of great significance, and more particularly the letter of Bishop Julius to the Eusebians after the Roman Council (Apol. c. Arian. 21) is a masterpiece. But we cannot enter on this matter here. The four formulæ of Antioch (it is to them that the reproach brought by Athanasius against his opponents chiefly refers—namely, that they betrayed their uncertainty by the new forms of faith they were constantly publishing,—see de decret. 1: de synod. 22—23: Encycl. ad epp. Ægypt. 7 sq.: Ep. ad. Afros 23) are in Athan., de synod. 22 sq. (Hahn § 84, 115, 85, 86). There are some good remarks in Gwatkin, p. 114 sq. The zealous efforts made by the Eusebians to arrive at a harmonious agreement with the West were probably closely connected also with the general political situation. After the fall of Constantine II. (spring 340) Constans had promptly made himself master of the whole of his brother's domain Constantius, whose attention was claimed by severe and incessant wars on the eastern boundary, was unable to hinder this. From the year 340 Constans thus had the decisive preponderance in the Empire. The first Antiochian formula still supports Arius, though with the odd qualification that those who were in favour of him had not followed him (*πῶς γὰρ ἐπίσκοποι ὄντες ἀκολουθήσαν πρεσβυτέρῳ*), but had tested his teaching: it limits itself to describing the Son as *μονογενῆ, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ὑπάρχοντα καὶ συνόντα τῷ γεγεννηκότι αὐτὸν πατρί*, but it already contains the anti-Marcellian proposition descriptive of the Son: *διαμένοντα βασιλέα καὶ Θεὸν εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*. The second, so-called Lucian, formula already gathers together all designations for the Son which could possibly be used of His Godhead from an Origenistic standpoint (above all, *μονογενῆ Θεὸν, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, ἄτρεπτον τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, τῆς θεότητος οὐσίας τε καὶ βουλῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα, Θεὸν λόγον*); it then adopts once more the addition which Eusebius had appended to the outline of his belief presented at Nicæa (see p. 52), and formulates the following proposition against Marcellus; *τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐχ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲ ἀργῶς κειμένων σημαινόντων ἀκριβῶς τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ὑπόστασιν* (N.B.=*οὐσίαν*) *καὶ τάξιν καὶ δόξαν, ὡς εἶναι τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν*; but on the other hand, without mentioning Arius, it expressly rejects the Arian catchwords objected to at Nicæa. The third, submitted by the Bishop of Tyana, has a still stronger anti-Marcellan colouring (I. Xρ. *ὄντα πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐν ὑποστάσει ... μένοντα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*), repudiates Marcellus, Sabellius, and Paul of Samosata by name, but otherwise in place of all other possible designations it has the Nicene sounding: *Θεὸν τέλειον ἐκ Θεοῦ τελείου*. At length the fourth formula, drawn up some months later, became the

During the following years Constantius' hands were tied by the Persian war, and he was forced to keep on good terms with his brother so as to avoid having trouble on the western boundary of his kingdom also. At the same time, just after the death of Eusebius of Nicomedia, which took place in the autumn of 342, the party amongst the conservatives of the East who, partly no doubt for political reasons, were actually set on coming to an agreement with the West, gained the lead. A general Council which was summoned by Constans to meet at Sardica in the summer of 343 and was approved of by Constantius, was to restore the unity of the Church. But the Western bishops, about a hundred in number, rejected the preliminary demand of the Eastern bishops for the deposition of Athanasius and Marcellus, both of whom were present in Sardica; pronounced sentence of deposition upon the leaders of the Orientals after the exodus of the latter; after an investigation declared the bishops attacked to be innocent, that is to say, orthodox; avowed their belief in the Nicene Creed, and under the guidance of Hosius took up the most rigid attitude possible on the doctrinal question.[1] In opposition to this the bishops,

final one. It is constructed as far as possible on the model of the Nicene Creed; at the end too some Arian catchwords are expressly condemned. The most important propositions run thus: *καὶ εἰς τὸν μονογενῆ αὐτοῦ υἱόν, τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ., τὸν πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός ... λόγον ὄντα καὶ σοφίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ φῶς ἀληθινόν*, at the close of this section (against Marcellus): *οὗ βασιλεία ἀκατάλυτος οὖσα διαμενεῖ εἰς τοὺς ἀπείρους αἰῶνας· ἔσται γὰρ καθεζόμενος ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι.* All four formulæ have this in common, that they are compatible with the theology of Origen; the three last, that Arianism in the strict sense is repudiated. The fourth was communicated to the Emperor Constans by a deputation in Gaul. For the rest it ought not to be forgotten that the Eusebians formally adhered to the basis of the Nicene Creed; see Hefele I., p. 502 ff.

[1] Sardica was situated in the territory of Constans. The most influential of the Eastern bishops were present. Hosius took the lead. (Histor. Arian 15.) The formal restatement of the Nicene Creed desired by some of them was not proceeded with. (Athan. Tom. ad Antioch. 5 against Socrates II., 20); but the description of the Faith which will be found at the close of the encyclical letter, although it is not to be regarded as an official declaration, is a document whose importance has hitherto not been sufficiently recognised. It originated with Hosius and Protogenes of Sardica, and *is the most unambiguous expression of the Western view in the matter*, so unambiguous that for the moment it seemed even to the orthodox Orientals themselves to be questionable (the formula is in Theodoret II. 8, lat. trans-

who met together in the neighbouring Philippopolis, framed a circular letter, dated from Sardica, in which they set forth the illegality of the procedure of their opponents, and confessed the faith in terms essentially identical with those of the fourth formula of Antioch.[1]

The endeavours of Constantius to give efficacy[2] to the resolutions of his bishops fell through; in fact, the shameless attempt to set a trap for the two Western bishops sent as a deputation from Sardica to Constantius and provided with a letter of introduction from Constans, and who were to try and effect the recall of the banished bishops, turned out to their advantage.[3] Constantius, so at least it seems, had not for a while any real confidence in his own party; or was it that he was afraid to rouse his brother? In a long-winded formula drawn up at Antioch in the summer of 344 they once more sought to hint to the West their orthodoxy and to suggest the minimum of their demands.[4] The Church in the West, it is true, rejected at

lation discovered by Maffei). It is here first of all that the proposition is found: *μίαν ὑπόστασιν, ἣν αὐτοὶ οἱ αἱρετικοὶ οὐσίαν προσαγορεύουσι* (for *ὑπόστασιν* we have in the Latin "substantiam"), *τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. Καὶ εἰ ζητοῖεν, τίς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἡ ὑπόστασις ἐστιν, ὁμολογοῦμεν ὡς αὕτη ἦν ἡ μόνη τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογουμένη.* In the second place the doctrine of the Son is put in such a way that one can very easily understand how the Westerns refused to condemn Marcellus; there are turns of expression which approach the doctrine of Marcellus. (A comparison with the Christology of Prudentius is instructive in this connection.) Ursacius and Valens amongst others were declared deposed. Their bishoprics were situated in the territory of Constans, but they were of an Arian way of thinking. Hefele, op. cit. p. 533 ff., treats in great detail the canons and acts of the Council.

[1] Above all, the Eusebians repeated their old statement that the decrees of deposition pronounced by Councils in reference to bishops are irrevocable. So too they held to the charges against Marcellus (of erroneous doctrine) and against Athanasius (of flagrant abuse of his power). There is a wish to introduce something entirely new, "ut orientales episcopi ab occidentalibus judicarentur"; but whoever holds by Marcellus and Athanasius let him be Anathema. The doctrinal formula (Hilarius Fragm. III. and de synod, 34) differs little from the fourth formula of Antioch and thus condemns Arianism. *Formally* the Easterns were in the right as regards Athanasius.

[2] Histor. Arian. 18, 19.

[3] Histor. Arian. 20; Theodoret II. 9, 10. Bishop Stephanus of Antioch, who had tried the trick, was deposed.

[4] Their motive in bringing forward the new formula was by almost completely meeting the demands of the Westerns in reference to the doctrinal question, to

both the Councils held at Milan in the years 345 and 347, the teaching of Photinus of Sirmium, who, in a surprising fashion, had developed an Adoptian doctrinal system out of the doctrine of Marcellus,[1] but otherwise remained firm; and the ship of the Eusebians already appeared to be in so great danger that its two chief pilots, Ursacius and Valens, preferred to go over to

induce them to give way on the personal question. (Ekthesis macrostichos, see Athan., de synod. 26: Socrat. II. 19). It begins with the fourth formula of Antioch, then follow detailed explanations of the faith as against the Arians, Sabellians, Marcellus, and Photinus who is mentioned here for the first time. Spite of the polemic against the proposition of Athanasius—who is, however, not mentioned by name—that the Son is begotten *οὐ βουλήσει οὐδὲ θελήσει*, this formula indicates the greatest approach conceivable on the part of the Eusebians towards meeting the views of their opponents. They emphasise in the strongest way the unity of the one Godhead (c. 4): *οὔτε μήν, τρία ὁμολογοῦντες πράγματα καὶ τρία πρόσωπα* (it has to be noticed that the bishops avoid the expression three "substances or hypostases" and use the Western *πρόσωπον* which had been brought into discredit by Sabellius) *τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁ. πνεύματος κατὰ τὰς γραφάς, τρεῖς δὲ τοῦτο θεοὺς ποιοῦμεν*, and they expressed themselves in such a way in c. 9, that the words must pass for an unobjectionable paraphrase of the Homousios. They are practically the very same expressions as those used by Athanasius to describe the relation of Father and Son. "Homousios" is, however, wanting: but, on the other hand, we find here, so far as I know, for the first time: *κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον*. Socrates, II. 20, has candidly remarked on the formula macrostichos: *ταῦτα οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἑσπέρια μέρη ἐπίσκοποι διὰ τὸ ἀλλογλώσσους εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνιέναι οὐ προσεδέχοντο, ἀρκεῖν τὴν ἐν Νικαίᾳ πίστιν λέγοντες*. On the Acts of a Synod at Köln, from which we gather that Bishop Euphrates of Köln who was sent to Antioch from Sardica, had afterwards fallen away to Arianism, see Rettberg (K.-G. Deutschlands, I., p. 123 ff.) and Hauck (K.-G. Deutschlands, I., p. 47 f.), who are opposed to their genuineness; Friedrich (K.-G. Deutschland, I., p. 277 f.) and Söder (Stud. u. Mitth. aus. d. Benedict. Orden, fourth year's issue, I., p. 295 f., II., p. 344 f., fifth year, I., p. 83 f.) who are in favour of it.

[1] Photinus of Sirmium, a fellow-countryman and pupil of Marcellus, developed the doctrinal system of the master in such a way as to represent even the *ἐνέργεια δραστική* of God as not assuming a concrete hypostatic form in Jesus Christ, (or if it did take a concrete form as a hypostasis, then this was a purely human one—the matter is not quite clear). He thus rigidly held fast the single personality of God, and accordingly, like Paul of Samosata, saw in Jesus a man miraculously born (Zahn, op. cit., p. 192 combats this; but neither is the evidence that Photinus denied the birth from the Virgin Mary certain enough, nor is it in itself credible that a catholic bishop in the fourth century should have departed so far from the tradition), predestined to his office by God, and who in virtue of his moral development has attained to divine honour. We thus have here the last inherently logical attempt to guard Christian monotheism, entirely to discard the philosophical Logos-doctrine, and to conceive of the Divine in Christ as a divine *effect*. But this attempt was no longer in harmony with the spirit of the age; Photinus was charged on all sides with teaching erroneous doctrine. His writings have dis-

the opposite party and to make their peace with Athanasius.[1] Constantius, very sorely pressed by the Persians, sought to have peace in the Church at any price and even granted the prayer of his brother's protégé, Athanasius, and allowed him to return to Alexandria (in October 346), where Gregory meanwhile had died (in June 345 [2]). The bishop got an enthusiastic welcome in his city. The protest of the Eastern Council at Sirmium—the first Council of Sirmium—had no effect. A large number of the Eastern bishops were themselves tired of the controversy, and it almost looked as if the refusal of the West to condemn Marcellus together with the word ὁμοούσιος, now virtually constituted the only stone of offence.[3]

appeared: compare the scattered statements regarding him in Athanasius, Hilary, the Church historians, Epiph. H. 72 and the anathemas of various Councils, see also Vigilius Taps. adv. Arian., Sabell. et Photin.). The two Milan Councils, the date of which is not quite certain, condemned him, so too did a Sirmian Council of Eusebians which was perhaps held as early as 347. Still he remained in office till 351, held in high respect by his congregation. That the macrostic Confession of the Orientals ought not all the same to be accepted as so orthodox as it from its wording appears to be, is evident from the fact that the Eastern bishops who were deputed to take it to the West declined at Milan to condemn Arianism too. (Hilarius, Fragm. V.)

[1] For the documents relating to their conversion, which was hypocritical and dictated entirely by policy, and to their complete recognition of Athanasius, see Athanas. Apol. c. Arian. 58, Hilar., Fragm. II.

[2] Schiller (op. cit. p. 282). "As a matter of fact Constans wished to establish a kind of supremacy in relation to his brother, which in spiritual matters was to be exercised through the Bishop of Rome. Trusting to his support, deposed bishops on their own authority returned to their dioceses, without having received the sanction of the Emperor. The restoration of Athanasius resolved on by the Council was a direct interference with the sovereignty of Constantius... But Constans was able once more to make such a skilful use of the existing Persian difficulty that his brother yielded." The fact is that the recall of Athanasius was altogether forced upon Constantius; the relation of the great bishop to his Emperor at this time was not that of a subject, but that of a hostile power with which he had to treat. This is naturally glossed over in the papers issued by Constantius referring to the recall. It is specially characteristic that Athanasius did not personally present himself before Constantius till after repeated invitations; see, above all, Apol. c. Arian. 51—56, Hist. Arian. 21—23.

[3] A Council of Jerusalem held in 346 under Maximus actually recognised Athanasius as a member of the Church. (Apol. c. Arian. 57). Cyril's Catecheses shew the standpoint of the Oriental extreme Right; they are undoubtedly based on Orig. de princip.; but they faithfully express the Christological standpoint of the formula macrostichos; the ὁμοούσιος only is wanting; as regards the matter of the Faith, Cyril is orthodox. The polemic directed against Sabellius and Marcellus

But the death of Constans in 350 and the overthrow of the usurper Magnentius in 353 changed everything. If in these last years Constantius had been compelled by the necessities of the situation to submit to the bishops, his own subjects, who had ruled his deceased brother, now that he was sole sovereign he was more than ever resolved *to govern the Church* and to pay back the humiliations which he had undergone.[1] Already in the year 351 the Easterns had at Sirmium—the second Council—again agreed upon taking common action, and Ursacius and Valens promptly rejoined them.[2] The great thing now was to humiliate the stubborn West. Constantius set about the task with wisdom, but what he wanted done he carried out by the sheer force of terror. He demanded only the condemnation of Athanasius, his mortal enemy, as a rebel, and purposely put the doctrinal question in the background. He forced the Western bishops, at Arles in 353 and at Milan in 355, to agree to this, by terrorising the Councils. The moral overthrow of the Westerns was scarcely less complete than that of the Easterns at Nicæa. Though the great majority were unaware of the struggle and were not forced to adopt a new confessional

(Catech. 15, 27) is severe and very bitter; Arianism is also refuted, but without any mention of names. Jews, Samaritans, and Manicheans are the chief opponents referred to, and Cyril is at great pains everywhere to adduce the biblical grounds for the formulæ which he uses. The Catecheses of Cyril are a valuable document in illustration of the fact that amongst the Eastern opponents of the Nicene formula there were bishops who, while fully recognising that Arianism was in the wrong, could not bring themselves to use a doctrinal formula which seemed to them a source of ceaseless strife and to be unbiblical besides.

[1] Schiller (p. 283 f.) supposes that Constantius was apprehensive before this that Athanasius would declare for Magnentius. Hence his friendly letter to Athanasius after the death of Constans, Hist. Arian. 24.

[2] Photinus was deposed here. The Creed of this Council, the first formula of Sirmium (in Athanas., de synod. 27, Hilar. de synod. 38 and Socr. II., 30), is identical with the Fourth Formula of Antioch, but numerous anathemas are added to it in which formulæ such as "two gods", (2), "πλατυσμὸς τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός" (7), "λογος ἐνδιάθετος ἢ προφορικός" (8) are condemned, and already several explanations of Bible passages are branded as heretical (11, 12, 14—18). The subordination of the Son is expressly (18) avowed in this Creed, which otherwise strongly resembles the Nicene Creed. The anathemas 20—23 have to do with the Holy Ghost. In No. 19 the formula ἓν πρόσωπον is rejected. Nos. 12, 13, deny that the divine element in Christ is capable of suffering. One can see that new questions have emerged.

formula, still the fact could not be concealed from those who better understood the state of things, that the projected condemnation of Athanasius meant something more than a personal question. The few bishops who refused were deposed and exiled.[1] The order for his deposition was communicated to Athanasius in February 356. Yielding only to force, he made his escape into the desert where the Emperor could not reach him. Egypt was in a state of rebellion, but the revolt was put down by the Emperor with blood.[2] The unity of the Church was restored; above all, it was once more brought under the imperial sway. And now, forsooth, the orthodox bishops who had formerly secured so much by the help of Constans began to recollect that the Emperor and the State ought not to meddle with religion. Constantius became "Antichrist" for those who would have lauded him as they had his father and his brother, if he had given them the help of his arm.[3]

But the political victory of the Eastern bishops directly led to their disunion; for it was only under the tyranny of the West and in the fight against Athanasius and the word

[1] Of the Western bishops—leaving out Pannonia—almost all were orthodox. The Councils—that of Arles was a provincial Council, that of Milan a General Council, but apparently badly attended—were also managed by the new Pope Liberius (since 352), but ended quite contrary to his will. The best description is in Krüger Lucifer, pp. 11—20. At Arles Paulinus of Trier was the only one who remained firm, and he was exiled to Phrygia; even the Papal legates yielded. At Milan Lucifer and Eusebius of Vercelli were exiled, and also Dionysius of Milan, although he had agreed to the condemnation of Athanasius. Soon after Hosius, Liberius, and Hilary had to follow them into exile. In Milan Constantius actually ruled the Church, but with a brutal terrorism. There are characteristic utterances of his in Lucifer's works and in Athanasius.

[2] Already in the years immediately preceding, an incessant agitation had again been kept up against Athanasius; see Socr. II., 26, Sozom. IV., 9, Athan. Apol. ad Const. 2 sq., 14 sq., 19 sq. He betook himself to the desert, but later on he seems to have remained in hiding in Alexandria. No one, it would appear, cared to secure the price set upon his head. We have several writings of his belonging to this period. His successor, George, was pretty much isolated in Alexandria.

[3] The watchword of the "independence" of the Church of the State was now issued by Athanasius, Hilary, and above all by the hot-blooded Lucifer. Hilary, who first emerges into notice in 355, speedily gained a high reputation. He was the first theologian of the West to penetrate into the secrets of the Nicene Creed, and with all his dependence on Athanasius was an original thinker, who, as a theologian, far surpassed the Alexandrian Bishop. On his theology see the monograph by Reinkens, also Möhler, op. cit. 449 ff., and Dorner.

"ὁμοούσιος" that they had become united. Above all, Arianism in its rigid, aggressive form again made its appearance. Aëtius and Eunomius, two theologians of spirit who had been trained in the Aristotelian dialectic, and were opponents of Platonic speculation, expressed its tenets in the plainest possible way, would have nothing to do with any mediation, and had no scruple in openly proclaiming the conversion of religion into morality and syllogistic reasoning. The formulæ which they and their followers, Aëtians, Eunomians, Exukontians, Heterousiasts, Anomœans, defended, ran thus: "ἑτερότης κατ' οὐσίαν", "ἀνόμοιος καὶ κατὰ πάντα καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν" ("different in substance", "unlike in everything and also in substance"). If they allowed that the Son perfectly knows the Father, this was not in any way a concession, but an expression of the thought that there is no kind of mystery about the Godhead, which on the contrary can be perfectly known by every rightly instructed man. And so too the statement that the Logos had his superior dignity from the date of his creation, and did not first get it by being tested, was not intended at all as a weakening of the Arian dogma, but as an expression of the fact that God the Creator has assigned its limit to every being.[1] The great majority of the Eastern bishops, for whom the Origenistic formulæ in very varied combinations were authoritative, were opposed to this party. The old watchword, however, "the unchangeable image", which was capable of different interpretations, now received in opposition to Arianism, in its strict form, and on the basis of the formulæ of Antioch, more and more a precise signification as implying that the Son is of like nature with the Father in respect of substance also, and not only in respect of will (ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν), and that his begetting is not an act at all identical with creation. The *likeness* of the qualities of Son and Father was more and more recognised here; on the other hand, the substantial *unity* was disallowed, so as to avoid getting on the track of Marcel-

[1] After the full account given of the theology of Arius there was no need for any detailed description of the theology of Aëtius and Eunomius; for it is nothing but logical Arianism; see on the Ἔκθεσις πίστεως and the Ἀπολογητικός of Eunomius Fabricius-Harless T. IX. The rejection of all conciliatory formulæ is characteristic.

lus; *i.e.*, these theologians did not, like Athanasius, advance from the unity to the mystery of the duality, but, on the contrary, still started from the duality and sought to reach the unity by making Father and Son perfectly co-ordinate. They therefore still had a Θεὸς δεύτερος, and in accordance with this excluded the idea of full *community* of substance. The leaders of these Homoiousians, also called semi-Arians, were George of Laodicea,[1] Eustathius of Sebaste, Eusebius of Emesa, Basilius of Ancyra, and others.

The point of supreme importance with the Emperor necessarily was to maintain intact the unity between those who up till now had been united, but this was all the more difficult as the Homoiousians more and more developed their doctrinal system in such a way that their ideas came to have weight even with those Westerns who lingered in exile in the East and whose theology was on Nicene lines.[2] Some bishops who were devoted to Constantius and who represented simply and solely the interests of the Emperor and of the Empire, now sought by means of a formula of the most indefinite possible character to unite Arians and semi-Arians. These were Ursacius, Valens, Acacius of Cæsarea, and Eudoxius of Antioch. If up till 356 the Nicene Creed had, strictly speaking, been merely evaded, now at last a Confession was to be openly brought forward in direct opposition to the Nicene Creed. Simple *likeness of nature* was to be the dogmatic catchword, all more definite characterisations being omitted, and in support of this, appeal was made to the insoluble mystery presented by the Holy Scriptures (ὅμοιος κατὰ τὰς γραφάς—like according to the Scriptures). This ingenious formula, along with which, it is true, was a statement expressly emphasising the subordination, left it free to every one to have what ideas he chose regarding the extent of the qualities of Father and Son, which were thus declared to be of like kind. The relative ὅμοιος did not neces

[1] Dräseke (Ges. patristische Unters., 1889, p. 1 ff.) wishes to credit him with the anonymous work against the Manicheans, which Lagarde discovered (1859) in a MS. of Titus of Bostra.

[2] With Hilary, for example, as his work "de synodis" proves. It is very characteristic that Lucifer, the strictest of the Nicenes, never came to have a clear idea of the meaning of the formulæ, ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος; see Krüger, p. 37 f.

sarily exclude the relative *ἀνόμοιος*, but neither did it exclude the *ὁμοιούσιος*. Already at the third Council of Sirmium (357), after Constantius, on a visit to Rome, had overthrown his enemies, a formula was set forth by the Western bishops of as conciliatory a character so far as Arianism was concerned as could possibly be conceived. It was proclaimed in presence of the Emperor, who under the influence of his consort came more and more to have Arian sympathies. This is the second Sirmian formula.[1] But the bishops assembled at Ancyra did not acquiesce in the move towards the Left (358).[2] What a

[1] The Confession is in Hilary, de Synod. 11, Athan. de synod. 28, Socrat. II. 30. Valens, Ursacius and Germinius of Sirmium took the lead. The words *ὁμοούσιος* and *ὁμοιούσιος* were *forbidden* as being unbiblical and because no one could express the generation of the Son. It is settled that the Father is greater, that the Son is subordinate. Here too the Christological problem of the future is already touched upon. Hilary pronounces the formula blasphemous. It marks the turning-point in the long controversy to this extent that it is the first public attempt to controvert the Nicene Creed. Against it Phobadius wrote the tractate "de filii divinitate", which is severely Western-Nicene in tone, and in this respect is markedly different from the conciliatory work of Hilary "de synodis"; see on it Gwatkin, p. 159 sq. The Eastern bishops Acacius and Uranius of Tyre, who shared the sentiments of the court-bishops, accorded a vote of thanks to the latter at a Council at Antioch, held in 358. Hosius subscribed the second Sirmian formula (Socr. II. 31).

[2] Aëtius was in high favour with Eudoxius of Antioch, and his pupils occupied the Eastern bishoprics. The manifesto of Sirmium appeared like an edict of toleration for strict Arianism. At the instigation of George of Laodicea some Semi-Arians joined together to oppose it at the Council of Ancyra. The comprehensive synodal-letter of Ancyra (Epiph. p. 73, 2—11, see Hilar. de synod) indicates the transition on the part of the Semi-Arians to the point of view at which the Niceans were able to meet them. It was re-echoed in the writings of Hilary and Athanasius de synodis (358—359). The Semi-Arians at Ancyra took up a position based on the fourth Antiochian formula, which was also that of Philippopolis and of the First Sirmian Council, but they explained that the new Arianism made it necessary to have precise statements. The following are the most important explanations given; (1) the name Father by its very form points to the fact that God must be the author of a substance of like quality with Him (*αἴτιος ὁμοίας αὐτοῦ οὐσίας*): *πᾶς πατὴρ ὁμοίας αὐτοῦ οὐσίας νοεῖται πατήρ*—this does away with the relation of Logos-Son and world-idea—(2) the designation "Son" excludes everything of a created kind and involves the full *ὁμοιότης*, (3) "the Son" is consequently Son in the peculiar and unique sense, and the analogy with men as sons of God is thus done away with. The likeness in substance is further based on Bible statements, and in the 19 anathemas together with Sabellianism *all* formulæ are rejected which express less than likeness in substance. Finally, however, "*ὁμοούσιος*" too, together with the characteristic addition "*ἡ ταυτοούσιος*" has an anathema attached to it, *i.e.*, the substantial *unity* of essence is rejected as Sabellian.

change! Easterns now defended purity of doctrine against Arianising Westerns! A deputation from this Council succeeded in paralysing the influence of the Arians with Constantius, and in asserting at the Fourth Council of Sirmium, in 358, their fundamental principles to which the Emperor lent the weight of his authority.[1] But the triumph of the Homoiousians led by Basilius Ancyranus was of short duration. The Emperor saw that the Church could not be delivered up either to Nicæans, to semi-Arians, or to Arians. The alliance between the two first mentioned, which was so zealously pushed on by Hilary, was not yet perfect. A grand Council was to declare the imperial will, and Homoiousians and Arians vied with each other in their efforts to get influencing it. The Homœans alone, however, both in their character as leaders and as led, concurred with the Emperor's views. They were represented by Ursacius, Valens, Marcus of Arethusa, Auxentius of Milan, and Germinius of Sirmium. The fourth Sirmian formula (359), an imperial cabinet-edict and a political masterpiece, was intended to embody what was to be laid before the Council.[2] The latter

The Conservatives of the East have undoubtedly here quite changed their ground. A definitely defined doctrine has taken the place of prolix formulæ, at once cosmological and soteriological in drift, and derived from Origen, Lucian, and Eusebius.

[1] The victory of the Semi-Arians at the court is a turn of affairs which we cannot clearly explain. The fact is incontestable. The third formula of Sirmium, drawn up at the Fourth Council of Sirmium, is identical with the fourth Antiochian formula. That Constantius should have fallen back on this is perhaps to be explained from the fact that the disturbances at Rome made it necessary for him to send Liberius back there, though the most he could hope for was to get him to subscribe that formula, but not the manifesto of the year 357. He actually got him to do this, *i.e.*, Liberius subscribed several older confessional formularies which originated at a time when the Nicene Creed had been only indirectly attacked. It was not only, however, that Liberius bought his freedom at that time, but it was actually for the time being a question of a general victory of the Homoiousians, which they used too entirely in their own interest, after all the bishops present at Sirmium, including Ursacius and Valens, had had to make up their minds to subscribe the synodal decrees. Eudoxius of Antioch and Aëtius and in addition 70 Anomœans were banished at the instigation of Basil of Ancyra and there were many instances of the violent use of power. One cannot be certain if these same violent proceedings did not bring about once more a quick change of feeling on the part of the Emperor.

[2] The Council was intended to bring about at last a general peace; at first the Emperor evidently intended to summon it to meet at Nicæa (Soz. IV. 16), then

was summoned to meet at Rimini and Seleucia because the circumstances in the East and West respectively differed so very much. In May 359 more than four hundred Western bishops assembled at Rimini. They were instructed to treat only of matters relating to the Faith and not to leave the Council till the unity aimed at had been attained. But the Emperor's confidants failed to induce the great majority of the members to accept the Sirmian formula. The bishops, on the contrary, took their stand on the basis of the Nicene Creed which had been abandoned during these last years, rejected Arianism and declared its friends deposed. But when they sought by means of a Deputation to get the Emperor to give his sanction to their decisions, they did not get a hearing. The Deputation was not admitted to the Emperor's presence, was at first detained and then conducted to Nice in Thrace, where the members at last shewed themselves docile enough to sign a formula—the formula of Nice—which was undoubtedly essentially identical with the Confession which the Westerns had themselves drawn up two years earlier at Sirmium, at the third Synod in 357—("the Son is like the Father [*κατὰ πάντα* is omitted] according to the Scriptures"). Armed with this docu-

Nicomedia was next considered as a likely place, but it was destroyed by an earthquake. Then it was that Nicæa was again thought of; Basil of Ancyra had still a great influence at the time. Finally, the party opposed to this was victorious, and the plan of a division of the Councils was carried through. But it was just this opposition-party which now wished to unite all parties in a Homœan Confession and gained over the Emperor to assent to this. The actual result, however, was that Homœans and Anomœans on the one hand, Homoiousians and Homousians on the other, more and more drew together. Hilary, who was staying in the East, had indeed already explained to his Gallic compatriots that it was possible to attach an "unpious" meaning to *ὁμοούσιος* quite as readily as to *ὁμοιούσιος*. The bishops assembled in presence of the Emperor now composed in advance for the Council a Confession which, since Semi-Arians were also present, might serve as a means of reconciling Homœan and Homoiousian conceptions. It was already evident at the time of signing it that it was differently interpreted. The catchwords ran thus: *ὅμοιον πατρὶ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς*—*ὅμοιον κατὰ πάντα ὡς οἱ ἅγιαι γραφαὶ λέγουσιν.* Valens signed it and at the same time simply repeated the word *ὅμοιον* without the *κατὰ πάντα*; Basil in signing it expressly remarked that *πάντα* included being also. The formula is in Athan. de synd. 8, Socrat. II. 37; see Sozom. IV. 17. The dogmatic treatise of Basil in Epiph. H. 73, 12—22, has reference to this formula, which Athanasius (de synodis) had already scoffed at because of its being dated, *i.e.*, because it bore the signs of its newness on its front.

ment Ursacius and Valens made their way to Rimini, taking the deputies with them, and by means of threats and persuasions finally induced the Assembly there to accept the formula into which one could indeed read the Homoiousia, but not the Homousia. In the autumn of 359 the Eastern Synod met at Seleucia. The Homoiousians, with whom some Niceans already made common cause, had the main say. Still the minority led by Acacius and Eudoxius, which defended the Sirmian formula and clung to the likeness while limiting it, however, to the will, was not an insignificant one. There was an open rupture in the Synod. The majority finally deposed the heads of the opposition-party.[1] But as regards the East as well, the decision lay with the court.[2] The Emperor, importuned on all sides, had resolved to abandon the strict Arians, and accordingly Aëtius was banished and his Homœan friends had to leave him, but he was also determined to dictate the formula of Nice to the Easterns too.[3] Their representatives finally condescended to recognise the formula, and this event was announced at the Council of Constantinople in 360, and the Homœan Confession was once more formulated.[4] Although the new Imperial Confession involved the exclusion of the extreme Left, this did not constitute its peculiar significance. Had it actually been what it appeared to be, a formula of union for all who rejected the

[1] Socr. II. 37 explains that Nice was chosen with the view of giving to the new formula a name which sounded the same as that of the Nicene Creed. The formula is in Athan. de synod. 30, and Theodoret II. 21: *ὁμοιον κατὰ τὰς γραφάς, οὗ τὴν γέννησιν οὐδεὶς οἶδεν.* In addition: *τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τῆς οὐσίας ὕπερ ἁπλούστερον ἐνετέθη ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων, ἀγνοούμενον δὲ τοῖς λαοῖς σκάνδαλον ἔφερε, διὰ τὸ ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς τοῦτο μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι, ἤρεσε περιαιρεθῆναι καὶ παντελῶς μηδεμίαν μνήμην οὐσίας τοῦ λοιποῦ γίνεσθαι ... μήτε μὴ δεῖν ἐπὶ προσώπου πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος μίαν ὑπόστασιν ὀνομάζεσθαι.* One might be pleased with this rational explanation if polytheism did not in fact lurk behind it.

[2] Hilary was present in Seleucia and made common cause with the Homoiousians against the others. Acacius in face of the superior numbers of the Homoiousians sought to save his party by drawing up a creed in which he expressly repudiated the Anomœans and proclaimed the *likeness in will*, (see the creed in Athanas. de synod. 29, Epiph. H. 73, c. 25, Socr. II. 40). But this did not protect him and his party.

[3] It was on the night of the last day of the year 359 that the Emperor achieved the triumph of the *ὅμοιος* in his empire.

[4] The Confession is in Athanas. de synod. 30 and Socr. II. 41.

unlikeness, it would not have been something to be condemned, from the standpoint of the State at all events. But in the following year it was recklessly used as a weapon against the Homoiousians.[1] They had to vacate all positions of influence, and by way of making up for what had been done to the one Aëtius, who had been sacrificed, his numerous friends were installed as bishops.[2] Under cover of the "likeness in nature" a mild form of Arianism was actually established in the Church, modified chiefly only by the absence of principle. In Gaul alone did the orthodox bishops once more bestir themselves after Julian had in January 360 been proclaimed Augustus at Paris.[3] Constantius died in November 361, during the campaign against the rebels.

3. TO THE COUNCILS OF CONSTANTINOPLE 381. 383.

The three possible standpoints—the Athanasian, the Lucianist-Arian, and the Origenist, which in opposition to the Arian had gradually narrowed itself down to the Homoiousian—had been set aside by Constantius in the interest of the unity of the Church. But the Homœan formula, which had no firm theological conviction behind it, meant the domination of a party which gravitated towards Arianism, *i.e.*, which resolved faith in Jesus Christ into a dialectical discussion about unbegotten and begotten and into the conviction of the *moral* unity of Father and Son. It was for twenty years, with the exception of a brief interval, the dominant creed in the East. This fact finds its explanation only in the change, or narrowing, which came over what was at an earlier date the middle party. The Arianising Homœans were now *conservative* and in their way even conciliatory. They disposed of the ancient tradition of the East as

[1] People like Eudoxius and Acacius were real victors; they got a perfectly free hand for themselves against the Homoiousians at the cost of the condemnation of Aëtius, and made common cause with Valens and Ursinus. The Creed of Nice was sent all over the Empire for signature under threat of penalty.

[2] Eunomius became bishop of Cyzikus; Eudoxius of Antioch received the chair of Constantinople.

[3] See the epistle of the Synod of Paris (360 or 361) in Hilar. Fragm. XI. It did not at that time require any courage to declare against Constantius.

the Eusebians had done before them; for their formula "of like nature according to Holy Scripture" contained that latitude which corresponded to the old traditional doctrine. With this we may compare the standpoint of Eusebius of Cæsarea. The old middle party had, however, in the ὁμοιούσιος made for themselves a *fixed* doctrinal formula.[1] This was a change of the

[1] The dogmatic dissertation of the Homoiousians in Epiphan. 73, 12—22, is of the highest importance; for it shews in more than *one* respect a dogmatic advance: (1) the differentiation of the conceptions οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον begins here. The first of these is used in order to express the idea of the essence or substance which imprints itself in the form of a definite quality; accordingly the action of the Fathers who in protesting against Paul of Samosata attributed a *special* οὐσία to the Son, is by an explanation excused. They did this in order to do away with the idea that the Logos is a mere ῥῆμα, a λεκτικὴ ἐνέργεια. The proper expression, however, is ὑπόστασις. It is because the Logos is an ὑπόστασις, *i.e.*, because he does not, like the other words of God, lack being, that the Fathers called τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὐσίαν (c. 12). The ἀκρίβεια τῆς τῶν προσώπων ἐπιγνώσεως must be strictly maintained as against Sabellius (c. 14); but no one is to be led astray by the word ὑποστάσεις (Pl.); it does not mean that there are two or three Gods: διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ὑποστάσεις οἱ ἀνατολικοὶ λέγουσιν, ἵνα τὰς ἰδιότητας τῶν προσώπων ὑφεστώσας καὶ ὑπαρχούσας γνωρίσωσιν. The word "Hypostasis" is thus merely meant to give the word πρόσωπον a definite meaning, implying that it is to be taken as signifying independently existing manifestations (c. 16), while οὐσία is in the tractate interchangeable with φύσις or πνεῦμα, and is thus still used only in the singular; (2) quite as much attention is already given to the Holy Ghost as to the Son, and the τρόποι ὑπάρξεως are developed, *i.e.*, an actual doctrine of the Trinity independent of any ideas about the world, is constructed (c. 16): Εἰ γὰρ πνεῦμα ὁ πατήρ, πνεῦμα καὶ ὁ υἱός, πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, οὐ νοεῖται πατὴρ ὁ υἱός· ὑφέστηκε δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, ὃ οὐ νοεῖται υἱός, ὃ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι... Τὰς ἰδιότητας προσώπων ὑφεστώτων ὑποστάσεις ὀνομάζουσιν οἱ ἀνατολικοί, οὐχὶ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις τρεῖς ἀρχὰς ἢ τρεῖς θεοὺς λέγοντες... Ὁμολογοῦσι γὰρ μίαν εἶναι θεότητα... ὅμως τὰ πρόσωπα ἐν ταῖς ἰδιότησι τῶν ὑποστάσεων εὐσεβῶς γνωρίζουσι, τὸν πατέρα ἐν τῇ πατρικῇ αὐθεντίᾳ ὑφεστῶτα νοοῦντες, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν οὐ μέρος ὄντα τοῦ πατρός, ἀλλὰ καθαρῶς ἐκ πατρὸς τέλειον ἐκ τελείου γεγεννημένον καὶ ὑφεστῶτα ὁμολογοῦντες, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὃ ἡ θεία γραφὴ παράκλητον ὀνομάζει, ἐκ πατρὸς δι' υἱοῦ ὑφεστῶτα γνωρίζοντες... Οὐκοῦν ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ υἱὸν ἀξίως νοοῦμεν, ἐν υἱῷ δὲ μονογενεῖ πατέρα εὐσεβῶς καὶ ἀξίως δοξάζομεν, (3) the Christological problem based on Philipp. II. 6 and Rom. VIII. 3 (ὁμοίωμα) is already introduced for the elucidation of the Trinitarian: ἀπὸ τοῦ σωματικοῦ εὐσεβῶς καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου πατρός τε καὶ υἱοῦ διδαχθῆναι (c. 17, 18). As Christ's flesh is *identical* with human flesh, but is, on the other hand, on account of its wonderful origin only ὅμοιος, κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πνεῦμα ὢν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς πνεῦμα γεννηθείς, κατὰ μὲν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ πνεύματος εἶναι τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄνευ ἀπορροίας καὶ πάθους καὶ μερισμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθῆναι ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ πατρί. Accordingly we have now the decisive statement: Οὐκοῦν διὰ τῆς πρὸς Φιλιππησίους ἐπιστολῆς ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς πῶς ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁμοία ἐστὶ

most decisive kind. We may still further say *it was not the "Homousios" which finally triumphed, but on the contrary the Homoiousian doctrine, which fixed on the terms of agreement with the "Homousios."* The doctrine which Hosius, Athanasius, Eustathius, and Marcellus had championed at Nicæa, was overthrown. The new Origenism which was based on the "Homousios" succeeded in establishing itself. A form of doctrine triumphed which did not exclude scientific theology, a subject in which Athanasius and the Westerns of the older days never shewed any interest. But Athanasius himself contributed to the revolution thus accomplished, [1] though it is very doubtful if he ever came to see the full extent of it.

τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ πατρός· πνεῦμα γὰρ ἐκ πατρός. Καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔννοιαν (and therefore thought of in essence as a generic conception) ταὐτόν, ὡς κατὰ τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς ἔννοιαν ταὐτὸν. Οὐ ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀλλὰ ὅμοιον, διότι τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅ ἐστιν ὁ υἱός, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ πατήρ, καὶ ἡ σάρξ, ἣν ὁ λόγος ἀνέβαλεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ σπέρματος καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' οὕτως ὡς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξεν . . . ὁ πατὴρ πνεῦμα ὢν αὐθεντικῶς ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς πνεῦμα ὢν οὐκ αὐθεντικῶς ποιεῖ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀλλ' ὁμοίως. Οὐκοῦν καθὰ μὲν σὰρξ καὶ σὰρξ ταὐτὸν, ὥσπερ καθὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πνεῦμα ταὐτόν. καθὸ δὲ ἄνευ σποράς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καθὸ ἄνευ ἀπορροίας καὶ πάθους ὁ υἱὸς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ὅμοιον. Thus these Homoiousians already admit the ταὐτόν if they also reject the ταὐτοούσιος (= ὁμοούσιος), *i.e.*, Father and Son are ταὐτόν as regards substance, in so far as they are both πνεῦμα, but in so far as they are different Hypostases they are not identical, but of like nature. (4) These Homoiousians have expressly rejected the designations ἀγέννητος for God and γεννητός for the Son, and indeed not only because they are unbiblical, but because "Father" includes much more than "Unbegotten", and because "γεννητός" includes much less than "Son", and further because the conjunction "unbegotten—begotten" does not express *the relation of reciprocity* between Father and Son (the γνησίως γεγεννημένῳ), which is emphasised as being the most important (c. 14, 19): διὸ κἂν πατέρα μόνον ὀνομάζωμεν, ἔχομεν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ πατρὸς συνυπακουομένην τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ υἱοῦ, πατὴρ γὰρ υἱοῦ πατὴρ λέγεται· κἂν υἱὸν μόνον ὀνομάσωμεν, ἔχομεν τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ πατρός, ὅτι υἱὸς πατρὸς λέγεται. Whoever names the one names the other at the same time, and yet does not posit him merely in accordance with his name, but with his name καὶ τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότητα; on the other hand, ἀγέννητον οὐ λέγεται γεννητοῦ ἀγέννητον, οὐδὲ γεννητὸν ἀγεννήτου γεννητόν. Athanasius could scarcely wish more than this, or rather: we have already here the main outlines of the theology of the three Cappadocians, and it is not accidental that Basil of Ancyra is himself a Cappadocian.

[1] The work of Athanasius, de synodis, written in the year 359, is of the highest importance for the history of the Arian controversy. It is distinguished as much by the firmness with which his position is maintained—for Athanasius did not yield in any point—as by its moderation and wisdom. The great bishop succeeded in combining these qualities in his book, because he was not concerned with the

Julian granted liberty to all the bishops to return, and in so doing did away with the artificial state of things created by Constantius. The Niceans were once more a power, and Athanasius who returned to Alexandria in February 362, at once re-assumed the leadership of the party. A Synod was held at Alexandria in summer, and this prepared the way for the triumph of orthodoxy in the year 381.[1] It was here resolved that the Nicene Creed was to be accepted *sans phrase, i.e.*, that those were to be recognised as Christian brethren who *now* acknowledge the ὁμοούσιος, and condemn the Arian heresy together with its chief supporters, irrespective of any former departure on their part from the faith. But still further, the question as to whether it was necessary to believe in *one* hypostasis or in *three* was left an open one. (At Alexandria the Holy Spirit had already been the subject of discussion as well as the Son.) Both statements were disapproved of since the ὁμοούσιος was considered to be sufficient, but it was explained that both might be understood in a pious sense.[2] These resolutions were not passed without strong opposition.[3] Not only did some bishops demand that

formula itself, but solely with the thought which in his view the formula attacked best expressed. We must, he said, speak like brethren to brethren to the Homoiousians who hold almost the same view as the Nicæans and are merely suspicious about a word. Whoever grants that the Son is in nature of like quality with the Father and springs from the substance of the Father is not far from the ὁμοούσιος; for this is a combination of ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας and ὁμοιούσιος (c. 41 ff.). While expressly making an apology to Basil of Ancyra, he endeavours to remove the stumbling-blocks presented by ὁμοούσιος, but seeks at the same time to shew that ὁμοιούσιος either involves an absurdity or is dogmatically incorrect (c. 53 f.).

[1] The most important source of information for the Synod of Alexandria is the Tomus of Athanas. ad Antioch., and in addition Rufin. X. 27—29, Socr. III. 7, Athan. ep. ad Rufinian. I need not here (after the work published by Revillout) enter upon any discussion of the σύνταγμα διδασκαλίας of the Synod, which is identical with Opp. Athanas. ed. Migne XXVIII., p. 836 sq.; cf. Eichhorn, Athan., de vita ascet. testim., 1886, p. 15 sq. On the Synod cf. also Gregor. Naz. Orat. 21, 35.

[2] Tom. ad Antioch. 5. 6. This was probably the largest concession which Athanasius ever made. When Socrates affirms that at the Synod the employment of "Ousia" and "Hypostasis" in reference to the Godhead was forbidden, his statement is not entirely incorrect; for it is evident from the Tomus that the Synod did actually disapprove of the use of the terms in this way.

[3] This is sufficiently shewn in the Tomus; the Lucifer schism has its root here; see Krüger, op. cit., pp. 43—54. Lucifer was, moreover, not a man of sufficient education to appreciate the real question at issue. He did not wish to have

those who had subscribed the Fourth Sirmian Formula should be denied the communion of the Church, but, what was of much greater importance, there was a party which insisted on the interpretation of the Nicene Creed which had been settled by some of the Western bishops at Sardica, and which as a matter of fact was the original one. [1] But they did not press their views, and they seem to have acquiesced in the decision of the Synod. This marked a complete change. [2] If up till now orthodox faith had meant the recognition of a mysterious plurality in the substantial unity of the Godhead, it was now made permissible to turn the unity into a mystery, *i.e.*, to reduce it to equality and to make the threefoldness the starting-point; but this simply means that that Homoiousianism was recognised which resolved to accept the word ὁμοούσιος. And to this theology, which changed the substantial *unity* of substance expressed in the ὁμοούσιος into a mere likeness or *equality* of substance, so that there was no longer a threefold unity, but a trinity, the future belonged, in the East, though not to the same extent in the West. The theologians who had studied Origen regarded it with favour. The Cappadocians started from the ὁμοούσιος, [3]

the *venia ex pœnitentia* accorded to the Semi-Arians who were passing over to orthodoxy. It was thus a Novatian-Donatist element which determined his position.

[1] See above, p. 68, and the Tom. c. 5. init. These bishops thus demanded the acknowledgment of the μία ὑπόστασις. The West never at bottom abandoned this demand, but in the Meletian-Antiochian schism it, however, finally got the worst of it and had to acquiesce in the Eastern doctrinal innovation. That at the Synod of Alexandria, however, the Homoiousians also attempted to get their catchword, or, their interpretation of the ὁμοούσιος, adopted, is evident from the letter of Apollinaris to Basil; see Dräseke Ztschr. f. K.G., VIII., p. 118 f.

[2] Just as it is to Zahn that, speaking generally, we primarily owe the understanding of the original meaning of Ὁμοούσιος, so it is he too who, so far as I know, first plainly noticed this complete change. (Marcell, p. 87 f., also Gwatkin, p. 242 sq.)

[3] This is specially evident from the letter of Basil to Apollinaris (in Dräseke, op. cit. 96 ff.) of the year 361. Basil communicates to the great teacher (of whom later) his doubts as to whether it is justifiable to use the word ὁμοούσιος. For biblical and philosophical dogmatic reasons he is inclined to prefer the formula ἀπαραλλάκτως ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν. Apollinaris accordingly explains to him (p. 112 ff.) that the ὁμοούσιος is more correct, but his own explanation of the word is no longer identical with that of Athanasius. He finds both expressed in it, the ταυτότης as well as the ἑτερότης, and according to his idea the Son is related to the Father as men are to Adam. Just as it may be said of all men, they are Adam, they were in *Adam*, and just as there is only *one* Adam, so too is it with the Godhead. Basil

though this is certainly true of Gregory of Nyssa only indirectly. They ackowledged the ὁμοούσιος and accordingly set up a system of doctrine which neither disavowed the theology of Origen, that is, science in general, nor yet remained in the terminologically helpless condition of Athanasius. But they succeeded in attaining terminological clearness—they could not improve on the *matter* of the doctrine—only because they modified the original thought of Athanasius and developed the theology which Basil of Ancyra had first propounded in his tractate. Οὐσία now got a meaning which was half way between the abstract "substance" and the concrete "individual substance", still it inclined very strongly in the direction of the former.[1] Ὑπόστασις got a meaning half way between "Person" and "Attribute", (Accident, Modality), still the conception of Person entered more largely into it.[2] Πρόσωπον was avoided because it had a Sabellian sound, but it was not rejected. The unity of the Godhead, as the Cappadocians conceived of it, was not the same as the unity which Athanasius had in his mind. Basil the Great was never tired of emphasising the new distinction implied in οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. For the central doctrine of the incarnation of God they required a conception of God of boundless fulness. Μία οὐσία (μία θεότης) ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν, (*one*

at any rate started from Homoiousianism, and it is because this has not been taken into consideration that the letter in question has been pronounced not genuine. For the rest, the efforts of the Benedictines in the third volume of their edition of the Opp. Basil. (Præf.) to vindicate Basil's orthodoxy shew that, leaving this letter out of account, his perfect soundness in the faith is not—in all his utterances—beyond doubt. Later on Basil understood the ὁμοούσιος exactly in the sense given to it by him in the letter to Apollinaris and which at that time made him hesitate to use it; see Krüger, p. 42 f. See further the characteristic statements made at an earlier date in ep. 8. 9: ὁ κατ' οὐσίαν Θεὸς τῷ κατ' οὐσίαν Θεῷ ὁμοούσιος!

[1] Basil has frequently so expressed himself as to suggest that he regarded the idea of the generic unity of Father and Son as sufficient (see, *e.g.*, ep. 38, 2). Zahn (p. 87): "the οὐσία with Basil designates the κοινόν, the ὑπόστασις the ἴδιον (ep. 114, 4). He is never tired of holding forth on the difference between the two expressions, and goes so far as to assert that the Nicene Fathers were well aware of this difference, since they would surely not have put the two words side by side without some purpose (ep. 125)." It is interesting to note that already at the Council of Antioch in 363 it had been explained that οὐ κατά τινα χρῆσιν Ἑλληνικὴν λαμβάνεται τοῖς πατράσι τὸ ὄνομα τῆς οὐσίας. Assuredly not! It was a terminology which was expressly invented.

[2] And yet in Gregory of Nyssa the persons appear also as συμβεβηκότα (accidents).

divine substance (one divine nature) in three *subjects*,) was the formula. In order to give clear expression to the actual distinction of the Persons within the Godhead, Gregory of Nyssa attached to them τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, (modes of existence,) ἰδιότητες χαρακτηρίζουσαι, ἐξαίρετα ἰδιώματα, (characteristic peculiarities, special characters). To the Father he attributed ἀγεννησία, the quality of being unbegotten, and in consequence of this the word which had formerly been forbidden by the Niceans was once more restored to a place of honour, no longer, however, as referring to substance, but as expressing a mode of being (σχέσις) of God the Father. To the Son he attributed γεννησία, the quality of being begotten, and even the older Homoiousians shewed more reserve on this point than Gregory did. To the Spirit he attributed ἐκπόρευσις—procession.[1] But what is more,

[1] See the treatises of Gregor. Nyss. περὶ διαφορᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως—περὶ τοῦ εἶεσθαι λέγειν τρεῖς Θεούς—πρὸς Ἕλληνας ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν. "Prosopon" is no longer for Gregory a technical term in the strict sense of the word, but on the other hand he also avoids the expression "three ἄτομα". The word φύσις maintained itself alongside of οὐσία, and in the same way ἰδιότης was used along with ὑπόστασις. The God who was common to the Three was supposed to be a real substance, not, however, a fourth alongside of the Three, but on the contrary the unity itself! On the characteristics of the Hypostases, see Gregor. Naz. Orat. 25. 16: Κοινὸν τὸ μὴ γεγονέναι καὶ ἡ θεότης. Ἴδιον δὲ πατρὸς μὲν ἡ ἀγεννησία, υἱοῦ δὲ ἡ γέννησις, πνεύματος δὲ ἡ ἔκπεμψις. The two others expressed their views in almost similar terms in their works against Eunomius, unless that Gregory of Nyssa alone put the doctrine of the Holy Ghost in a logically developed form (see below), while as regards it, Basil (see de spir. s. ad Amphiloch.) advanced least of them all. The pronounced attitude taken up by them all, especially by Basil, against Marcellus, is characteristic. The theological orations of Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. 27—31) may, more than anything else, have spread the doctrinal system far and wide. (It is important to note that in opposition to it Athanasius in his letter ad Afros. [c. 369] expressly said that ὑπόστασις and οὐσία were to be used as identical in meaning.) It follows from Orat. 31 (33) that Gregory did *not* wish to apply the *number* one to the Godhead; a unity was for him only the κίνησις and φύσις (μίαν φύσιν ἐν τρισὶν ἰδιότησι, νοεραῖς τελείαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰς ὑφεστώσαις, ἀριθμῷ διαιρεταῖς καὶ οὐ διαιρεταῖς θεότητι). So too he was doubtful about the suitability of the old image, "source, stream", for the Trinity, not only because it represents the Godhead as something changeable, something flowing, *but also because it gave the appearance of a numerical unity to the Godhead.* He is equally unwilling, and in fact for the same reasons, to sanction the use of the old comparison of sun, beam, and brightness. He is always in a fighting attitude towards "Sabellianism". The doctrine of the *one* God is to him Jewish—that is the new discovery. "We do not acknowledge a Jewish, narrow, jealous, weak Godhead" (Orat. *25. 16*). Gregory had, moreover, already begun those odd speculations about the

the entire Origenistic speculation regarding the Trinity, with which Athanasius would have nothing to do, that is, of which he knew nothing, was rehabilitated. The moment or element of finitude within the Trinitarian evolution was no doubt struck out, still the Absolute has nevertheless not only *modi* in itself, but also in some degree, stages. The (eternal) *generation* or begetting, in the sense of a Godhead extending itself to the limits of the creaturely, was again put in the foreground. In this way the subordination-conception, which was an irreducible remainder in Athanasius' whole way of looking at the question, again acquired a peculiar significance. The idea that the Father in Himself is to be identified with the entire Godhead again became one of the ground-principles of speculation. He is the starting-point of the Trinity, just as He is the Creator of the world. The idea that He is source, beginning, cause of the Godhead (*πηγή, αρχή, αἰτία τῆς θεότητος*), the cause (*τὸ αἴτιον*) and consequently God in the proper sense (*κυρίως Θεός*), while the other Hypostases again are effects (*αἰτιατά*),[1] meant something different to the Cappadocians from what it did to Athanasius. For the Logos-conception, which Athanasius had discarded as theistic-*cosmical*, again came to the front, and in their view Logos and Cosmos are more closely related than in that of Athanasius. The unity of the Godhead does not rest here on the Homousia, but in the last resort, as with Arius, on the "monarchy" of God the Father; and the Spiritual on earth is, in fine, not a mere creature of God, but—at any rate

immanent substance of God which, though they are mere bubble-blowing, are still highly thought of. The divine loftiness, according to him, shews itself in this, that in His immanent life also God is a *fruitful* principle; the life of the creature has its vital manifestation in the tension of dualities, but it is in this opposition that its imperfection also consists; the Trinity is the "sublation", or abrogation of the duality, living movement and at the same time rest, and not in any way a sublimation into multiplicity. The Orat. 23 in particular is full of thoughts of this sort, see c. 8: *τριάδα τελείαν ἐκ τελειῶν τριῶν, μονάδος μὲν κινηθείσης διὰ τὸ πλούσιον, δυάδος δὲ ὑπερβαθείσης, ὑπὲρ γὰρ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ σώματα, τριάδος δὲ ὁρισθείσης διὰ τὸ τέλειον, πρώτη γὰρ ὑπερβαίνει δυάδος σύνθεσιν, ἵνα μήτε στενὴ μένῃ ἡ θεότης μήτε εἰς ἄπειρον χέηται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφιλότιμον, τὸ δὲ ἄτακτον, καὶ τὸ μὲν Ἰουδαϊκὸν παντελῶς, τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν καὶ πολύθεον.*

[1] Gregor. Nyss., *ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν* T. II. p. 85; *ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός, ἐξ οὗ ὁ υἱὸς γεννᾶται καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεται, διὸ καὶ κυρίως τὸν ἕνα αἴτιον ὄντα τῶν αὐτοῦ αἰτιατῶν ἕνα Θεόν φαμεν.*

with Gregory of Nyssa—as in the view of Origen, is a being with a nature akin to His.[1] "Science" concluded an alliance with the Nicene Creed; that was a condition of the triumph of orthodoxy. If at the beginning of the controversy the scientific thinkers—including those amongst the heathen—had sympathised with Arianism, men were now to be found as the defenders of the Nicene Creed to whom even a Libanius yielded the palm. These men took their stand on the general theory of the universe which was accepted by the science of the time; they were Platonists, and they once more naïvely appealed to Plato in support even of their doctrine of the Trinity.[2] Those who were on the side of Plato, Origen,[3] and Libanius—Basil indeed had recommended the latter to his pupils as one who could help them in advanced culture,—those who were on a footing of equality with the scholars, the statesmen, and highest officials, could not fail to get sympathy. The literary triumphs of the Cappadocians who knew how to unite devotion to the Faith and to the practical ideals of the Church with their scientific interests, the victories over Eunomius and his following were at the same time the triumphs of Neo-platonism over an Aristotelianism which had become thoroughly arid and formal.[4] Orthodoxy in alliance with science had a spring which lasted from two to three decades, a short spring which was not followed by any summer, but by destructive storms. Spite of all the persecutions, the years between 370 and 394 were

[1] It is here that we have the root of the difference between Athanasius and Gregory.

[2] From this time this once more became the fashion amongst the scientific orthodox. The confession of Socrates (VII. 6) is very characteristic. He cannot understand how the two Arian Presbyters, Timotheus and Georgius can remain Arians and yet study Plato and Origen so industriously and esteem them so highly: *οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τὸ τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως εἰληφέναι φησί, καὶ Ὠριγένης συναίδιον παντοκρατορικοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί.* It is instructive further to note how Philostorgius too (in Suidas) asserts that in the matter of the vindication of the *ὁμοούσιος* Athanasius was deemed a boy in comparison with the Cappadocians and Apollinaris.

[3] See the Philocalia.

[4] This is one of the strongest impressions we carry away from a reading of the works against Eunomius.

very happy ones for the orthodox Church of the East. It was engaged on a great task, and this was to restore the true faith to the Churches of the East, and to introduce into them the asceticism which was closely allied with science.[1] It was in the midst of a struggle which was more honourable than the struggles of the last decades had been. Men dreamt the dream of an eternal league between Faith and Science. Athanasius did not share this dream, but neither did he disturb it. He did not go in for the new theology, and there is much to shew that it did not quite satisfy him.[2] But he saw the aim of his life, the recognition of the complete Godhead of Christ, brought nearer accomplishment, and he continued to be the patriarch and the recognised head of orthodoxy, as the letters of Basil in particular shew. When, however, orthodoxy had attained its victory, there arose after a few years within its own camp an opponent more dangerous to its scientific representatives than Eunomius and Valens—the traditionalism which condemned all science.

Nothing more than an outline can here be given of the development of events in particular instances. The Synod of Alexandria was not able by means of its resolution to unite the parties which had separated at Antioch: the party of the

[1] This aspect of the activity of the Cappadocians cannot be too highly valued. But in this respect too, though in quite a new fashion, they took up the work of Athanasius. The dominant party on the contrary were supported by an Emperor (Valens) who no doubt for good reasons persecuted monarchism. (See the law in the Cod. Theodos. XII. 1, 63 of the year 365.) The aversion of the Homœans to monasticism is evident from the App. Const. Basil's journey to Egypt was epoch-making. The relation in which he stood to Eustathius of Sebaste, the ascetic and Semi-Arian, is also of great importance.

[2] For the sake of peace and in order to secure the main thing, Athanasius at the Synod of Alexandria, which may be called a continuation of the Synod of Ancyra, himself concluded the alliance with the new Oriental orthodoxy and acknowledged Meletius. But his procedure later on in the Antiochian schism (see Basil., ep. 89, 2), the close relation in which he stood throughout to Rome as contrasted with the East, the signal reserve he exhibited towards Basil (Basil. ep. 66, 69), and finally the view he took of the Marcellian Controversy which was still going on—Basil saw in Marcellus a declared Sabellian heretic, while the judgment passed on him and his following by Athanasius was essentially different—prove that he never came to have a satisfying confidence in the neo-orthodox Niceans who were associated with Meletius; see on this Zahn, pp. 83 ff., 88 ff., Rade, Damasus, p. 81 ff.

orthodox who clung to the old faith and that of the Homoiousians who under the leadership of Meletius acknowledged the Homousios. This Antiochian split remained an open wound, and the history of the attempts to get it healed makes it abundantly evident that different doctrines were really in question, that Alexandria and the East had not lost their feeling of distrust of Meletius, and that the Cappadocians who were at the head of the new orthodoxy in the East were not able to suppress the suspicion of Sabellianism in the light of the old orthodoxy.[1]

Jovian, who was inclined to orthodoxy, once more recalled Athanasius who had been banished for the last time by Julian.[2] Athanasius somewhat prematurely announced the triumph of the true faith in the East.[3] Under the new ruler, Acacius, at a Synod held in Antioch in 363, found himself obliged to agree with Meletius and to join with him in declaring his adherence to the ὁμοούσιος, explaining at the same time that it expressed as much as the ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας (of the substance) and the ὁμοιούσιος together[4] (see Athan., de Synod.) But the accession of Valens in the following year changed everything. An attempt on the part of the semi-Arians at the Synod at Lampsacus in 364 to get the upper hand, miscarried.[5] Eudoxius of Constantinople and the adroit Acacius who again made a change of front, became masters of the situation, and Valens resolved

[1] See the art. "Meletius" in Herzog's R.-Encykl. IX., p. 530 f. and the discussion by Rade, op. cit., p. 74 ff. The Westerns had the same kind of feeling in reference to the opponent of Meletius in Antioch, Paulinus, as they formerly had in reference to Athanasius; he alone was for them orthodox; but they did not succeed in getting their view adopted. Hieron. ep. 15. 16 shews what scruples the formula, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, gave rise to in the minds of the Westerns.

[2] Julian, spite of his aversion to all Christians, seems nevertheless to have been somewhat more favourably disposed towards Arianism than towards orthodoxy, *i.e.*, than to Athanasius, who, moreover, incurred his suspicions on political grounds.

[3] See his letter to Jovian in the Opp. and in Theodoret. IV. 3. Here the matter is so represented as to suggest that there were now only a few Arian Churches in the East. The attack on those who do indeed accept the ὁμοούσιος, but give it a false interpretation, is worthy of note.

[4] See the Synodical-epistle in Socrat. III. 25, Mansi III., p. 369.

[5] Socrat. IV. 2 sq. 12, Sozom. VI. 7 sq. In the following decade the view of Eudoxius of Constantinople was the authoritative one.

to adopt once more the policy of Constantius, to maintain the Arian Homœism in its old position, and to make all bishops who thought differently[1] suffer. Orthodox and Homoiousians had again to go into banishment. From this time onwards many Homoiousians turned to the West, having made up their minds to accept the ὁμοούσιος in order to get support. The West after the brief episode of the period of oppression (353—360) was once more Nicene. There were but few Arians, although they were influential. After various Councils had met, the Homoiousians sent deputies from Pontus, Cappadocia, and Asia[2] to Liberius to get the doctrinal union brought about. Liberius, whose sentiments were the same as those of Hilary, did not refuse their request. The announcement of this happy event was made at Tyana in 367;[3] but at a Carian Council a Homoiousian minority persisted in rejecting the ὁμοούσιος.[4] From this time Basil, who became bishop in 370,[5] took an active part in affairs and he was soon after followed by the other Cappadocians, and they threw not only the weight of science, but also that of asceticism, into the scale in favour of orthodoxy. The new bishop of Rome, Damasus, took a decided stand against Arianism at the Roman Synods held in 369 (370) and 377, then against the Pneumatomachians (see below) and the Apollinarian heresy, while Marcellus and Photinus were also condemned. The rigid standpoint of the bishops Julius and Athanasius again became the dominant one in the West, and it was only after some hesitation that the Western bishops resolved to offer the hand of friendship to the new-fashioned orthodoxy of the East. The representatives of the latter did not indeed settle the Antiochian schism at the well-attended Council at Antioch in September 379, but they subscribed the

[1] The Altercatio Heracliani et Germinii is instructive; see Caspari, Kirchenhist. Anecdota, 1883.

[2] Cappadocia was the native land of the new orthodoxy; see the Cappadocian self-consciousness of Gregor. Naz.; up till this time, however, it had been the principal seat of Arianism.

[3] Socrat. IV. 12.

[4] Sozom. VI. 12.

[5] He was at the same time the patriarch of the diocese of Pontus.

Roman pronouncements of the last years, and thus placed themselves at the standpoint of Damasus.[1]

But meanwhile very great changes had taken place in the State. In November 375 Valentinian died. He had not taken any part in Church politics, and had in fact protected the Arian

[1] It was Athanasius who roused Damasus to take up an attitude of energetic opposition to the Arian Bishop Auxentius of Milan, and thus, speaking generally, led him to follow in the track of Bishop Julius; see Athan. ep. ad Afros. It was at the Roman Council of 369 that the Western episcopate first formally and solemnly renounced the resolution of Rimini. On the text of the epistle of this Council, see Rade, p. 52 ff. Auxentius of Milan was condemned; but this sentence was a futile one since the Court protected him. No mention was yet made at this Council of the difficulties of the East. The years from 371 to 380 are the epochs during which the new-fashioned orthodoxy of the East, under the leadership of Basil and Meletius, attempted to induce the West to bring its influence to bear on Valens and the Homœan-Arian party, by means of an imposing manifesto, and thus to strengthen orthodoxy in the East, but at the same time to pronounce in favour of the Homoiousian-Homoousian doctrine and to put the orthodox Niceans in the wrong. These attempts were not successful; for Damasus in close league, first with Athanasius, then after his death (373), with his successor Peter, was extremely reserved, and in the first instance either did not interfere at all or interfered in favour of the old Niceans, of Paulinus that is, at Antioch. (This Peter, like Athanasius before him, had fled to Rome, and the alliance of Rome with Alexandria was part of the traditional policy of the Roman bishop from the days of Fabian to the middle of the fifth century.) The numerous letters and embassies which came from the East of which Basil was throughout the soul, shew what trouble was taken about the matter there. But the letters of Basil did not please the "*ἀκριβέστεροι*" in Rome; at first, indeed, intercourse with the East was carried on only through the medium of Alexandria, and on one occasion Basil had his letter simply returned to him. He complained that at Rome they were friendly with everybody who brought an orthodox confession and did not mind anything else. He referred to the friendship shewn towards those who were inclined to the views of Marcellus, further to the friendly intercourse of the Roman bishop with Paulinus, who was always suspected of Sabellianism by Basil, and to the occasional recognition of an Apollinarian. In letter 214 Basil brought the charge of Sabellianism against the entire Homoousian doctrine in its older form. It was in the year 376 that the West first promised help to the East. (The decretals of Damasus = 1 Fragment of the letter of Damasus designated by Coustant as ep. 4.) Basil now (ep. 263) pleads for active interference—where possible an imposing Council—against the heretics who are heretics under cover of the Nicene Creed, and he designates as such the Macedonian Eustathius of Sebaste, Apollinaris and *Paulinus*, *i.e.*, the man who taught pretty much the same doctrine as Athanasius; according to Basil, however, he is a Marcellian. The accusations against Paulinus were naturally received with anything but favour in the West. Peter of Alexandria who was still in Rome at the time, called Meletius, Basil's honoured friend, simply an Arian. A Synod was nevertheless held in Rome at which Apollinarianism was for the first time rejected (377); to it we owe the pieces 2 and 3 in the ep. Damasi, 4 ed. Coustant.

bishops as he did the orthodox bishops, and had never had any difference with his brother regarding their religious policy. His successor, the youthful Gratian,[1] yielded himself wholly to the guidance of the masterful Ambrose. He firmly established the State Church as against the heterodox parties, by passing some severe laws, and in doing this he followed Ambrose "whom the Lord had taken from amongst the judges of the earth and placed in the Apostolic chair." (Basil ep. 197, 1.) In August 378 Valens fell at the battle of Adrianople, fighting with the Goths; and on the 19th of January, 379, the Western Theodosius was made Emperor of the East by Gratian. The death of Valens was quite as much a determining cause of the final triumph of orthodoxy as its alliance with science; for the inner force of a religious idea can never secure for it the dominion of the world. Theodosius was a convinced Western Christian who took up the policy of Gratian, but carried it out in a perfectly independent fashion.[2] He was determined to rule

Basil died in January 379. He did not attain the aim of all his work, which was to unite the orthodoxy of the East and the West on the basis of the Homoiousian interpretation of the Homousios. But soon after his death, in September 379, Meletius held a synod in Antioch, and this synod subscribed all the manifestoes of the Romans, *i.e.*, of the West, issued during the previous years 369, 376, 377, and thus simply submitted to the will of the West *in dogmaticis*, and despatched to Rome the Acts which contained the concessions. The triumph of the old-orthodox interpretation of the Nicene Creed thus seemed perfect. The West, under the guidance of Ambrose, from this time forth recognised the Meletians also as orthodox. It was from there (see the Synod of Aquileia 380, under Ambrosius) that the proposal emanated that if one of the two anti-bishops in Antioch should die, no successor should be chosen, and thus the schism would be healed. The fact that the Meletians thus came round to the orthodox standpoint is explicable only when we consider the complete changes which had taken place in the political situation since the death of Valens. On the involved state of things in the years from 369 to 378 see the letters of Basil, 70, 89—92, 129, 138, 214, 215, 239, 242, 243, 253—256, 263, 265, 266. It was the investigation of the matter by Rade, *op. cit.* pp. 70—121, which first threw light on this. On Damasus and Peter of Alex. see Socrat. IV. 37, Sozom. VI. 39, Theod. IV. 22. All were agreed in holding Athanasius in high respect. It was this that kept the combatants together. Gregory begins his panegyric (Orat. 21) with the words: Ἀθανάσιον ἐπαινῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινέσομαι, and in saying this he said what everybody thought.

[1] See on Gratian's religious policy my art. in Herzog's R.-Encykl. s. h. v.

[2] Valentinian was the last representative of the principle of freedom in religion, in the sense in which Constantine had sought to carry it out in the first and larger half of his reign, and also Julian.

the Church as Constantius had done, but to rule it in the spirit of rigid orthodoxy. He had himself been baptised [1] in the year 380, and immediately after appeared the famous edict which enjoined the orthodox faith on all nations. It is, however, in the highest degree characteristic of his whole policy that this faith is more definitely described as the Roman and Alexandrian faith, *i.e.*, the new doctrinal orthodoxy of Cappadocia and Asia is passed over in silence.[2] After his entry into Constantinople Theodosius took all their churches from the Arians and handed them over to the orthodox.[3] In the year 381 he issued a regulation in which he prohibited all heretics from holding divine service in the towns. In the same year, however, the Emperor summoned a large Eastern Council to meet at Constantinople, and its resolutions were afterwards regarded as ecumenical and strictly binding, though not till the middle of the fifth century, and in the West not till a still later date. This Council denotes a complete change in the policy of Theodosius. His stay in the East had taught him that it was necessary for him to recognise as orthodox all who acknowledged the Nicene Creed however they might interpret it, and at the same time to make an attempt to gain over the Macedonians. He had come to see that in the East he must rely upon the *Eastern* form of orthodoxy, the new orthodoxy, that he would have to suppress the aspirations of the Alexandrian bishops, and that he must do nothing which would have the appearance of anything like tutelage of the East by the West.

[1] During a severe illness, by the orthodox bishop of Thessalonica.

[2] Impp. Gratianus Valentinianus et Theodosius AAA. ad populum urbis Constantinop.: "Cunctos populos, quos clementiæ nostræ regit temperamentum in tali volumus religione versari, quam divinum Petrum apostolum tradidisse Romanis religio usque ad nunc ab ipso insinuata declarat quamque pontificem Damasum sequi claret et Petrum Alexandriæ episcopum virum apostolicæ sanctitatis, hoc est, ut secundum apostolicam disciplinam evangelicamque doctrinam patris et filii et spiritus sancti unam deitatem sub pari majestate et sub pia trinitate credamus (this is the Western-Alexandrian way of formulating the problem). Hanc legem sequentes Christianorum catholicorum nomen jubemus amplecti, reliquos vere dementes vesanosque judicantes hæretici dogmatis infamiam sustinere, divina primum vindicta, post etiam motus nostri, quem ex cælesti arbitrio sumpserimus, ultione plectendos" (Cod. Theod. XVI. 1, 2; Cod. Justin I. 1.

[3] With the exception of Egypt most of the Churches in the East were at this time in the hands of the Arians.

This reversal of his policy is shewn most strikingly by the fact that Meletius of Antioch was called upon to preside at the Council, the very man who was specially suspected by the orthodox of the West.[1] He died shortly after the Council met, and first Gregory of Nazianzus,[2] and then Nectarius of Con-

[1] The relations which existed in the years 378—381 between the East and the West (Alexander was closely allied with the latter) are complicated and obscure. Their nature was still in all essential respects determined by the continuance of the schism in Antioch. The following is certain (I) Theodosius, as soon as he came to perceive the true state of things in the East, had ranged himself on the side of the orthodox there; he wished to suppress Arianism not by the aid of the West and of the Alexandrian bishop Peter who was closely allied with Rome and who had already acted as if he were the supreme Patriarch of the Greek Church, but by the orthodox powers of the East itself. The proof of this is (1) that he transferred in a body to Meletius the Arian Churches in Antioch,—Paulinus was shelved; (2) that in the Edict (Cod. Theodos. XVI. 1, 3) he does not mention Damasus, but on the contrary enumerates the orthodox of the East as authorities (July 30th, 381) and this Gwatkin, p. 262, rightly terms an "amended definition of orthodoxy"; (3) that he refused to accede to the repeated and urgent demands of the Westerns who wished him to settle impartially the dispute at Antioch with due respect to the superior claims of Paulinus, and also refused their request for the summoning of an Ecumenical Council at Alexandria; (4) that he summoned an Eastern Council to meet at Constantinople without troubling himself in the slightest about the West, Rome and Alexandria, made Meletius president of it, heaped honours upon him, and sanctioned the choice of a successor after his death, and this in spite of the advice of the Westerns that the whole Antiochian Church should now be handed over to Paulinus, an advice which had the support of Gregory of Nazianzus himself. Nor can there be any doubt in view of the manner in which the Council was summoned to meet, that its original intention was to draw up a formula of agreement with the Macedonians. It is certain (II.) that the orthodox Fathers who assembled at Constantinople gladly recognised and availed themselves of the opportunity thus presented of freeing themselves from the tutelage of Alexandria and the West, and of recalling by a distinct act the concessions which they had made under compulsion two years previously at Antioch. "It is in the East that the sun first rises, it was starting from the East that the God who came in the flesh flashed upon the world." By their united attitude, their choice of Flavian as the successor of Meletius, who had died during the Council, by passing the third Canon—on the importance of the chair of Constantinople—and by their rejection of Maximus who was proposed for the chair of Constantinople by Alexandria and patronised by Rome and the West, they inflicted the severest possible defeat on Alexandria and the West, and specially on the policy of Peter and Damasus. It is certain (III.) finally, that shortly before the Council of Constantinople, during the Council, and immediately after it rose, the relations between the Egyptians and Westerns and the East were of the most strained character, and that a breach was imminent. (See the letter in Mansi III., p. 631.)

[2] The choice of him as president (on this and on the general procedure of the Council see his Carmen de vita sua) was not any more than that of Meletius

stantinople presided over its deliberations. The opposition at the Council between the old orthodox party, orthodox in the Alexandrian and Western sense, who were few in numbers, and the new orthodox party composed of Antiochians, Cappadocians and Asiatics, was of the most pronounced character, though we are only partially acquainted with it.[1] The confusion was so great that Gregory of Nazianzus resigned and left the Council with the most bitter feelings.[2] Still union was finally

approved of by Alexandria and Rome. His support of Paulinus may find its explanation in the fact that he aimed at getting into the good graces of Rome after he had himself attained the Patriarchate. Gregory had a Tasso-like nature. Quite incapable of effecting anything in the sphere of Church government or politics, he did not really desire office; but he wished to have the honour and distinction which are connected with office. So long as he did not have office he was ambitious, when he had it he threw it away.

[1] The Egyptians even went the length of separating themselves from the majority at the Council; they did not approve of the decisions come to by the neo-orthodox; see Theodoret V. 8.

[2] The Egyptian bishops felt it to be intolerable that the Cappadocian and not their man, Maximus, should get the position of Patriarch in Constantinople The resignation of Gregory of Nazianzus was the price demanded by the Egyptians for yielding; see Gregory's farewell address to the Council, Orat. 42. The Canons 1—4 of the Council—for these only are in all probability genuine, while those which follow belong to the Council of 382—are strongly anti-Alexandrian and are intended to bring down the claims of the Alexandrian which were already pitched high. Canon 3 is directed not so much against Rome as against Alexandria (*Τὸν μέντοι Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐπίσκοπον ἔχειν τὰ πρεσβεῖα τῆς τιμῆς μετὰ τὸν τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπίσκοπον, διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν νέαν Ῥώμην*). Canon 2 is intended to put a stop to the attempt of the Bishop of Alexandria to rule other Eastern Churches. But this very Canon plainly proves (cf. the sixth Canon of Nice) that as a matter of fact the Bishop of Alexandria had a position in the East which was wholly different from that of the other bishops. He only is mentioned in the singular number—*τὸν μὲν Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐπίσκοπον... τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀνατολῆς ἐπισκόπους..; φυλαττομένων τῶν πρεσβείων τῇ Ἀντιοχέων ἐκκλησίᾳ.., τοὺς τῆς Ἀσιανῆς διοικήσεως ἐπισκόπους... τοὺς τῆς Ποντικῆς... τοὺς τῆς Θρᾳκικῆς*. The peculiar position of the Alexandrian bishop which the latter wished to develop into a position of primacy, was chiefly due to three causes. (It is quite clear that Athanasius and Peter wished so to develop it, and perhaps even Dionysius the Great; the intention of the Alexandrian scheme to place Maximus on the episcopal seat of Constantinople, was to secure a preponderating influence upon the capital and the imperial Church by the aid of this creature of Alexandria.) These three causes were as follows; (1) Alexandria was the second city of the Empire and was recognised as such *in the Church also* at least as early as the middle of the third century; see, *e.g.*, the conciliar epistle of the great Council of Antioch of the year 268, addressed "to the bishops of Rome and *Alexandria* and to all Catholic churches." (Alexandria

secured, although the attempt to win over the Macedonians failed. The "150 bishops" unitedly avowed their adherence to the Nicene faith, and, as we are told, accepted in addition to this a special explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity in which the complete Homousia of the Spirit also was expressed. In the first canon containing the decisions, after the ratification of the Nicene Creed, Eunomians (Anomeans) Arians (Eudoxians) Semi-Arians (Pneumatomachians) Sabellians, Marcellians, Photinians and Apollinarians were expressly anathematised. The Nicene Creed thus gained an unqualified victory so far as its actual terms were concerned, but understood according to the interpretation of Meletius, the Cappadocians, and Cyril of Jerusalem. *The community of substance in the sense of equality or likeness of substance, not in that of unity of substance, was from this time the orthodox doctrine in the East.* But the Creed which since the middle of the fifth century in the East, and since about 530 in the West, has passed for the ecumenical-Constantinopolitan Creed, is neither ecumenical nor Constantinopolitan; for the Council was not an ecumenical one, but an Eastern one, and it did not in fact set up any new

ranks as the second, Antioch as the third city of the Empire in Josephus, de bello Jud. 4, 11, 5, cf. the chronograph of the year 354, Stryzygowski, Jahrb. d. k. deutschen archäol. Instituts. Supplementary vol., 1888, I., die Kalenderbilder des Chronographen v. j. 354, p. 24 f. The chronograph gives the series thus, Rome, Alexandria, Constantinople, Trèves. Lumbroso, L'Egitto dei Greci e dei Romani, 1882, p. 86, proves that all the authors of the first to the third centuries agree in giving the first place after Rome to Alexandria, see, *e.g.*, Dio Chrysostomus, Orat. 32, 1, p. 412: *ἡ γὰρ πόλις ὑμῶν τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ τόπῳ πλεῖστον ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περιφανῶς ἀποδέδεικται δευτέρα τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον.* In the "ordo urbium nobilium" of Ausonius we have for the first time the cities given in the following order: Rome, Constantinople, Carthage, Antioch, Alexandria, Trèves. So long as Alexandria was the second city in the Empire, it was the first city in the East. (2) Alexandria had this in common with Rome, that it had no cities in its diocese which were of importance in any way. The bishop of Alexandria was always the bishop of Egypt (Libya and Pentapolis), as the bishop of Rome was always the bishop of Italy. The case was quite otherwise with Antioch and Ephesus; they always had important episcopates alongside of them. (3) The lead in the great Arian controversy had fallen to the Bishop of Alexandria; he had shewn himself equal to this task and in this way had come to be the most powerful ecclesiastic in the East. The hints which I have given as to the policy of the Alexandrian Patriarch here and in Chap. III. 2, have been further developed in an instructive fashion by Rohrbach (die Patriarchen von Alexandrien) in the Preuss. Jahrb. Vol. 69, Parts 1 and 2.

Creed. This Creed, on the contrary, is the Baptismal Creed of the Jerusalem Church which was issued in a revised form soon after 362 and furnished with some Nicene formulæ and with a *regula fidei* in reference to the Holy Spirit, and which was perhaps brought forward at the Council of 381 and approved of, but which cannot pass for its creed. How it subsequently came to rank as a decision of the Council is a matter regarding which we are completely in the dark. This much, however, is clear, that if this Creed had any connection at all with the Council of 381, the *neo-orthodox* character of the latter is thereby brought out in a specially striking way; *for the so-called Creed of Constantinople can in fact be taken simply as a formula of union between orthodox, Semi-Arians, and Pneumatomachians.* The most contested phrase of the Nicene Creed "ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός" is wanting in it, and it presents the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in a form which could not have appeared wholly unacceptable even to the Pneumatomachians.[1]

[1] On the Creed of Constantinople see my article in Herzog's R.-Encyklop. VIII., pp. 212—230, which summarises the works of Caspari and particularly of Hort, and carries the argument further. The following facts are certain. (1) The Council of 381 did not set up any new creed, but simply avowed anew its adherence to the Nicene Creed (Socrat. V. 8, Sozom. VII. 7, 9, Theodoret V. 8, Greg. Naz. ep. 102 [Orat. 52] the testimony of the Latin and Constantinople Councils of 382). (2) If we take the years from 381 to 450, we do not find in any Synodal Act, Church Father, or heterodox theologians during that period any certain trace whatsoever of the existence of the Creed of Constantinople, much less any proof that it was used then as the Creed of Constantinople or as the official Baptismal Creed; it is simultaneously with the recognition of the Council of 381 as an ecumenical Council—about 451 in the East, in the West fifty years later—that the Creed in question, which now emerges, is first described as the Creed of Constantinople. (3) It did not, however, then first come into existence, but is on the contrary much older; it is found already in the Ancoratus of Epiphanius which belongs to the year 374, and there is no reason for holding that it is an interpolation here; on the contrary (4) the internal evidence goes to shew that it is a Nicene redaction of the Baptismal Creed of Jerusalem composed soon after 362. The Creed is thus not any extension of the Nicene Creed, but rather belongs to that great series of Creeds which sprang up after the Council of Alexandria (362) in the second creed-making epoch of the Eastern Churches. At that time the opponents of Arianism in the East, now grown stronger, resolved to give expression to the Nicene doctrine in connection with the solemn rite of baptism. It was possible to do this in three different ways, that is to say either by embodying the Nicene catchwords in the old provincial church creeds, by enlarging the Nicene Creed for the special purpose of using it as a baptismal Creed, or, finally, by *adopting* it itself, without alteration, for church use as a baptismal Creed, in spite

For this very reason it is certainly out of the question to regard the Creed as the Creed of the Council of 381. It did indeed assert the complete Homousia of the divine Persons. But the legendary process in the Church which attached this Creed to that Council performed a remarkable act of justice;

of its incompleteness and its polemical character. These three plans were actually followed. In the first half of the fifth century the third was the one most widely adopted, but previously to this the two first were the favourites. To this series belong the revised Antiochian Confession, the later Nestorian Creed, the Philadelphian, the Creed in the pseudo-Athanasian *ἑρμηνεία εἰς τὸ σύμβολον*, the second, longer, Creed in the Ancoratus of Epiphanius, the Cappadocian-Armenian, the exposition of the Nicene Creed ascribed to Basil, a Creed which was read at Chalcedon and which is described as "Nicene." To this class our Creed also belongs. If it be compared with the Nicene Creed it will be easily seen that it cannot be based on the latter; if, on the other hand, it be compared with the old Creed of Jerusalem (in Cyril of Jerusalem) it becomes plain that it is nothing but a Nicene redaction of this Creed. But this is as much as to say that it was probably composed by Cyril of Jerusalem. Moreover, its general character also perfectly corresponds with what we know of Cyril's theology and of his gradual approximation to orthodoxy. (Socrat. V. 8, Sozom. VII. 7) "Cyril's personal history presents in various respects a parallel to the transition of the Jerusalem Creed into the form of the so-called Creed of Constantinople." That is to say, in the Creed which afterwards became ecumenical the words of the Nicene Creed "*τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός*" and the Nicene anathemas are omitted. The christological section accordingly runs thus: "*καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο.*" From the writings of the Homoiousians and the Cappadocians we can accordingly easily gather that the "*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός*" presented a far greater difficulty to the half-friends of the Nicene Creed than the *ὁμοούσιος*; for *ὁμοούσιος* not without some show of fairness might be interpreted as *ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν*, while on the contrary the "*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*", both in what it said and in what it excluded—the will, namely—seemed to leave the door open to Sabellianism. It follows also from Athan. de Synodis that he considered the "*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*" as of supreme importance; for in a way that is very characteristic of him he observes that *ὁμοούσιος* is equal to *ὁμοιούσιος ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, that is, whoever intentionally avows his belief in the *ὁμοούσιος* without the "*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*" avows his belief in it as a Homoiousian. *The Christological formula in the Creed of Jerusalem, i.e., what was later on the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, is thus almost homoiousian*, even although it retains the *ὁμοούσιος*. It corresponds exactly to the standpoint which Cyril must have taken up soon after 362. The same holds good of what the Creed says regarding the Holy Spirit. The words: "*καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ συνπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν*" are in entire harmony with the form which the doctrine of the Holy Spirit had in the sixties. A Pneumatomachian could have subscribed this formula at a pinch; and just because of this it is certain that the Council of 381 did not accept this Creed. We can only conjecture how it came

for in tracing back to this Council "an enlarged Nicene Creed" without the "ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός", "of the substance of the Father", without the Nicene anathemas, and without the avowal of the Homousia of the Spirit, and in attesting it as orthodox, it, without wishing to do so, preserved the recollection of the fact that the Eastern orthodoxy of 381 had really been a neo-orthodoxy, which in its use of the word Ὁμοούσιος did not represent the dogmatic conviction of Athanasius. In the *quid pro quo* involved in this substitution of one Creed for another, we have a judicial sentence which could not conceivably have been more discriminating; but it involves still more than that—namely, the most cruel satire. From the fact that in the Church the Creed of Constantinople gradually came to be accepted as a perfect expression of orthodoxy, and was spoken of as the Nicene Creed while the latter was forgotten, it follows that the great difference which existed between the old Faith and the Cappadocian neo-orthodoxy was no longer understood, and that under cover of the Ὁμοούσιος a sort of Homoiousianism had in general been reached, the view which has really been the orthodox one in all Churches until this day. The father of the official doctrine of the Trinity in the form in which the Churches have held to it, was not Athanasius, nor Basil of Cæsarea, but Basil of Ancyra.

All the same, the thought of the great Athanasius, though in

to be the Creed of Constantinople (see Hort., pp. 97—106 f. and my article pp. 225 f., 228 f.). It was probably entered in the Acts of the Council as the Confession by which Cyril had proved to the Council that his faith was orthodox and which the highly esteemed Epiphanius had also avowed as his. The Bishop of Constantinople took it from among the Acts shortly before the year 451 and put it into circulation. The desire to foist into the churches a *Constantinopolitan* Creed was stronger in his case than his perception of the defects of this very Creed. It was about 530 that the Creed of Constantinople first became a Baptismal Creed in the East and displaced the Nicene Creed. It was about the same time that it first came into notice in the West, but it, however, very quickly shoved the old Apostolic Baptismal Creeds into the background, being used in opposition to Germanic Arianism which was very widely spread there. On the "filioque" see below. We may merely mention the extreme and wholly unworkable hypothesis of the Catholic Vincenzi (De process. Spiritus S., Romæ, 1878) that the Creed of Constantinople is a Greek made-up composition belonging to the beginning of the seventh century, a fabrication the sole aim of which was to carry back the date of the rise of the heresy of the procession of the Holy Spirit *ex patre solo* into the Fourth Century

a considerably altered form, had triumphed. Science and the revolution which took place in the political world had paved the way for its victory; *suppressed*, it certainly never could have been.

The Westerns were anything but pleased in the first instance with the course things had taken in the East. At Councils held at the same time in Rome and Milan, in the latter place under the presidency of Ambrose, they had made representations to Theodosius and had even threatened him with a withdrawal of Church privileges.[1] But Theodosius answered them in a very ungracious manner, whereupon they sought to justify their attitude.[2] The Emperor was prudent enough not to fall in with the proposal of the Westerns that an ecumenical Council should be summoned to meet at Rome. He followed the policy of Constantius also in keeping the Churches of the two halves of the Empire separate, as his choice of Rimini and Seleucia proves. And by his masterly conduct of affairs he actually succeeded in introducing a *modus vivendi* in the year 382, spite of the attempts made to thwart him by his colleague Gratian who was led by Ambrose. Gratian summoned a General Council to meet at Rome, to which the Eastern bishops were also invited. But Theodosius had already got them together in Constantinople. They accordingly replied in a letter in which they declined the invitation, and its tone which was as praiseworthy as it was prudent, helped in all probability to lessen the tension between the East and the West. They appealed, besides, not only to the decisions of the Council of 381, but also to their resolution of 378 in which they had made advances to the West,[3] and they explained finally that they had adopted

[1] See the letter "Sanctum" in Mansi III., p. 631.

[2] See the letter "Fidei" in Mansi III., p. 630.

[3] The important letter is in Theodoret V. 9. It contains a description of the persecutions which had been endured, of the struggles which still continued, thanks that they ὡς οἰκεῖα μέλη should have received an invitation to the Council so that they may rule along with the West and that it may not rule alone, regret that they are prevented from appearing at it; then follows the exposition of the Faith, after the despatch of the three envoys had been announced: "What we have suffered we suffered for the Evangelical Faith which was settled at Nicæa, ταύτην τὴν πίστιν καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ διαστρέφουσι τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθοῦς

a recent detailed dogmatic declaration of the Western bishops, of Damasus that is, and were ready to recognise the Paulinists in Antioch as orthodox, which meant that they no longer suspected them of Marcellianism.[1] The despatch of three envoys to Rome where, besides Jerome, the distinguished Epiphanius happened to be just at this time, could not but help towards

πίστεως συναρέσκειν δεῖ· ἦν μόλις ποτὲ [sic] πρεσβυτάτην τε οὖσαν καὶ ἀκόλουθον τῷ βαπτίσματι καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἡμᾶς πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, δηλαδὴ θεότητός τε καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ οὐσίας μιᾶς τοῦ πατρός καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πιστευομένης, ὁμοτίμου τε τῆς ἀξίας καὶ συναϊδίου τῆς βασιλείας, ἐν τρισὶ τελείαις ὑποστάσεσιν ἤγουν τρισὶ τελείοις προσώποις, ὡς μήτε τὴν Σαβελλίου νόσον χώραν λαβεῖν συγχεομένων τῶν ὑποστάσεων, εἴγουν τῶν ἰδιοτήτων ἀναιρουμένων, μή τε μὴν τὴν τῶν Εὐνομιανῶν καὶ Ἀρειανῶν καὶ Πνευματομάχων βλασφημίαν ἰσχύειν, τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τῆς θεότητος τεμνομένης καὶ τῇ ἀκτίστῳ καὶ ὁμοουσίῳ καὶ συναϊδίῳ τριάδι μεταγενεστέρας τινὸς ἢ κτιστῆς ἢ ἑτεροουσίου φύσεως ἐπαγομένης. The Easterns did not yield anything here and yet they expressed their belief in as conciliatory a form as possible since they were silent about Marcellus, called Sabellianism a "disease", but Arianism a "blasphemy". Next follows the reference to the acts of the Councils of 379 and 381, then an explanation regarding the new appointment to the "as it were newly founded Church of Constantinople" and to the bishopric of Antioch where—this is directed against Rome and Alexandria—the name Christian first arose. So too the recognition of Cyril of Jerusalem, who had suffered so much for the Faith, is justified. Jerusalem is called in this connection "the mother of all Churches." The Easterns at the close beseech the Westerns to give their consent to all this, τῆς πνευματικῆς μεσιτευούσης ἀγάπης καὶ τοῦ κυριακοῦ φόβου, πᾶσαν μὲν καταστέλλοντος ἀνθρωπίνην προσπάθειαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν οἰκοδομὴν προτιμοτέραν ποιοῦντος τῆς πρὸς τὸν καθ' ἕνα συμπαθείας ἢ χάριτος. Then will we no longer say, what is condemned by the Apostles: "I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas", but we shall all appear as belonging to Christ, who is not divided in us, and will with the help of God preserve the body of the Church from division.

[1] The so-called fifth Canon of the Council of 381 (see Rade, pp. 107, 116 f., 133) belongs to the Synod of 382, as also the sixth; the seventh is later. It runs: περὶ τοῦ τόμου τῶν Δυτικῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ ἀπεδεξάμεθα τοὺς μίαν ὁμολογοῦντας πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος θεότητα. It can only be the Paulinists in Antioch who are here referred to. But as regards the Western Tomos we must with Rade, op. cit., apparently take it to be the twenty-four Anathemas of Damasus (in Theodoret V. II.). This noteworthy document, which perhaps originated in the year 381, presents in a full and definite way the standpoint of the Westerns in regard to the different dogmatic questions. It is specially worthy of notice that the doctrine of Marcellus is condemned without any mention being made of its author. The ninth anathema is further of importance and also the eleventh: "If anyone does not confess that the Son is from the Father, *i.e.*, is born of His Divine substance, let him be accursed." Compare with this the so-called Creed of Constantinople in which the ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας is wanting. The fulness with which the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Spirit are already treated, is significant.

the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The opposition to Nectarius of Constantinople and Cyril of Jerusalem was now allowed to drop in Rome; but the Western bishops could not yet bring themselves to acknowledge Flavian in Antioch, and, moreover, Paulinus, his opponent, was himself present at the Council in Rome. There was once more a strong reaction against Apollinarianism.[1]

If Arianism, or Homœism, from the time when it ceased to enjoy the imperial favour tended rapidly to disappear in the Empire, if too it had no fanatic as Donatism had, it was nevertheless still a power in the East in 383; large provinces had still Arian tendencies, the common people[2] in them above all; while in the West it had supporters[3] in the Empress Jus-

[1] To this period, according to Rade's pertinent conjecture, the work of Damasus given in Theodoret V. 10 against Apollinarianism, also belongs. It probably came from the pen of Jerome, soon after 382, and gives expression to the supreme self-consciousness of the occupant of the chair of Peter. Jerome always flattered Damasus.

[2] The Church historians, Philostorgius in particular, give us some information about this, but they do not enter much into particulars. Eunomius kept his ground firmly and courageously and declined all compromises. He did not even so much as recognise the baptism and ordination of the other Church parties (Philostorg. X. 4). The Conciliar epistle of the Easterns of the year 382 (see above) further shews what difficulties the attempt to carry through the Homoousios gave rise to.

[3] See the struggles of Ambrose against Arianism in Upper Italy, which went on still the year 388. After the death of his mother, Valentinus II. declared for orthodoxy; see Cod. Theodos. XVI. 5, 15. The knowledge that Maximus the usurper had owed his large following to the fact of his being strictly orthodox helped to bring about this decision. The assertion of Libanius that Maximus entered into an alliance even with the unruly and rebellious Alexandrians is one which is calculated to make us reflect. The fact that in the days of Theodosius Ambrose was at the head of the Church in the West, probably contributed largely to bring about an adjustment of the differences between the Western-Alexandrian and the Cappadocian-neo-orthodox doctrines of the Son. This bishop had learned from Philo, Origen, and Basil, and he had friendly intercourse with the last mentioned; but he never shewed any interest in or appreciation of the difference between the form of doctrine in East and West, and he did not go into the speculations of the theologians of the East. It was thus merely in a superficial fashion that he accepted the theological science of the East. But this very fact was of advantage to him so far as his position was concerned; for it meant that he did not separate himself from the common sense of the West, while, on the other hand, he had a great respect for the Cappadocian theology and consequently was admirably suited for being a peace-maker. *Ex professo* he did not handle the Trinitarian problem; his formulæ bear what is essentially the Western stamp, without, however, being pointed against the "Meletians", and in fact, he himself accepted the statement: "nulla est discrepantia divinitatis et operis; non igitur in utroque una persona, sed una substantia

tinia and her son. Theodosius was more concerned to win over the Arians than to drive them out of the Church. In the first years of his reign while shewing a firm determination to establish orthodoxy, he had at the same time followed a sort of *conciliatory* policy which, however, to the honour of the Arians be it said, did not succeed. Just as in 381 he invited the Macedonians to the Council, so in the year 383 he made a further attempt to unite all the opposing parties at a Constantinopolitan Council and if possible to bring about concord. The attempt was sincere—even Eunomius was present—but it failed; but it is very memorable for two reasons: (1) the orthodox bishop of Constantinople made common cause on this occasion with the Novatian bishop, a proof of how insecure the position of orthodoxy in the capital itself still was;[1] (2) an attempt was made at the Council to transfer the whole question in dispute between orthodox and Arians into the region of tradition. The Holy Scriptures were to be dispensed with, *and the proof of the truth of orthodoxy was to be furnished solely by the testimony of the ante-Nicene Fathers to whose authority the opposite party must as good Catholics bow.* This undertaking was a prophecy of the ominous future which was before the Church, and proved at the same time that the actual

est"; but on the other hand: "non duo domini, sed unus dominus, quia et pater deus et filius deus, sed unus deus, quia pater in filio et filius in patre—nevertheless—unus deus, quia una deitas" (see Förster, Ambrosius, p. 130). Ambrose did not engage in any independent speculations regarding the Trinity, as Hilary did (see Reinkens, op. cit., and Schwane, D G. d. patrist. Zeit., p. 150 ff.). The fact, however, that in the fourth century the greatest theologian of the West—namely, Jerome, and the most powerful ecclesiastical prince of the West, Ambrose, had learned their theology from the Greeks, was the most important cause of the final union of East and West in the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity. Hosius, Julius of Rome, Lucifer and Damasus of Rome would not have been able to accomplish the dogmatic unity of the two halves of the Empire. As a matter of fact the dogmatic unity did not spring from the alliance of Athanasius, Julius, Peter, and Damasus, Alexandria and Rome that is, but from the alliance of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Jerome, and Ambrose.

[1] On the Novatians in the East in the Fourth Century and their relations to the orthodox, particularly in the city of Constantinople, see my articles s. v. "Novatian", "Socrates", in Herzog's R.-Encykl. The Novatians, strange to say, always had been and continued to be Nicene. The explanation of this may be found in the fact that they originated in the West, or in the fact of their connection with the West.

interest in the controversy in the East had already once more taken a secondary place compared with the conservative interest. Nothing grows faster than tradition, and nothing is more convenient when the truth of a proposition has to be defended than to fall back on the contention *that it has always been so*.[1]

After this Council Theodosius discontinued his efforts in favour of union and from this time sought to suppress Arianism. Ambrose seconded his plans in Upper Italy. The orthodox State-Church, which was, however, on the other hand, a Church-State, was established. Severe laws were now passed against all heretics with the exception of the Novatians.[2] The State had at last secured that unity of the Church which Constantine had already striven after. But it was a two-edged sword. It injured the State and dealt it a most dangerous wound. Amongst the Greeks Arianism died out more quickly than Hellenism. Violent schisms amongst the Arians themselves seem to have accelerated its downfall,[3] but the different stages are unknown

[1] Socr. V. 10 (Sozom. VII. 12) has given us some information regarding the proceedings at the Council of Constantinople in 383. Theodosius wished to have an actual conference between the opposing parties. Sisinius, the reader to the Novatian bishop Agelius, is then said to have advised that instead of having a disputation the matter should be settled simply on the basis of passages from the Fathers; the patristic proof alone was to be authoritative. Socrates tells us that with the consent of the Emperor this was actually the course followed, and that on the part of the orthodox only those Fathers were appealed to who had lived *before* the Arian controversy. The raising of the question, however, as to whether the various parties actually recognised these Fathers as authoritative, produced a Babylonian confusion amongst them, and indeed even amongst the members of one and the same party, so that the Emperor abandoned this plan of settling the dispute. He next collected together Confessions composed by the different parties (the bold one composed by Eunomius is still preserved, see Mansi III., p. 646 sq.), but rejected them all with the exception of the orthodox one, and ungraciously sent the parties home. The Arians, it is said, consoled themselves for the Emperor's unkind treatment of them, with the saying that "many are called but few chosen". This narrative, so far as the particulars are concerned, is too much a made-up one to be implicitly trusted. But the attempt to decide the whole question on the authority of tradition was certainly made. If we consider how at first both parties proceeded almost exclusively on the basis of the Holy Scriptures we can perceive in the attempt an extremely significant advance in the work of laying waste the Eastern Churches.

[2] See Cod. Theodos. XVI. 1, 4 of the year 386 and the other laws of Theodosius and his sons. Things became particularly bad from about 410 onwards.

[3] See Sozom. in Books VII. and VIII., especially in VIII. 1.

to us. The history of its fortunes amongst the German peoples until the seventh century does not fall within the scope of this work. The educated laity, however, in the East regarded the orthodox formula rather as a necessary evil and as an unexplainable mystery than as an expression of their Faith. The victory of the Nicene Creed was a victory of the priests over the faith of the Christian people. The Logos-doctrine had already become unintelligible to those who were not theologians. The setting up of the Nicene-Cappadocian formula as the fundamental Confession of the Church made it perfectly impossible for the Catholic laity to get an inner comprehension of the Christian Faith taking as their guide the form in which it was presented in the doctrine of the Church. The thought that Christianity is the revelation of something incomprehensible became more and more a familiar one to men's minds. This thought has for its obverse side the adoration of the mystery,[1] and for its reverse side indifference and subjection to mystagogues.[2] The priests and theologians could certainly not give the people more than they possessed themselves; but it is alarming to note in the ecclesiastical literature of the Fourth Century and the period following how little attention is given to the Christian *people*. The theologians had always the clergy, the officials, good society in their minds. The people must simply believe the Faith; they accordingly did not live in this Faith, but in that Christianity of the second rank which is

[1] Athanasius had already described the whole substance of the Christian religion as a "doctrine of the mysteries"—see, *e.g.*, his Festival-letters, p. 68 (ed. Larsow).

[2] We have here, above all, to remember the attitude taken up by Socrates, which is typical of that of the ecclesiastically pious laity of the East. His standpoint is—we ought silently to adore the mystery. Whatever the generation the last but one before his own has fixed, is for him already holy; but he will have nothing to do with dogmatic disputes in his own time, and one may even find in what he says traces of a vague feeling on his part that the laity as regards their Faith had in fine been duped by the bishops and their controversies. His agreement with what was said by Euagrius in reference to the Trinity (III. 7) is characteristic of his position in the matter: *πᾶσα πρότασις ἢ γένος ἔχει κατηγορούμενον ἢ εἶδος ἢ διαφορὰν ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ τὸ ἐκ τούτων συγκείμενον· οὐδὲν δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶ λαβεῖν. σιωπῇ προσκυνείσθω τὸ ἄρρητον.* He will have nothing to do with *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*. The case too of Procopius of Cæsarea illustrates the attitude of reserve taken up by the laity in the sixth century to the whole dogmatic system of the Church.

represented in the legends of the saints, in apocalypses, in image-worship, in the veneration of angels and martyrs, in crosses and amulets, in the Mass regarded as magical worship, and in sacramental observances of all sorts. Christ as the ὁμοούσιος became a dogmatic form of words; and in place of this the bones of the martyrs became living saints, and the shades of the old dethroned gods together with their worship, revived once more.

APPENDIX.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY GHOST AND OF THE TRINITY.

I. IN the baptismal formula, along with the confession of belief in the Father and Son, there had always been from early times a confession also of belief in the Holy Spirit. This belief expressed the thought that Christianity has within it the Spirit of the Father—the Spirit of Christ—the living, illuminating, divine principle. The Spirit is the *gift* of God. But after the Montanist controversies the combination of Spirit and Church, Spirit and individual Christians came to have a secondary place in regular theological thought. The World-Church and its theologians busied themselves instead with the Spirit in so far as it spoke through the prophets, in so far as it had before this brooded "over the waters", in so far as it descended on Christ at His baptism, etc.—though this soon became a minor point—or took part in His human origin. But there was quite an accumulation of difficulties here for rational theology. These difficulties lay (1) in the notion itself, in so far as πνεῦμα also described the substance of God and of the Logos; (2) in the impossibility of recognising any specific activity of the Spirit in the present; (3) in the desire to ascribe to the Logos rather than to the Spirit the active working in the universe and in the history of revelation. The form of the Spirit's existence, its rank and function were accordingly quite uncertain. By one the Holy Spirit was considered as a gift and as an impersonal—and therefore also an unbegotten—power which Christ had promised to send and which consequently became an actual fact only after Christ's Ascension; by another as a primitive power in the history of revelation; by a third as an active

power in the world-process also. Others again attributed to it a personal existence misled by the expression "the Paraclete". Of these some regarded it as a created divine being, others as the highest spiritual creature made by God, the highest angel; others again as the second προβολή or "derivatio" of the Father, and thus as a permanently existing Being sharing in the Godhead itself; while once more others identified it with the eternal Son Himself. There were actually some too who were inclined to regard the Spirit, which is feminine in Hebrew, and which was identified with the "Wisdom" of God, as a female principle. [1] The views held regarding its rank and functions also were accordingly very different. All who regarded the Spirit as personal, subordinated it to the Father and probably also as a rule to the Son when they distinguished it from the latter, for the relation of Father and Son did not seem to permit of the existence of a third being of the same kind, and, besides, Christ had expressly said that he would send the Spirit, and therefore it looked as if the latter were His servant or messenger. The other idea that the Logos is the organ of the Spirit or Wisdom is very rarely met with. This or an idea similar to it was the one reached by those who distinguished between the impersonal Logos or Wisdom eternally inherent in God and the created Logos or Wisdom, and then identified the divine in Christ with the latter. As to its functions, we meet with no further speculations regarding their peculiar nature after the attempts of the Montanists to define them, until a very much later date when at last theologians had learned to commit a special department of the mysteries to the care of the Spirit. All that was meanwhile said regarding the activity of the Spirit in the world-process, in the history of revelation, in regeneration, including illumination and sanctification, was of a wholly vague kind, and was frequently either the expression of perplexity or of exegetical learning, but never gave evidence of any special theological interest in the question. We must not, however, overlook the fact that in Church theology in its oldest form as we see it in Irenæus

[1] The fact that in the original draft of the Apostolical Constitutions (II. 26) a parallel is drawn between the deaconess and the Holy Spirit is perhaps connected with this too.

and Tertullian, we find an attempt made to give to the Spirit, which had necessarily to be ranked as a being of special dignity within the Godhead, an immanent relation to the Father and the Son. The passages in Irenæus referring to the Spirit are of special importance, though Tertullian was the first to call Him "God". One can trace within theology a well-marked line of development running from Justin through Tertullian to Origen.[1] After Sabellius, starting from totally different premises, had by his speculations drawn attention to the Holy Spirit, Origen here too supplied a definite conception on the subject just as he had in connection with the doctrine of the Logos. While admitting the want of any certainty in what was given by tradition, he treated *the doctrine of the Holy Spirit entirely according to the analogy of the doctrine of the Logos*, and even *demanded* that it should be so treated. The Holy Spirit forms part of the Godhead, it is a permanently existing divine Being, but it is at the same time a creature, and a creature, in fact, which occupies a stage lower than the Son, because it, like everything created, has come into being by the Son or Logos. The sphere of its activity is correspondingly smaller than that of the Son. Origen declared that intensively it was more important, but he did not give this its due value, since for him the categories of magnitude, space, and causality were in the last resort the highest.[2] The fact that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was treated in Tertullian (adv. Prax.) and Origen in a way perfectly analogous to that followed in the case of the doctrine of the Logos, is the strongest possible proof that there was no specific theological interest taken in this point of doctrine.[3] Nor was it different in

[1] But it is only in so far as Origen teaches the pre-temporal "processio" of the Spirit that his doctrine betokens an advance on that of Tertullian, who still essentially limits the action of the Spirit to the history of the world and of revelation. By the "unius substantiæ" which he regards as true of the Spirit also, Tertullian comes nearer the views which finally prevailed in the Fourth Century than Origen. For the remarkable formula used by Hippolytus in connection with the Spirit, see Vol. II., p. 261.

[2] On the doctrine of the Holy Spirit before Origen and in Origen see Vol. II. passim, Kahnis, L. vom. h. Geist, 1847, Bigg, The Christian Platonists, 171 sq., Nitzsch, pp. 289—293.

[3] It is in Irenæus alone that we find indications of any specific speculation regarding the Holy Spirit.

the period following. The Arian and the Arianising formulæ of the Fourth Century still at least embody the attempt to state in reference to the Spirit what, according to the old Church tradition, describes the character of its active working, little as that is; the pompous formula of orthodoxy, however, merely gives expression to the general thought that there is no foreign element in the Godhead, and shews, moreover, that the doctrine of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit was already beginning to be an embarrassing one for the Church.

The doctrine of Origen that the Holy Spirit is an individual hypostasis and that it is a created being included within the sphere of the Godhead itself, found only very partial acceptance for more than a century. And even in the cases in which, under the influence of the baptismal formula, reference was made to a Trinity in the Godhead—which came to be more and more the practice,—the third Being was still left in the vague, and, as at an earlier period, we hear of the promised *gift* of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the philosophical theologians became more and more convinced that it was necessary to assume the presence not merely of a threefold economy in the Godhead, but of three divine beings or substances. In the first thirty years after the commencement of the Arian controversy, the Holy Spirit is scarcely ever mentioned,[1] although the Lucianists and consequently Arius too regarded it as indeed a divine hypostasis, but at the same time as the most perfect creature, which the Father had created through the Son and which therefore was inferior to the Son also in nature, dignity, and position.[2] In their Confessions they kept to the old simple tradition: *πιστεύομεν καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ εἰς παράκλησιν καὶ ἁγιασμὸν καὶ τελείωσιν τοῖς πιστεύουσι διδόμενον*,[3] "and we believe

[1] See Basil., ep. 125: *ὁ δὲ περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος λόγος ἐν παραδρομῇ κεῖται, οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξεργασίας ἀξιωθείς, διὰ τὸ μηδέπω τότε κεκινῆσθαι τὸ ζήτημα*, *i.e.*, at the time of the Nicene Council.

[2] See above, p. 19. The view of Eunomius is representative of the whole group; see the documents which originated with him and Basil c. Eunom. III. 5. Epiphanius has pithily summarised the Arian doctrine (H. 69 c. 56): *τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα κτίσμα πάλιν κτίσματός φασιν εἶναι διὰ τὸ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὰ πάντα γεγενῆσθαι* (John I. 3).

[3] See the so-called Confession of Lucian, *i.e.*, the Second Creed of Antioch.; cf. besides the third and fourth formulæ of Antioch, the so-called formula of

in the Holy Spirit given to believers for consolation, and sanctification, and perfection." They recognised three graduated hypostases in the Godhead. The fact that Athanasius did not in the first instance think of the Spirit at all, regarding which also nothing was fixed at Nicæa, is simply a proof of his intense interest in his doctrine of the Son. The first trace of the emergence of the question as to the Spirit is found, so far as I know, in the Anathemas (20 ff.) of the very conservative Creed of the Eusebian Council of Sirmium (351). Here the identification of the Holy Spirit with the unbegotten God and with the Son, as also the designation of it as *μέρος τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τοῦ υἱοῦ*, (part of the Father and of the Son,) are forbidden.[1] It was towards the end of the fifties that Athanasius directed his attention to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and he at once took up a firm position.[2] If the Holy Spirit belongs to the Godhead it must be worshipped, if it is an independent being then all that holds good of the Son holds good of it *also*, for otherwise the Triad would be divided and blasphemed and the rank of the Son too would again become doubtful—this is for him a conclusive argument. There can be nothing foreign, nothing created in the Triad which is just the one God (*ὅλη τριὰς εἷς Θεός ἐστιν*). Athanasius was not only able to adduce a number of passages from Scripture in support of this assertion, but he also endeavoured to verify his view by a consideration of the functions of the Holy Spirit. The principle of sanctification cannot be of the same nature as the beings which it sanctifies; the source of life for creatures cannot itself be a creature;

Sardica—a proof that the orthodox theologians of the West had not yet given attention to the question; their statement: *πιστεύομεν τὸν παράκλητον, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἡμῖν αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος καὶ ἐπηγγείλατο καὶ ἐπεμψεν· καὶ τοῦτο πιστεύομεν πεμφθέν, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, if it has been correctly handed down, shews, besides, a highly suspicious want of clearness; further the formula macrostich., the formulæ of Philippopolis and the later Sirmian and Homœan formulæ; in the formula of 357 we have "spiritus paracletus per filium est."

[1] The theology of Marcellus might certainly have drawn the attention of the theologians to the doctrine of the Spirit; for Marcellus discussed this doctrine although not with fulness; see Zahn, op. cit., p. 147 ff. According to Marcellus the Spirit proceeds from the Father *and* from the Logos, and forms part of the divine substance; its special work does not, however, begin till after that of the Son.

[2] See Athanas. ad Serap.

he who is the medium whereby we enter into fellowship with the Divine nature must himself possess this nature.[1] On the other hand, He who works as the Father and the Son work, or to put it more accurately, He who bestows one and the same grace—for there is only *one* grace, namely, that of the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit—is part of the Godhead, and whoever rejects Him separates himself from the Faith generally. Thus everything is really already expressed in the baptismal formula; for without the Holy Spirit it would be destroyed, since it is the Spirit who throughout *completes* or perfects what is done. The personality of the Spirit is simply presupposed by Athanasius in the indefinite form in which he also presupposed the personality of the Son. The attempts to distinguish the peculiar nature of the activity of the Spirit from that of the Father and the Son did not indeed get beyond empty words such as perfection, connection, termination of activity, etc. The question as to why the Son could not do all this Himself, and why, if there was here a third, the existence of a Fourth was not also possible, was left unanswered. It is necessary to believe in the Trinity as handed down by tradition: "and it is manifest that the Spirit is not one being of the many nor an angel [one of many], but one unique being, or rather, He belongs to the Logos who is one, and to God who is one, and is also of the same substance" (*καὶ οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄγγελος, ἀλλ' ἕν ὄν. μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἑνὸς ὄντος ἴδιον καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἴδιον καὶ ὁμοούσιόν ἐστίν*).[2] The "Tropicists" as he calls those who teach erroneous doctrine in reference to the Holy Spirit, are in his view no better than the Arians.

[1] Passages op. cit., above all, I. 23, 24: *εἰ κτίσμα δὲ ἦν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἂν τις ἐν αὐτῷ μετουσία τοῦ Θεοῦ γένοιτο ἡμῖν· ἀλλ' ἡ ἄρα κτίσματι μὲν συνηπτόμεθα, ἀλλότριοι δὲ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἐγινόμεθα, ὡς κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτῆς μετέχοντες... εἰ δὲ τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος μετουσίᾳ γινόμεθα κοινωνοὶ θείας φύσεως, μαίνοιτ' ἂν τις λέγων τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς κτιστῆς φύσεως, καὶ μὴ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐν οἷς γίνεται οὗτοι θεοποιοῦνται· εἰ δὲ θεοποιεῖ, οὐκ ἀμφίβολον, ὅτι ἡ τούτου φύσις Θεοῦ ἐστι.*

[2] Ad Serap. I. 27. Athanasius also appeals in support of this belief to the tradition of the Catholic Church (c. 28 sq.), though he is able to construe it ideally only and does not quote any authorities.

The letters of Athanasius to Serapion of Thmuis were called forth by the complaints of this bishop about the intrigues of those who taught false doctrine regarding the Holy Spirit. As a matter of fact, amongst the Semi-Arians the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was now purposely developed in opposition to the Homousia. It was in particular the highly esteemed chief of the Thracian Semi-Arians, Macedonius, at a later date the deposed bishop of Constantinople, who defended the doctrine that the Spirit is a creature similar to the angels, a being subordinate to the Father and the Son and in their service.[1] It is worth noting with regard to these Semi-Arians that the more their common opposition to the Homœans and Anomœans drove them to side with the Nicæans the more firmly they stuck to their doctrine of the Spirit. It looked as if they wished to preserve in their doctrine of the Holy Spirit the Conservativism which they had had to abandon as regards the doctrine of the Son. It was at the Synod of Alexandria (362) that the orthodox first took up the definite position with regard to this question that whoever regards the Holy Spirit as a creature and separates it from the substance of Christ, in so doing divides up the Holy Trinity, gives a hypocritical adherence to the Nicene Faith, and has merely in appearance renounced Arianism.[2] But what was thus firmly established by the Alexandrians by no means at once became law for the orthodox in the East. The statements regarding the Spirit[3] were indeed further amplified

[1] On Macedonius see the articles in the Diction. of Chr. Biogr. and in Herzog's R.-Encykl, and in addition Gwatkin, pp. 160—181, 208. The doctrine is given in Athan. ad Serap. I. 1 f. Socrat. II. 45, 38, Sozom. IV. 27, etc., Basil, ep. 251, Theodoret. II. 6. The Macedonians laid stress on the difference between the particles ἐκ, διά, ἐν, as used of the hypostases, and emphasised the fact that the Holy Scripture does not describe the Holy Spirit as an object of adoration, and pointed out that the relation of Father and Son did not admit of a third. What the τρίτη διαθήκη of the Macedonians was (see Gregor. Naz. Orat. 31. 7), I do not know.

[2] See Athan., Tom. ad Antioch. 3, see also 5: τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ ξένον ἀλλ' ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρός.

[3] The formula of the revised Creed of Jerusalem, *i.e.*, the later Creed of Constantinople, is characteristic. It only demands the complete adoration and glorifying of the Spirit along with the Father and Son, but otherwise confines itself to general predicates: "τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν." These are undoubtedly of a very exalted kind and seem also

in subsequent years in connection with the remodelling of the old Confessions, but amongst the Homoiousians who were becoming Homousians, the greatest uncertainty continued to prevail up till 380. The thirty-first oration of Gregory of Nazianzus which was composed at that time, proves this.[1] Meanwhile it was just the Cappadocians who did most towards getting the orthodox conception naturalised in the Church, namely, Basil in his work against Eunomius (lib. III.) and in the tractate "de spiritu sancto," Gregory of Nazianzus in several of his orations (31, 37, 44), and Gregory of Nyssa in his amplifications of Trinitarian doctrine. They had apparently learned something from the letters of Athanasius ad Serap., for they repeat his arguments and give them more formal development. But neither in Basil nor in Gregory of Nazianzus is there the stringency which marks the thought of Athanasius. The absence of any tangible tradition exercised a strong influence[2] on them, and at bottom they are already satisfied—Basil at any rate—with the avowal that the Spirit is not in any sense a creature.[3]

to exclude the idea of the dependence of the Spirit on the Son, but nevertheless they do not get the length of the complete Homousia.

[1] He writes, "Of the wise amongst us some consider the Holy Spirit to be an energy, others a creature, others God, while others again cannot make up their minds to adopt any definite view out of reverence for Scripture, as they put it, because it does not make any very definite statement on the point. On this account they neither accord to Him divine adoration nor do they refuse it to Him, and thus take a middle road, but which is really a very bad path. Of those again who hold Him to be God, some keep this pious belief to themselves, while others state it openly. Others to a certain degree measure the Godhead since like us they accept the Trinity, but they put a great distance between the three by maintaining that the first is infinite in substance and power, the second in power, but not in substance, while the third is infinite in neither of these two respects." For the details see Ullmann, p. 264 f.; at pages 269—275 he has set forth the doctrine of Gregory regarding the Holy Spirit, together with the Scriptural proofs.

[2] Gregory of Nazianzus has consequently (Orat. 31.2) to begin by remarking that he had been accused of introducing a Θεὸς ξένος καὶ ἄγραφος. He himself practically admits the want of any explicit Scriptural proof, and has recourse to the plea (c. 3) that "love of the letter is a cloak for impiety." Basil undoubtedly appealed (de s. s. 29) to Irenæus, Clemens Alex., Origen, and Dionysius of Rome in defence of his doctrine, but he felt all the same that there was little evidence in support of it. Gregory made a similar admission.

[3] Cf. also the remarkable words of Gregory of Naz. Vol. III., p. 230. The striking utterances of the Cappadocians regarding the letter of Holy Scripture, tradition

Gregory of Nyssa as an Origenist and speculative Trinitarian carried the doctrine further.[1] As the theologians were at a loss how to accord to the Spirit a peculiar mode of being in relation to the Father, they hit upon the plan of attributing to it, following some passages in St John, eternal sending

kerygma, and dogma all owe their origin to the troublesome situation created by the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The Greeks of later days no longer found themselves in such a predicament of this kind, and consequently they did not require to repeat the bold statements regarding tradition.

[1] See also the work of Didymus, *περὶ τριάδος*, edid. Mingarelli, particularly the Second Book, c. 6 sq., written about 380, which contains the fullest Fourth Century proof of the complete Godhead of the Holy Spirit which we possess. Previous to this Didymus had already composed a tractate "de spiritu sancto". Of special interest further is the "*οἰκονομία*", that is, the pædagogic or politic reticence which the Cappadocians permitted themselves and others in connection with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. According to Gregory of Naz. God Himself merely *indicated* the Godhead of the Holy Spirit in the N. T. and did not plainly reveal it till later on in order not to lay too great a burden on men (!)—a theory which overthrows the whole Catholic doctrine of tradition. It is thus also permitted to the faithful now to imitate this divine "economy" and *to bring forward the doctrine of the Spirit with caution and to introduce it gradually*. "Those who *regard* the Holy Spirit as God are godly men illuminated with knowledge, and those who *say that He is God, when this is done in presence of well-disposed hearers, have something heroic about them; but if it be done in presence of the vulgar-minded it shews that they do not possess the true teaching wisdom* (*εἰ δὲ ταπεινοῖς, οὐκ οἰκονομικοί*), because they are casting their pearls into the mud, or are giving strong meat instead of milk," and so on (Orat. 41.6). Gregory defends the conduct of Basil also, who, watched by the Arians in his lofty post in Cæsarea, guarded against openly calling the Holy Spirit "God" because the *γυμνὴ φωνή* that the Holy Spirit is God would have cost him his bishopric. (Orat. 43.68.) He acknowledged the Godhead of the Spirit "economically" only, *i.e.*, when the time was suitable for so doing. He was sharply blamed for this conduct by the rigidly orthodox clerics, as Gregory tells us (Ep. 26, al. 20). They complained that while Basil expressed himself admirably regarding the Father and the Son, he tore away the Spirit from the divine fellowship as rivers wash away the sand on their banks and hollow out the stones; he did not frankly confess the truth, but acted rather from policy than from truly pious feeling, and concealed the ambiguity of his teaching by the art of speech. Gregory who was regarded as a suspected person himself, stood up for his friend; a man, he said, occupying such an important post as Basil did, must surely proceed with some prudence and circumspection in proclaiming the truth (*βέλτιον οἰκονομηθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν*) and make some concession to the haziness of the spirit of the time so as not to still further damage the good cause by any public pronouncement. The difference between Athanasius and the *religious*-orthodox on the one hand, and the *theological*-orthodox on the other, comes out here with special clearness. Athanasius would have indignantly rejected that "*οἰκονομηθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν*", because he did not regard God Him-

forth (ἔκπεμψις) and procession (ἐκπόρευσις). Just as in the second century the begetting of Christ whereby he came to exist on this earth had been made into a super-terrestrial begetting then became an eternal begetting, while the "being begotten" next came to be regarded as the supreme characteristic of the second hypostasis, so in the fourth century an "eternal sending" of the Spirit was made out of the promised "sending" of the Holy Spirit and was regarded as descriptive of the essential characteristic of the third hypostasis within the Holy Trinity. Nowhere can the work of imaginative conception be more plainly recognised than here. Behind a history already in itself a wonderful one, and the scene of which is laid partly in the Godhead and partly within humanity, there was put by a process of abstraction and reduplication a second history the events of which are supposed to pass entirely within the Godhead itself. The former history is to get its stability through the latter which comprises "the entire mystery of our Faith."

The matter was much more quickly settled in the West. Hilary, it is true, was anything but clear as regards doctrine, but this was merely because he had eaten of the tree of Greek theology. The general unreasoned conviction in the West was that the Holy Spirit, belief in whom was avowed in the Apostles' Creed, is the one God likewise.

When the question as to the personality of the Spirit emerged, it was as quickly settled that it must be a *persona*, for the nature of God is not so poor that His Spirit cannot be a person.—(It has to be noted that *persona* and our "person" are not the same thing.) The views of Lactantius again on this point were different. Since the year 362 the orthodox at several Councils in the West and then in Asia had pronounced in favour of

self as a politician or a pedagogue, who acts κατ' οἰκονομίαν, but as the Truth. If he had ever acted as the Cappadocians did, the Homœans would have been the victors. Still, on the other hand, we ought not to judge the Cappadocians too severely. As followers of Origen they regarded the loftiest utterances of the Faith as *Science*; but Science admits, in fact often demands a pedagogic and economic or accommodating method of procedure. Just as Basil made a distinction between κηρύγματα and δόγματα, so Gregory (Orat. 40) concluded his Decalogue of Faith with the words: ἔχεις τοῦ μυστηρίου τὰ ἔκφορα, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ἀκοαῖς οὐκ ἀπόρρητα· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἴσως μαθήσῃ, τῆς τριάδος χαριζομένης, ἃ καὶ κρύφεις παρὰ σεαυτῷ σφραγῖδι κρατούμενα.

the complete Godhead of the Spirit [1] in opposition to the Arians, as we see from the Confession of Eunomius, and also to the Pneumatomachians.[2] The big Eastern Council summoned to meet at Constantinople in 381 by Theodosius orginally included thirty-six Macedonians amongst its members. But they could not be got to assent to the new doctrine of the Holy Spirit, spite of all the imperial efforts made to win them over. They were accordingly compelled to leave the Council.[3] The latter reaffirmed the Nicene Creed, but gave to it a detailed dogmatic explanation which has not been preserved, in which the complete homousia of the Spirit was avowed, and in the same way the first canon of the Council passes condemnation on the Semi-Arians or "Pneumatomachians".[4] The pronouncements of the years following confirmed the final result; see the epistle of the Council of Constantinople of 382,[5] but above all, the anathemas of Damasus.[6] The doctrine of the homousia of the Spirit from this time onward was as much a part of orthodoxy as the doctrine of the homousia of the Son. But since according to

[1] Their leaders, in addition to Macedonius, were Eustathius of Sebaste, Eleusius of Cyzikus, and probably also Basil of Ancyra. In Marathonius of Nicomedia the party had a member who was held in high honour both because of his position and his ascetic life. The Macedonians in general made a deep impression on their contemporaries by their ascetic practices and by their determined struggle against the Homœans. In the countries on the Hellespont they were the most important party.

[2] The most important utterances are the Epistle of the Alexandrian Council of 363, the declarations of the Westerns under Damasus in the years 369, 376, 377, the resolution of an Illyrian Council, (given in Theodoret IV. 9), the Council at Antioch in 379, which is decisive as regards the East in so far as those present avowed their belief in the Western doctrine including the doctrine of the Spirit. Compare, besides, the Confession of Basil (Hahn, § 121): *βαπτιζομεν εἰς τριάδα ὁμοούσιον*, that of Epiphanius in the Ancorat. (374): *πνεῦμα ἄκτιστον*, and that produced by Charisius (Hahn, § 144): *πνεῦμα ὁμοούσιον πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ*.

[3] See Socr. V. 8; Sozom. VII. 7, 9; Theodoret V. 8.

[4] It follows from a communication of the Council held at Constantinople in 382, that the Council issued a "tomus" on the doctrine of the Trinity. That the formula in reference to the Holy Spirit which is given in the so-called Creed of Constantinople, did not proceed from the Council of 381 and cannot have proceeded from it, since it is not sufficiently different from the view of the Macedonians, has been shewn above, p. 93.

[5] Theodoret V. 9.

[6] C. 16 f., see Theodoret V. 11.

the Greek way of conceiving of the matter, the Father continued to be regarded as the root of the Godhead, the perfect homousia of the Holy Spirit necessarily always seemed to the Greeks to be called in question whenever he was derived from the Son *also*. He consequently seemed to be inferior to the Son and thus to be a grandchild of the Father, or else to possess a double root. Then, besides, the dependence of the Spirit on the Son was obstinately maintained by the Arians and Semi-Arians on the ground that certain passages in the Bible supported this view, and in the interest of their conception of a descending Trinity in *three* stages. Thus the Greeks had constantly to watch and see that the procession of the Spirit from the Father *alone* was taught, and after the revised Creed of Jerusalem became an ecumenical Creed, they had a sacred text in support of their doctrine, which came to be as important as the doctrine itself.

II. The Cappadocians [1] and their great teacher, Apollinaris of Laodicea,[2] before them, reached *the* doctrine of the Trinity, which remained the dominant one in the Church, though it always continued to be capable of being differently restated by

[1] Athanasius prepared the way in his letters ad Serapionem.

[2] As is proved by his correspondence with Basil and as his own writings shew, Apollinaris was the first who completely *developed* the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. He was, however, more strongly influenced by Aristotle than the Cappadocians were, and accordingly in his case the conception of the *one* divine substance was a shade nearer the idea of a mere generic conception than with them, although he too was in no way satisfied with the genuine conception (see above p. 84). Apollinaris further retained the old image of αὐγή, ἀκτίς, ἥλιος, not, however, as it would appear, in order by it to illustrate the unity, but rather the difference in the greatness of the persons (περὶ τριαδ. 12, 17). (The Logos had already a side turned in the direction of finitude.) His followers afterwards directly objected to the doctrine of the Cappadocians and vice versa. We are now better acquainted with Apollinaris's doctrine of the Trinity than formerly, since Dräseke (Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch. VI., p. 503 ff.) has shewn it to be very probable that the pseudo-Justinian Ἔκθεσις πίστεως ἤτοι περὶ τριάδος is by him, and that the detailed statements of Gregory of Nazianzus in the first letter to Kledonius refer to this work (op. cit., p. 515 ff.). From the work, κατὰ μέρος πίστις, which Caspari has rightly claimed for Apollinaris (Alte und neue Quellen, 1879, p. 65 f.), and which represents a dogmatic advance as compared with the tractate περὶ τριάδος, it likewise follows that Apollinaris is to be reckoned amongst the founders of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity,—also because of his advanced doctrine of the Holy Spirit in which he teaches the homousia—and that in fact he ought to be called the very first of these.

st coincide with the real substance. The subj
: to be represented as mere attributes nor, on
separate persons, but as independent, though a
tual relationship, unthinkable, partakers of the di
eir likeness of nature which is involved in th
substance finds expression in the identity of t
d activities, their difference in the characterist
ἐρξεως, ἰδίωμα) of their *manner* of existence as s
as, unbegotten, begotten, proceeding from (ἀγε
·όρευσις). The special characteristic attached
plies that He is the source, the root, the first p
dhead, while the two other persons—*within* t
nce—are "caused". The Father is greater
ɔ in so far as He is the first principle and tl
τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας λόγον). The Godhead i
itself and *apart from all relation to the world*, a
ing existence and no rigid and barren unity,
.ch." Yet neither is it a divided multiplicity "
nk", but, on the contrary, unity in Trinity
ity. Because the Godhead is what is common
:re is only one God. At the same time the hypo
not to be regarded as a merely nominal one,
erence to the substance, the will, the energy, th
d consequently not to the rank of the perso
ity results the unity of activity. Every divin
derstood as a working of the Father through

still active in the Church, the Holy Spirit, are the Godhead themselves.[1] The Cappadocians were pupils both of Origen[2] and of Athanasius. This fact explains their doctrinal system.

Before them, however, there had been a theologian in the ancient Church who had come under influences wholly similar to those which had affected them, and who because of this, also anticipated in a striking way their formulæ when he saw that he must amplify the doctrine of God. *This was Tertullian.* Tertullian's theology was dependent on the one hand on Justin and the Apologists, and on the other on Irenæus, but besides this the modalistic Monarchianism which at that time held sway in the West and which he combatted, exercised a strong influence upon him. Consequently the conditions under which Tertullian composed his work "adv. Praxean" were, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as those by which the Cappadocians were surrounded, and they accordingly led to a similar result, so that we may say: *the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity already announced its presence even in its details, in Tertullian—and only in him and in his pupil Novatian.*[3] Did not Hosius carry it into the East? (See above p. 57.)

[1] Gregory designates as opponents of the correct doctrine of the Trinity (1) the Sabellians, (2) the Arians, (3)—this is extremely remarkable—the hyper-orthodox who teach the doctrine of three Gods equal in substance (*οἱ ἄκραν παρ' ἡμῖν ὀρθόδοξοι*, Orat. 2, 37). The true orthodoxy is always represented as the *middle-path*. For details, see Ullmann, pp. 232—275.

[2] The theology of Origen was transplanted into the Pontus country by Gregorius Thaumaturgus. It is thus that Marcellus also probably became acquainted with it and combatted it.

[3] Owing to the importance of the matter it may be allowable here to go back again to Tertullian (see Vol. ii., p. 258 f.). The crude part of his doctrine and the points in which it diverges from Cappadocian orthodoxy are indeed sufficiently obvious. Son and Spirit proceed from the Father solely in view of the work of creation and revelation; the Father can send forth as many "officiales" as He chooses (adv. Prax. 4); Son and Spirit do not possess the entire substance of the Godhead, but on the contrary are "portiones" (9); they are subordinate to the Father (minores); they are in fact transitory manifestations: the Son at last gives everything back again to the Father; the Father alone is absolutely invisible, and though the Son is indeed invisible too, He can become visible and can do things which would be simply unworthy of the Father, and so on. All these utterances along with other things shew that Tertullian was a theologian who occupied a position between Justin and Origen. But the remarkable thing is that at the same time we have a view in a highly developed form which coincides with the Cappadocian view, and—this is genuinely Western—in some points in fact approaches nearer

The Christological dogma with its formula had already had a share in the establishment of the Trinitarian dogma. Tertullian had already made use of the same conceptions for giving a fixed form both to his doctrine of God and to his Christology (adv. Prax.). The form taken by the Trinitarian doctrine of the

Modalism and the teaching of Athanasius than that of Gregory and has a strong resemblance to the doctrine of an immanent Trinity, without actually being such: the Godhead in substantia, status, potestas, virtus, is one (2 ff.), there is only *one* divine substance and therefore there are not two or three Gods or Lords (13, 19). In this one substance there is no separatio, or divisio, or dispersio, or diversitas (3, 8, 9), though there is indeed a distributio, distinctio, dispositio, dispensatio (9, 13), an *οἰκονομία* in short, a differentia per distinctionem (14). Accordingly the unitas substantiæ is not in any way a singularitas numeri (22, 25)—God is not unicus et singularis (12)—but it comprises three nomina or species, formæ gradus, res, *personæ*, (Tertullian here, however, usually avoids the use of all substantives), see 2, 8 etc. No one of these is a mere attribute, on the contrary each is a substantiva res ex ipsius dei substantia (26); there are thus tres res et tres species unius et indivisæ substantiæ (19); these, however, are most intimately connected together (conjuncti 27); they are tres cohærentes (8, 25) without, however, being one (masc.) [rather are they one (neut. 22, 25)], because the second and the third spring ex unitate patris (19) and are accordingly God as He is, individui et inseparati a patre (18). In the divine substance there are in fact conserti et connexi gradus (8). These three gradus or persons are different from each other in proprietas and conditio, but not in substance (8, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 25). The peculiar property of the Father is that He is a nullo prolatus et innatus (19) and also absolutely invisible. The Son is also invisible in virtue of the substance, but visible as to his conditio (14). In virtue of the substance there is in fact a perfect *societas nominum*; even the Son in accordance with this is "almighty" (17, 18). It is thus necessary to believe in the unitas ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem. This has already become an established truth as against Jews and heathen. What is most instructive of all, however, is to notice Tertullian's use of "persona" as distinguished from "substantia", because it is here that he has most plainly prepared the way for the later orthodox phraseology. The Latin Bible supplied Tertullian with the word "persona"; for (adv. Prax. 6) in Proverbs VIII. 30 it had "cottidie oblectabar in *persona* ejus" and in Lamentations IV. 20 (adv. Prax. 14) "spiritus personæ ejus Christus dominus." (The LXX. has *πρόσωπον* in both passages.) Both passages must have attracted special notice. But Tertullian was further a jurist, and as such the conceptions "persona" and "substantia" were quite familiar to him. I accordingly conjecture—and it is probably more than a conjecture—that Tertullian always continued to be influenced in his use of these words by the juristic usage, as is specially evident from his naive idea of a substantia impersonalis and from the sharp distinction he draws between persona and substantia. From the juristic point of view there is as little objection to the formula that several persons are possessors of one and the same substance or property, that they are in uno statu, as to the other formula that one person possesses several substances unmixed. (See Tertullian's Christology adv. Prax. 27; Vol. ii., p. 281.) The fact that Tertullian, so far as I know, never renders "substance" by "natura"—although he takes the latter to in-

Homoiousians, as represented by Basil of Ancyra and of Apollinaris, was likewise determined by their Christological speculations. (It was Christological speculation which produced the "ὁμοίωμα"

clude substance—seems to me as conclusively in favour of my view as the other fact that, in the introduction to his work (3), he attempted to elucidate the problem by making use of an image drawn from the spheres of law and politics. "Monarchy does not always require to be administered by *one* despot; on the contrary he may name proximæ personæ officiales, and exercise authority through them and along with them; it does not cease to be *one* government, especially when the Son is the co-administrator. Son and Father are, however, consortes substantiæ patris." Tertullian's exposition of the doctrine in which he hit upon the spirit of the West was, however, hardly understood in the East. In the East the question was taken up in a philosophical way, and there the difficulties first made themselves felt, which in the juristic way of looking at the matter had been kept in the background. In the latter "persona" is sometimes manifestation, sometimes ideal subject, sometimes fictive subject, sometimes "individuum", and "substantia" is the property, the substance, the Real, the actual content of the subject as distinguished from its form and manifestation (persona). It is significant that Tertullian is also able to use nomen, species, forma, gradus, and in fact even res for "persona", so elastic is the conception, while for "substantia" he has deitas, virtus, potestas, status. On the other hand, when the question is viewed philosophically it is difficult, it is in fact actually impossible to distinguish between nature and person. The following passages will illustrate Tertullian's use of words, (ad v. persona): adv. Valent. 4: "personales substantiæ", sharply distinguished from "sensus, affectus, motus"; adv. Prax. 7: "filius ex sua persona profitetur patrem"; ibid: "Non vis eum substantivum habere in re per substantiæ proprietatem, ut res et persona quædam videri possit" (scil. Logos); ibid: "quæcumque ergo substantia sermonis (*τοῦ λόγου*) fuit, illam dico personam"; 11: "filii personam ... sic et cetera, quæ nunc ad patrem de filio vel ad filium, nunc ad filium de patre vel ad patrem, nunc ad spiritum pronuntiantur, unamquamque personam in sua proprietate constituunt"; 12: "alium autem quomodo accipere debeas jam professus sum, *personæ*, *non substantiæ*, nomine, ad distinctionem non ad divisionem"; 13: "si una persona et dei et domini in scripturis inveniretur, etc."; 14: "si Christus personæ paternæ spiritus est, merito spiritus, cujus personæ erat, id est patris, eum faciem suam ex unitate scilicet pronuntiavit"; 15: "manifesta et personalis distinctio conditionis (this too is a juristic conception) patris et filii"; 18: "pater prima persona, quæ ante filii nomen erat proponenda,'; 21: "quo dicto (Matt. XVI. 17) Christus utriusque personæ constituit distinctionem"; 23: (on John XII. 28) "quot personæ tibi videntur, Praxea?" ..."Non propter me ista vox (John XII. 30) venit, sed propter vos, ut credant et hi et patrem et filium in suis quemque nominibus et personis et locis"; 24: "duarum personarum conjunctio (in reference to John XIV. 10 "apparet proprietas utriusque personæ"); 26: "nam nec semel sed ter ad singula nomina in personas singulas tinguimur"; 27: "Father and Son must not be distinguished in una persona"; c. 27: "videmus duplicem statum non confusum sed conjunctum in una persona, deum et hominem Jesum"; 31: "sic voluit deus renovare sacramentum, ut nove unus crederetur per filium et spiritum, ut coram iam deus in suis propriis nominibus et personis cognosceretur."

[likeness] and which gave currency to the analogy of the conceptions "Humanity" and "Adam" in relation to individual men.)[1] But the Cappadocians learned from them. Quod erat in causa, apparet in effectu! An Aristotelian and a Subordinationist element lurks in the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity as well as this element of dependence upon Christological dogma. The Christological controversies accordingly could not but re-act on the form given to the dogma of the Trinity. That their influence was not stronger than the historical evidence shews it actually to have been, is to be explained solely by the rigid form taken by the dogma so quickly rendered sacred by tradition. Anything in the way of modification was unsuccessful, and accordingly the attempts in this direction belong not to the history of dogma, but of theology. Some Monophysites who were influenced by the Aristotelian philosophy and who were thus scholars of the same type as Apollinaris, but who were also Chalcedonian theologians, attempted to give a dialectic shape to the ambiguous conceptions of "Nature" and "Person" in the Church. In doing this they naturally landed either in Tritheism or in Unitarianism, which their opponents could also represent as Quaternity whenever the three persons were reckoned as belonging to the one real Substance as Reals and not as attributes. The departure on the part of the Monophysites from orthodox dogma had not a philosophical cause only, though the period was one in which there had been a revival of Aristotelian study, but was also the result of their Christology. Since in their Christology they regarded φύσις (nature) as equal to ὑπόστασις (hypostasis),[2] it naturally suggested itself to them to carry out the same equation in reference to the

[1] Natural theology also exercised an influence here and did good service to the Homousios. If it is certain that man has been created κατ' ὁμοίωσιν of God, and if the view—a view which was indeed rejected—could even suggest itself, that his spirit is a portio dei (substantia divina), then the Logos appeared to have no advantage over man if the Homoousia were not attributed to Him.

[2] Οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος—said both Monophysites and Nestorians in setting forth their Christology. This was applied to the Trinity. But the orthodox too in so far as they were Aristotelians, shunned the platonic—which was also the juristic—fiction of a φύσις ἀνυπόστατος, and this was bound to create difficulties in connection with their doctrine of the Trinity. The Theopaschian controversy is connected with this; see Chap. III.

Trinity. But if οὐσία or φύσις be regarded as equivalent to ὑπόστασις then we have Unitarianism; while if on the other hand, in making this equation we start from the hypostasis, we have three gods. Both of these doctrines were taught amongst the Monophysites in the sixth century, or to put it more accurately, from about 530.[1] In opposition to the Tritheists Johannes Damascenus, although he was himself strongly influenced by Aristotle and based his theology on the work of the Cappadocians, gave a Modalistic turn to the theological exposition of the dogma of the Trinity, and in so doing sought to get rid of the last remains of Subordinationism. It is true that he also grants that the Father is greater than the Son (de fide orthodox. I. 8) because He is the Principle of the Son, a view which Athanasius too, founding on John XIV. 28, had always maintained, but he nevertheless conceives of the being unbegotten (ἀγεννησία) in a still higher fashion than the Cappadocians had done—namely, as a mode of being of the same kind as the being begotten (γεννησία) and procession (ἐκπόρευσις), and in order to put the unity of the Hypostases on a firm basis he not only emphasises much more strongly the "in one another" (ἐν ἀλλήλοις) which had already been maintained before this, rejecting the Apollinarian analogy of human-substance and man, and teaching that each person is not less dependent on others than on himself, but he also uses the questionable formula that the difference between them exists only for thought (ἐπινοία), and that there exists between them a pervasion (περιχώρησις) with-

[1] Of the Monophysite Tritheists the most important are Askusnages, Johannes Philoponus against whom Leontius of Byzantium wrote "de sectis", and Peter of Kallinico. On the works of John, see the article in the Dict. of Christ. Biogr.; an important fragment in Joh. Damasc., de hær. 83 from the "Diætetes" of John. Here it may be plainly seen that Christology determined the form of John's doctrine of the Trinity, but that he sought to give out as Church doctrine his Aristotelian conception of the Hypostasis, viz., Nature reaching manifestation in an "individuum", Nature itself existing only in the single substance, or in the Idea. From Leontius we gather that John spoke of τρεῖς μερικαὶ οὐσίαι and accepted the notion of an οὐσία κοινή which, however, exists only in conception. This doctrine caused divisions amongst the Monophysites, and these led the Coptic patriarch Damian to emphasise so strongly the reality of the one substance, that he could be represented as a Tetradite, although at the same time he probably took away from the independence of the persons. Cf. the Art. "Tritheisticher Streit" by Gass in the R.-Encykl.

out, however, any blending (συναλοιφή) and mixture (σύμφύρσις) (I. 8). In his case too this way of putting the dogma was determined by the Christological dogma.[1]

In the Eastern Church the further development of the dogma of the Trinity beyond the limit reached by the Cappadocians had no appreciable result.[2] It was too unimportant in itself, and, above all, it left untouched the point in connection with which the placing of the Father above the other Hypostases came most plainly to the front. John also (I. 8) taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds *from the Father.*[3] He further simply repeated the old statements that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, that He is the image of the Son as the latter is of the Father, and that He is the mediation between Father and Son, although in his day the doctrine of the Latins—the filioque—was already known in the East.[4] The Easterns clung to the statements in support of which they alleged countless passages from the writings of the Fathers of the Fourth Century, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, or from the Father through the Son. As against the Arians and Semi-Arians they emphasised the Spirit's independence of the Son, in so far as

[1] See on this Bach, DG. des MA. I., pp. 53 ff., 67 ff. In the Tritheistic propositions and in the counter-movement we have the beginning of the mediæval controversy regarding Realism and Nominalism.

[2] On the other hand the fact that the most distinguished teacher of the East propounded a doctrine of the Trinity which seems to be akin to that of Augustine was of importance for Western theology. We cannot assume that Augustine influenced John. Moreover, after this theologians were still to be found in the East who, perhaps under the influence of Mohammedanism, worked out the doctrine of the Trinity in a modalistic way. Thus in the eleventh century Elias of Nisibis in his book "On the proof of the truth of the Faith", written against the Mohammedans, says (Horst, 1886, p. 1 f.); "Wisdom and Life are two *attributes* of God, which no one except Him possesses. For this reason Christians also say that He is three persons, *i.e.*, possesses three essential attributes—namely, Essence, Wisdom which is His Word, and Life; He is, however, a single substance... 'Three persons' expresses the same as is expressed by the statement—the Almighty is God, wise, and living. The Essence is the Father, the Wisdom is the Son, the Life is the Holy Spirit." God is thus purely a single being. I am not able to say whether Elias is alone amongst the Nestorians in teaching this heterodox doctrine.

[3] The addition "and rests in the Son" does not require to be taken account of; see Langen, Joh. v. Damaskus, p. 283 ff.

[4] John expressly rejects the view (l. c.) that the Spirit is from the Son or that it has its ὑπαρξις from the Son (Hom. de Sabb. s.).

dependence meant that the Spirit was a creation of the Son, and they always continued to stick to the "from the Father". If in the following centuries they seldom *purposely* emphasised it, still they always laid stress on it as being a self-evident expression of the thesis that the Father is the First Principle (ἀρχή) in the Trinity, and that accordingly the Spirit appears as depotentiated, or double caused, if it is regarded as proceeding from the Son also.[1] The doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone thus clearly shews that in the East the mutual indwelling of the Hypostases was not thought of as complete, and that the Father was regarded as greater than the Son. The spiritual representation of the Trinity was of a different kind in the East and in the West respectively, especially from the time of Augustine onwards. It is accordingly at this point that Photius (867) took up the subject, since he, in searching for a dogmatic disputed point, charged the West with introducing innovations into doctrine, and strengthened this charge by alleging the still graver accusation against the West, of having falsified the most holy Creed of Constantinople by the addition of the "filioque"—"worst of

[1] Παρὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ or διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ was the expression used; *i.e.*, it was assumed from what was stated in Holy Scripture that there was a μεσιτεία on the part of the Son in connection with the ἐκπόρευσις of the Spirit; *e.g.*, Athan. ad Serap. I. 20, so that Athanasius himself could say, "what the Holy Spirit has, it has from (παρὰ) the Son" (Orat. IV. 24), but the Father alone is the *cause* of the Spirit; cf. Basil. ep. 38. 4, de sp. s. 6 f.; Gregor., Naz., Orat. 31. 7, 8, 29; Gregor., Nyss., Orat. cat. 3 and many passages in his work against Eunomius. This system of doctrine continued to be the dominant one, and it makes no difference to it that a passage has always been pointed to in Epiphanius and Cyril according to which the Spirit is ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Marcellus had already expressed himself on this point in his own fashion when he wrote (Euseb., de eccl. theol. III. 4): Πῶς γάρ, εἰ μὴ ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος οὖσα εἰς τριάδα πλατύνοιτο, ἐγχωρεῖ, αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ποτὲ μὲν λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται, ποτὲ δὲ λέγειν, ἐκεῖνος ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν. In reference to this point the dominant theology found it possible only to distinguish between the immanent processio and the processio in the historical revelation, or to analyse the "παρά" into "ἐκ" (Father) and "διά". In the Nestorian controversy the use of the proposition that the Spirit proceeds from the Son was formally disallowed. Theodoret, it is true, maintained in opposition to Cyril the view that the Holy Spirit is ἴδιον υἱοῦ, but he declared it to be an impiety to teach that the Holy Spirit is ἐξ υἱοῦ or has δι' υἱοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν (Opp. V. p. 47 ed. Schultze). Maximus Confess. further repeated this in the ep. ad Marinum, and so too did Joh. Damasc. It is to be found also in the Confession of Theodore v. Mops. (Hahn, § 139, p. 230).

evils is the addition to the holy Creed" (*κακῶν κάκιστον ἡ ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ συμβόλῳ προσθήκη*). As a matter of fact "filioque", as a word in the Creed and indeed in the doctrine itself too, was an innovation, but in reality it was merely the correct expression for the original Western conception of the one God in whom the Trinity coheres. This is not the place to describe the endless controversy; for the countless and ever new arguments adduced on both sides, so far as they do not spring from a different way of conceiving of the Trinity and from the determination to hold by what had once been delivered to the Church, are worthless. Nor have the attempts to reconcile the opposing views any interest for the history of dogma, because, as a rule, they were dictated by ecclesiastical policy. It is, however, worthy of note that the Greeks gradually came to be suspicious of the old "*διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ*", "through the Son", too, but that they otherwise continued to hold by the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity.[1] This together with the dogma of the Incarnation continued to be the Faith of the Church, the mystery *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. The whole of the material, however, which had

[1] Photius, Mystag. (ed. Hergenröther) p. 15: *Εἰ δύο αἰτίαι ἐν τῇ θεαρχικῇ καὶ ὑπερουσίῳ τριάδι καθορᾶται, ποῦ τὸ τῆς μοναρχίας πολυύμνητον καὶ θεοπρεπὲς κράτος*; The tracing back of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son is compared to Manichean dualism. The controversial works are innumerable and those in the Slav languages are also very numerous, dating chiefly from the ninth, eleventh, thirteenth, (Council of Lyons) fifteenth (Synod of Florence) and seventeenth (Cyrillus Lucaris) centuries. In our own day, owing to the Old-Catholic movement and its projects of Union, the question has again been revived. For the carrying out of their plans of Union with Eastern Churches, which have already been in a large measure successful, the Romans have always found it necessary to have controversialists of a conciliatory disposition, *e.g.*, Leo Allatius; while for their condemnation of the obstinate Greeks they have always required fanatical controversialists. The Greeks in order to protect themselves against the threatening encroachment on the part of the Romans, still continue to lay great stress on dogmatic controversy, as is proved by the existence of numerous works and essays, and even by the Greek newspapers which appear in Constantinople. Besides the large works on the Schism by Pichler, and on Photius by Hergenröther, cf. Walch, Hist. controv. de process. s. s. 1751; Theophanes, de process. s. s. 1772; Gass, Symbolik d. griech. K. p. 130 ff.; Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 318 ff.; Vincenzi, op. cit.; Langen, Die trinitar. Lehrdifferenz, 1876; Swete, On the History of the Procession of the Holy Spirit, 1876; Stanley, The Eastern Church, 1864; Kranich, Der h. Basil, i. s. Stellung z. filioque, 1882; Pawlow, Kritische Versuche zur Geschichte der ältesten griechish-russischen Polemik gegen die Lateiner (Russian) 1878; Bach, Dogmen*gesch.* des M.-A. II. p. 748 ff.

been taken over from Greek philosophy was turned to account in giving a definite form to this dogma, and was to a certain extent exhausted here. Accordingly in the Trinitarian theology we also meet with what the Church inherited from the downfall of the ancient world of thought, though certainly it presents itself in a very much abridged and stunted form. Owing to the way in which it was employed and owing to its being united with separate Biblical expressions which came to be taken as philosophical-theological conceptions—the τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, modes of existence for example—it doubtless underwent the most astonishing modification. Still the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological treatment given to it, became the vehicle by which the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy was transmitted to the Slavic and Germanic peoples. It contains a most peculiar blend of the Christian thought of the revelation of God in Jesus and the legacy of ancient philosophy.

In the West, Augustine, following an ancient Western tendency, destroyed the last remains of subordinationism, though just because of this he advanced in the direction of Modalism. According to him in constructing the doctrine of God we should not start from the person of the Father. On the contrary the conception of the Godhead ought from the very first to be personal and Trinitarian, so that the Father is regarded as being conditioned in His existence by the Son in the same way as the Son is by the Father. Augustine wishes the unity of the three persons to be so conceived of that the three are equal to each one singly, and the triple personality is understood as existing within the absolute simplicity of God. The differences or characteristic notes of the three persons are still to hold good when the Godhead is so conceived of; but they appear merely as relations in the one Godhead, and their characteristics are done away when it is considered that in connection with the act of production or procession Son and Spirit are to be regarded as active agents. Augustine searched for analogies to the threefoldness which is found in the one divine essence, in creation, in the conceptions of basis and substance, form and idea, persistence, and in the human spirit in object, subjective picture of the object, intention of perception—mens ipsa, notitia

mentis, amor—memoria, intelligentia, voluntas. The doctrine in its entirety is the effort of a man whose mind was as sceptical as it was intellectually powerful, but who revelled in the incomprehensible, who had laid hold of a new thought, but who both as sceptic and as theosophist felt himself bound to tradition, and who for this reason was for his punishment driven about between the poles of a *docta ignorantia* and a knowledge which was replete with contradictions. This speculation, which attempts to construe the most immanent of immanent Trinities and to sublimate the Trinity into a unity, just because it does this, discards everything in the way of a basis in historical religion and loses itself in paradoxical distinctions and speculations, while at the same time it is not able to give clear expression to its new and valuable thought. The great work of Augustine, "De Trinitate", can scarcely be said to have promoted piety anywhere or at any time. It, however, became the high-school not only for the technico-logical culture of the understanding, but also for the metaphysics of the Middle-Ages. The realistic scholasticism of the Middle-Ages is not conceivable apart from this work, because it itself already contains Scholasticism.[1]

[1] The larger histories of dogma go very fully into Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. For the history of dogma, however, it is sufficient to get a knowledge of the main outlines of this doctrine. The chief source is the great work "de trinitate", the letters Nos. 11 and 120 are specially instructive; the former because, written immediately after Augustine's conversion, it nevertheless already contains his fundamental thought, although still in a simple form and accompanied by a confidence in the power of sanctified reason to understand the mystery; letter 120, because in a proportionately brief form it sets forth the doctrine in its matured shape. (The Quaternity is rejected in c. 7, 13.) Besides this, attention should be given to lib. XI. 10 de civit. dei, amongst other passages; cf. the monographs by Bindemann and Dorner jun., and also Gangauf, Augustin's specul. Lehre v. Gott., 1865. According to Augustine it is not the divine substance or the Father that is the monarchical principle, but, on the contrary, the Trinity itself is the one God (unus deus est ipse trinitas, pater et filius et spiritus s. est unus deus; see de trin. V. 9, c. serm. Arian. c. 4). Consequently the equality and unity are conceived of by him in a much stricter fashion than by the Cappadocians. He is not afraid of the paradox that two persons are equal to three, and again that one is equal to three (VII. 11, VI. 10); for "singula sunt in singulis et omnia in singulis et singula in omnibus et omnia in omnibus et unum omnia." Accordingly the Son too takes an active part in His own sending (II. 9: "a patre et filio missus est idem filius, quia verbum patris est ipse filius"); the immanent function of the persons as well as their economic function are never to be thought of as separated, for "sunt semper unicem, neuter solus" (VI. 7); it is therefore true that the Trinity—in the O. T.—

It was for Augustine a self-evident truth that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, and he expressly maintained

has also been seen (II.), a fact which the Greeks denied, and that the unity is actually a numerical one. It is accordingly also self-evident that the equality is a perfect one; the Father in all His acts is no less dependent on the Son than the Son is on Him (c. serm. Arian. 3: l. c. 4 is therefore striking: "solus pater non legitur missus, quoniam solus non habet auctorem, a quo genitus sit vel a quo procedat"); the special qualities do not establish anything in the way of superiority or inferiority. Nor are the persons to be conceived of as independent substances or as accidents, but as *relations*, in which the inner life of the Godhead is present (V. 4, VII. 11, VI. 60, V. 5: "in deo nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil in eo mutabile est; nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid, sicut pater ad filium et filius ad patrem, quod non est accidens, quia et ille semper pater et ille semper filius" etc. V. 6: amplification of the "relative", see also ep. 233). We can see that Augustine only gets beyond Modalism by the mere assertion that he does not wish to be a Modalist, and by the aid of ingenious distinctions between different ideas. His strength and the significance of his book consist in the attempts he makes to base the doctrine of the Trinity on analogies, together with these distinctions in thought. In connection with these Augustine has given us some extraordinarily acute and valuable discussions on psychology, the theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, which supplied the subsequent centuries with philosophical education. The Scholastics made use of these investigations not only in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, in discussing which they do not get beyond Modalism—but also in connection with the conception of God in itself and theology generally. It is impossible, however, to understand the labyrinths of the work "de trinitate", on which Augustine was occupied for fifteen years, if we do not keep the fact in view that the great thinker has attempted to express in his formula for the Trinity a thought which this formula not only does not contain, but, on the contrary, implicitly disowns—namely, that the Godhead is personal and is consequently one person, that θεότης and Θεός mean the same thing. Obliged to believe in "the three persons in the one essence" by tradition, but obliged also by his Christian experience to believe in the single personality of God (see the Confessions), spite of the value which he too puts upon the "Essence" this situation could only result in a contradiction. Had Augustine been able to make a fresh start in putting the Christian religion into a doctrinal system, he would have been the last to have thought of the Greek formula. One who could write (V. 9) "dictum est 'tres personæ' non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur," would not have discovered the three persons in the one substance! But though thus involved in contradiction this great mind was nevertheless able to instruct posterity in a hundred ways, for Augustine employed the whole resources of his philosophy in the endeavour to overcome the contradiction which could not be overcome. It is moreover, of importance that his acquaintance with the Cappadocian theology was of such a very superficial kind. When (V. 9) he translates the formula, μίαν οὐσίαν τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, by "una essentia tres substantiæ" it is evident that he had not entered into the spirit or grasped the point of view of that theology. The addition, however, "sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam obtinuit, ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus essentiam, quod intellegitur cum dicimus substantiam, non audemus dicere: unam essentiam tres substantias, sed unam essentiam vel substantiam, tres

this.[1] In doing this he merely gave expression to the view which was implicitly contained in the ancient Western doctrine of the

autem personas, quemadmodum multi Latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt, cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enuntiarent verbis quod sine verbis intellegebant," proves that spite of the agreement come to with the East, the West was not yet conscious of possessing a common terminology. The studies of Reuter (Ztschr. f. K. G. V., p. 375 ff., VI. p. 155 ff.) have thrown light on Augustine's relation to the Trinitarian conclusions of the East. We may assent to his thesis (p. 191) "In his discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity Augustine seldom expressly falls back on the formulæ of the Nicene Creed. His doctrine is not anti-Nicene, but neither is it for the most part Nicene in its wording. He made very little use of the discussions of Greek or even of Latin authors." The Nicene Creed is not once mentioned in the work "de trinitate". We ought not in fact to measure the acquaintance which the West had with the theological development in the East by the careful attention given to it by the Roman bishops. Reuter is right in saying (p. 383 f.) that it is not so much the Nicene Creed or indeed any formula whatever which Augustine takes for granted as expressing the Church doctrine of the Trinity, but rather a fixed series of fundamental thoughts. The West was never so deeply impressed by the Nicene Creed as the East had been. In the writings of Tertullian, Novatian, Dionysius of Rome amongst others, it possessed the "series of fundamental thoughts" which proved sufficient and in which was still contained a trace of that ἓν πρόσωπον maintained by Calixt. (Philos. IX. 12) and the presence of which is still manifested in the "non ut illud diceretur [to wit, 'tres personæ'] " of Augustine. Just for this very reason the West did not require the Nicene Creed, or required it only when it came to close quarters with Arianism, as we may gather from what is said by Ambrose. We have finally to refer to an important element in the position of Augustine in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity. Augustine was positively and negatively influenced by Neo-Platonism as represented by Plotinus and Porphyry. Negatively, in so far as he was there confronted with a doctrine of the Trinity, but with one which was based on a descending series of emanations; positively, in so far as he took over from Plotinus the thought of the simplicity of God and attempted actually to make use of it. To Augustine as a philosopher the construction of a doctrine of the Trinity was already a matter of course. All the more was it necessary for him to strive to construct a peculiarly *Christian* doctrine of the Trinity, and, because of the idea of simplicity which could no longer be referred to the Father alone, to bring the other two persons into unity with the Father. With the philosophical postulate of the simplicity of God was blended the religious postulate of the personality of God, a point regarding which indeed Augustine never got to have theoretically clear views. Here accordingly the other two "persons" had to be fused, and in this way originated the logical work of art represented by his doctrine of the Trinity, which no one had taught him and which appeared even to himself to be so difficult that he did not count on its being understood by outsiders (Reuter, p. 384). Prudentius (see, *e.g.*, Cath. XI. 13 sq.) has a very ancient doctrine of the Trinity, which partly recalls that of Tertullian and partly that of Marcellus.

[1] The Father Himself is only relatively principium, the Son and the Holy Spirit are also to be termed principium; but they form together one principium (V. 13). The statement accordingly holds good: "fatendum est, patrem

Trinity[1] inasmuch as the procession of the Spirit from Father and Son implied in it could never be regarded as the procession from *two* First Principles. The first mention of the doctrine after Augustine is in the Confession of Faith of a Synod of Toledo which probably met in 447, hardly in 400, "paracletus a patre filioque procedens" (Hahn, § 97) and in the words of Leo I. (ep. ad Turib. c. 1): "de utroque processit"; see further the so-called Athanasian Creed and the Confession of the Synod of Toledo in the year 589 (Reccared's Confession, Hahn, § 106). It was at this Synod that the "filioque" was first put into the text of the Creed of Constantinople, which had probably then or shortly before first reached Spain. We have no further information regarding the reception it met with;[2] it is likely that in opposition to the West Gothic Arianism there was a desire to give expression to the doctrine of the equality of Father and Son. From Spain the addition reached the Carlovingian Frankish Empire,[3] and already in the first decades of the ninth century it had been there embodied in the official form of the Creed—by the order of Charles the Great. In Rome the Augustinian doctrine of the Holy Spirit had indeed been long ago sanctioned, but as late as the beginning of the ninth century the Creed as accepted there was still without that addition, as the table constructed by Leo III. and his answer to the Frankish ambassadors in the year 809 prove. Soon after this, however,—when and under what circumstances it is impossible to say—it was adopted into the Creed in Rome too; see the ordo Romanus de div. off. (Max Bibl. Patr. XIII.,

et filium principium esse spiritus sancti, non duo principia." It is, however, worthy of note that Augustine in this very place (V. 14) rejects the view that the Son was born of the Holy Spirit also.

[1] It seems to have appeared again in the teaching of Priscillian as avowed Modalism; see the Anathemas of the Spanish Synod of 447 in Hefele, op. cit. II., p. 307 f., and Leo I., ep. ad Turibium.

[2] See the Acts of the Council in Mansi IX., pp. 977—1010, Gams, K. Gesch. Spaniens II. 2, p. 6 ff., Hefele III., p. 48 ff. Rösler (Prudentius, p. 362 ff.) regards the Confession in question as being that of the Council of 400.

[3] The first controversy, (with the Easterns,) arose at the Council of Gentilly in the year 767. Already in the libri Carolini the East is censured for not accepting the filioque.

p. 677*a*), which perhaps belongs to the second half of the ninth century, and the controversy with Photius.[1]

So far as popular Christian thought is concerned, the Cappadocian manner of formulating the doctrine exercised in the end a more decisive influence even in the West than the Augustinian view which dissolves the persons into conceptions and leaves little room for the play of ordinary or pictorial thought. But for the Church and for Science[2] Augustine's view came to be authoritative. What contributed most to this result was the fact that it was embodied as the doctrine of Athanasius in a formula which came to have the authority of a universal and binding Confession of Faith. It is extremely probable that the so-called Athanasian Creed, so far as the first half of it is concerned, is a Gallican Rule of Faith explanatory of the Creed of Nicæa. As such it was from the fifth century onwards, by means of the theology of Augustine and Vincentius of Lerinum, gradually made into a course of instruction for the clergy, *i.e.*, the monks, suitable for being committed to memory. As a *regula fidei* meant to explain the Nicene Creed it was called "fides catholica" or "fides Athanasii", though it had other names also, and perhaps as early as 500 it began with the words "Quicunque vult salvus esse." It is probable that in the course of the sixth century it essentially received its present technical form in Southern Gaul where the West-Gothic Spanish Arianism still continued to provoke opposition. In the middle of the sixth century it, or at least a recension very similar to it, was already current as the authoritative course of instruction for the clergy in Southern Gaul, and was together with the Psalms learned by heart. It got into the decisions of single Councils from the Psalm-books and breviaries of the monks and clergy, in so far as the practice had here begun of appealing to single statements in this rule of faith. Starting from here it gradually came to be the Confession of the Frankish Church in the eighth and ninth centuries. It was perhaps then that the second Christological half was added, the origin of which is completely

[1] See Abelard, Sic et Non IV., p. 26 sq. ed. Cousin, and the works cited above; in addition Köllner, Symbolik I., p. 1 f., p. 28 ff.

[2] See Erigena's doctrine of the Trinity, which is entirely drawn from Augustine, de div. nat. I. 62, II. 32, 35, homil. in prolog. ev. sec. Joann.

wrapped in obscurity; it was of course put together before the ninth century. The Frankish Church by its relations with Rome was the means of communicating the Creed as the Confession of Athanasius to the entire Western Church during the period from the ninth to the eleventh centuries. As Rome and—through Rome—the West finally received the Gallico-Frankish form of the so-called Apostles' Creed and gave up the primitive Apostles' Creed, so too Rome adopted as a second Creed the Gallico-Frankish statement of the Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity. This, at any rate, is the relatively most probable view that can be taken of the obscure history of the origin and reception of the so-called Athanasian Creed.[1] The three

[1] For the older works on the Athanasian Creed which begin with the disquisition of Voss (1642), see Köllner, Symbolik I., p. 53 ff. In more recent times, besides Caspari, the English, who use the Creed at divine service and nevertheless have come to feel it to be inconvenient, have published valuable discussions on it; see Ffoulkes The Athan. Creed, 1871; Swainson, The Nicene and Apost. Creeds, etc., 1875; Ommaney, Early History of the Athan. Creed, 1875; two prize-essays by Peabody and Courtney Stanhope Kenny, 1876, which are known to me only from the Jena Lit. Ztg., 1877, No. 21. In addition the discussions on the Utrecht Psalter by Hardy (1874), Aratz (1874), and Springer (1880). It is since the non-Athanasian origin of the Creed has been established beyond doubt both on internal and external grounds, that positive work has begun to be done, and this has not yet been brought to a conclusion. The question as to how far its transmission in writing takes us back has already been the subject of important controversies. It is doubtful if the manuscript takes us back as far as the time of Charles the Great or Charles the Bald. But the question of origin cannot be decided by the settlement of this point. Swainson gives 850 as the date of its origin—amongst the Neustrian clergy—and sees in it a piece of intentional deception. Ffoulkes endeavours to prove that it originated at the end of the eighth century and is also inclined to believe there was deception in the matter; Caspari suggests the sixth century; others go as far back as the fifth, beyond the middle of which, at any rate, we cannot, for internal reasons, go. The question of origin is a complicated one since the Rule of Faith originated by stages and only gradually came to be authoritative. There is no reason for thinking of deception. What I have given in the text is based on independent studies, but to describe these at length would take us too far. The most certain traces seem to me to point to Southern Gaul, and North Africa may also have had something to do with it. The Athanasian Creed does not belong to the same category as the pseudo-Isidorian Decretals as Swainson holds; nor was it set up by Charles the Great as a sharp boundary line between East and West, which is the view of Ffoulkes; on the contrary, it was a syllabus of instruction based on the doctrine of Athanasius, which in uncritical times was turned into a creed of Athanasius. The necessity for a detailed creed of this kind was coincident with the desire to possess a compendium of the sacred paradoxes of Augustine and at the same time a sharp weapon against the Trinitarian, *i.e*, Arian, errors which had for so long haunted the West.

so-called ecumenical Creeds are consequently all "apocryphal." The Apostles' Creed did not originate with the Apostles, though so far as its basis is concerned, it belongs to the post-Apostolic age; the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed originated neither in Nicæa nor in Constantinople, but in Jerusalem or Cyprus, though it got its main contents from Nicæa; the Athanasian Creed is not the work of Athanasius. Nor are they ecumenical, on the contrary it is at most the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed which can be so termed[1] since the East knew nothing of the other two.

The doctrine of the Trinity in the Athanasian Creed is strictly Augustinian, and yet it has certain traits which are not to be traced either to Augustine or to Vincentius. No other Creed went so far in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity as an article of faith necessary to salvation, as this one. This can be explained only by the fact of its having originated in mediæval times. The Franks regarded the Faith handed down to them by the ancient Church simply as a legal statute, and accordingly only required faith in the Faith, obedience, that is, *fides implicita* therefore, since they did not yet possess what was required for a religious or philosophical appropriation of the system of belief. Under the form of *fides implicita*, however, *i.e.*, a faith of obedience, the most developed theology can be looked for from every one. *In the Athanasian Creed as a Creed we have the transformation of the doctrine of the Trinity as an article of Faith to be inwardly appropriated, into an ecclesiastical legal statute on the observance of which salvation depends.*[2]

[1] The Armenian Church possesses a Creed which is closely akin to the Creed of Constantinople, but not identical with it.

[2] The Creed is in Hahn, § 81. Careful attention has been bestowed on the separate statements by those who have investigated the subject, and their origin has been ascertained. The verses 9—12 are not to be directly traced to Augustine. Four times over in the Creed salvation is made dependent on carefully defined belief. This is not like Augustine; see ep. 169. 4. He did not intend his amplifications of Trinitarian doctrine to be taken as Church doctrine (de trin. I. 2). The most recent work on the Creed is in Lumby's History of the Creeds, third ed., 1887. Lumby comes to the conclusion based on a very careful examination of the MSS., and tradition, that the Creed in its present shape is not older than the time of Charles the Bald.

For Athanasius the fundamental religious thought was the "Ὁμοούσιος", and just because of this he could not treat it technically. For the Cappadocians the "Ὁμοούσιος" and the doctrine of the Trinity came to be the sum of theological knowledge. For the Westerns after Augustine these doctrines became a sacred legal statute, to which, above all, obedience must be rendered. This is the course of things which is constantly repeated in the history of religion. Men pass from the religious thought to the philosophical and theological doctrinal proposition, and from the doctrinal proposition which requires knowledge to the legal proposition which demands obedience, or to the sacred relic the common veneration for which constitutes a bond of union for the community, whether it be that of the nation, the state, or the Church. And thus the process of formulating comes to have an ever-increasing importance, and the Confession with the mouth becomes the foundation of the Church. But in reference to this the Valentinian Herakleon had as early as the second century correctly remarked:—

"There is an agreement in faith and life on the one hand and in word on the other; the agreement in word is also an agreement based on authorities which many hold to be the only agreement, though this is not a sound opinion; for hypocrites can subscribe to this kind of agreement." (Ὁμολογίαν εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἐν τῇ πίστει καὶ πολιτείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν φωνῇ· ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν φωνῇ ὁμολογία καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξουσιῶν γίνεται, ἣν μόνην ὁμολογίαν ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οἱ πολλοί, οὐχ ὑγιῶς· δύνανται δὲ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ ὁμολογεῖν.)

CHAPTER II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERFECT LIKENESS OF THE NATURE OF THE INCARNATE SON OF GOD WITH THAT OF HUMANITY.

WHILE the question whether the Divine which had appeared on the earth was identical with the supreme Godhead, was still agitating men's minds, the second question arose as to the nature of the union of the Divine in Christ with humanity. In this question, comprising as it does two closely connected problems, the problem, namely, as to the character of the humanity of Christ, and the problem as to how the union of divinity and humanity is to be conceived of, that which constituted the supreme concern of Greek theology has its culmination. It accordingly had already necessarily emerged in the Arian controversy, for it was in reference to the thought of the union of Godhead and humanity that the whole controversy was carried on by Athanasius.[1]

The problem was not a new one; on the contrary, it had already engaged the attention of the old theologians who had carried on the struggle against Marcion and Valentin,[2] and since the time of Irenæus it had occupied a central place in men's thoughts. The doctrine that the flesh of Christ was actual human flesh had been for long an established one,[3]

[1] See Vol. III., Chap. VI.

[2] The Valentinians themselves had already handled it with supreme technical skill, though no unanimity was attained in their own schools. With them the whole stress was laid on complicated distinctions within the person of Christ. On the other hand, all the elements of the composite nature of Jesus Christ were by some of the leaders of the schools elevated to the heavenly sphere.

[3] See Tertull., de carne Christi.

although platonising theologians still continued to find it possible to combine with it dogmatic thoughts and a refined Valentianism;[1] in fact, no single outstanding Church teacher really accepted the humanity in a perfectly unqualified way. Further than that it was necessary to believe in an actual "incarnation of the Logos" (*σάρκωσις τοῦ λόγου*) all else was uncertain. What in the way of intensification or modification the conception of the *σάρξ* was susceptible of in order still to rank as human flesh, was a point which was as uncertain as the question as to the relation between *σάρξ* and *ἄνθρωπος*, and as the other question as to whether the *σάρξ* must maintain itself as such in union with the Divine and whether it could or could not do this. All the Christological problems which had before given rise to controversies with the Gnostics returned in a more subtle form, since it was still possible to posit a real *σάρξ* of Christ in the statement of the problem, and then actually to do away with it again in the course of speculation.

A Christological theory had undoubtedly been propounded by Origen, according to which the presence of a human *soul* also in Jesus is to be expressly admitted. Others before him had long ago demanded this, perhaps partly because they already felt that everything turned on the human personal life, and that a human body without a soul involves a merely seeming humanity, though they did not actually draw the logical conclusions.[2] But the theory of Origen was not determined by this thought alone. He was also influenced by a cosmological postulate. He required a middle term between the Logos and matter to bind them together, and this was to be found in the human soul of Christ, concerning which he taught that it had not shared in the general antemundane fall of the spirits.[3] Moreover, he was certainly acute enough to perceive that the free human will also must be located in the personality of Christ and that Holy Scripture affirms that it is. But his theory of the human

[1] So, above all, the Alexandrians.

[2] See I Clem. ad Cor. 49, 6: *τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς... καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.* Iren. V. I. 1: *τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι λυτρωσαμένου ἡμᾶς τοῦ κυρίου καὶ δόντος τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν.*

[3] For details, see Vol. II., p. 369 ff.

soul and of the nature of the union of the divine and human in Christ scarcely passed beyond the circle of his own pupils.[1] It was too closely connected with the most peculiar and most questionable fundamental presuppositions of the great philosopher and was also too difficult to win approval. Even in Alexandria in the time of Alexander and Athanasius it would appear that attention was no longer given to Origen's way of putting the doctrine; in those cases in which his view was retained its effect at best was merely still further to increase the elasticity of all the conceptions attached to the person of Jesus.

The general stagnation which marked theology in the first half of the Fourth Century, shewed itself no less in the different views of the Incarnation than in the doctrine of the Godhead of Christ. Most theologians contented themselves with the idea of the ensarkosis, and in connection with this clung to the most naive doketic views as regard details.[2] If this already involved a reassertion of the opinions held in the oldest theological schools which Christianity possessed, namely, the Valentinian, others went still further in reasserting these opinions and directly

[1] Hilary (de trinit. X. 22) will not entertain the idea of a human soul. His view of the origin of souls is certainly, speaking generally, creationist. "He has taken the soul from Himself which, moreover, was never communicated by men as something emanating from those who beget.... The soul of the body (of Christ) must have been from God."

[2] The detailed discussions of Hilary amongst other things (de trinitate) shew the length to which these doketic views had gone and the extent to which they had spread. According to him the body of Christ was exalted above all πάθη and always took these upon itself voluntarily only. The normal condition of the body of Christ was always the condition of glorification, the appearance in ordinary material form with the ordinary needs was on every occasion a voluntary act (X. 23, 25: "in natura Christi corporis infirmitatem naturæ corporeæ non fuisse" etc.). Christ in Gethsemane did not tremble and pray for himself, but for his disciples (X. 37, 41) He did not feel pain; His sufferings affected Him as an arrow passes through fire and air (X. 23). His nature was absolutely incapable of suffering. Amongst the confused ideas of Hilary, that of a depotentiation of the Logos by an act of self-emptying, is also met with. But the passages to which the modern supporters of the kenotic theory appeal (de trin. IX. 14, XI. 48, XII. 6) are not in place; for when Hilary is dealing with the idea of self-humiliation he always takes back in the second statement what he has asserted in the first, so that the unchangeableness of God may not suffer. Hence the statement: "Christus in forma dei manens formam servi accepit." This statement must be taken along with the strongly kenotic statements of Hilary.

taught the doctrine of the heavenly σάρξ of Christ,[1] the Homousia of this σάρξ with the Godhead of the Logos, and so on.[2] Others adopted the theory of a transformation. According to them the σάρξ originated with the Logos Himself, who in view of its appearance or manifestation, by an act of transformation made for Himself a body capable of suffering and thus in part renounced His own nature. We can trace the influence here of the old monarchian theologoumena of the ὑιοπάτωρ who is incapable of suffering when He wills and capable of suffering when He wills.[3] Speculative Pantheistic views, such as afterwards plainly reappeared amongst the Monophysites and which had formerly been propounded by the Gnostics, may already have been in existence at this time, ideas such as those of the moment of finitude in the essence of God Himself, and of the Cosmos as the natural body of the Godhead. In opposition to these views some taught the doctrine of a perfect incarnation (ἐνανθρώπησις), feeling probably that a mere ensarkosis or appearing in the flesh was not sufficient. But they were perfectly in the dark in regard to the question as to whether the Godhead really became a man or adopted human nature. As no one had yet decided this question, so no one knew whether the incarnate Logos had two natures or one, though the great majority clung to the idea of one nature without knowing, however, how to conceive of it. No one knew whether the Logos was blended with humanity or merely joined with it, whether He had transformed Himself into it or whether He had put it on as a dress

[1] "Corpus cæleste" says Hilary himself, l. c. X. 18. The Pauline speculations regarding the second Adam and the heavenly man, had come to have very disastrous consequences for the theologians of the Fourth and Fifth Centuries as they had already had for the Gnostics before them. By the attention which was given to these speculations the problem, which was otherwise already a complicated one, got into the direst confusion. It was, however, doketism in particular, both in its coarse and in its refined forms, which turned them to account, and modern theologians have shown a fondness for fishing in these muddy waters in order to extract from them their very different fancies regarding Christ as the heavenly type of humanity and as the ideal-man.

[2] See Vol. III., p. 299 ff.

[3] That the Logos himself formed His own body (from Mary) seems to have been the almost universal opinion; see Hilary X. 18 (also 22) "Christ Himself is the sourte of His body."

and dwelt in it as in a temple, whether in becoming man He had taken it up into the Godhead, or in deifying it had left its peculiar nature intact; or had not deified it at all, but had merely associated it with the Godhead. Further, no one knew in what way the Gospel statements were to be employed in connection with the complicated nature of the God-man. Was the flesh, the man, born of the Virgin Mary, or was the Logos born of her together with the flesh. Who suffers, who hungers, who thirsts, who trembles and is afraid, who asks and is anxious, who confesses his ignorance, who describes the Father as the only Good, who dies, the man or the God-man? And again: who does miracles, commands nature, forgives sins, in short, who is the Redeemer, God or the God-Man? There was no fixed, generally accepted answer. Further, no one was able to make any definite statement regarding the permanence of the humanity[1] of Christ and its nature after the Resurrection, and yet the question as to the effect of the Incarnation turned entirely on this point. Finally, the question as to whether the Logos did or did not undergo a change owing to the Incarnation, was one on which complete uncertainty prevailed. The questions regarding exaltation, humiliation, depotentiation, assumption emerged and affected the always half-concealed fundamental question, as to the relation of the Divine and human generally. The theologians, however, groped uncertainly about, and however paradoxical many of the doctrines already were of a suffering without suffering, of a humiliation without humiliation, still the most paradoxical by no means passed yet for the most certain.[2] We can easily see that we are here at the very central point of the old Greek theology; at the time of the Nicene Creed this was, however, no rock, but a slippery bit of country shelving down on all sides. The religious thought: *Θεὸς σαρκωθεὶς δι'*

[1] See the peculiar doctrine of Marcellus in Zahn, Marcell., p. 177 f., given differently by Dorner and Baur.

[2] Examples of these disputed questions are supplied by all the writings of the Fathers dealing with the subject, down to the middle of the Fourth Century. A specially characteristic example is to be found in Philostorg., H. E., IX. 14. He tells us that in Constantinople, in the time of Valens, Demophilus, *e.g.*, preached *τὸ σῶμα τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀνακραθὲν τῇ θεότητι εἰς τὸ ἀδηλότατον κεχωρηκέναι*, as a drop of milk *disappears* when it trickles into the ocean.

ἡμᾶς,—God made flesh for us,—stood firm, but the theology which sought to grasp it slipped off it at every point. How could it possibly be put in intelligible conceptions so long as theologians concerned themselves with the "Natures"! A human nature made divine which nevertheless remains truly human, is a *contradictio in adjecto.* What those in after times succeeded in doing was accordingly not to give a clear explanation, but simply a paraphrase which as formulated was by no means perfectly suited to express the thought, and whose value consisted in this, that it surrounded the speculative theologians with a hedge and prevented them from falling into abysses.

The Christological problem, however, as it was treated in the ancient Church was not only connected in the closest way with the Trinitarian, and, further, had not only the element of contradiction in common with it, but it also in the last resort issued in the same formulæ. If in the case of the latter the singular of the substance or nature and the plurality of the persons were the accepted terms, it was the reverse way in the case of the other, where the accepted terms came finally to be the plurality of the substances and the unity of the persons. The distinction between "Nature" and "Person" was also the subject of discussion in both cases. That this distinction, with which the West had been long acquainted without, however, using it as a speculative starting-point, supplied the means of escape from the difficulties connected with both problems, theologians had begun to perceive as early as the middle of the Fourth Century, though undoubtedly in a slow and hesitating fashion. This was the anchor to which they fastened themselves, although it was not supplied by any philosophy; they had to provide it for themselves. While, however, so far as the Trinitarian problem was concerned, the distinction once introduced quickly established itself in the East, it was a century before it triumphed there as regards the Christological problem, and this triumph, far from uniting the parties, permanently separated them.

What is the explanation of this remarkable phenomenon? It may be said that neither in connection with the Trinitarian question did the perfect unity of the substance succeed in establishing itself (see pp. 120, 125); but it very nearly did so, and

the controversy accordingly ceased. Why then did the formula of the unity of the person not in the same way prove satisfactory in connection with the Christological problem?

This question may already be raised here, though it cannot be settled till the next chapter. Attention must, however, be directed to one point. The antecedents of the "solution" of the Trinitarian and Christological problem which proved victorious in the Eastern Church and consequently in the Catholic Church generally, are to be found only partly in the East; it was naturalised in the West. The Tertullian who in the work "adv. Prax." created the formula of the "una substantia" and the "tres personæ", in the same work constructed the formulæ of the "utraque substantia (duplex status non confusus—this is the ἀσυγχύτως—sed conjunctus) in una persona" (the substance of two kinds in one person, the twofold state not confused but joined together in one person); "duæ substantiæ in Christo Jesu, divina et humana" (two substances in Christ Jesus, divine and human); "salva est utriusque proprietas substantiæ in Christo Jesu" (the property of each substance in Christ Jesus is not interfered with).[1] He thus laid the foundation for the formally similar treatment of both problems, and created the terminology which was accepted by the East after more than two hundred years. Had he the same interest in the Christological problem as the later Eastern theologians had? Was the deification of humanity a matter of importance to him? By no means. And what philosophy did he make use of? Well, no philosophy at all; on the contrary, *he used the method of legal fictions.* By the aid of the distinction current among jurists between "substance" and "person" he with great facility explained and securely established as against the Monarchians both the ancient ecclesiastical and, *par excellence*, Western formula, "Christus deus et homo", and also the formula, "pater, filius et spiritus sanctus—unus deus." Substance—for Tertullian never uses the word "nature"—is in the language of the jurists not anything personal, but rather corresponds to "property" in the sense of possession, or to the essence as distinguished from the manifestation or "status"; the person again is not in itself anything

[1] See Vol. II., p. 280 ff. and above, p. 121.

substantial, but the subject or individual as capable of entering into legal relations and possessing property, who can quite well possess different substances, just as on the other hand it is possible for one substance to be in the possession of several persons. Tertullian introduced these legal terms into theology. That this is what they were in his use of them, and not philosophical terms, is shewn by the words themselves, shewn too by the application made of them and by the utter disregard of the difficulty which their application must necessarily create for every philosophical thinker. And it was these legal fictions which the East had to accept as philosophy, *i.e.*, theology, or change into philosophy! This became the basis of the "philosophy of revelation."(!) This was more than the boldest Neo-Platonic philosophy in its strangest intellectual phantasies had ever asked. No wonder that difficulties were made about accepting it, especially when, besides, it did not cover what was still the preponderating interest of the Faith, the interest in the deification of humanity. People always shrank from positing an *οὐσία ἀνυπόστατος*, a substance without an hypostasis, because when used in reference to a living being it was simply absurd, and because the unity of the person of Christ, "salva utriusque substantiæ proprietate", gave no security for the unity of the Godhead and humanity. The jurist Tertullian, however, could manage quite well with "person" and substance", as if the distinction between them were self-evident, because he did not here develop the logical results of the doctrine of redemption, but gave expression [1] to a matter of fact which was ostensibly

[1] The Westerns did the same after him; amid all the odd ideas that some of them produced they always clung to the humana et divina substantia, to the filius dei et filius hominis, and this distinction which had been supplied by the Creed, together with the unity of the person, became for them the rudder when it came to be a question of sailing through the stormy waves which had arisen in the East. See already Novatian, then Hilary, Ambrose, Augustin, Leo I. and also the less important theologians. It is extremely characteristic that Vincentius (Comm. 17, 18) still uses not the designation two natures, but two substances, and as against Apollinaris he finds the thesis perfectly sufficient "that Christ had two substances, the one divine, the other human, the one from the Father, the other from His Mother." Hilary very frequently employs the expressions "utraque natura", "persona"; he also writes de trin. IX. 14: "utriusque naturæ persona." In the "Statuta ecclesiæ antiqua" (Mansi III., p. 950) we have: "qui episcopus ordinandus est, antea exami-

contained in the Creed, and because he did not, properly speaking, indulge in philosophical speculation, but applied the artificial language of the jurists. If we accordingly perceive that many centuries afterwards, the philosophical-realistic method of handling the main problem was in Western scholasticism completely displaced by a formal-logical or legal method of treatment, there is nothing surprising in this; for the foundation of such a method of handling the problem was in fact laid by Tertullian.

Irenæus had already clearly discerned and plainly expressed the thought of the most perfect union. The great Western theologians about the year 200 were further advanced in respect of Christology in consequence of the struggle with Gnosticism and Patripassianism, than the East was a hundred years later.[1] But what they had secured in the heat of battle did not possess even in the West itself any general validity; while in the East the greatest uncertainty reigned, having been brought in by the "scientific" Christology of Origen.[2] It delayed or threw back the development, which had certainly begun in a strictly scientific form. Thus at the beginning of the Fourth Century the East had once more to take up the question entirely anew. If we are to estimate correctly what was finally accomplished, it must not be measured by the Gospel, but by the dead state of things which had prevailed a hundred years before.

The assertion of Arius and his pupils that the Logos took only a human body gave the impulse to renewed consideration of the problem. Like Paul of Samosata the Lucianists would have nothing to do with two natures, but they taught the doctrine of one half-divine nature which was characterised by

netur... si incarnationem divinam non in patre neque in spiritu s. factam, sed in filio tantum credat, ut qui erat in divinitate dei patris filius, ipse fieret in homine hominis matris filius, deus verus ex patre, homo verus ex matre, carnem ex matris visceribus habens et animam humanam rationalem, simul in eo ambæ naturæ, *i.e.*, deus et homo, una persona, unus filius, unus Christus." For details see below.

[1] See Vol. II., p. 275 ff.

[2] Nevertheless he strongly emphasised the thought of the deification of the human nature. On the other hand it is possible to attribute to him a doctrine of *two* natures.

human feelings, limited knowledge and suffering.[1] Like Paul of Samosata they also found fault with the orthodox on the ground that their Christology led to the assumption of two Sons of God or two natures; for these were still regarded as identical. The reply made by the orthodox at first to this charge lacked theological precision. Just because Athanasius was as much convinced of the necessity of the Incarnation (*ἐνανθρώπησις*) as of the unity of the personality of Christ as Redeemer, he did not put the doctrine in fixed formulæ. On the one hand, as against Arius, he made a sharp distinction between what the God and what the man in Christ had done, in order to keep the Logos Omoousios free of everything human; on the other hand, however, he wished the divine and human to be thought of as a perfect unity; for it is to a strictly uniform being that we owe our salvation, the Word made flesh, the *λόγος σαρκωθείς*.[2]

[1] Most instructive in this connection is the otherwise interesting Creed of Eudoxius of Constantinople (Caspari, Quellen IV., p. 176 ff.): *πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα, τὸν μόνον ἀληθινόν, Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, τὴν μόνην φύσιν ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀπάτορα, ὅτι μηδένα σέβειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἐπαναβεβηκυῖα· καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον, τὸν υἱόν, εὐσεβῆ ἐκ τοῦ σέβειν τὸν πατέρα, καὶ μονογενῆ μέν, κρείττονα πάσης τῆς μετ' αὐτὸν κτίσεως, πρωτότοκον δέ, ὅτι τὸ ἐξαίρετον καὶ πρώτιστόν ἐστι τῶν κτισμάτων, σαρκωθέντα, οὐκ ἐνανθρωτήσαντα, οὔτε γὰρ ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνείληφεν, ἀλλὰ σὰρξ γέγονεν, ἵνα διὰ σαρκὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡς διὰ παραπετάσματος Θεὸς ἡμῖν χρηματίσῃ· οὐ δύο φύσεις, ἐπεὶ μὴ τέλειος ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ ψυχῆς Θεὸς ἐν σαρκί· μία τὸ ὅλον κατὰ σύνθεσιν φύσις· παθητὸς δι' οἰκονομίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος παθόντος τὸν κόσμον σώζειν ἐδύνατο· Ἀποκρινέσθωσαν οὖν, πῶς ὁ παθητὸς καὶ θνητὸς τῷ κρείττονι τούτων Θεῷ, πάθους τε καὶ θανάτου ἐπέκεινα, δύναται εἶναι ὁμοούσιος.* In the same way Eunomius, see Epiph. H. 69. 19, Ancor. 33.

[2] Curiously enough Athanasius throughout merely touched on the Christology of Arius. He afterwards stated his views in greater detail in opposition to Apollinaris, see Atzberger, Logoslehre d. h. Athan., p. 171 ff. In the "Orations against the Arians" the distinction between the divinity and humanity of Christ is brought prominently forward. The unity is next secured again by means of the deceptive formula that the flesh of the Logos was just his own flesh, his humanity (Orat. III. 32: *"οθεν τῆς σαρκὸς πασχούσης οὐκ ἦν ἐκτὸς ταύτης ὁ λόγος· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῦ λέγεται τὸ πάθος*); see also the particularly characteristic word *ἰδιοποίησις* used for the assumption of the flesh. In the case of Athanasius it may already be very clearly seen that it was not religious feeling, but solely the biblical tradition regarding Christ (His weakness and His capacity for being affected in a human way,) which led him in the direction of the doctrine of the two natures. That tradition was a serious stumbling-block. But Athanasius used neither the formula "*δύο φύσεις*" nor the other "*μία φύσις*". (See also Reuter, Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch. VI., p. 184 f.) He speaks of divinity and humanity or of *Θεὸς λόγος* and *σάρξ*. So far as I know the formula *μία φύσις* was brought into use by Apollinaris, while, so far as I know,

The prolix amplifications of Hilary[1] were still more uncertain, so much so that there was some justification for the charge brought against orthodoxy by its opponents, that it led to a division of the Son of God from the Son of Man. But Athanasius had not reflected on this; in this connection too he had stated the mystery simply and forcibly, frequently in the words of Irenæus. The Logos not only had a man, did not only dwell in a man, but was man. He united what was ours with Himself in order to give us what was His. The Logos is not, however, thereby lowered, but on the contrary, the human is raised higher.[2] The question as to the extent of what was comprised in the human nature was one which Athanasius did not think out. He preferred to speak of a natural union, an ἕνωσις φυσική, in Christ, but in this connection he uniformly disregarded the human personality. The *free will* was the category used, roughly speaking, at that period to express what is called in modern times "human personality". But Athanasius had not yet thought of this term in connection with Christ, because he had not learned anything from Origen. In all probability he found in fact no problem here, but, like Irenæus, a comforting mystery which could not be other than

we first meet with the other, the δύο φύσεις, in Origen, and next in the mouths of the Arians who reproached the orthodox with their use of it—with the exception of a doubtful fragment of Melito, where, moreover, we have δύο οὐσίαι. The Cappadocians were the first to make use of the expression again in attacking Apollinaris, inasmuch as they made a sharp distinction between "two natures" and "two Sons". Owing to its use by the Cappadocians the formula of "two natures" had almost already become orthodox and had been regularly introduced into ecclesiastical language, or, to put it otherwise, the tradition which had come down from Origen and the presence of which is scarcely anywhere noticeable in Athanasius himself, penetrated into the Church in connection with this matter also by means of the Cappadocians. Cyril himself accordingly employed the expression. Thus the problem raised by Reuter, op. cit. 185 f., as to how it comes about that Cyril employs an Origenistic formula, which nevertheless is not to be found in Athanasius, is solved. We have to remember that there was a revival of Origenism in consequence of the theological work of the Cappadocians. For the rest "δύο φύσεις" as distinguished from "duo substantiæ" is to be regarded as a realistic speculative formula.

[1] See especially lib. X. de trinit., Dorner I., pp. 1037—1071.

[2] See the collection of passages referring to the matter in Dorner I., pp. 948—955. The Arian doctrine of the σῶμα ἄψυχον of Christ had already been combated *by Eustathius, see* Dorner, op. cit. 966—969.

it was. He did not see that the mind must necessarily go astray on this matter either in the direction of the Gnostic doctrine of two natures or in that of the doctrine of unity, in the sense in which it was held by Valentinian, the doctrine of a heavenly humanity, or in the sense in which it was held by Arius. He believed that the doctrine of one composite being would serve his purpose which in any given case allowed of the distinction being made between what belonged to the divinity and what belonged to the humanity respectively. Neither did the great theologian who attached himself to Athanasius—namely, Marcellus—perceive yet the full difficulty of the problem. His energetic and practical theology could, however, only bring him nearer to the doctrine of a complete unity. The Logos is the Ego of the Personality of Christ; the nature which serves as an organ for the incarnate Logos and gives outward expression to his self-manifestation, is impersonal. The Logos is the ἐνέργεια δραστική, the divine energy; the body is the matter which is moved by it, which is transformed into a perfect instrument for the Logos. Marcellus was still further than Athanasius from assuming the existence of two separate, independent natures. He does indeed incidentally attack the Arian idea of the unity and he also employs the expression σύναφεια, connection, for the union of the Logos with humanity, but at bottom he sees at every point in the incarnate God-Logos a perfect unity.[1] He thus thought about the matter as the great Christologist did after him, who first felt the difficulty of the problem and created a formula which did not harm Greek religious feeling, but rather gave it a secure basis, and which in doing this nevertheless left unnoticed an element of tradition which was indeed concealed, but was not to be rooted out.

Apollinaris of Laodicea[2] whose divine teachers were Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, who had learned from Athanasius,

[1] See Dorner I., p. 871 ff.; Zahn, Marcell., pp. 155—165.

[2] Dräseke, Zeitfolge d. dogmat. Schriften des A. v. Laod. (Jahrb. f. protest. Theol., 1887, Part 4). The same author, Apoll. v. Laodicea, nebst einem Anhange, Apollinarii Laod. quæ supersunt dogmatica (Texte u. Unters. z. Altchristl. Litt. Gesch. VII, 3, 4) in addition Jülicher in the Gött. Gel. Anz., 1893, No. 2.

whose theological method was the Aristotelian one, and who because of this had been strongly influenced by the Arian theology, the zealous and acute opponent of Origen and Porphyry, the sober-minded exegete who preserved the most brilliant traditions of the school of Antioch and had a reverence for the letter of Scripture, made it the task of his life to combat the Origenistic and Arian theologies,—their doctrine of the Trinity and their Christology. Nemesius and Philostorgius have termed him the most important theologian of his age,[1] and that in fact he was. The most striking proof of his importance is supplied by the fact that many of his works create the impression of having been written in later centuries, so energetically has he thought out the Christological problem and overtaken the coming generations. His syllogistic-dialectic and his exegetic method is akin to that of the later Antiochians, and consequently the Fourth Century possessed in Marcellus, Eunomius, Apollinaris and the Antiochians a series of theologians, who, although not unacquainted with Plotinus and Origen, did not all the same adhere to the Origenistic, Neo-Platonic speculative views, theologians who were united by their employment of the same philosophico-theological method, but who nevertheless arrived at wholly different results.[2]

[1] According to Suidas, referring back to Philostorgius, Athanasius seemed a child alongside of Apollinaris, Basil, and Gregory of Nazianzus.

[2] The fullest account of the Apollinarian Christology (after Walch) is that given by Dorner I., p. 985 ff. (but cf. now Dräseke). Since that account was written, however, thanks to the labours of Caspari (Alte und neue Quellen z. Gesch. des Taufsymbols, 1879) and Dräseke, a new and rich supply of material has been brought forward. These scholars have shewn that the Apollinarians have foisted (from about 400) writings by their master on recognised authorities, such as Gregor. Thaum., Athanasius, Felix of Rome, Julius of Rome, in order to accredit their theology. We still possess the greater part of these writings; see Caspari, Quellen, IV., p. 65 ff. (on the κατὰ μέρος πίστις); Dräseke in the Ztschr. f. K. Gesch. Vol. VI., VII., VIII., IX.; Jahrb. f. protest. Theol., IX., X., XIII.; Ztschr f. wiss. Theol., XXVI., XXIX., XXX., collected together in the Monograph (Texte u. Unters. VII. 3, 4 by Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, p. 92 ff.). The sources for Apollinaris previously known, *i.e.*, the places where fragments are found, are besides Epiph., H. 77, Socrat., Sozom., the works of Athanasius (the genuineness of the work adv. Apoll. is disputed), of the Cappadocians, of Theodore and Theodoret.; see in addition the resolutions of Councils from 362 onwards, Mai, Script. Vet. nova Coll. T. VII. Spicil. X. 2 and catenas. Epiphanius treated Apollinaris in a friendly fashion, Athanasius corresponded with him, the Cappadocians at first revered him

Apollinaris in combating Arius and his changeable Christ, *Χριστὸς τρεπτός*, started by allowing that the assumption that in Christ the God-Logos who was equal in substance with God united Himself with a physically perfect man, necessarily led to the idea of two Sons of God, one natural and one adopted.[1] A perfect God and a perfect man can never make a uniform being,[2] and in this he was in agreement with Paul of Samosata, Marcellus and the Arians. They constitute on the contrary a hybrid form, *i.e.*, a fabulous Minotaur, a cross breed, etc. But if there is no such thing as a union between a perfect God and a perfect man, then, if these premises are valid, the idea of the incarnation of God which is the whole point in question, disappears. And further the unchangeableness and sinlessness of Christ disappears also, for changeableness and sin belong to the nature of the perfect man. We are, therefore, not to see in the Redeemer a perfect man, we are on the contrary to assume and believe that the Logos assumed human nature, namely, the animated *σάρξ*, but that He Himself became the principle of self-consciousness and self-determination (*πνεῦμα*) in this *σάρξ*. Freedom too is an attribute of the perfect man, but—this as against Origen—Christ cannot possibly have possessed this freedom; for the Godhead in Him would have destroyed it. God, however, destroys nothing He has created.[3]

Apollinaris sought to prove his doctrine out of the central convictions of Greek piety, and at the same time to establish

and always held him in high respect, while the Arian theologians extolled him as their ablest opponent. Cf. on this Vincent., Common. 15—20.

[1] Gregor. Antir. 42. According to Apollinaris two knowing and willing beings could not possibly be united in *one* being. Here we can see the Antiochian tradition which had come from Paul of Samosata: *δύο τέλεια ἓν γένεσθαι οὐ δύναται.* (So Apollinaris according to what purports to be the work of Athanasius against him, I. 2 Migne, Vol. 26, p. 1096.)

[2] *Εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ τελείῳ συνήφθη Θεὸς τέλειος, δύο ἂν ἦσαν, εἷς μὲν φύσει υἱὸς Θεοῦ, εἷς δὲ θετός* (Dräseke, Texte u. Unters. VII. 3, 4, p. 388).

[3] There are three theses which Apollinaris everywhere attacks, and from these we can easily understand what his own theology is. He wishes to disown (1) the view that there are two Sons, (2) the idea that Christ was an *ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος*, the view he attributed to Marcellus, since heathens and Jews could also believe in a Christ of this kind, (3) the view that Christ was a free and therefore a changeable being. He accordingly directs his attacks (1) against the Gnostic division of Christ and Jesus, (2) against Paul, Marcellus, and Photinus, (3) against Origen and Arius.

it by Biblical and speculative arguments. In a lying age he stated it with the most refreshing candour. Everything that Christ had done for us God must have done, otherwise it has no saving power: "The death of a man does not abolish death" —*ἀνθρώπου θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον.*[1] Everything that He did must be perfect else it avails us nothing. There is here thus absolutely no room for a human ego. This would do away with the redemption. If it had been present in Him, then Paul of Samosata would be right, and Christ would be merely an inspired man, *ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος*; but such a being cannot give us any help; for if he had not essentially united humanity with Himself how could we expect to be filled with the divine nature? Further, if he had been a man he would have been subject to weaknesses, but we require an unchangeable spirit who raises us above weaknesses.[2] Therefore He must have assumed our nature in such a way that He made it the perfect organ of His Godhead and Himself became its *νοῦς*—the human nature of Christ "is not moved separately"—*οὐ κινεῖται ἰδιαζόντως*. But this is also the doctrine of Scripture. It says that the Logos became flesh, and by this is denoted the animated body, not the *νοῦς*. It does not say "He assumed a man", but that "He was found as a man"—*ὡς ἄνθρωπος*. It teaches that He appeared in the likeness of sinful flesh—*ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, and was in the likeness or according to the likeness of men—*ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων* or *καθ' ὁμοίωσιν*. It shews finally that there was in Him the most perfect unity of the human and the divine, so that it says of the humanity what holds good of the divinity and vice versa; God was born and died, and so on. At the same time, however, the Godhead is not to be thought of as capable of suffering. Owing to the intimate union with the *σάρξ* which was

[1] Antir. 51.

[2] Athan. adv. Apoll. I. 2: *ὅπου τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖ ἁμαρτία.* It is just from the *νοῦς* that sin springs. In addition Antir. 40, 51: *Ἡ σὰρξ ἐδεῖτο ἀτρέπτου νοῦ, μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος αὐτῇ διὰ ἐπιστημοσύνης ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ συναρμόζοντος αὐτὴν ἀβιάστως ἑαυτῷ ... Οὐ δύναται σώζειν τὸν κόσμον ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ὢν καὶ τῇ κοινῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φθορᾷ ὑποκείμενος.* We must accordingly seriously accept the thought that in Christ the Godhead was not a force, but *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*. Antir. 39: *Οὐ σώζεται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος δι' ἀναλήψεως νοῦ καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ προσλήψεως σαρκός.* Apollinaris was conscious that he was the first to perceive what the *incarnation* of God meant.

wholly and entirely *its σάρξ*, it shared in a complete fashion in the suffering, and the efficacy of redemption consists only in the fact that it did so share in it. And conversely the *σάρξ* is entirely taken up into the nature of the Logos. "The flesh therefore is divine, because it is united with God, and it indeed saves"—*θεϊκὴ ἄρα σάρξ, ὅτι Θεῷ συνήφθη καὶ αὕτη μὲν σώζει.*[1] Starting from this Apollinaris attempted to give his doctrine a speculative basis. This also rests on Scripture passages, but at the same time it refers back to a peculiar metaphysic. The attempt indeed to reach it was made long before his day, and it is uncertain how far he himself followed it out, since those who tell us about it had here an occasion for special pleading. Apollinaris starts from the Scriptural statement that Christ is the heavenly man, the second spiritual, heavenly Adam. (See also John III. 13.) Close upon this idea he, like Marcellus, puts in the more general idea of Aristotle that the divine is always related to the human as the moving to the moved.[2] As such

[1] Apollinaris assumes the existence in Christ of what is indeed a composite nature, but which is nevertheless a nature possessing oneness. The *μία φύσις τοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη* is his formula (see the letter to the Emperor Jovian in Hahn, Symbole 2, § 120: *ὁμολογοῦμεν... οὐ δύο φύσεις τὸν ἕνα υἱόν, μίαν προσκυνητὴν καὶ μίαν ἀπροσκύνητον, ἀλλὰ μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην καὶ προσκυνουμένην μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ μιᾷ προσκυνήσει.*) He, besides, expressly teaches that the *σαρκωθεὶς οὐκ ἐστιν ἕτερος παρὰ τὸν ἀσώματον*; he demands a perfect *ἀντιμεθίστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων* and he here reasons again mainly from the standpoint of Greek religious feeling: *Ἄλλης καὶ ἄλλης οὐσίας μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν προσκύνησιν ἀθέμιτον, τουτέστιν ποιητοῦ καὶ ποιήματος, Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου. Μία δὲ ἡ προσκύνησις τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ὀνόματι νοεῖται Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος. Οὐκ ἄρα ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη οὐσία Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μία κατὰ σύνθεσιν Θεοῦ πρὸς σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον*, or: *ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ προσκυνητὸν ἑαυτὸν εἰδέναι καὶ μή. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεόν τε καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, ἀλλ' ἐν μονότητι συγκράτου φύσεως θεϊκῆς σεσαρκωμένης*, see still other passages in Dorner I., p. 999 ff. The flesh must therefore be adored also; for it constitutes an inseparable part of the *one* substance: *ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ κυρίου προσκυνεῖται καθὸ ἓν ἐστι πρόσωπον καὶ ἓν ζῶον μετ' αὐτοῦ.*

[2] Mai VII., p. 70 (the letter of the Apollinarian Julian): *Ἐκ κινητοῦ καὶ ἀκινήτου, ἐνεργητικοῦ τε καὶ παθητικοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν σύνθετον, ἑνί τε καὶ μόνῳ κινουμένην θελήματι· καὶ μιᾷ ἐνεργείᾳ τά τε θαύματα πεποιηκέναι καὶ τὰ πάθη, μόνος καὶ πρῶτος ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Ἀπολλινάριος ἐφθέγξατο, τὸ κεκρυμμένον πᾶσι καταφωτίσας μυστήριον*; see also l. c., p. 301, where Apollinaris himself has developed the thought of the one being (*ἓν ζῶον*) composed of the ruling moving principle of activity, and the *σῶμα*, the passive principle: *σὰρξ, Θεοῦ σὰρξ γενομένη, ζῷόν ἐστι μετὰ ταῦτα συντεθεῖσα εἰς μίαν φύσιν.* P. 73: *Οὐδεμία διαίρεσις τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν θείαις φέρεται γραφαῖς· ἀλλ' ἔστι μία φύσις, μία ὑπόστασις, μία ἐνέργεια.*

they stand opposed. This relation first reached perfect outward embodiment and manifestation in the word made flesh, the λόγος σαρκωθείς. But the Logos as "the mover" was from all eternity destined to become the λόγος σαρκωθείς. He has always been in mysterious fashion "mind incarnate"—νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, and "spirit made flesh"—πνεῦμα σαρκωθέν. Therefore He could be and had to be the λόγος σαρκωθείς, the Logos made flesh. He certainly did not bring His flesh with Him from heaven, but He is nevertheless the "heavenly man"; because it was intended that He should become flesh, His flesh is consubstantial with His Godhead; His Godhead comprised within it the future moment of the incarnation from all eternity, because only thus was it destined to be in the most perfect way the authoritative principle, the ἡγεμονικόν, of the creature. And just for this reason the historical incarnation which cannot be denied, is the direct opposite of anything like the accidental and arbitrary inspiration of a man. It is the realisation of an idea which always had its reality in the essence of the Logos, the heavenly man, the mediator (μεσότης) between God and humanity. After the incarnation too everything in this heavenly man is divine; for death could be overcome only if it was God who suffered and died. The human is purely the passive element only, the organ of the Godhead and the object of redemption.[1]

[1] Apollinaris has not himself put in words those furthest reaches of his speculations in any of the numerous confessional formulæ of his which we possess. (See, *e.g.*, the two Confessions in the κατὰ μέρος πίστις.) Much, too, of what is said by Gregory in his letters to Kledonius and by Gregory of Nyssa in the Antir. may be exaggerated, but as regards the main point Apollinaris's own words prove that he really went the length of attributing the moment of the σάρξ in some form or other to the Logos in the pre-temporal existence. He conceived of the nature of the Logos as that of the mediator; it was only by so conceiving of it that the μία φύσις could get justice done to it, and he accordingly does not hesitate to take something from the Godhead itself, without detriment to its homousia. The essential characteristic of the πνεῦμα which the Logos is, consists in this, that it includes the idea of the mediator, *i.e.*, the type of humanity. In this sense he could say: ἡ θεία σάρκωσις οὐ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς παρθένου ἔσχεν (Antir. 15), or (c. 13), προϋπάρχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος Χριστός, οὐχ ὡς ἑτέρου ὄντος παρ' αὐτὸν τοῦ πνεύματος, τοῦτ' ἔστι τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ κυρίου ἐν τῇ τοῦ θεανθρώπου φύσει θείου πνεύματος ὄντος. The Logos was already man before He appeared on earth, since the statement holds good: αὐτὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότητα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄνθρωπον εἶναι. This conception, however, which was not meant to take from the historical fact of the incarnation, but was intended, on the contrary, to make its reality certain, now led him further to the

This doctrine, estimated by the presuppositions and aims of the Greek conception of Christianity as religion, is complete. Apollinaris set forth in a way that cannot be surpassed, energetically developed and in numerous works untiringly repeated, with the pathos of the most genuine conviction, what at heart all pious Greeks believed and acknowledged. Every correction made on his Christology calls in question the basis or at least the vitality of Greek piety. Only this perfect unity of the person guarantees the redemption of the human race and its acquiring of a divine life. "Oh new creation and wondrous mingling. God and flesh produced one nature!" (ὦ καινὴ κτίσις καὶ μίξις θεσπεσία, Θεὸς καὶ σὰρξ μίαν ἀπετέλεσαν φύσιν!) All else in the Redeemer is non-existent for faith. The assumption of a human separate personality

idea that neither is the Godhead present in the Logos, in its totality: οὐδεμία μεσότης ἑκατέρας ἴσχει τὰς ἀκρότητας ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, ἀλλὰ μερικῶς ἐπιμεμιγμένας. As the middle colour between black and white has not merely the white in it in an imperfect way, but also the black, as spring is half winter and half summer, as the mule is neither wholly horse nor wholly ass, so the mixture of divinity and humanity in the Logos, at least in the Logos as appearing on the earth, is of such a kind that neither element is entirely perfect: οὔτε ἄνθρωπος ὅλος οὔτε Θεός. How far the doctrine of Apollinaris did actually lead to this conclusion—and we have here a clear example of the imperfect way in which the Homousia was understood amongst the neo-orthodox of the East; how far his opponents, including not only the Gregories, but also Theodoret, H. F. IV. 8, were justified in asserting that his Trinity was composed of a great, a greater, and a greatest; how far he made use of the old traditional image of the sun and the sunbeam in order to build up on the basis of the Homousia a graduated Trinity, are points which still require to be thoroughly investigated in the light of the new material we now possess. But if his Christ actually was the middle being his opponents represent it to have been, one can only be astonished to observe how in the case of Apollinaris speculation regarding Christ has returned to the point it started from. For this Christ is actually the Pauline Christ, the heavenly spiritual being (ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ), who assumed the body, *i.e.*, the flesh, neither ὁ Θεός nor man, but *as* God and *as* a man, who is nevertheless the mediator or reconciler between God and man because being without sin He has done away with sin and death in His body and consequently for humanity generally—the second Adam, the heavenly man. It cannot be doubted either but that Apollinaris formed his views chiefly on the New Testament; for he was above all an exegete—though unfortunately what is his in the numerous collections of passages, in those of Cramer pre-eminently, has up till now not been ascertained nor has any test been applied to find out what belongs to him—and he endeavoured to be true to the words of the Bible without applying the allegorical method of Origen, as his notable adherence to the primitive Christian eschatology, the reign of a thousand years, proves.

in Christ does away with His power as Redeemer. Thousands before Apollinaris felt this and had a vague idea of its truth. He alone understood and preached it. He did not juggle with what was a matter of indifference to Faith or dangerous to Faith, but did away with it.[1]

But he perceived at the same time that that separate personality is present whenever a human *νοῦς* is attributed to Christ. This decided the matter so far as he was concerned. Christ possessed no human *νοῦς*. He was honest enough not to say anything more about the perfect humanity of Christ, but openly avowed that Christ was not a complete man.[2] The fact that Apollinaris, when called on to decide between the interests of the Faith and the claims of tradition, unhesitatingly decided in favour of the former, is fitted to call forth our admiration, and is a clear proof of the great bishop's piety and love of truth.

But the very frankness of his language reminded the Church that the Gospel and partly tradition also demand a complete human nature for Christ. Even before the appearance of Apollinaris the conflict with Arius had, from about the year 351, taken a turn which made it as necessary to emphasise the complete human nature of the incarnate one as to reject the

[1] The confessional formulæ of Apollinaris and his pupils emphasised as a rule only the homousia of the Logos, the assumption of flesh from Mary and the perfect unity (*ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν τὴν προσκύνησιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκός*). The somewhat long creed in the *κ. μ. πίστις* is the most instructive, see Caspari IV., p. 18, there too, p. 20, will be found the shorter one, and at p. 24 that of the Apollinarian Jobius. In the latter we have: *ὁμολογῶ τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, ἐξ αἰῶνος μὲν ἄσαρκον Θεὸν λόγον, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων δὲ αἰώνων σάρκα ἐξ ἁγίας παρθένου ἐνώσαντα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι Θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον, ἵνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὑπόστασιν μίαν σύνθετον καὶ πρόσωπον ἓν ἀδιαίρετον, μεσίτευον Θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ συνάπτον τὰ διῃρημένα ποιήματα τῷ πεποιηκότι, ὁμοούσιον Θεῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἡνωμένην αὐτῷ σάρκα, προσκυνούμενον δὲ καὶ δοξαζόμενον μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας σαρκός· ὅτι δι' αὐτῆς ἡμῖν γέγονεν λύτρωσις ἐκ θανάτου καὶ κοινωνία πρὸς τὸν ἀθάνατον· ἄκρως γὰρ ἡνωμένη ἡ σὰρξ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ μηδέποτε αὐτοῦ χωριζομένη, οὔκ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου, οὐ δούλου, οὐ κτιστοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου, τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, τοῦ ὁμοουσίου τῷ Θεῷ, τουτέστιν τῇ ἀσωμάτῳ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἀῤῥήτου πατρός.* It is difficult to say whether the long Creed printed by Caspari, p. 163 f., and which in its formalism bears a resemblance to the Athanasian, is Apollinarian or Monophysite.

[2] Apollinaris did not deny the homousia of Christ with humanity, but he conceived of it as a likeness in nature = *ὁμοίωμα*. The later Apollinarians even emphasised the homousia, but they were thinking of a body and the *ψυχὴ σαρκική*.

thought of a transformation of the Logos into flesh or of a depotentiation. The Christological question became involved with the Trinitarian, and the latter was illustrated by the aid of the former. The full humanity was supposed to prove the full Godhead *ex analogia*; it had been reached in the struggle against Gnosis, and it was required in order to explain the Gospel accounts which otherwise cast a shadow on the Godhead of the Redeemer. Accordingly the complete humanity of Christ was first expressly asserted at the Council of Alexandria in 362 and, in fact, in opposition[1] to the views of Apollinaris.[2] The great literary activity of the bishop who was equally distinguished as exegete and apologist and as a systematic theologian, and who gathered around him a band of enthusiastic pupils, falls within the sixties.[3] With the beginning of the seventieth year of the century the Cappadocians came forward in opposition to their old master, shewed now their unconcealed

[1] See Dräseke, Texte und Unters. VIII. 3. 4., p. 28 f.

[2] Athan.. Tom. ad. Antioch. 7. He first establishes the truth that the Word of God did not come in Christ to a holy man as it came to the prophets, on the contrary: *αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων ἔλαβε δούλου μορφήν, ἔκ τε τῆς Μαρίας τὸ κατὰ σάρκα γεγένηται ἄνθρωπος δι' ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὕτω τελείως καὶ ὁλοκλήρως τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ἐλευθερούμενον ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ζωοποιούμενον ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν εἰσάγεται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν.* Then it is further said: *ὡμολόγουν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σῶμα ἄψυχον οὐδ' ἀναίσθητον οὐδ' ἀνόητον εἶχεν ὁ σωτήρ, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν, τοῦ κυρίου δι' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπου γενομένου, ἀνόητον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν.* Finally, however, the identity of the Son of God and the Son of man is strongly emphasised. It was the same person who asked about Lazarus and who raised him from the dead. He asked *ἀνθρωπίνως*, He raised from the dead *θείκῶς*.

[3] In the way in which it kept firmly together, in its veneration for the master, in its activity and vivacity and finally in the efforts made by the members of it to carry their point in the Church, the school of Apollinaris reminds us of the school of Lucian. Like the latter it was chiefly an exegetical school, and at the same time like it it was a school for theologico-philosophical method after the manner of the Aristotelian dialectic. Such conditions always give rise to a peculiar arrogance and to a confident feeling of superiority to everybody else. "It was our father Apollinaris who first and who alone uttered and put in a clear light the mystery which had been hidden from all—namely, that Christ became one being out of the moving and the immovable": it is thus that one Apollinarian writes to another and in so doing shews that the real interest of the school was in the methodical and the formal. The fact that afterwards falsification was carried to such an extraordinary extent in the school is a sign that the Epigoni aspired to secure power at all costs.

indignation and sought to cast suspicion on his doctrine of the Trinity also. Apollinaris accordingly retorted by treating them as they treated him. How far Athanasius himself was mixed up with the controversy is a point which is still uncertain. Apollinaris separated from the Church about the year 375. Soon after he consecrated Vitalius bishop of Antioch.[1] It was the West led by Bishop Damasus which hastened to the assistance of the orthodoxy of the East held in fetters under Valens, and which at the Roman Council of 377 condemned Apollinarianism.[2] It could do this with a good conscience since it had always understood the "filius hominis" in the thesis in the full extent of the term and had had no difficulties about the unity. Basil had been the denouncer of the Apollinarian heresy (Ep. 263). The Council of Antioch of 379 sided with the Romans, and that held at Constantinople in 381 in its first canon expressly condemned the heresy of the Apollinarians. The anathemas of Damasus which belong perhaps to the year 381, condemn (No. 7) "those who say that the Word of God dwelt in human flesh in place of the rational and intellectual soul of man, since the Son Himself is the Word of God and was not in His body in place of a rational and intellectual soul, but assumed and saved our soul, *i.e.*, a rational and intellectual soul without sin," ("eos, qui pro hominis anima rationabili et intelligibili dicunt dei verbum in humana carne versatum, quum ipse filius sit verbum dei et non pro anima rationabili et intelligibili in suo corpore fuerit, sed nostram id est rationabilem et intelligibilem sine peccato animam susceperit atque salvaverit."[3] Before this those are condemned on the other hand "who assert the existence of two sons, one before time and another after the assumption of flesh from the Virgin"—"qui duos filios asserunt, unum ante sæcula et alterum post assumptionem carnis ex virgine."—With all the zeal of a fanatic who had nevertheless not made the matter his own, Damasus, under the guidance of Jerome, soon

[1] Sozom. H. E. VI. 25; Epiph. H. 67. 21, 23—25; Gregor. Naz., ep. ad Cledon. II. 2; Basil, ep. 265, 2. On him see Dräseke, Ges. patrist. Abhandl. (1889), p. 78 ff.

[2] See the fragment "Illud sane miramur", Rade, p. 113 f., Mansi III., p. 461; see also the fragment "Ea gratia", Mansi III., p. 460.

[3] See Hahn, op. cit., p. 200.

after the year 382, once more took up the question and warned the Church against the doctrine of Apollinaris and his pupil Timothy: "Christ the Son of God by His passion brought the most complete redemption to the human race in order to free from all sin the whole man who lies in sin. If therefore anyone says something was wanting either in the humanity or divinity of Christ, he is filled with the spirit of the devil and proves himself to be a son of hell.[1] Why therefore do you once more demand of me the condemnation of Timothy? He has already been deposed here by the sentence of the Apostolic chair, Bishop Peter of Alexandria being also present at the time, together with his teacher Apollinaris, and must await on the day of judgment the chastisement and punishment due to his sin."[2] Apollinaris was condemned. One after another the representatives of the non-Alexandrian theology, Paul, Marcellus, Photinus, Apollinaris were cut off from the Church. The Antiochians will follow them, but the turn of Origen and his pupils is also to come; the Cappadocians only will be saved "so as by fire."

The homousia or the identity in nature,—for both words were used,—of the humanity of the Redeemer and humanity, was thus acknowledged. And as a matter of fact many and important arguments could be alleged in support of it. One has to make use of the most desperate exegesis in order to banish it from the Synoptics. And further Christ redeemed only what He assumed; if He did not assume a human soul then the latter has not been redeemed, and this appeared a very obvious argument. Finally, it was only by the assumption of the completeness of the human nature in Christ that His divinity seemed to be secured against sinking down into the region of human feelings and suffering. But what signified these advantages if the unity was insecure? And Apollinaris was perfectly right: it was insecure. His opponents, the Cappadocians, might indeed be able to refute him as regards separate points,[3] but they

[1] See the fragment "Illud sane miramur": "If an imperfect man was assumed then the gift of God is imperfect, because the whole man has not been redeemed."

[2] Theodoret, H. E. V. 10.

[3] See several letters of Basil, the two letters of Gregory of Nazianzus to Kledonius and his ep. ad. Nectar. sive Orat. 46, also the Antirrhet. of Gregory of Nyssa and

could not escape from the reproach he brought against them that they reduced the doctrine to the idea of an inspired man. In proportion, however, as they sought to escape it, their assertion of the completeness of the human nature in Christ became a mere assertion. Their long-winded, obscure, and hazy deductions made in truth a miserable appearance alongside of the unambiguous, coherent, and frank avowals of their opponent. There are two natures,[1] but yet there is only one; there are not two Sons, but the divinity effects one thing, the humanity another; Christ possessed human freedom, and nevertheless He acted within the limits of divine necessity. On the other hand, the whole position of the later Monophysites, thought out to all its conceivable conclusions, is already to be found in Apollinaris; but his opponents had not yet at their command a fixed terminology whereby to preserve the contradiction and to protect it against disintegration. At bottom their views were the same as those of Apollinaris, they did not think of two strictly separate natures; but they were unwilling to give up the perfect human nature, and they had learned too much from Origen to sacrifice the thought of freedom to the constitution of the God-man.[2]

his work ad Theophil. They enter upon an examination of the Scripture proofs of Apollinaris and also of his argument that the Logos could not have assumed a rational, free nature, since in this case he must necessarily have destroyed freedom, which is not, however, the Creator's way of doing: *φθορὰ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ζώου τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτεξούσιον· οὐ φθείρεται δὲ ἡ φύσις ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὴν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνοῦται ὁ ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ* (Antirrh. 45). Gregory's remarks on this are extremely weak. The only striking thing is to be found in the detailed arguments in which it is shewn that the picture of the Christ of the Gospels includes a human soul; for it was neither the God-Logos nor the irrational flesh which was sad, which trembled, feared, etc., but the human spirit; see also Athan. c. Apoll. I., 16—18.

[1] The definite formula "*δύο φύσεις*" without some qualifying clause is rarely met with in the East before the time of the great Antiochians, though it is otherwise in the West. But expressions such as that of Eusebius, H. E. I. 2, 1, are, however, frequent: *Διττοῦ ὄντος τοῦ κατ' αὐτὸν τρόπου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν σώματος ἀοικήτος κεφαλῇ ᾗ Θεὸς ἐπινοεῖται, τοῦ δὲ ποσὶ παραβαλλομένου, ᾗ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ὁμοιοπαθῆ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν ὑπέδυ σωτηρίας, γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν*, etc. The Arian theologians always reproached the orthodox with teaching the doctrine of *δύο φύσεις*.

[2] It is unnecessary to give any summary of the numerous different forms in which the Cappadocians set forth their view as against Apollinaris (see Ullmann, Gregor. v. Naz., p. 276 ff.; Dorner I., pp. 1035 f., 1075 f.; Schwane II., pp. 366—390), for what they wish and do not get at—the unity, namely—is obvious, while their terminology on the other hand is still uncertain. At this time expressions and

Probably an historical and biblical element had a share in turning them against Apollinaris, the thought of the man Jesus as he is presented in the Gospels, this, however, not as something which had a well-understood religious value, but as a part of the tradition of the schools and as a relic of antiquity. None of the religious thoughts current at that time led to the idea of a "perfect man" with a free will, *i.e.*, as an individual.

images of the most varied kind were in use (*δύο φύσεις, δύο οὐσίαι, μία φύσις, σάρκωσις, ἐνανθρώπησις, θεάνθρωπος, ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης, ἕνωσις φυσική, ἕνωσις κατὰ μετουσίαν, σύγκρασις, μίξις, συνάφεια, μετουσία, ἐνοίκησις*, the humanity of Christ was described as *καταπέτασμα* or *παραπέτασμα*, as *ναός*, as *οἶκος*, as *ἱμάτιον*, as *ὄργανον*. In the writings of the Cappadocians most of these terms are still found side by side; the only idea which is definitely rejected is that of the change into flesh whether by kenosis or by actual transmutation. The unchangeable, the divinity, remains unchangeable; it merely takes to itself what it did not possess. How the unlimited united with the limited is just the point which is left obscure. We might imagine we were listening to a teacher of the period before Irenæus when we hear Gregory of Nazianzus say that the unlimited dealt with us through the medium of the flesh as through a curtain, because we were not capable of enduring His pure Godhead (Orat. 39, 13, similarly Athanasius). He also teaches that Christ by assuming humanity did not become two out of one (masc.), but out of two became one (neut.). We can imagine it is Apollinaris who is speaking when he further declares that God is both, the one who assumes and what is assumed, and uses the word *σύγκρασις* in this connection (Orat. 37. 2, this word is frequently met in Methodius). This thought is expressed in an almost stronger form in Orat. 38. 13 (see Orat. 29. 19): "Christ is one out of the two opposite things, out of flesh and spirit, of which the one deifies while the other was deified, *ὢ τῆς καινῆς μίξεως, ὢ τῆς παραδόξου κράσεως*! The eternally existing comes into being, the uncreated is created, the unlimited limits itself, since—and now the thought takes an Origenistic turn—the rational soul is the means whereby a union is brought about between the Godhead and the gross flesh." As if it were possible to stop short at this function of the human soul, as if the human soul did not include the free will regarding which Gregory here maintains a prudent silence. On the other hand, however, Gregory maintains in opposition to Apollinaris that "there are undoubtedly two natures, God and man; soul and body are also in Him, but there are not two Sons or Gods, since there are not two men in one, because Paul speaks of an inner and an outer man"—this argument is specially weak since it is just the argument which Apollinaris could make use of. "To put it in a word: He is one and again He is another, in so far as He is Saviour, but He is not one person and again another person—God forbid. For both exist in the union which has been accomplished since God is made human and man is made divine, or however it may be expressed" (Ep. ad. Cledon. I.). Gregory as a pupil of Origen sees no difficulty in putting two different substances together into one. But neither does he follow the Chalcedonian Creed since with him it was not a question of a union of divinity and humanity in a third, but a question of fusion, and this spite of the *δύο φύσεις*. In their struggle with Apollinaris the Cappadocians nowhere intentionally arrived

The idea that the human *νοῦς* cannot have been saved if Christ did not assume it too, was one which they themselves could not honestly believe in, for they stripped His humanity of the principle of individuality and of more than that. In Apollinaris, on the contrary, it was really the sovereignty of faith which supplied him with his doctrine. He merely completed the work of Athanasius inasmuch as he added to it the Christology which was demanded by the Homousia of the Logos. They both made a supreme sacrifice to their faith in that they took from the complicated and contradictory tradition regarding Christ those elements only which were in harmony with the belief that He was the Redeemer from sin and death. They neglected everything else: *λόγος ὁμοούσιος ἐν σαρκί, (μία φύσις σύνθετος)*—the consubstantial Logos in the flesh, (one composite nature)—was the watchword of Apollinaris, in the sense of a perfectly uniform being. This Apollinarianism dressed in orthodox garb exercised the strongest possible influence upon Church doctrine in the Fifth Century. The Church, however, rejected this particular

at the line of thought followed by the school of Antioch at a later time, though, what is very rare, a formula here and there has an Antiochian appearance. They are at bottom Monophysites, although they were the first to make the ominous "two natures" of Origen fit for church use. It was only because they were compelled that they trouble themselves about the question of freedom in Christ, and the thought once occurred to Gregory of Nyssa (Antir. 48) that Christ would not have possessed any *ἀρετή* if He had been without *αὐτεξούσιον*. What most strongly impressed the Christian world in general was certainly the view that Christ had to give His body as a ransom for our body, His soul for our soul, His spirit for our spirit. There was undoubtedly some real justification for this thought since Apollinaris, or his pupils, seem to have carried their Paulinism so far (for so at least it would appear from some undoubtedly uncertain indications in the work of Athan. adv. Apollo, sec. I., 2 sq., II. 11) as to assert that Christ had only done away with the sin and death belonging to the flesh and thus renewed the flesh, but that the purification of the spirit was something which each individual had to carry out for himself by the imitation of Christ on the basis of that purification; in this sense redemption was not yet perfect. *Σαρκὸς μὲν καινότητα Χριστὸς ἐπιδέδεικται καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, τοῦ δὲ φρονοῦντος ἐν ἡμῖν τὴν καινότητα διὰ μιμήσεως καὶ ὁμοιώσεως καὶ ἀποχῆς τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἕκαστος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιδείκνυται* (I. 2) or *τῇ ὁμοιώσει καὶ τῇ μιμήσει σώζεσθαι τοὺς πιστεύοντας καὶ οὐ τῇ ἀνακαινίσει* (II. 11). In opposition to this thesis, which probably really originated with Apollinaris since it is in harmony with the traditions of the school of Antioch, his opponents had certainly good reason for emphasising the full extent of the work of Christ if the whole structure of the faith of that time were not to be rendered insecure. Kenotic statements such as we meet with in Hilary are, so far as I know, not to be found in the writings of the Cappadocians.

form of unity and maintained the idea of "the perfect man", "the perfect humanity" in the unity. The Church knew what it wanted to do—to unite contradictions; there were not to be two sons, but two natures; not two natures, but one substance; though it certainly did not know how this was to be conceived of. Nor did it know how the contradiction was to be expressed. But while it thus loaded its own faith with a heavy burden and thereby weakened its power, by preserving the thought of the perfect humanity of Christ, it did an inestimable service to later generations. And there was further one good result which even those times got the benefit of. The Gnostic speculations regarding the heavenly origin of the flesh of Christ, the transformation of God into a man, and such like, were now forbidden, or at least were rendered excessively difficult.

CHAPTER III.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSONAL UNION OF THE DIVINE AND HUMAN NATURES IN THE INCARNATE SON OF GOD.

THE course of theological development in ecclesiastical antiquity may in some parts be compared to the windings of a descending spiral. Starting from any given point we seem to be always getting further away, and finally we come back to it again; only we are a stage lower down. The great Trinitarian controversy of the Fourth Century has its starting-point in the Christological doctrine of Paul of Samosata: Christ, the deified man inspired by the power of God and one with God in loving affection and in energy of will. Opposed to this doctrine was the belief that Christ is co-substantial with God, the Θεὸς ὁμοούσιος, who has become man. This article of faith established itself after Arianism and other middle doctrines had been rejected. But when in the course of the development both the perfect Godhead and the perfect humanity of Christ had been elevated to the rank of an article of faith, it looked as if the unity could be secured only by once more following the path taken by Paul of Samosata, by emphasising the spiritual and moral unity of God and man. This idea of the unity was indeed made more difficult now that the God in Christ had to be conceived of as a personal being, but any other unity no longer offered itself to thinking people who were unwilling to give up clear views on the subject. And it was still permissible to hold this view of the unity; for though the doctrine of Apollinaris had been repudiated, no fixed idea was thereby arrived at as to the nature of the union of the divine and the human. All the conceivable forms in which the conception of

the union of the divine and the human might be put, were still at anyone's disposal, especially as no single term was yet in regular use.

As it was the Antiochian Apollinaris who worked out to its logical conclusion the doctrine of the Trinity as regards Christology, so it was his compatriots who worked out to its logical conclusion the formula "perfect God and perfect man." This conclusion was indeed the opposite of the doctrine of Apollinaris. He had shewn every clear thinker that it was impossible to carry out the idea of the incarnation without deducting something from the essence of humanity, and that the incarnate one could have only one nature (μία φύσις). But if the human nature in the incarnate one was nevertheless to be complete,—and the Church maintained that it was,—then the conception of the incarnation would have to get a new form. And if piety should suffer in the process, well, there was and there still is a stronger interest than that of piety—namely, that of truth.

§ 1. *The Nestorian Controversy.*

I. The most zealous opponents of Apollinaris were his compatriots and scientific friends, the Antiochian theologians, distinguished by methodical study of Scripture, sober thinking in imitation of Aristotle, and the strictest asceticism. They alone had during many decades worked out the Christological dogma in a scientific way in opposition to Arius and Apollinaris. Following the example of Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodorus of Mopsuestia treated it with the greatest fulness by making use of the philosophical theological fundamental conceptions which Paul of Samosata had already employed, and by turning to account the biblical results of the exegetical labours of the school of Antioch. The Antiochians based their position on the Ὁμοούσιος and did not wish either to interfere with the divine personality of the Logos. But at the same time they fully accepted the perfect humanity of Christ. The most important characteristic of perfect humanity is its freedom. The thought that Christ possessed a free will was the lode-star of their Christology. To this was added the other thought that

the nature of the Godhead is absolutely unchangeable and incapable of suffering. Both of these thoughts have at least no concern with the belief in the real redemption of humanity from sin and death through the God-man. *The Christology of the Antiochians was therefore not soteriologically determined;* on the contrary, the realistic-soteriological elements were attached to it by way of supplement.[1]

In the view of the Antiochians it followed from the premises above mentioned, that Christ possessed, strictly speaking, two natures and that the supposition of a natural union (ἕνωσις φυσική, ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν) was prejudicial both to the humanity and the divinity of Christ, as the doctrines of Arius and Apollinaris shewed. It was, on the contrary, necessary to maintain that the God-Logos assumed a perfect man of the race of David and united him with Himself. He dwelt (ἐνοίκησις) in the man Jesus from the time of the conception. This indwelling[2] is to be

[1] In respect of scientific method we may regard Paul of Samosata, Dorotheus, Lucian, the Lucianists such as Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia, Eusebius of Emesa, Theodore of Heraklea, Eustathius, Marcellus, Cyril of Jerusalem, Apollinaris, Diodorus, Theodore, Polychronius, Chrysostom, Theodoret, etc., as forming a union of like-minded scholars as opposed to the school of Origen. Regarded in a theological aspect their differences are manifold. Diodorus of Tarsus († shortly before 394) and his school constitute a special group here. Diodorus "the ascetic who was punished in his body by the Olympian gods", was the recognised head. His numerous works, of which only fragments are preserved, are specified in the Diction. of Chr. Biogr. I., p. 836 sq. He was as prolific an apologist, controversialist, and dogmatist as he was an exegete. His most important pupils were Theodore of Mopsuestia († 428) and Chrysostom. The former is the typical representative of the whole tendency. Of the astounding mass of his works a good deal has been preserved. To what is printed in Migne, T. 66, we have to add, above all, the edition of his commentary on the Pauline letters by Swete, 2 vols., 1882; the fragments of the dogmatic works are given in the second volume, pp. 289—339. Sachau edited, in 1869, Syrian fragments with a Latin translation; in addition Bäthgen in the Ztschr. f. Atlich. Wissensch. V., p. 53 ff.; Möller, in Herzog's R.-Encykl. XV. 2, p. 395 ff.; Gurjew, Theodor von Mopsu., 1890 [Russian]. On the Antiochian School Münscher (1811), Kihn (1866), Hergenröther (1866). Specht, Theodor v. M. u. Theodoret, 1871; Kihn, Theodor v. Mops. 1880. Glubokowski has written a very comprehensive and thorough monograph on Theodoret in Russian (2 vols. 1890). Bertram, Thedoreti doctrina christologica. Hildesiæ, 1883. On Theodoret's brother, Polychronius, see Bardenhewer, 1879. Chrysostom did not take any part in the work of giving Christology a sharply outlined form. Theodoret taught the same doctrine as Theodore, but finally capitulated.

[2] Athanasius also used the word in a natural way, *e.g.*, de incarn. 9.

conceived of according to the analogy of the indwelling of God in men generally. It is not a substantial indwelling, not *κατ' οὐσίαν*, for this involves a transmutation or else limits the Godhead. Nor is it any mere indwelling of inspiration, but a gracious indwelling, *κατὰ χάριν* (*κατ' εὐδοκίαν*), *i.e.*, God out of grace and in accordance with His own good pleasure has united Himself with the man Jesus in the way in which He unites Himself with every pious soul, only that in the case of Jesus the union was besides a perfect one in virtue of the perfection of his piety. It is to be thought of as a species of combination (*συνάφεια*), or we may express it thus: God dwells in the man as in a temple.[1] The human nature, therefore, as nature remains purely unchanged, for grace leaves the nature as it is. This nature, then, like all human nature, was also a free self-developing nature. As man Jesus Christ had to pass through all the stages of moral growth as a free self-acting agent. Over him and in him God did undoubtedly always hold sway as a supporting power, but He did not interfere with the development of the character belonging to his human nature, which by independent action confirmed itself in the good.

In accordance with this the union was only a relative one (*ἕνωσις σχετική*) and was at the outset only relatively perfect, *i.e.*, the God-Logos united Himself with the man Jesus as early as the time of his conception, forseeing of what sort he would be (*κατὰ πρόγνωσιν ὁποῖός τις ἔσται*), but this union merely began then in order to become a more intimate union at every stage of the human development.[2] It consisted in the common feeling and energy of the two natures as well as in the common direction given to the will; it was therefore essentially a moral union. By means of it, however, there appeared at the close of the human development of Jesus and in virtue of the elevation which was granted to him as the reward of his perseverance,

[1] Athanasius also employed this image, *e.g.*, l. c. c. 20.

[2] It was always and from the first dependent on God's good pleasure in the virtue of the man Jesus; for to Theodore the general proposition held good without any exception that God bestows grace solely in proportion to the free exercise of virtue. Grace is always reward; see the large fragment from the seventh book of the work *περὶ ἐνανθρωπήσεως* in Swete II., p. 293 sq. Theodore paid special attention to the baptism of Jesus also.

subject or individual worthy of adoration, (I separate the natures, I unite the adoration: χωρίζω τὰς φύσεις, ἑνῶ τὴν προσκύνησιν). Still we must not speak of two sons or two lords, but, on the contrary, we have to adore one person, whose unity, however, is not a substantial one, but κατὰ χάριν. *The formula of the distinction of the natures and the unity of the person is to be found in Theodore.* But the unity of the person is the unity of names, of honour, of adoration.[1] Since, however, each nature in Christ is at the same time person, it was here that the peculiar difficulty of the Antiochian Christology made its appearance. The union does not at bottom result in any unity of the person; it is merely nominal. The Antiochians had two persons in Christ, a divine and a human (δύο ὑποστάσεις or πρόσωπα). When, spite of this, they spoke of one, this was really a third, or rather, to put it more correctly, it was only in the combination (συνάφεια), and indeed in the last resort it was only in the relation of believers to Jesus Christ that the latter appeared as a unity.

It was in accordance with this that the conception of the Incarnation took its shape. Two natures are two subjects; for a subjectless or impersonal spiritual nature does not exist. Since accordingly one subject cannot become the other, for if it did it would either have to cease to exist itself or would have to transform itself, it is also impossible that the Logos ca have become man. It is only in appearance that He becam something through the incarnation, through "becoming man in reality He assumes something in addition to what He h Since the sphere of the unity is solely the will, the attribu experiences, and acts of the two natures are to be kept stri apart. It was the man only who was born; it was he suffered, trembled, was afraid, died. To maintain that this be said of God is both absurd and blasphemous. S accordingly Mary is not to be called the mother of Go at least in the proper sense of the term.[2] But the C

[1] "Unam offer venerationem."

[2] The designation θεοτόκος was already quite current about 360. Inst use at an earlier period may be found in Pierius and Alexander of see accordingly Julian c. Christ., p. 276 E.

adores Jesus Christ as the one Lord, because God has also raised to divine dignity the man who in feeling was united with the Logos so as to form a unity.

In accordance with this conception, though certainly *invitis autoribus*, the humanity in the person of Christ came again to the front as a humanity which experienced merely the effects produced by the divine Logos who remained in the background. Since the distinction between person and nature was not fundamental, was not made in a realistic way, that is, and since the possibility of the substantial union of two persons was denied as we can see already from the case of Paul of Samosata, since further, in opposition to Paul, the Godhead in Christ was recognised as being a substantial Godhead, unity was *not* attained, as opponents at a later time justly observed. When again, as in the case of the Antiochians, an approach was made towards this unity, then the divine factor, contrary to the presupposition which was strictly clung to, threatened to become an inspiring and supporting power, and hence the reproach brought against them of Ebionitism, Somosatenism, Photinianism, or of Judaising. It would appear that the Antiochians rarely took the doctrine of redemption and perfection as the starting-point of their arguments, or when they did, they conceived of it in such a way that the question is not of a restitution, but of the still defective perfection of the human race, a question of the new second katastasis. The natural condition of humanity, of which liability to death forms a part, can be improved; humanity can be raised above itself by means of a complete emancipation from the sense life and by moral effort. This possibility, which lies open to everyone who summons up courage to raise himself by the exercise of free will above his inherited nature, has become a fact through Christ the second Adam. This fact has an immeasurable significance, for its effects now uphold everyone who honestly strives so to raise himself. The second Adam who has already appeared will once more appear from heaven ἐπὶ τῷ πάντας εἰς μίμησιν ἄγειν ἑαυτοῦ—in order to bring all to imitate him. He already points out to all "the path to the angelic life", and, judging from the way in which they sometimes work out the thought, it almost looks as if in the

view of the Antiochians the whole thing reduced itself to this alone. The hints given here towards a spiritual conception of the redemption through Christ have not, as one can see, resulted from perceiving that everything depends on a transformation of the feelings and will, and in the case of the Antiochians themselves they have by no means entirely displaced the realistic and mystical conception of redemption. In the indefinite form which is peculiar to them, they were thoughts of reason and results of exegesis, but not thoughts of faith. We hail them as cheering proofs of the fact that the feeling of the spiritual character of the Christian religion had not at that time wholly died out amongst the Greeks; but there can be no doubt of this, that these Antiochians were further away from the thought of redemption as the forgiveness of sins and regeneration than from the idea of a realistic redemption. While in Christology they illustrated in an admirable way the weak side and in fact the impossibility of this idea, they did not understand how to point these out in reference to soteriology itself. The latter was with them always vague and tinged with a strongly moralistic element. Its connection with the Christology was loose and indefinite, while the development of the latter in the form of positive doctrines was no less questionable, contradictory and uncouth than the theses of their opponents; for the Antiochians out of one being made two and thereby introduced an innovation into the Church of the East. Only Gnostics had before them taught the doctrine of two strictly different natures in Christ. The fact too that the redemption work of Christ was essentially attributed to the man Jesus and not to God was a further innovation. It was a flagrant contradiction that Theodore would not entertain the idea of two Sons although he assumed the presence of two natures and rejected the thought of an impersonal nature. But though we might criticise the Christology of the Antiochians still more severely, we must not forget that *they held up before the Church the picture of the historical Christ at a time when the Church in its doctrinal formulæ was going further away from Him.* One has indeed to add that they also directed attention to the incomprehensible essence of the God-Logos which ostensibly remained behind this picture,

and did not on that account possess the power of presenting the historical Christ to the minds of men in a forcible way. But still that these theologians should have done what they did at that time was of immeasurable importance. It is to them the Church owes it that its Christology did not entirely become the development of an idea of Christ which swallowed up the historical Christ. And there is still something else for which these Antiochians are to be praised. Although they professed to preserve the traditional elements of dogma as a whole, they nevertheless essentially modified them by perceiving that every spiritual nature is a person and that what gives character and value to the person is feeling and will. This view, which was inherited from the Adoptionists and Paul, restores to the Christian religion its strictly spiritual character. But the Antiochians as Easterns were able to get possession of this knowledge only in a way which led from religion to moralism, because they based the spiritual on freedom, while again they understood freedom in the sense of independence even in relation to God. It was Augustine in his thought of liberty as "adhærere deo" and as "necessitas boni" who first united the most ardent piety with the recognition of Christianity as the spiritual-moral religion. It is, however, worth remembering that alone of all the Easterns the Antiochians and the theologians who sympathised with them took an interest in the Augustinian-Pelagian controversy—though they undoubtedly sided with Pelagius. For this interest proves that spite of the Eastern fog of mysteries, they were accessible to the freer air in which that controversy was fought out. Their opponents in the East wished to have mystery and spiritual freedom side by side; they, however, strove to lift the whole of religion up into the sphere of the latter—and they led it in the direction of moralism.[1] What confused the Antiochian

[1] Compare, above all, the full Confession of Theodore in Mansi IV., p. 1347 sq. (Hahn, § 139) which gives an admirable view of the Christology of Theodore and of its tendency. The word *συνάπτεσθαι* (*συνάφεια*) occurs more than a dozen times (so far as I know the word is first found within Christology in a fragment of Hippolytus [ed. Lagarde, p. 202]; *ἵνα ὁ πρωτότοκος Θεοῦ πρωτοτόκῳ ἀνθρώπῳ συναπτόμενος δειχθῇ*, Julius Afr. in his letter to Aristides [ed. Spitta, p. 121] uses *συνάφεια* in the sense of blood-relationship); *λόγος ἄνθρωπον εἴληφε τέλειον ἐκ σπέρματος ὄντα Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Δαυίδ* is the principal thesis (also *τέλειον τὴν φύσιν*). The exaltation is strongly emphasised; then we have: *δέχεται τὴν παρὰ πᾶσης τῆς*

theology and involved it in contradictions was apparently the load of tradition, *i.e.*, the adhesion to the belief that Jesus Christ possessed a divine nature. This belief, however, constituted

κτίσεως προσκύνησιν, ὡς ἀχώριστον πρὸς τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἔχων τὴν συνάφειαν, ἀναφορᾷ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίᾳ πάσης αὐτῷ τῆς κτίσεως τὴν προσκύνησιν ἀπονεμούσης. Καὶ οὔτε δύο φαμὲν υἱοὺς οὔτε δύο κυρίους... κύριος κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ Θεὸς λόγος, ᾧ συνημμένος τε καὶ μετέχων θεότητος κοινωνεῖ τῆς υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τε καὶ τιμῆς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε δύο φαμὲν υἱοὺς οὔτε δύο κυρίους. In what follows the doctrine of the two sons is again disowned and this with a certain irritation, as is also the idea that our Sonship can be compared with that of Christ, (μόνος ἐξαίρετον ἔχων τοῦτο ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν λόγον συναφείᾳ τῆς τε υἱότητος καὶ κυριότητος μετέχων, ἀναιρεῖ μὲν πᾶσαν ἔννοιαν δυάδος υἱῶν τε καὶ κυρίων). Theodore thus did not teach the doctrine of two sons, one natural and one adopted, but that of one son who communicated his name, his authority, and his glory to the man Jesus in virtue of the συνάφεια. This was indeed the impossible shift of one in a dilemma. At the end of the Creed the doctrine of the two Adams—a specially Antiochian doctrine cf. Apoll.—and that of the two states are developed in detail. The commentaries of Theodore ought to be studied in order that it may be seen how γνώμη and μίμησις—as opposed to φύσις—were for him the main thing. Both in our case and in that of Christ everything was to depend upon freedom, disposition, and the direction of the will. In what follows I quote some passages from the dogmatic works of Theodore by way of explaining and illustrating the account given in the text; Diodorus is in complete agreement with Theodore so far as it is still possible for us to check his statements. Theodore, de myster. I. 13 (Swete, p. 332): "Angelus diaboli est Samosatenus Paulus, qui purum hominem dicere præsumpsit dominum J. Chr. et negavit existentiam divinitatis unigeniti, quæ est ante sæcula"; cf. adv. Apollin. 3 (Swete, p. 318), where Theodore places Paul together with Theodotus and Artemon and condemns him. Theodore, περὶ ἐνανθρωπήσεως l. 1 (Swete, p. 291): "præcipuum Christo præter ceteros homines non aliquo puro honore ex deo pervenit, sicut in ceteris hominibus, sed per unitatem ad deum verbum, per quam omnis honoris ei particeps est post in cœlum ascensum"; l. 2 (p. 291): "homo Jesus similiter omnibus hominibus, nihil differens connaturalibus hominibus, quam quia ipsi gratiam dedit; gratia autem data naturam non immutat, sed post mortis destructionem donavit ei deus nomen supra omne nomen... o gratia, quæ superavit omnem naturam!... sed mei fratres dicunt mihi: "non separa hominem et deum, sed unum eundemque dic, hominem dicens connaturalem mihi deum"; si dicam connaturalem deum, dic quomodo homo et deus unum est? numquid una natura hominis et dei, domini et servi, factoris et facturæ? homo homini consubstantialis est, deus autem deo consubstantialis est. Quomodo igitur homo et deus unum per unitatem esse potest, qui salvificat et qui salvificatur, qui ante sæcula est et qui ex Maria adparuit"? l. c. l. 2 (p. 292): "quando naturas quisque discernit, alterum et alterum necessario invenit... hoc interim item persona idem ipse invenitur, nequequam confusis naturis, sed propter adunationem quæ facta est adsumpti et adsumentis... sic neque naturarum confusio fiet neque personæ quædam prava divisio, maneat enim et naturarum ratio inconfusa et indivisa cognoscatur esse persona; illud quidem proprietate naturæ... illud autem adunatione personæ, in una adpellatione totius considerata sive adsumentis sive etiam adsumpti natura"; l. c. l. 7 (p. 294): οὐσίᾳ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἐνοι-

the strong foundation of the theology of their opponents. Their Christology was built up on this thesis. For the Antiochians

κεῖν τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ἀπρεπεστάτων ἐστίν ... οὔτε οὐσίᾳ λέγειν οὔτε μὴν ἐνεργείᾳ οἷόν τε ποιεῖσθαι τὸν Θεὸν τὴν ἐνοίκησιν (both would draw him into the sphere of ἀνάγκη and limit him). Δῆλον οὖν ὡς εὐδοκίᾳ λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐνοίκησιν προσήκει, εὐδοκία δὲ λέγεται ἡ ἀρίστη καὶ καλλίστη θέλησις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἣν ἂν ποιήσηται ἀρεσθεὶς τοῖς ἀνακεῖσθαι αὐτῷ ἐσπουδακόσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτῶν ... ἄπειρος μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ἀπερίγραφος τὴν φύσιν πάρεστιν τοῖς πᾶσιν· τῇ δὲ εὐδοκίᾳ τῶν μὲν ἔστιν μακράν, τῶν δὲ ἐγγύς. This ἐνοίκησις, however, as is shewn in what follows, has different τρόποι; in its unique and perfect form it is in the "Son" only; l. c. (p. 297): Ἰησοῦς δὲ προέκοπτεν ... χάριτι παρὰ Θεῷ—χάριτι δὲ, ἀκόλουθον τῇ συνέσει καὶ τῇ γνώσει τὴν ἀρετὴν μετιών, ἐξ ἧς ἡ παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ χάρις αὐτῷ τὴν προσθήκην ἐλάμβανεν ... δῆλον δὲ ἄρα κἀκεῖνο, ὡς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀκριβέστερόν τε καὶ μετὰ πλείονος ἐπλήρου τῆς εὐχερείας ἢ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀνθρώποις ἦν δυνατόν, ὅσῳ καὶ κατὰ πρόγνωσιν τοῦ ὁποῖός τις ἔσται ἑνώσας αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς λόγος ἑαυτῷ ἐν αὐτῇ διαπλάσεως ἀρχῇ, μείζονα παρεῖχεν τὴν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ συνέργειαν πρὸς τὴν τῶν δεόντων κατόρθωσιν ... ἤνωτο μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῷ Θεῷ ὁ ληφθεὶς κατὰ πρόγνωσιν· ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ διαπλάσει τῆς μήτρας τὴν καταρχὴν τῆς ἑνώσεως δεξαμενος; l. c. l. 8. (p. 299): πρόδηλον δὲ ὡς τὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἐφαρμόζον· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης συναχθεῖσαι αἱ φύσεις ἓν πρόσωπον κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀπετέλεσαν (Matt. XIX. 6, is now brought in as an analogy; we also no longer speak κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἑνώσεως λόγον of two persons, but of one, δηλονότι τῶν φύσεων διακεκριμένων; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὰς φύσεις διακρίνωμεν, τελείαν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου φαμέν, καὶ τέλειον τὸ πρόσωπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπρόσωπον ἔστιν ὑπόστασιν εἰπεῖν· τελείαν δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ὁμοίως· ὅταν μέντοι ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν ἀπίδωμεν, ἓν πρόσωπον τότε φαμέν: l. c. l. 9 (p. 300): Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο—ἐνταῦθα τὸ "ἐγένετο" οὐδαμῶς ἑτέρως λέγεσθαι δυνάμενον εὑρήκαμεν ἢ κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ... τὸ δοκεῖν οὐ κατὰ τὸ μὴ εἰληφέναι σάρκα ἀληθῆ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μὴ γεγενῆσθαι: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ "ἔλαβεν" λέγῃ, οὐ κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγει· ὅταν δε "ἐγένετο", τότε κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν· οὐ γὰρ μετεποιήθη εἰς σάρκα; l. c. l. 10 (p. 301): καταβέβηκεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ μὲν τῇ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνοικήσει· ἔστιν δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ τῷ ἀπεριγράφῳ τῆς φύσεως πᾶσιν παρών; l. c. l. 12 (p. 303): ἀληθῆ υἱὸν λέγω τὸν τῇ φυσικῇ γεννήσει τὴν υἱότητα κεκτημένον· ἑπομένως δὲ συνεπιδεχόμενον τῇ σημασίᾳ καὶ τὸν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τῆς ἀξίας μετέχοντα τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑνώσει. For the explanations given of Luke I. 31 f.; 1 Tim. III. 16; Matt. III. 14, IV. 4, see p. 306 f., l. c. l. 12 (p. 308): ἑνώσας αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ τῇ σχέσει τῆς γνώμης, μείζονά τινα παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν, ὡς τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν χάριτος εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἑξῆς διαδοθησομένης ἀνθρώπους· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ καλὰ πρόθεσιν ἀκέραιον αὐτῷ διεφύλαττεν; see the sequel where the thought is developed that the man Jesus voluntarily willed the good, his will being protected by the God-Logos; l. c. l. 15 (p. 309): "utrumque iuste filius vocatur, una existente persona, quam adunatio naturarum effecit" l. c. c. 15 (p. 310): Mary may as well be called θεοτόκος as ἀνθρωποτόκος, but the latter τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος the former τῇ ἀναφορᾷ. Adv. Apollin. l. c. (p. 313): the distinction between ναός (the man Jesus) and ὁ ἐν ναῷ Θεὸς λόγος· next: ἔστιν μὲν γὰρ ἀνοήτον τὸ τὸν Θεὸν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου γεγεννῆσθαι λέγειν. In the eighth Sermon of the "Catechism" Theodore has employed the Aristotelian category "secundum aliquid" in order to shew, that a thing may be a unity in one respect and a duality in another.

it was simply a fact to which they had to adapt themselves, although they had not themselves felt its truth in this form.

The view adopted by the Alexandrians, above all by Cyril, is undoubtedly the ancient view, that namely of Irenæus, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians, even when we make allowance for the falsification of tradition by the Apollinarians. The interest they had in seeing in Christ the most perfect unity of the divine and human, and therefore their interest in the reality of our redemption, determined the character of the development of the doctrines. Up till the year 431, and even beyond that time, this was wanting in formal thoroughness and scientific precision. This is as little an accident as the fact that Athanasius supplied no scientific doctrine of the Trinity. The belief in the real incarnation of God was only capable of the scientific treatment which Apollinaris had given it. If this were forbidden then theologians were debarred from all treatment of the subject with the exception of the merely analytic and descriptive or scholastic mode of treatment. This latter was not, however, yet in existence. But also apart from this, belief in the real incarnation simply demanded a forcible and definite statement of the secret, nothing more: σιωπῇ προσκυνείσθω τὸ ἄρρητον—let the secret be adored in silence. We must live in the feeling of this secret. This is why Cyril also stated his faith in what was essentially a polemical form only; he would not have taken long to have given a purely positive statement of it. Therefore it is that without knowing it he has recourse to Apollinarian works when he wishes to bring forward a plain and intelligible formula in opposition to the Antiochians and so to make the mystery clearer—and he is continually in danger of overstepping the limits of his own religious thought—and therefore it is finally, that his terminology has so little fixity about it.[1]

[1] In many respects his language is more certain than that of the Cappadocians and Athanasius: he no longer speaks, so far as I know, of mingling, fusion and so on, but in other respects his language is not behind theirs in uncertainty, and in denying "freedom" to Christ, he comes nearer to Apollinaris than they, for they in fact made use also of the conception of "two natures." The works of Cyril are in Aubert. Vol. VI. and VII., Migne Vols. 75—77. Most of what bears on the subject under discussion will be found also in Mansi T. IV., V. Specially notable are his letters to the Egyptian monks, to Nestorius (3) to John of Antioch,

Still he vindicated the religious thought of Greek piety: ("If the God-Logos did not suffer for us in a human way then He did not accomplish our salvation in a divine way, and if He was only man or a mere instrument then we are not truly redeemed." "Our Immanuel would not in any way have benefited us by His death if He had been a man; but we are redeemed because the God-Logos gave His own body to death.") Neither Cyril's personal character nor the way in which he devised and carried on the controversy ought to be allowed to lead us astray as regards this fact: for his Christianity did not succeed in making him just.

It was as easy for Cyril to formulate the thought of faith as it was for Athanasius and the Cappadocians. Faith does not in his case start from the historical Christ, but from the Θεὸς λόγος, and is occupied only with Him. By the Incarnation the God-Logos incorporated with Himself the whole human nature and still remained the same. He did not transform Himself, but He took up humanity into the unity of His substance, without losing any of it; on the contrary, He honoured it and raised it into His divine substance. He is the same with human nature as He was before the Incarnation, the one indivisible subject which merely added something to itself just in order to take up into its nature this something thus added. Everything which the human body and the human soul of the God-Logos endured, He Himself endured, for they are *His* body and *His* soul.[1] The characteristic *moments* in this

to Succensus (2) to the Constantinopolitan and Alexandrian Churches, the liber de recta in Jesum fide addressed to Theodosius, the book and the oration on the same subject addressed to the Empress, the explanation of the 12 anathemas and their vindication as against Theodoret, the five books against Nestorius, the dialogue on the Incarnation of the only-begotten, the other dialogue: Ὅτι εἷς ὁ Χριστός and the tractate κατὰ τῶν μὴ βουλομένων ὁμολογεῖν θεοτόκον τὴν ἁγίαν παρθένον. On Cyril's theology see Dorner, Thomasius, (Christology) and H. Schultz. Koppalik, Cyril, Mainz 1881. That the work published by Mai (Script. Vet. Nova Coll. I., VIII.) περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου ἐνανθρωπήσεως does not belong to Cyril has been shewn by Ehrhard (the work attributed to Cyril of Alex. περὶ τ. τ. κυρ· ἐνανθ., a work of Theodoret of Cyrus. Tübingen, 1888). In this treatise will be found a full and thorough account of the Christological formulæ of Cyril.

[1] I purposely cite no passages; they would not, taken separately, prove the doctrine here summarised, but would, on the contrary, point now in one direction and now in another. That the group of phrases given in the text embodies Cyril's

conception are "one and the same" (εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός) that is, the God-Logos, "the making the flesh His own by way of accommodation" (ἰδίαν ποιεῖν τὴν σάρκα οἰκονομικῶς), "He remembered who He was" (μεμένηκε ὅπερ ἦν), "out of two natures one" (ἐκ δύο φύσεων εἷς), or "the joining of two natures in an unbroken union without confusion and unchangeably" (συνέλευσις δύο φύσεων καθ' ἕνωσιν ἀδιάσπαστον ἀσυγχύτως καὶ ἀτρέπτως), "the Logos with His own flesh" (ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας σαρκός), hence the "physical union" (ἕνωσις φυσική) or "hypostatic union" (καθ' ὑπόστασιν), and finally, "one nature of the God-Logos made flesh" (μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη),[1] yet "not so that the difference of the two natures is done away with by the union" (οὐχ' ὡς τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν). Cyril scarcely touched upon the distinction between φύσις (οὐσία) and ὑπόστασις, which had nevertheless already come to be current among the Antiochians so far as Christology was concerned; still he never says "of two hypostases" (ἐκ δύο ὑποστάσεων) or "a union in nature" (ἕνωσις κατὰ φῦσιν).[2] He was not able to make that distinction, because in his view φύσις and ὑπόστασις meant the same thing as applied to the divine nature, but not as applied to the human. *What rather is really characteristic in Cyril's position is his express rejection of the view that an individual man was present in Christ, although he attributes to Christ all the elements of man's nature.*[3] For Cyril, however, everything depends on the possibility and actuality of such a human nature, on the fact, namely, that in Christ a hypostatic union was reached and that this union forthwith purified and

view and in a measure embodies it completely, will be allowed by everyone acquainted with the subject. Nor as regards Christology can I hope much from a careful monograph on Cyril on the lines of a history of dogma, such as has recently been asked for; for beyond what is adduced above Cyril had no theological interest; his way of formulating his views might, however, easily lead to his having a very complicated "Christology" attributed to him.

[1] According to an expression taken from a work of Apollinaris which Cyril considered as Athanasian, because the Apollinarians had fathered it on Athanasius.

[2] See Loofs, Leontius, p. 45.

[3] The Ep. ad Succens. supplies the most important proof-passages here. Cyril's thought is that the substance (οὐσία) of the human nature in Christ does not subsist on its own account, but that it is nevertheless not imperfect since it has its subsisting element in the God-Logos. This either means nothing at all or it is Apollinarianism.

transfigured human nature generally. Christ can be the second Adam for men only if they belong to him in a material sense as they did to the first Adam, and they do belong to Him materially only if He was not an individual man like Peter and Paul, but the real beginner of a new humanity. Cyril's view, moreover, was determined as a whole by the realistic thought of of redemption.[1] Still it is not a matter of accident that he so frequently uses σάρξ for "human nature", although in opposition to Apollinaris he acknowledged the human conscious soul in Christ. It was only σάρξ that he could freely employ straight off in this connection, not πνεῦμα and ψυχή. The proposition that *before* the Incarnation there were two φύσεις, but *after* it only one, is, however, of special importance for Cyril's conception of the Incarnation. This perverse formula, which Cyril repeats and varies endlessly, regards the humanity of Christ as having existed before the Incarnation, and therefore in accordance with the Platonic metaphysic, but does not do away with the humanity after the Incarnation, on the contrary, it merely transfers it entirely to the substance of the God-Logos. Both natures are now to be distinguished θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ—a phrase which he uses very frequently, *i.e.*, it is in virtue of the physical or natural unity that the Logos has actually become man. This physical unity does not, however, mean that the Godhead thereby becomes capable of suffering: but the Logos suffers in His own flesh and was born of Mary as regards His own humanity. He is thus God crucified, (Θεὸς σταυρωθείς)—the Logos suffered without suffering, *i.e.*, in His flesh (ἔπαθεν ὁ λόγος ἀπαθῶς, *i.e.*, ἐν σαρκί)—and Mary is θεοτόκος, in so far as the σάρξ which she bore constitutes an indissoluble unity with the Logos. (What belonged to the Logos thus became the property of the humanity, and again what belonged to the humanity became the property of the Logos—γέγονε τοίνυν ἴδια μὲν τοῦ λόγου τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ἴδια δὲ πάλιν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τὰ αὐτοῦ λόγου). Therefore this

[1] Orat. ad imp. Theodos. 19, 20 (Mansi IV. 641): An apparent body would have been sufficient if the God-Logos had merely required to show us the path to the angelic life. But He became a perfect man, ἵνα τῆς μὲν ἐπεισάκτου φθορᾶς τὸ γηΐνον ἡμῶν ἀπαλλάξῃ σῶμα, τῇ καθ' ἕνωσιν οἰκονομίᾳ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῷ ζωὴν ἐνιείς, ψυχὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀνθρωπίνην ποιούμενος ἁμαρτίας αὐτὴν ἀποφήνῃ κρείττονα, τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως τὸ πεπηγός τε καί ἄτρεπτον, οἷάπερ ἐρίῳ βαφήν, ἐγκαταχρώσας αὐτῇ.

σάρξ of Christ can in the Lord's Supper be the means of producing divine life, although it has not disappeared as human flesh.[1]

Is this conception Monophysitism? It is necessary to distinguish here between the phraseology and what is actually stated. As regards their actual substance all conceptions may be described as Monophysite or Apollinarian which reject the idea that Christ was an individual man; for between the doctrine of the hypostatic union and the most logical Apthartodocetism there are only grades of difference. No hard and fast line can be drawn here, although very different forms of monophysitism were possible according as the consequences of the Incarnation for the divinity of Christ on the one hand, or for His humanity on the other were conceived of in a concrete way and definitely stated. But according to ecclesiastical phraseology only those partfes are to be described as monophysite who rejected the deliverance of the Council of Chalcedon. But this deliverance presupposes the existence of factors which did not yet lie within the mental horizon of Cyril. In these circumstances we must content ourselves with saying that nowhere did Cyril intentionally deviate to the right hand, or to the left, from the line of thought followed by the Greek Church and its great Fathers in their doctrine of redemption. He was a Monophysite in so far as he taught that the Logos after the Incarnation continues to have as before one nature only; but as the opponent of Apollinaris he did not wish to mix the human nature with the divine in Christ.[2] The assertion of a perfect humanity, unmingled natures, must be allowed to stand, for it is really impossible to put in an intel-

[1] Cyril connected the Christological dogma in the form in which he put it, with the Lord's Supper and also with baptism.

[2] Similarly also Loofs op. cit., p. 48 f. As Loofs rightly remarks, the distinction between the natures which Cyril wished to have made was nevertheless not one solely in thought, but I cannot find any word which expresses what he wanted. It is obvious that as regards the docetic and Apollinarian ideas (apparent-humanity, κρᾶσις, σύγχυσις, τροπή), which were current and which were still widely spread at the time, Cyril's influence was of a wholesome kind. It is wonderful how firm he was here. Perhaps it is herein that his greatest significance lies. And yet the best of what he had he had got from Apollinaris. Moreover, before Cyril, Didymus in Alexandria had already put together and used the words ἀτρέπτως, ἀσυγχύτως in his formula for the Incarnation; see Vol. III., p. 299. They were therefore not a monopoly of the Antiochians.

ligible form any part of these speculations which treat of substances as if they had no connection whatever with a living person. It is really not any more difficult to put up with the contradiction here than it is to tolerate the whole method of looking at the question. Both constitute the great mystery of the faith. Monophysitism, which limits itself to the statement that in Christ out of two perfect natures, divinity and humanity, one composite or incarnate divine nature has come into existence, and which will have nothing to do with the idea of a free will[1] in Christ, is dogmatically consistent. It has indeed no longer the logical satisfying clearness of the Apollinarian thesis; it involves an additional mystery, or a logical contradiction, still in return for this it definitely put into words the by no means unimportant element of "perfect humanity". But this Monophysitism, when distinctly formulated as ἕνωσις φυσική, certainly made it plain to the Greeks themselves that it was no longer possible to reconcile the Christ of faith with the picture of Christ given in the Gospels; for the idea of the physical unity of the two natures and of the interchange of properties, which Cyril had worked out in a strict fashion, swallowed up what of the human remained in Him. Arrived at this point three possible courses were open. It was necessary either to revise the doctrine of redemption and perfection which had the above-mentioned statement as its logical result—a thing which was not to be thought of,—or else theologians would have to make up their minds still further to adapt the picture of the historical Christ to the

[1] Like Apollinaris, Cyril also regarded with the deepest abhorrence the thought that Christ possessed a free will. Everything seemed to them to be made uncertain if Christ was not ἄτρεπτος. We can quite understand this feeling; for all belief in Christ as Redeemer is, to say the least of it, indifferent to the idea that Christ might have done other than He did. But that age was in the direst dilemma; for "freedom" was at that time the only formula for the "personality" of the creature, and yet it at the same time necessarily involved the capability of sin. In this dilemma the true believers resolved to deny freedom to Christ. With these accordingly the Apollinarians who had been excluded from the Church were able once more to unite. "All with the exception of a few," writes Theodoret H. E. V. 3, cf. V. 37, "came over to the Church and again took part in Church fellowship; they had not, however, all the same, got rid of their earlier disease, but still infected many with it who before had been sound. From this root there sprang up in the Church the doctrine of the μία τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῆς θεότητος φύσις, which attributes suffering to the Godhead too of the only begotten."

dogmatic idea, *i.e.*, to destroy it altogether, which was logical Monophysitism, or finally, it would be necessary to discover a word, or a formula, which would mark off the dogma of faith from Apollinarianism with still greater sharpness than had been done by the catchword "perfect humanity". It was therefore necessary to intensify the contradictions still further, so that it was no longer only the concrete union of the natures which appeared as the secret, but the conception of the union itself already involved a *contradictio in adjecto* and became a mystery. If it could be maintained that the natures had become united without being united, then on the outside everything seemed to be as it should be, and Apollinaris was as certainly beaten as Paul of Samosata—and this was maintained. But certainly no pupil of Athanasius or Cyril hit on a notion such as this, which paralysed the force of the thought: λόγος σαρκωθείς. A danger lurked here which had finally a momentous result. The expression of the faith which was constantly being burdened with fresh contradictions so that no legitimate element might be wanting to it, had to forfeit its strength.[1] Its place was finally taken by a complicated formula which it was no longer possible to make one's own through feeling, the mystery of conceptions put in the form of concrete ideas. If theologians might no longer teach as Apollinaris taught and in fact no longer quite in the way in which Cyril taught, they saw themselves under the necessity of using a complicated formula. But to begin with it seemed as if Cyril had carried his point.[2]

The controversy broke out in Constantinople and was throughout carried on with ambitious designs and for the purposes of ecclesiastical policy. In the person of Nestorius an ascetic Antiochian was again raised to the dignity of Bishop of Constantinople (428). The bishop of the capital just because he was

[1] Thomasius in his description of the Christology of Cyril sees only difficulties, but no contradictions. Nor has he fully understood the relation between Apollinaris and Cyril.

[2] Cyril never sought subsequently to tone down in appearance the paradox of the mystery of the Incarnation by means of logical distinctions. In this connection it is important to note that he allows that Nestorius wishes a ἕνωσις τῶν προσώπων (Ep. ad C P. Mansi IV., p. 1005), but that he himself rejects such a union *because the important* thing is the union of the natures.

the bishop was an object of jealousy to the Alexandrian Patriarch and as an Antiochian he was doubly so. A conceited preacher and one who plumed himself on being an enemy of heretics, but not a man with any meanness about him, Nestorius, who was supported by his presbyter Anastasius, gave offence in the capital by using the catchwords of the Antiochian dogmatic and by the contest he engaged in against the description of Mary as θεοτόκος. With great frankness Nestorius described the statements regarding the God who was wrapped in swaddling clothes and fastened to the Cross, as heathen fables. His Christology[1] was that of Theodore; it cannot be said that he developed it further; on the contrary, one can see the influence of Chrysostom. Nestorius seems scarcely to have mentioned the human development of Jesus, and he seems to have laid greater emphasis on the idea of the union than Theodore ("one Christ"), if also only in the form of the συνάφεια and προσκύνησις; but he was, above all, concerned in getting rid of "the corruption of Arius and Apollinaris." Cyril took advantage of the excitement in the Capital, which would perhaps have quieted down spite of some unruly priests and monks, in order to stir up the Egyptian monks, the Egyptian clergy in Constantinople, and the imperial ladies. The result was an angry correspondence with Nestorius, who was, moreover, protected by the Emperor. Cyril wrote in a more dignified way than his rival, but the hierarchs since the days of Cyprian had always known better how to take up an outwardly dignified attitude than their opponents. The narrow-minded patriarch of the capital was characterised by a simple pride.[2] He expressed himself in an inconsiderate and imprudent way

[1] Some of his writings in Mansi IV., V., see also VI., VII., IX. On the beginning of the controversy Socrat. H. E. VII. 29 sq. cf. the letters of Cœlestin and Vincent. Common. 17 sq. The sermons of Nestorius, above all, deserve attention. The history is in Hefele, op. cit. II. 2, pp. 141—288, who is indeed wholly biassed. See Walch, Ketzergesch., Vol. V.; Largent, S. Cyrille et le concile d'Éphèse (Rev. des quest. hist., 1872, July). Older accounts by Tillemont and Gibbon.

[2] Luther ("Von den Conc. u. K K.", Vol. 25, pp. 304 ff., 307), falling back on Socrates, has rehabilitated Nestorius: "One can see from this that Nestorius, though a proud and foolish bishop, is in earnest about Christ; but in his folly he does not know what he is saying and how he is saying it, like one who was not able to speak properly of such things and yet wished to speak as if he knew all about it.

in his letters, and his conduct in his diocese was no less inconsiderate and imprudent, for there he went on with the work of deposition and attacked "Apollinarianism" as if it had been a red rag.

The formulæ employed by the two opponents were no longer very different. Everything depended on how they were accentuated. Both spoke of two natures and one Christ, and the one wished as little to be an Apollinarian as the other did to be a "blasphemous"[1] Samosatene. Cyril did not deny that the Godhead was incapable of suffering, and Nestorius was prepared to use even the formula θεοτόκος with a qualification.[2] But in reality they were undoubtedly separated from each other by a deep gulf represented in the former case by the ἕνωσις φυσική, (the physical union,) and in the latter by the ἕνωσις κατὰ συνάφειαν, (the union by combination,) and they can scarcely be blamed if they indulged in specious arguments; for both views were intelligible only when one went behind the formulæ, and in the case of many if not actually in that of the leaders, ideas which went a great deal further were as a matter of fact concealed behind the formulæ.[3] Nestorius addressed himself to the Roman bishop Cœlestin as a colleague of co-ordinate rank, Cyril did the same soon after as an informant moved by a sense of duty, and therewith the controversy came to have a universal importance. But owing to the interference of the Roman bishop on behalf of Cyril it also took a wholly unexpected turn; for there is not

[1] So Nestorius himself in the third letter to Cœlestin.

[2] This was the case from the first; see already the first letter to Cœlestin. In the third letter he proposed to the Pope that the latter should see that neither θεοτόκος nor ἀνθρωποτόκος was used, but χριστότοκος; "This controversy about words," he adds moreover, "will not in my opinion occasion any difficult enquiry at the Council nor will it interfere with the doctrine of the divinity of Christ."

[3] In this contest Nestorius directs his attack against Photinianism, as representing the idea that the Word had first originated with the Virgin, against Apollinarianism, against the idea that the flesh of Christ was no longer flesh after the Resurrection, and therefore against the "deificatio" of the flesh, and against the mingling of the natures (first letter to Cœlestin). As a matter of fact nothing of all this applied to Cyril. The latter fought against Nestorius as if it were a matter of combating Paul of Samosata, and in this Cœlestin made common cause with him (see his first letter to the Church of Constantinople c. 3). The real difference was: Did God *become* man or did He not?

perhaps in the history of dogma a second fact of equal importance which so thoroughly deserves to be pronounced a scandal nor one which at the same is so little to the credit of its author, as the interference of the Pope on behalf of Cyril.

He had indeed sufficient reason for doing this. Since the time of Athanasius and Julius, and in fact from the days even of Demetrius and Fabian, it had always been the traditional dogmatic policy of the Roman Chair to support the Alexandrian Patriarch, as conversely the latter in his struggle against the ambitious patriarch of New Rome necessarily looked for his natural ally in old Rome.[1] Further Nestorius had shewn himself unwilling to excommunicate right off the Pelagians who had been condemned by the Pope and who had fled to Constantinople. Finally, he had not in his writing generally given token of the submission which the Apostolic Chair already demanded. But what does that signify in face of the fact that Cœlestin in interfering on behalf of Cyril disowned his western view and in the most frivolous fashion condemned Nestorius without having considered his teaching. That he did both things may be easily shewn. In his letter to the Pope Nestorius laid before the latter the formula "utraque natura quæ per conjunctionem summam et inconfusam in una persona unigeniti adoratur"[2] ("the two natures which, perfectly joined together and without confusion, are adored in the one person of the only-begotten"). *This was substantially the Western formula, and Cœlestin himself held no other view.*[3] He did not, however, trouble himself

[1] The solidarity between Rome and Alexandria is emphasised also in the letters of Cœlestin to Cyril (I. 1), to John of Antioch (c. 2) and to Nestorius (c. 11).

[2] Ep. II. Nest. ad Cœlest. (Mansi IV., p. 1024.)

[3] It was substantially the Western formula: see on this above, p. 145, and Reuter, Ztschr. für K.-G. VI., p. 156 ff. Augustine, Cœlestin's authority, had taught the doctrine of una persona and two natures, or still more frequently the "duæ substantiæ" which corresponds more closely with the Western conception; he had further used "deus (ex patre) et homo (ex matre), or "verbum et homo" or "deus-homo." He had rejected every view which taught the changeableness of God, and explained that the "forma dei" remained together with the "forma servi" after the "assumptio carnis". He had not himself questioned the relative correctness of the idea of the indwelling of the Godhead in Christ after the fashion of the indwelling of the Godhead in believers, *i.e.*, as in a temple, if he also clung to the view that the Word *became* flesh. It is undoubted that accord-

about the formula, put his own Christology on one side and declared in favour of Cyril, while he made everything depend on the one point "θεοτόκος" in order at least to produce an appearance of difference, although this was just the very point regarding which Nestorius was prepared to make concessions.

ing to Augustine, "Christ is the collective person comprising a duality" in connection with which we have to distinguish between what relates to the forma dei and the forma servi. It is only with certain qualifications that the formula "God was crucified" is to be employed, the perfectly correct statement is only "Christus crucifixus est in forma servi." The passages in which Augustine speaks of "caro dei", "natus ex femina deus" etc., are extremely rare, and for him these formulæ have in my opinion no real importance; for the reconciling work of Christ belongs according to Augustine to his humanity; see above. Here he is therefore in agreement with the Antiochians. (The fact that in one passage Augustine, like Tertullian, speaks of "mingling", is of no importance). We meet with the same thing in Ambrose (de incarn. Sacram.) and again in Vincentius and Leo I. They all go back together to Tertullian (see above). Ambrose like Augustine speaks of two substances (natures) and he is "still more zealously intent than the latter in preserving the two in their integrity": "Servemus distinctionem divinitatis et carnis." Apollinaris has no more violent opponent than Ambrose. According to him the Johannine "becoming flesh" first gets its true meaning through "He dwelt among us." When we speak of the death and passion of Christ we ought to add "secundum carnem". And naturally in this connection emphasis is also laid on the "unus et idem", but the co-existence of the formæ dei et servi is maintained. And here, as in Augustine, we meet with the formula that the Logos assumed a man. In fact Ambrose, the keenest opponent of Apollinaris, turned against the ἀντιμετάστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων as against a dangerous, Apollinarian mode of speech, and went so far in regard to the distinction of the natures as even to hazard (c. 2, § 13) the bold statement: "Fieri non protest, ut, per quem sunt omnia, sit unus ex nobis." (More detailed information in Förster, Ambrosius, p. 128 f., 136 f.) The remaining evidence, moreover, which we possess in the shape of Papal letters etc., proves that the Westerns since the time of Tertullian and Novatian—in the latter also we find the "utraque substantia" (not "natura") and the "sociatus homo et deus"—possessed a christological formula on which they were all agreed, based on their creed, and to which they had strictly adhered, (see the admirable remarks of Reuter op. cit. p. 191 f.). *This form was closely akin to that of the Antiochians, although it rested on a different basis.* The Antiochians, without being influenced by the West, had reached quite independently the formula "two natures, one person." Not only the "mild" Antiochians (Loofs op. cit., p. 49 f.), but Theodore also (see above) and Nestorius had employed it. We must certainly admit that there is a radical difference, the Antiochian formula would strictly have run thus: The two natures, which are two hypostases, constitute together one prosopon or person who is to be adored, *i.e.*, in the view of the Antiochians nature and hypostasis coincided and the undivided subject possessed its unity only in the union, the name, in the position of authority and in adoration. On the other hand we should have to paraphrase the Western form of the doctrine which was outlined by Tertullian, developed by Ambrose and handed on to the theologians

The Pope had determined to put down Nestorius. A Roman Synod (430) demanded of him immediate recantation on pain of excommunication. As if by way of insult Cyril was charged by the Pope himself with the duty of carrying the sentence out. Nestorius himself, whose Church was revolutionised, now

of subsequent times, thus: Jesus Christ as one and the same possesses two substances (properties) or two co-existent forms (status, forma). The difference is obvious at the first glance. The former formula is of a speculative kind and from general conceptions constructs a personal being, the latter on the contrary assigns "the state of life" to a person, it is, so to speak (see above), of a legal or political kind. The two formulæ are thus quite disparate (the Antiochian and Alexandrian are on the contrary formally similar) and therefore it is very possible that the Western form in fine, considered from the *religious* point of view, contains a side which is more akin to the Alexandrian than to the Antiochian form. But in the formulæ Nestorius was in agreement with Cœlestin, and it cannot be proved that the Pope was able to look behind the formulæ (see the "simplicior" in Mansi V., p. 702). In fact the opposite can be proved. In all his numerous letters he took good care in connection with this affair not to state his own Christological view. If anything escapes him it does not remind us at all of Cyril's views, see, *e.g.*, the letter to the Church of Constantinople (Mansi IV., p. 1044): "Nestorius denies that the Logos assumed a man for our sakes." He fastens solely on the θεοτόκος to which objection had been taken by Nestorius and he adduces a sort of argument in proof of its antiquity taken from a poem of Ambrose. Beyond this nothing else occurs in his letters to shew what was really to blame in the Christology of Nestorius. In place of this he from the very start loads him with abuse, with threats from the Bible and with imprecations of a wholly general character, denounces him to his Church as a heretic and writes him a letter (Mansi IV., p. 1026 sq.), which in its unfairness and bare-faced audacity is one of the vilest compositions we have of the fourth and fifth centuries. In his instructions to his legates too and in his letter to the Council, he carefully guarded against using any Christological formula at all, and he knew very well why. As Nestorius had expressed himself, particularly towards the end, his Christology came so near to that of Augustine that Cœlestin at all events was not able to distinguish the one from the other. Cœlestin's main concern, however, was by no means with the Christology, but rather with the person of Nestorius because the latter had not treated the Pelagians *ad nutum papæ*. He accordingly, instructed his legates simply to take Cyril's side, and in his letter to the Council contented himself with an exhortation to the members to preserve the old faith without saying what the old faith was. There is, however, not the slightest ground for the assumption that Augustine's affair with the Gallican monk and presbyter Leporius (about 426, Mansi IV., pp. 518, 519 sq.) probably had an influence upon Cœlestin. This controversy, which was quickly settled, undoubtedly shews that on the basis of the formulæ of Tertullian and Novatian, discussions regarding the mystery of the person of Christ had been started in the West too, which led to considerable division of opinion, and that in opposition to this the Westerns held firmly to their "unus et idem" which, however, was something different from the Antiochian ἓν πρόσωπον (Leporius would have nothing to do with the idea of a deus natus et passus; Augustine and Aurelius of Carthage forced him to recant: the Confession of Leporius is in

urged the Emperor to call a General Council, and in addition to this collected a number of accusations against Cyril for the way in which he had discharged the duties of his office. To the twelve anathemas which an Alexandrian Council under the presidency of Cyril had served on him, and which embodied the teaching of Cyril in sharply cut phrases (*θεοτόκος γεγέννηκε σαρκικῶς σάρκα γεγονότα τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ λόγον—ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν—ἕνωσις φυσική—σὰρξ τοῦ κυρίου ζωοποιός*,—the mother of God bore flesh born after the manner of flesh, the Logos of God—hypostatic union—natural union—the life-giving flesh of the Lord) he replied by twelve counter-anathemas.[1] This sealed the breach. The Emperor, displeased with Cyril, summoned a Council to meet at Ephesus at Whitsuntide 431. Cyril who appeared with some 50 bishops, here shewed how an Emperor, such as Theodosius was, ought to be treated. Without waiting for the arrival of the Syrians under John of Antioch, the cautious friend (?) of Nestorius,[2] the Egyptian party supported by the bishop of Ephesus, Memnon, on its own authority and spite of the opposition of the Imperial commissioner, constituted itself the Council, treated Nestorius who naturally did not appear at this meeting, but waited in the city for the Syrians, as an accused person, approved of all Cyril's declarations as being in harmony with

Hahn, Symbole 2, § 138). But in the affair with Nestorius Cœlestin nowhere referred to the heresy of Leporius and to his recantation. The commonitorium of Vincentius best shews how little disposed those in the West were to have their own Christological form of doctrine interfered with by the East or by the recognised Council of Ephesus. In this book, written soon after 431, the Creed of Ephesus is highly praised and Nestorius is abused, but at the same time the Christological formula of Tertullian and no other is used, and what is said exhibits complete uncertainty regarding the teaching of Nestorius.

[1] Mansi IV., pp. 1081 sq., 1099 sq., Hahn, § 142, 143. In the third thesis of Nestorius the permanence of the difference of the two natures also after the Incarnation is strongly emphasised. The fifth thesis runs thus: "Si quis post assumptionem hominis naturaliter dei filium unum esse audet dicere, anathema sit." It is the most questionable one.

[2] John of Antioch was perhaps also one of the false friends of Nestorius. The matter is still not quite clear—spite of the Coptic sources which are now at our command. Probably John came so late intentionally, in order to be able to turn the scale; from the first his attitude towards Nestorius had been an equivocal one. We may indeed assume that he wished to get rid both of Nestorius and of Cyril in order to secure for himself the supreme influence over the Church.

Holy Scripture and the Nicene Creed, pronounced the deposition of Nestorius and declared him to have forfeited priestly fellowship. In opposition to this petty assembly, which did not set up any new creed, but which on the contrary took up the position that the sole question had reference to the Nicene Creed which was in danger, Nestorius and his friends, as soon as the Syrians arrived, held the legal Council under the presidency of the Imperial Commissioner and pronounced sentence of deposition on Cyril and Memnon. It was only now that the Papal legates arrived in Ephesus and they at once took the side of Cyril.[1] In accordance with their instructions they reopened the case *pro forma*, in order to exalt the authority of the Apostolic Chair. Cyril's party complied with this, and the Legates then agreed to everything which had been done, after all the documents had been once more read over.[2] With the cry, "the whole Council thanks the new Paul Cœlestin, the new Paul Cyril, Cœlestin the guardian of the faith, Cœlestin who concurs with the Council: One Cœlestin, one Cyril, one faith of the Council, one faith of the whole world,"[3] this assembly closed, which sought to maintain the ancient Nicene faith and did maintain it, at which, however, there was no discussion, but at which unanimity was reached solely on the basis of a selection of authorities.[4]

[1] Otherwise the Westerns were not present at all.

[2] Besides Cœlestin's letter to the Council a similar one from the Carthaginian Archbishop Capreolus who excused the absence of the Africans was read again. This letter too is instructive because the bishop does not go beyond counselling that no change should be made on the ancient faith. He expresses no opinion on the question in dispute, (Mansi IV., p. 1207 sq.).

[3] Mansi l. c. p. 1287. At the close the Council did the Pope the further favour of condemning the Pelagians. Thus both parties were quits. Cœlestin condemned Nestorius without knowing what his teaching was and thereby disparaged his own doctrine, and the followers of Cyril condemned the Pelagians without thoroughly examining their theses and condemned themselves in condemning them. We may put it thus and yet not mistake the peculiar solidarity which existed between the Antiochians and the Pelagians; for the Ephesian judges knew nothing of this. It was Cassian who first drew attention to it (libr. VII., de incarn. Chr.).

[4] See the Acts in Mansi; Vicentius too in the so-called Second Commonitorium describes the procedure; they interrogated antiquity. "Peter of Alex., Athanasius, Theophilus of Alex., the three Cappadocians, Felix and Julius of Rome were quoted at Ephesus as teachers, councillors, witnesses and judges (what, however, was

The following will be found in the historical accounts. The Emperor, instead of standing up for the right, allowed himself to be overawed. At first it is true the resolutions of Cyril's Council were annulled, but thereafter the controversy was to be settled in true Byzantine fashion by the removal of the leaders. The Emperor gave the force of law both to the deposition of Cyril and Memnon and to that of Nestorius. The Alexandrians, however, were united and followed one master, but this was not the case with the opposite party. Nestorius who was violent but not tenacious, resigned; soon, however, his isolation was to change to imprisonment. In the eyes of the Emperor the doctrine which he represented was by no means condemned; but Cyril succeeded in getting permission to resume possession of his bishopric, and by means of intrigue and bribery his party continued more and more to gain ground at the Court and the capital. Still he could not reckon on a victory as regards the dogmatic question; he had to be content with knowing that a man who was acceptable to him occupied the chair of Constantinople. The Emperor sought to bring about a union, and the friends of Nestorius became disunited. One section under the leadership of John of Antioch was prepared to come to terms, and to this party Theodoret, [1] the most distinguished Antiochian scholar, also belonged, though undoubtedly with a certain reserve. Another section actively resisted. Cyril's behaviour in the year 432—433 is little to his credit. To him it was of more importance to get the condemnation of his mortal enemy, Nestorius, carried through in the Church, than to preserve his dogmatic system pure. Thus he subscribed the creed submitted by the moderate Antiochians, without, however, retracting his earlier opinions, and in return for this got some of the heads of the opposite party, above all, John of Ephesus, to abandon Nestorius. Cyril could save his consistency by interpreting this Antiochian creed in accordance with his Christology; the friends of Nestorius were not able to

quoted from them originated with Apollinaris!), and also Cyprian and Augustine." According to Vincentius these constituted "the hallowed decalogue". But in addition to these the opinions of others were also adduced.

[1] He was now the spiritual leader of the Antiochians. He fought untiringly for the view that God was incapable of suffering.

escape the disgrace which they had brought upon themselves by their treachery towards their ill-used friend. But in a question which was for him a matter of faith Cyril had agreed to a compromise, in proof of the fact that all hierarchs are open to conviction when they are in danger of losing power and influence.[1] He could, moreover, reckon on the victory of his opponents being a Pyrrhic victory. His own reputation and that of his dogmatic system went on increasing; thousands of monks were busy spreading it, and Cyril himself was constantly working at the Court and in Rome. The condemnation of Nestorius was followed by the most disgraceful treatment of the unfortunate bishop. In consequence of the confusion which arose because he was condemned while his teaching was tolerated by others, the whole party was weakened; the strict Nestorians separated from the others,[2] and since Cyril had not been under the necessity

[1] The Creed of Union is in Mansi V., pp. 781, 291, 303. (Hahn § 99). It was composed as early as the year 431, probably by Theodoret, and was sent from Ephesus to be submitted to the Emperor, Cyril subscribed it in the year 433. The Creed is a dogmatic work of art in which the Antiochians, however, could without much difficulty recognise their views, but not so Cyril. The second, and really important half runs thus: *δύο γὰρ φύσεων ἕνωσις γέγονε· διὸ ἕνα Χριστόν, ἕνα υἱόν, ἕνα κύριον ὁμολογοῦμεν. Κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τῆς ἀσυγχύτου ἑνώσεως ἔννοιαν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὴν ἁγίαν παρθένον θεοτόκον*, [Nestorius had already admitted this, and he might in fact have subscribed this creed without any scruples of conscience] *διὰ τὸ τὸν Θεὸν λόγον σαρκωθῆναι καὶ ἐνανθρωπῆσαι, καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συλλήψεως ἑνῶσαι ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς ληφθέντα ναόν. Τὰς δὲ εὐαγγελικὰς καὶ ἀποστολικὰς περὶ τοῦ κυρίου φωνὰς ἴσμεν τοὺς θεολόγους ἄνδρας τὰς μὲν κοινοποιοῦντας, ὡς ἑφ' ἑνὸς προσώπου, τὰς δὲ διαιροῦντας, ὡς ἐπὶ δύο φύσεων* (Cyril admitted that!) *καὶ τὰς μὲν θεοπρεπεῖς κατὰ τὴν θεότητα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τὰς δὲ ταπεινὰς κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα αὐτοῦ παραδιδόντας.* This formula of union which reflects no discredit on the Antiochians, especially as they, like the Arians and Semi-Arians before them, had a theological rather than a religious interest in the problem, is markedly different from the later Chalcedonian formula. It does not abandon an intelligible position as that was understood by the Antiochians. Cyril had to content himself with the words *ἕνωσις* and *θεοτόκος* and had to put up with the absence of *συνάφεια*. He naturally clung firmly to the *μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη*, declaring that the creed of union merely excluded the misinterpretations of the doctrine he had hitherto taught, misinterpretations which he had himself always disavowed; in fact he went so far as to assert that the Antiochians too understood the difference of the natures after the incarnation as being purely a distinction *in thought*.

[2] This was a slow process which began with the emigration to Edessa and was concluded only at the end of the fifth century with the formation of a strictly exclusive Nestorian Church. It maintained itself in the extreme East of Christendom, in East Syria and Persia, and soon took on a national colouring; on the

of retracting anything, he was able to direct his energies towards getting the decrees of his assembly accepted as orthodox, as ecumenical decrees, under cover of the union-creed. He did actually succeed in a few years in getting this done in the East; in the West they had ranked as such from the first. The situation continued to be perplexed and became more and more disingenuous.

§ 2. *The Eutychian Controversy.*

Cyril died in the year 444; there were in his own party some who so far as he was concerned had never forgiven him the union of 433 which had led Cyril to agree to the expression "δύο φύσεις".[1] His successor was Dioscurus who, according to the testimony of his own adherents, though not indeed the equal of his predecessor, was also not unlike him. The Alexandrian bishops from Athanasius to Dioscurus have something in common. They strove to make themselves the masters of Egypt and the leaders of the Church of the East.[2] Their resistance to the power of the State was not less strong than their hatred of the

strongly marked national consciousness of the Nestorians in Church matters, see Horst, Elias von Nisibis, p. 112 ff. The Emperor Zeno put an end to their existence in the Empire in 489. All the successors of Theodosius II. persecuted them. How the latter came to have such a ferocious hatred of Nestorius whom he had once protected has not, however, been yet explained. The Emperor gave orders that all the writings of Nestorius were to be burned and that his followers were to be called "Simonists". The result was that the writings of Diodorus and Theodore were all the more eagerly circulated in the East and translated into other languages. Edessa in particular did a great deal in the way of getting the Greek-Antiochian literature put into Syrian (Persian, Armenian). Much that is of a free and antique character has been preserved in the Nestorian-Persian or Chaldean Church; Assemani, Bibl. Orient. III., 2; Silbernagl, Kirchen des Orients p. 202 ff.; Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 226 ff. For the history of dogma, in the strict sense of the word, the Nestorians are no longer of any importance.

[1] See Isidor Pelus. epp. I., Nos. 323, 334; Acacius of Melitene, ep. ad Cyril. in Mansi V., p. 860 (998 sq.). Cyril himself (ep. ad Eulog. Migne, Vol. 77, p. 225) says that people are now speaking reproachfully of him: διὰ τί δύο φύσεις ὀνομαζόντων αὐτῶν ἠνέσχετο ἢ καὶ ἐπῄνεσε ὁ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας. Fuller details in Ehrhard, op. cit., p. 42 f.

[2] See, above all, the Church History of Socrates, who thoroughly understood this aspiration of theirs.

parvenu, the bishop of New Rome, whose aspirations after power they wished to put a stop to. We can only compare them with the great Popes, and the comparison is so far a just one inasmuch as they aimed at making Egypt a sort of independent ecclesiastical State. Each bishop in the series from Athanasius to Dioscurus came nearer accomplishing this design.[1] In following out this policy they relied upon three powerful forces, on Greek piety and monasticism, on the masses of the lower classes, and on the Roman Bishop who had an equal interest in keeping down the bishop of Constantinople, and in making head against the State. In the respect first mentioned, Theophilus' change of front is specially characteristic. He abandoned science, *i.e.*, Origenism, as soon as he perceived that a stronger force was present in the Church,—namely, the orthodoxy of the monks and of the religious communities. From that time onwards the Alexandrian bishop stood at the head of ecclesiastical traditionalism; he decisively rejected Greek science. But in doing this he surrendered what was an important element in the influence he could exercise on the rest of the churches, and the loss of this was a momentous one. He became a national Coptic bishop. This brings us to the second point. Like all

[1] Of all the great bishops of the Empire the Roman and Alexandrian bishops alone possessed a traditional policy which was strictly adhered to, and acted in accordance with it. They accordingly really became forces in history. The Chair of Antioch never had a policy; in the conflicts with the Arians it became a mere puppet after the Church already sixty years before this had had to come to its assistance, and it possessed no fixed traditions. The position taken up in the Nestorian controversy by the feeble and unreliable John is typical of the bishops of Antioch (see his letter to Sixtus of Rome). It is customary to complain of the hierarchial imperiousness of Athanasius, of the violent actions of Theophilus, Cyril, and Dioscurus, and of the unfeeling policy of the Roman bishops, and to contrast them with the Bishops of Antioch. But people do not reflect that when forces manifest themselves they have to adapt themselves to the material upon which they are to work, and quite as little do they try to imagine what appearance the history of the Church would have presented without the "violences" of the Roman and Alexandrian bishops. Those who at the present day complain, together with their dogmatic system, would not at all events have been here at all if these tyrannical and unfeeling princes of the Church had not existed, and the tame dogmatic of the present time would never have made its appearance apart from the fanatical dogmatic of those despots. It may be incidentally remarked that we ought hardly to conclude from Mansi VI., p. 1008, that Dioscurus wished to restore Origen's reputation.

despots, the great Alexandrian bishops sought the support of the masses. They were demagogues. They flattered the people and sought to please them, while they hampered and crushed the aristocracy composed of the bishops, the scholars and the upper classes.

Athanasius had already begun this policy, in fact he was not in all probability the first to follow it. Each of his successors went a step further on these lines. But the Copts were not the Romans; the master of the eternal city could always think of ruling the world. A Coptic despot, however, who had rejected all that belonged to the Greek world, could only dream of world-empire.[1] Cyril had the Egyptian clergy and people completely under his power; but the less wise Dioscurus by his unconcealed despotism created an aristocratic reaction in the country. In him we see the downfall and overthrow of the policy of the Alexandrian chair. Had he been a man like Leo I., Christianity might perhaps have got a second Rome in Alexandria.[2] But there was no room in the world for two such chairs. The traditional policy of common action which had for so long united Rome and Alexandria, was bound to reach a point at which it turned into bitter enmity. The Byzantine patriarch accordingly turned this enmity to account. It is indeed possible to trace back the whole difference between the Roman and the Alexandrian bishop to the brusque and imprudent conduct of Dioscurus, or, with a still greater show of justice, to Leo's love of power;[3] but this would be to take a narrow view of the

[1] Hellenism in the East received its death-blow owing to the downfall of the Alexandrian bishop in the year 451; with Theophilus the process of estrangement between the Church and Hellenism had undoubtedly already begun.

[2] The unique position of the Alexandrian Chair till 450 and its policy, have up till now not had justice done them in our histories. The bishop of Alexandria ranked as the second in Christendom (see above, at the Council of 381) and corresponding to this position was a certain right which is indeed difficult to define—of oversight, or better, the exercise of an oversight over the churches of the East in the Fourth and Fifth centuries, which was being more and more widely recognised. The Alexandrian bishops attempted to develop the position which they thus occupied to a position of primacy.

[3] Sixtus III., Cœlestin's successor, as his letters prove, continued on the best of terms with Cyril and silently repulsed the attempt made by two Nestorian bishops, Eutherius and Helladius, to break up the union between Rome and Alexandria

matter. About the middle of the fifth century the Alexandrian bishop was on the point of becoming master of Egypt and at the same time master of the East. Rome would not have been Rome if she had looked calmly on at a result such as this, to which indeed she had herself contributed so long as she was concerned in defending herself against a more powerful enemy. It is here that we have the key to the proper understanding of the direction taken by Roman policy in the East, and it is owing to it that the history of dogma too has taken a wholly unexpected turn. For once that opposition had sprung up between Rome and Alexandria it could not be but that the profound dogmatic difference between the two which Cœlestin had disregarded in order to humble the Emperor and the Constantinopolitan bishop, should find expression. But if Rome came off victorious, then the dogmatic development of the East was bound to enter a new, and what was essentially, a foreign channel. Conversely again, the permanent victory of the Second Council of Ephesus (449) would, owing to the weakness of the State, have been equivalent to the victory of Egypt in the Church and probably also in the Empire; for Empire and Emperor had come to be entirely dependent on the Church which culminated in the Alexandrian chair and its monks. Pope and Emperor therefore made common cause; in the years 450—451 they had a common enemy and realised the solidarity of their interests. But the political victory of Rome did not correspond with the victory of Leo in the dogmatic question over the East under the leadership of Alexandria. The Emperor went about the matter in an extremely clever way. While making use of

(see the letter of the two amongst the letters of Sixtus). His epistle to John of Ephesus proves (ep. 6) that he had inherited his predecessor's hatred of Nestorius. On the other hand the sole letter of Leo I. to Dioscurus which we possess, and which was written soon after his enthronement (445), surprises us by its tone which recalls the letters of Victor and Stephanus, and by its demands. Dioscurus could not have forgotten a letter such as this. Still it is not till the time of the Council of Ephesus that we have plain evidence of the dissension between the two bishops (see Leo's ep. 43 sq.). The way in which Dioscurus treated Leo's epistle and the legates secured for him the bitter enmity of the Pope. The question now was: Rome or Alexandria? Previous to this Leo himself, like his predecessors, had in Christology used a form of statement which was Cyrillian, or Tertullian-Augustinian. He says Serm. 34. 4: "dei filius naturæ carnis immixtus", and 23. 1: "naturæ alteri altera miscebatur."

the Roman bishop in so far as he found him necessary in order to carry out his purpose, which was to deliver the Empire and the Church from the despotism of Alexandria based as it was on dogmatics, he at the same time deprived him of the power of extending in any way his influence in the East by raising his own court-patriarch to a position of equal rank and importance with the Pope. Simultaneously with the downfall of his Alexandrian colleague Leo I. had to direct his attention once more to his Constantinopolitan colleague, behind whom stood no less a person than the Emperor himself—the Byzantine idea of the state. He now promptly resumed the traditional policy of his chair and sought to form a connection with Proterius, the successor of Dioscurus. He, however, no longer found in Alexandria a powerful monarch, but only the shadow of such a ruler, the Melchitian bishop of a small party who soon fell a victim to the fanaticism of the Egyptians. But on the other hand the Emperor had dearly bought his victory over the hankering after independence on the part of the Church in the East, in the form in which it had been fostered by the monkish church of the Copts under the Alexandrian patriarchs. He plunged the East into a state of frightful confusion, and his policy, which was a clever one for the moment, resulted in being the direst calamity for the Eastern Empire, since it set free the centrifugal and national forces of the Eastern provinces. It was possible to overthrow the Egyptian ecclesiastical State, but this done, it was no longer possible permanently to retain Egypt. It was possible to deliver the Empire and Constantinople from the domination of a dogmatic which was hostile to the State, but it was not possible to force a foreign dogmatic on the people of the East. The Roman bishop, however, also soon saw that he was further from the attainment of his aim than ever, and the proud language employed by Leo's successors towards the Emperor and the East and which reminds us of the mediæval Popes, is not so much a token of actual power as a proof of the breach and estrangement between East and West which had occurred, and so of the actual powerlessness of Rome. The Emperor could no longer get at the Pope, but neither could the Pope get at the Emperor and the East; he came to have no influence.

A section of the Easterns could come to terms with the dogmatic decree of Chalcedon—it is always possible to come to terms with dogmatic decrees—and while acknowledging its authority could nevertheless give expression to what was truly essential in the Faith of the East; but the twenty-eighth Canon of Chalcedon, which had reference to the Roman bishop, was no "noumenon" which could be got over by scholastic refinement. Rome had the satisfaction of having dictated its Christological formula to the Byzantine State-Church, just as it had previously taken the biggest share in the work of getting the Trinitarian formula accepted, but this very Church now took up a position of extreme isolation relatively to Rome and the West. The Byzantine Patriarch, although his power was always more and more restricted within the domain in the East over which he ruled, was an invincible opponent; for he was simply the exponent of all the peculiar powers still possessed at the time by the State of Constantine and Theodosius I. and by the Greek Church.

This is the general outline of the circumstances we have to take into account in studying the history of the "Eutychian Controversy." What happened here was, *mutatis mutandis*, repeated in the controversy about images in so far as the State in this struggle in the same way resisted the authority of the Church which sought to crush it. It was successful in both instances. The power which had opposed the State in Egyptian Monophysitism and set itself against it in the matter of the adoration of images, was one and the same. But the nature of the victory was different in the two cases. In the middle of the Fifth Century the State, unfortunately for itself, did not possess the power of putting up with the dogmatic teaching of its opponent while humiliating the opponent himself; or shall we say: it did not think of the power it had, and to its own loss lent an ear to the suggestions of a foreign power, namely, the Roman bishop. In the ninth century, however, it was able to let its opponent have its own way in the domain of dogma and worship—for the adoration of images was restored,—and yet to make it submit to its laws and attach it to its interests. A powerful ruler, who would have accepted the dogmatic decree

of the second Council of Ephesus but who would have been at the same time able to break the political power of Dioscurus and to compel the monks and Copts to submit—would perhaps—if it is permissible to make such a reflection—have been able to maintain the unity of the Empire of Constantius and to preserve for the Eastern provinces the Græco-Christian culture. Of what incalculable importance this would have been! But it is useless to pursue a line of thought such as this.

It follows from these considerations that the history of dogma has to be regarded almost exclusively in its connection with politics, not merely after the Council of Chalcedon, but already previous to this. The forces which from 444 onwards determined the great decisions and actions were throughout political. It was individuals only who really thought of the Faith when they spoke of the Faith; they brought about crises, but they no longer determined the course things were to take. Nor is it the case that what was dogmatically "the right thing" gained acceptance here as if by a wonderful arrangement of things; for if, as is reasonable to suppose, "the right thing" here can only be what is in harmony with Greek religious feeling, then it did not gain entire acceptance. And in pronouncing an opinion on this, whether we take our stand at a very much earlier or at a very much later period, it may certainly be maintained that the decision of Chalcedon was the happiest amongst those that were at all possible at the time; but to see this can in no way alter the opinion that the Council of Chalcedon, which to distinguish it from the Robber Council [1] we might call the Robber and Traitor Council, betrayed the secret of Greek Faith. It is only with the forces of history that the historian is concerned; and so, from about 444 onwards, the political historian almost entirely takes the place of the historian of dogmas. If the latter is willing to keep strictly to his own domain but a small extent of ground is left to him, which, since what does not change awakens no interest, gets smaller and smaller from century to century.

[1] Thomasius (Dogmengesch. I. 2, p. 367) also pronounces the Council of Chalcedon "*hardly* less stormy" than that of the year 449.

If it be asked, what is the saddest and most momentous event in the history of dogma since the condemnation of Paul of Samosata, we must point to the union of the year 433. The shadow of this occurrence rests on the whole subsequent history of dogma.[1] It bore two sorts of evil fruit. In the first place it permanently prohibited Greek piety from establishing the formula which was alone appropriate to it: *μία φύσις θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*—one incarnate nature of the divine Logos. (The relief which the Creed of Ephesus of 449 was supposed to bring, came too late.) In the second place it introduced such a stagnation into the dogmatic question that every one who attempted to state his Christological views ran the risk of being regarded as a heretic, while on the other hand people found it possible when they so desired, to give a favourable turn to every dogmatic utterance. It threw the East into

[1] The documentary material bearing on the Eutychian controversy has been for the most part printed in Mansi T. V. sq.; where also will be found the letters of Leo I. (cf. the edition of Ballerini) and those of Theodoret having reference to the subject. Historical accounts in Prosper, Liberatus, Facundus, in the hist. eccl. of Zacharias of Mytilene hitherto published only in Syrian, in the breviculus hist. Eutych. (Sirmond's App. ad Cod. Theodos.), in Euagrius, Theophanes, and many later Greek and particularly Oriental chroniclers. To these have been added in recent times, apart from Zacharias (see Krüger, Monophys. Streitigkeiten, 1884) first of all the hitherto unknown Appellations of Flavian and Eusebius of Doryläum to Leo I. (see Guerrino Amelini, S. Leone magno e l'Oriente. Roma 1882, Grisar i. d. Ztschr. f. Kath. Theol. VII., 1883, p. 191 f., Mommsen, Neues Archiv. XI. 2, 1886, p. 361 f.); second, the Acts of the Robber-Council according to a Syrian MS., in German by Hoffmann (Kiel 1873), in an English translation with rich additions from other Syrian MSS. by Perry, The Second Synod of Ephesus 1881, and previously published by the same writer, An Ancient Syriac Docum. etc., Oxford 1867; Martin, Actes du Brigand. d'Éphese, traduct. faite sur le texte Syriaque, 1875; by the same, Le Pseudo-Synode connu dans l'hist. sous le nom de Brigandage d'Éphese, étudié d'après ses actes retrouvés en Syriaque, 1875, thirdly the publication of Révillout, Récits de Dioscore, exilé à Gangres, sur le concile de Chalcédoine, translated into French from the Coptic, (Rev. Egyptol. 1880, p. 187 sq., 1882, p. 21 sq., 1883, p. 17 sq.); see Krüger op. cit. p. 12 f. Accounts in Baronius, Tillemont, Gibbon, Walch, Schröckh, Neander and Hefele; cf. the works on Leo I. by Quesnel, Arendt, Perthel. Spite of these works we do not yet possess a critical account of the history of the Church and of dogma for the all important years previous to the Council of Chalcedon. The most important preliminary work in this direction would be a monograph on Theodoret, the man who in my opinion was the most truth-loving and the least guided by considerations of policy of the Fathers of that period. This has been done by a Russian, Glubokowski (see above); but it is unfortunately not accessible to German science.

a state of confusion and made of Christology an armoury of poisoned weapons for the warfare of ecclesiastical politics. A middle party was formed from each of the two sides. To one of these Theodoret belonged, and to another Dioscurus (Cyril). But the representatives of these middle parties were no nearer each other than the two extremes. If they employed the same formulæ they nevertheless gave them a different meaning, and they were at the same time intent upon protecting their extreme associates so far as possible.

The Alexandrians had acquired the sovereignty of the East at the price of union. The "high-priest Emperor" and his eunuchs abandoned themselves more and more to their guidance. Under the feeble Theodosius the Empire was in danger of becoming an ecclesiastical state led by Alexandria. In addition to this, under cover of the formula of concord the doctrine of the one nature was propagated, and even the extravagances of earlier times again made their appearance. Cyril himself who was so cautious otherwise in his use of formulæ, had not been able to avoid the use of the questionable Apollinarian conception, according to which the nature or hypostasis of the incarnate Logos is a "certain middle something",[1] and accordingly it is not astonishing to find that his followers went still further. The brave and indefatigable Theodoret[2] did indeed keep a look-out against the ἕνωσις φυσική, "the suffering God", the κρᾶσις or mixture, in short, against the anathemas of Cyril, while at the same time he parried the attacks of Cyril on Theodore of Mopsuestia. But spite of the great prudence shewn by Theodoret in keeping to a middle path Dioscurus succeeded in calumniating him at the Court, after he had himself in his character as supreme bishop interfered in the affairs of Antioch.[3] Theodoret was instructed to keep to his diocese.

[1] See, *e.g.*, de recte fida ad Theodos. (Mansi IV., p. 673): Ἰ. Χρ. ἀνθρωπίνοις τε αὖ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἰδιώμασιν εἰς ἔν τι τὸ μεταξὺ συγκείμενος.

[2] See, above all, his "Eranistes". The work of the Catholic Bertram, Theodoreti doctrina christologica, 1883, is painstaking but biassed; sec. Theol. Lit. Ztg., 1883, No. 24; Möller in Herzog's R.-Encyklop. sec ed. XV., p. 401 ff. The question of Theodoret's orthodoxy is certainly a very troublesome one for a Catholic.

[3] Dioscurus treated the metropolitan Irenæus of Tyre, and Theodoret in the year 448, in the style of one who was primate of the whole Greek Church and was recognised by the Emperor as such.

Still greater was the hatred of the Alexandrians against the bold and worldly-minded Bishop Ibas of Edessa, Theodore's enthusiastic supporter. Dioscurus had apparently made up his mind to bring the East under his authority and gradually to exterminate all who in a half way or who wholly accepted the Antiochian theology. The formula: two natures or hypostases, one Christ, was to disappear from the Church.

In the capital the old and respected Archimandrite Eutyches supported his views, taking his stand on the Christology of Cyril. Still it was no mere calumny when his opponents maintained that in the course of the violent attack on the Nestorians he had himself fallen into the error of making Apollinarian statements. Already in the year 448 Bishop Domnus of Antioch had denounced him on these grounds to the Emperor. But no action was taken until Bishop Eusebius of Doryläum brought a similar charge against him before Flavian who was bishop of Constantinople at the time. Eutyches afterwards asserted that he had done this from personal hatred, and one cannot get rid of the suspicion that he was right; for Eusebius himself had formerly been one of most bitter opponents of Nestorius. In any case a certain obscurity hangs over the outbreak of the controversy, and the energy too with which Flavian at once took the matter up is strange. He was on bad terms with the court and particularly with the all-powerful Chrysaphius with whom Eutyches stood in high favour. The bishop probably felt that he was hampered by the Archimandrite and wanted to get rid of him. It is useless to look for any religious motives in the case of Flavian, whose Christological statements bear a pretty close resemblance to those of Cyril, though they did actually fall short of them.[1] The Council of Constantinople

[1] Flavian takes his stand on the Union of 433 though he inclines to the Antiochian interpretation of it; see his confession in Mansi VI., p. 541: *καὶ γὰρ ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ὁμολογοῦντες τὸν Χριστὸν μετὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου καὶ ἐνανθρώπησιν, ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ προσώπῳ* (a distinction is thus drawn between *φύσις* and *ὑπόστασις*, while *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον* are regarded as parallel terms, and accordingly the way is paved for the Chalcedonian formula in the East also), *ἕνα Χριστόν, ἕνα υἱόν, ἕνα κύριον ὁμολογοῦμεν, καὶ μίαν μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου φύσιν σεσαρκωμένην μέντοι καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσασαν λέγειν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα*— the letter is addressed to Leo, and Flavian was apparently not yet aware what

(448) which followed on this and with whose procedure we are well acquainted, shewed the frivolity of the attack on Eutyches, though it shewed too how the influential archimandrite set his bishop at defiance. In reference to the dogmatic question Eutyches acted with great prudence, and, though indeed with some hesitation, gave his assent to the formula of the Creed of Union, "of two natures, one Christ" (one hypostasis, one person). But one can plainly see that this formula, in so far as it was taken as implying the continued existence of the two natures after the union, was one which Eutyches would regard as objectionable. "Two natures after the union" was rightly felt to be Nestorian and above all to be an "innovation". Eutyches, indeed, corrected the incautious statements he had made at an earlier time, divergent from the middle path of the formula of unity—my God is not of the same substance with us;[1] He has no "body of a man" (*σῶμα ἀνθρώπου*), but only a "human body" (*σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον*). But this was of no avail. It was insisted that he taught a "blending" (*σύγκρασις*) and "confusion" (*σύγχυσις*), and after the most disgraceful proceedings the records of which were besides falsified, he was deposed "amid tears" on account of Valentinian and Apollinarian heresy. This was done by people who themselves professed to acknowledge Cyril's second letter to Nestorius and its approval by the Synod of Ephesus,

Leo's views were and whether perhaps he did not adhere entirely to the doctrine of Cyril. The prudent patriarch accordingly "confesses" two natures after the incarnation also and yet one!—*διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. τὸν Χρ. Τοὺς δὲ δύο υἱοὺς ἢ δύο ὑποστάσεις* etc.; a condemnation of Nestorius follows. Here at all events the way is paved for the Chalcedonian formula but, characteristically enough, by a bishop who sought to take up a safe position relatively to both sides.

[1] The statement when compared with Cyril's doctrine can scarcely be regarded as open to suspicion. Eutyches recognised the existence of two natures previous to the incarnation, *i.e.*, allowed that the distinction in thought was an ideal moment, but he could not admit the perfect homousia of the body of the Logos with our body after the incarnation, since that body was to be thought of as having been deified. Cyril had not indeed openly said that the actual body of the Logos was not *ὁμοούσιος* with our body, but still he could scarcely avoid that conclusion. Eutyches rejected as a calumny the charge brought against him of teaching that Christ brought his flesh from heaven, on the contrary indeed he was the first to declare in the course of the debate that the Holy Virgin is *homousios* with us and that from her our God became flesh. He wished in this way to escape making any direct admission.

as well as the epistle of Cyril to John of Antioch. Both parties laboured to secure the favour of the Court, the capital, and the Roman bishop, and the Court sided with Eutyches. People's views were still everywhere ruled by the condemnation of Nestorius and there was no inclination to change sides. Flavian, "the moderate Antiochian" played a dangerous game when he sought to increase the authority of his chair in face of the court and the ruling system of dogma. Leo I. who was applied to by Eutyches first, was for some weeks uncertain which course to take (Leon. epp. 20 sq.). He was disposed to regard the Constantinopolitan Patriarch as his born enemy; but he had soon to recognise the fact that his strongest enemy was to be looked for elsewhere. Dioscurus, who substantially agreed with Eutyches and who long ere this took an active part in different provincial Synods in the East as supreme bishop, had already annexed the question and moved the Emperor to summon a Council. The Pope's policy was now marked out for him. He must not strike either upon the Constantinopolitan Scylla or upon the Alexandrian Charybdis, but on the contrary, as his predecessor Julius had done, he must attempt to bring the true faith and with it himself to the East. Dioscurus was determined to use every means to exploit the Council in his own interests. It was to establish the authority of the Alexandrian Patriarch and of the Alexandrian Christology in the Church of the East. He was prudent enough all the same to employ no new formula while attempting this. The Nicene Creed was alone to be regarded as authoritative, of course according to the interpretation put upon it by the anathemas of Cyril. Whoever went a word beyond this was to be considered an innovator, a heretic. This was his standpoint and he found a pliant Emperor and a minister who were favourably disposed toward him and who were prepared to hand over the Church to him in order to humiliate the occupant of the episcopal chair of the capital for the time being whom they hated, a policy which was treachery to the State.[1] Dioscurus was equipped with full

[1] See the letter of the Empress Eudokia to Theod. II. (Leo. ep 57): *ἐγράφη γὰρ ἐνταῦθα πᾶσαν φιλονεικείαν κεκινῆσθαι, ὥστε Φλαυιανὸν τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἐπαρθῆναι.*

powers as master of the Synod. It was called together in accordance with his ideas, even a representative of the monastic order was present—a novelty at a Council—and Theodoret was excluded.

Leo had meanwhile discovered that Eutyches was a heretic[1] (ep. 27) and bethought himself of the Western Christological form of doctrine which his predecessors, Cœlestin and Sixtus, and he himself seem up to this time to have forgotten. The summoning of a Council caused him grave anxiety; Flavian, who had seriously displeased the Pope by his independent attitude, nevertheless suddenly became his dear friend who had been attacked, and along with the legates who attended the Council Leo sent numerous letters to all in the East concerned in the affair (epp. 28—38), to Flavian (28, 36, 38), to the Emperor (29, 37), to Pulcheria (30, 31), to the Constantinopolitan archimandrites (32), to the Council (33) and to Bishop Julian of Kos (34, 35). He repeatedly observes that a synodal decision was not at all necessary, and that the Council was superfluous.[2] But what he was now above all concerned with was to furnish Flavian with dogmatic instructions and to draw the attention of the Council to the unique dignity of the Roman Chair which had already decided the question. The latter of these two things he did in Epistle 33, which contains a daring attempt to misrepresent[3] the conditions under which the Council had come

[1] Leo's admission is amusing reading (ep. 34 1): "Diu apud nos uncertum fuit, quid in ipso Eutyche catholicis displiceret." Now Eutyches is the child of the devil who denies the reality of the body of Christ. Leo represents him in the bluntest fashion as the out and out doketist.

[2] Ep. 36 ad Flav.: "Et quia clementissimus imperator pro ecclessiæ pace sollicitus synodum voluit congregari, quamvis evidenter appareat, rem, de qua agitur, nequaquam synodali indigere tractatu" etc.; ep. 37 ad Theod. II.: "præsertim cum tam evidens fidei causa sit, ut rationabilius ab indicenda synodo fuisset abstinendum" etc.

[3] Leo writes here as if in this affair of Eutyches the Emperor had had recourse to him first as the successor of Peter, and as if he had at once unfolded the true doctrine of the Incarnation on the basis of the confession of Peter and thereby refuted Eutyches ("religiosa clementissimi principis fides sciens ad suam gloriam maxime pertinere, si intra ecclesiam catholicam nullius erroris germen exsurgeret, hanc reverentiam divinis detulit institutis, ut ad sanctæ dispositionis effectum auctoritatem apostolicæ sedis adhiberet, tamquam ab ipso Petro cuperet declarari, quid in eius confessione laudatum sit, quando dicente domino: quem me esse dicunt homines filium hominis?" etc.). The Council is merely an opus superadditum,

together, while he accomplished the former by the dogmatic epistle he sent to Flavian. It contains a paraphrase of the Christological section of the work of Tertullian adv. Prax. (cf. Novatian de trinitate) in accordance with the views, and in part in the words, of Ambrose and Augustine, with special reference to Eutyches, and in combating the views of the latter it accordingly undeniably goes a step beyond what had hitherto been accepted in the West, though not any further than the situation for the moment demanded. This document, which was highly lauded in subsequent times and is to the present day, contains nothing new. What, however, is of importance in it is that the West, *i.e.*, the Pope, has here kept in view the peculiar character of its Church. It is consequently an evidence of power, and the Christology set forth in it may at the same time have actually corresponded with the inclinations of the Pope. But on the other hand it ought not to be forgotten that the situation, as represented by Nestorianism already condemned and Eutychianism about to be rejected, appeared directly to call for the old Western formula "duæ substantiæ (naturæ) in una persona", and that the Pope expressed himself more fully regarding it than tradition justified.[1] The Pope

"ut pleniori iudicio omnis possit error aboleri." Thus the condemnation of Eutyches is already decided upon and the Council has merely to repeat it. The Pope enjoins this.

[1] The letter to which not till a later date, however, (see Mansi VI., p. 962 sq.) though by Leo himself, proofs were appended from Hilary, Augustine, Gregory of Nazianzus, Chrysostom and Cyril, begins with a reference to the Roman Creed which in the view of Leo decides the whole question in its opening words; for the three statements: "Credere in patrem omnipotentem, et in Christum Iesum filium eius unicum dominum nostrum, qui natus est de spiritu sancto et Maria virgine", demolish "the devices of almost all heretics." They involve the nativitas divina, and the nativitas temporalis which in no way injures the former. We should not have been able to overcome the author of sin and death if the deus ex deo had not assumed our nature. If Eutyches was unable to recognise that this was taught in the Creed, then certain passages (which the Pope now adduces) ought to have convinced him—as if Eutyches had ever denied the truth of this thought! The idea of a non-human body of Christ cannot be proved from the miraculous birth; for the Holy Spirit merely gave the impulse; the reality of the body of Christ was got from the body of Maria semper virgo (c. 2). This is followed by the proposition in the style of Tertullian: "Salva igitur proprietate utriusque naturæ et substantiæ (both words should be noted) et in unam coeunte personam suscepta est a maiestate humilitas", attached to which we have a series of expressions

throughout puts the interests of our salvation in the foreground; he wants exactly what Cyril and Eutyches also want, but he goes on to give an explanation which Cyril at any rate would have entirely repudiated, [Cyril said that the idea of redemption demands the deification of the human nature, Leo went on to shew that this same idea demands a true human nature which

which are supported by statements in Damasus, Ambrose, Augustine, and partly also in Tertullian; thus, "natura inviolabilis unita est naturæ passibili", "mediator dei et hominum homo Iesus Christus", "mori potest ex uno, mori non potest ex altero", "in integra veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris", "assumpsit formam servi sine sorde peccati, humana augens, divina non minuens", "exinanitio inclinatio fuit miserationis, non defectio potestatis", "tenet sine defectu proprietatem suam utraque natura, et sicut formam servi dei forma non adimit, ita formam dei servi forma non minuit." This was the way in which God met the cunning of the devil, in order that we should not be lost contra dei propositum (c. 3). Next follow the old Western paradoxes of the "invisibilis factus visibilis" etc. The fourth chapter contains the detailed development of the doctrine. The human nature in Christ was not absorbed by the divine; on the contrary "agit utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est verbo scilicet operante quod verbi est et carne exsequente quod carnis est." The flesh never loses the "natura nostri generis". In accordance with this the evangelic history is apportioned between the human and the divine nature of him "qui unus idemque est". "Quamvis enim in domino J. Chr. dei et hominis (!) una persona sit, aliud tamen est, unde in utroque communis est contumelia, aliud unde communis est gloria". "Propter hanc unitatem personæ", as it is put in c. 5, "in utraque natura intelligendam et filius hominis legitur descendisse de cœlo" etc., that means as Leo now shews, that we can and must interchange the *opera*. "That the Son of God was crucified and buried, we all confess in the Creed." Christ established this article of faith in the 40 days after the Resurrection, after Peter had already before this ackowledged the identity of the Son of God and the Son of Man. All ought accordingly to see that the "proprietas divinæ humanæque naturæ" "individua permanet" in Him, and consequently know that "Word" and "Flesh" are not the same, but that the *one* Son of God is Word and Flesh. Eutyches, who has by the most barefaced fictions emptied of its meaning the mystery to which alone we owe our redemption and separates the human nature from Jesus, incurs the sentence pronounced in 1 John IV. 2, 3. He must also necessarily deny the reality of the passion and death of Christ and thus subvert everything, the Spirit of sanctification, the water and the blood.

In his concluding chapter Leo discusses the statement of Eutyches that before the union there were two natures and one after it and expresses his astonishment that "none of the judges censured such a foolish and perverse avowal and passed over such an absurd and blasphemous utterance as if they had heard nothing to which to take exception." The first half of the statement is as impious as the second; this statement which had been passed over ought "si per inspirationem misericordiæ dei ad satisfactionem causa perducitur," to be made a clean sweep of

remains absolutely unchanged], and which, so far, goes beyond the use and wont doctrine of the West and actually approaches Nestorianism, inasmuch as the Pope uses by preference "nature" in place of substance and speaks of a peculiar mode of action on the part of each nature, and thus really hypostatises each nature. In Leo's view the "Person" is no longer entirely the

as a pestilential opinion. The Pope hopes that Eutyches will amend and in this case the greatest mercy will be shewn him. The statements in this twenty-eighth letter were further supplemented in letter 35 addressed to Julian. Here (c. 1) Nestorius too is regarded as a heretic; as against Eutyches the view is made good that it is not only a question of the Creator being known, but also of the creature being redeemed. Here we meet with the statement "in susceptione hominis non unius substantiæ, sed unius eiusdemque personæ", here the unity of the person is made intelligible (see Cyril) by pointing to unity of body and soul in man, and here finally the statement of Eutyches examined in the sixth chapter of letter 28 and which was not censured at Constantinople, is further dealt with. Leo understands it as meaning that the human nature of Christ had been already created before the Incarnation and accordingly classes it along with the statement of Origen regarding the pre-existence of the soul which had been already condemned. See also letter 59.

A few remarks on the catchwords ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως will perhaps not be out of place here. (The words ἀδιαιρέτως and ἀχωρίστως do not require any special genetic explanation.) They have sprung from two sources in the history of dogma. The first of these is to be found in Tertullian's work adv. Prax. Tertullian c. 27 wrote in opposition to certain monarchian ideas, according to which the spiritus (= deus = pater = Christus) was either changed into the caro (= homo = filius = Jesus) or else was united and mingled with the caro so as to form a tertium quid and therefore a new being, and thus disappeared in the new being. The view thus developed became universally known through Novatian who adopted it in part, but particularly by means of Leo's doctrinal letter. It runs: "Si enim sermo ex transfiguratione et demutatione substantiæ caro factus est, una iam erit substantia ex duabus, ex carne et spiritu, mixtura quædam, ut electrum ex auro et argento et incipit nec aurum esse, id est spiritus, neque argentum, id est caro, dum alterum altero mutatur et tertium quid efficitur." Thus Jesus would be no longer either God or Man: ita ex utraque neutrum est; aliud longe tertium est quam utrumque. But both the passages in the Psalms (LXXXVII. 5) and the Apostle (Rom. I. 3) teach de utraque eius substantia. Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum, in una persona, deum et hominem Iesum ... Et adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiæ, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in illo, *i.e.*, virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit, esuriens sub diabolo, sitiens sub Samaritide... denique et mortua est. Quodsi tertium quid esset, ex utroque confusum, ut electrum, non tam distincta documenta parerent utriusque substantiæ. Sed et spiritus carnalia et caro spiritalia egisset ex translatione aut neque carnalia neque spiritalia, sed tertiæ alicuius formæ ex confusione... Sed quia substantiæ ambæ in statu suo quæque distincte agebant, ideo illis et operæ et exitus sui occurrerunt." The second source is to be found in the Eastern and Western

one subject with two "properties", but the union of two hypostatic natures. In a word, the unity is neither made intelligible by Leo nor did he consider what was the supreme concern of the pious Greeks in this matter, namely, to see in the humanity of Christ the real deification of human nature generally. Nor is there any trace in the doctrinal letter of any-

authors who wrote against Apollinaris; these maintained the ἀσυγχύτως and ἀτρέπτως, and this was quite the current view in the time of Cyril. Cyril, in a great number of passages asserts that according to his doctrine the two natures are joined together ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀναλλοιώτως, ἀμεταβλήτως, without there having been any kind of mingling (σύγχυσις, σύγκρασις, συνουσίωσις) (see adv. Nest. l. 5, c. 4—ad Theodos. n. 6, 10—ep. 3 ad Nestor. Migne, Vol. 77, p. 109—adv. neg. deip. n. 2—epil. ad. I—adv. Theodoret. ad. 4, 5, 8, 10—adv. Orient. ad 1, 10, 11—ep. ad Maxim., Vol. 77, p. 152—ad Acac. Ber. 160—ad Joan. 180—ad Acac. Mel. 192—ad Eulog. 225—ad Valerian. 257—1 ad Succ. 232, 36—2 ad Succ. 237, 40—ad Euseb. 288—Explan. Symb. 304—Quod un. Christ. Vol. 75, p. 1361—Hom. XV., Vol. 77, p. 1092—in Luc., Vol. 72, p. 909—c. Julian. I., 10, Vol. 76, p. 1012—Hom. ad Alex., Vol. 77, pp. 1112, 1113—in ep. ad Hebr., Vol. 74, p. 1004—Resp. ad Tiberium ed. Pusey c. 6, 7, III., p. 587 sq. Cyril devoted a special work to this subject entitled κατὰ συνουσιαστῶν which I regard as one of his last). Nevertheless he defended the word κρᾶσις as against Nestorius (adv. Nestor. I., 1 c. 3) as an expression used by the fathers to bring out the closeness of the union of the two natures, and unhesitatingly employs certain forms of speech compounded of it or its synonyms. (Ehrhard op. cit., p. 44.) Further, both of these, the amplifications of Tertullian and those of the anti-Apollinarian Greek fathers, refer back to philosophical usage, but this usage explains at the same time why Cyril and others could indeed adopt the expression κρᾶσις but not σύγχυσις. The Stoics (see Zeller. Philos. d. Griechen III. 3, p. 127) drew a distinction between παράθεσις, μῖξις, κρᾶσις and σύγχυσις. "The παράθεσις is the σωμάτων συναφὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας, as in the case of the mixing of different kinds of grain"—they have the Nestorians in view—: μῖξις on the contrary is δύο ἢ καί πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις δι' ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων, as in the case of the union of fire with iron and of the soul with the body; but speaking more accurately a mingling of this sort of dry bodies should be called μῖξις, and of fluid bodies κρᾶσις (the κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων of the Stoics presupposes the permeability of the bodies and assumes that the smaller body when mingled with a larger body spreads itself over the entire extent of the latter and is thus to be found in every particle of it [ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ μίγματι], but that both preserve their own peculiarities in the mingling; thus the "mixtio" does not exclude, but on the contrary includes the salva proprietas utriusque substantiæ). The σύγχυσις finally is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, *i.e.*, the old substances and their qualities cease to exist (φθείρεσθαι) and a third body comes into existence." Tertullian, the Stoic, rested his ideas apparently on these philosophical theorems and first of all applied this materialistic view to the relation of the two substances in

thing like an express repudiation of Nestorius, not to speak of the Antiochian Christology.[1]

The Council was opened at Ephesus in August 449. Dioscurus presided and assigned the second place to the represen-

Christ (he and Novatian, who was also a Stoic, accept the μῖξις and reject the σύγχυσις; but along with this Tertullian has further a juristic set of conceptions (una persona, duæ substantiæ). In his treatise "Ammonius Sakkas und Plotinus" (Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos. VII. Vol. H. 3) Zeller, however, has called attention to the fact that Ammonius Sakkas (Plotinus) described the relation of body and soul in man in the sense of the Stoic κρᾶσις (μῖξις) (the soul entirely permeates the body and unites itself with it so as to form one substance, but nevertheless remains unchanged and retains its proprietas salva) and that Nemesius expressly says that this view of the matter, in support of which he appeals to Porphyry, is to be applied to the relation of the two natures in Christ. Now, however, not only the Eastern bishops but also Leo I. expressly appeal in support of their Christology to the relation between body and soul. There can therefore be no doubt but that this is to be traced back to the Neo-Platonic school which had adopted a Stoic terminology. Plotinus calls the soul not only ἀπαθής but also ἄτρεπτος (because in the union it undergoes no change); but, as Zeller observes, he never speaks of ἀσύγχυτος. This word, however, once more occurs in Porphyry and is used to designate the union. Consequently so far as the Easterns are concerned the ἀτρέπτως is to be referred to Plotinus and the ἀσυγχύτως to Porphyry (Zeller), while the West through Tertullian took the "non confusus" direct from the Stoa.

[1] It may also be said that the speculations of Cyril and the Alexandrian theologians begin where Leo leaves off, and for this reason it is altogether astonishing to read in Thomasius (Dogmengesch., Vol. I., p. 365) that Leo in his epistle seeks to gather up both negatively and positively the results of the Christological movement so far as it had gone. Leo did not think of this. He contents himself with making the thought definite and confessing with full assurance that Christ was perfect God and perfect man, and points out that redemption demands the divinity and the humanity. But the question as to the relation into which the divinity and the humanity have come to each other, was one which really never gave him any concern when he thought of redemption. This, however, was the main question with Cyril, Eutyches and Dioscurus. It cannot accordingly be said that Leo and they are in direct contradiction. On the contrary, Cyril and his followers further developed the problem in concrete fashion in the name of the Faith, ex necessitate fidei so to speak, while with Leo it was in true Western fashion left in the indefinite form of conceptions. This is how the matter stands on a favourable view of Leo's position; for as soon as we take his development of the doctrine in a concrete sense and transfer it into the region of the Eastern controversy it can be understood only as Nestorian. With Leo it is not at all a question of a union of the two natures. It may, however, help towards forming a fair and correct estimate of Leo's position to note that he (mistakenly) saw in Eutychianism the recurrence of a danger which he had so energetically warded off in his struggle with Manichæism (see his sermon). He in fact opposes "Eutychianism" as if it were Manichæism.

tative of the Roman bishop. There were one hundred and thirty-five members present. The bishops who had sat in judgment on Eutyches were not allowed to vote, since the Synod meant to proceed with a revision of that process. Dioscurus put the Pope's letter to the Council amongst the Acts, but did not have it read out, and in fact treated Rome as non-existent. Not Rome but Alexandria was to speak. It was a bold stroke, but Dioscurus had got authority from the Emperor. As regards its proceedings the Council does not compare unfavourably with other Councils. What gave it its peculiar character was the fact that it was guided by a powerful and determined will, that of Dioscurus. The latter got the Council simply to resolve not to go beyond the conclusions come to at Nicæa and Ephesus. The affair of Eutyches was next taken up; he declared that he took his stand on the teaching of these Councils and repudiated Manes, Valentin, Apollinaris, and Nestorius. In the course of the debate it became evident that those present regarded the formula "after the Incarnation one nature", as alone orthodox—with the addition: "made flesh and made man" (*σεσαρκωμένην καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσασαν*), and that they condemned the doctrine of two natures after the Incarnation. In this sense Eutyches was declared by all to be orthodox. Rome's legates refrained from voting. Domnus of Antioch and Juvenal of Jerusalem also concurred, and even three of the bishops who had condemned Eutyches at Constantinople did the same. Dioscurus now proceeded to take aggressive steps. Each bishop was required to state in writing whether he considered that those should be punished who in the course of their theological investigations had gone beyond the Nicene Creed. Dioscurus got the answer he wished, and even the Roman legate did not oppose the question when put in this form. On the basis of this resolution the Council pronounced sentence of deposition on Flavian and Eusebius of Doryläum, Domnus and Juvenal concurring. Both of the deposed bishops were present and soon after appealed to the Pope, whose legates, moreover, had at least shewn some hesitation at the Council, though after the first session they took no further share in the proceedings. In the second and third sessions Dioscurus got the detested Ibas

deposed (to whom the saying was currently attributed "I do not envy Christ because He became God; for I too can become God if I wish"), the Sabinian bishop of Perrha and several others;[1] also Theodoret,[2] the pillar of the East, and finally even Domnus of Antioch.[3] The fact that he had for so long sided with Dioscurus availed him nothing. He had latterly drawn back, was unwilling to take part in the ecclesiastico-political revision of the Canons of Nicæa and Constantinople which Dioscurus was contemplating, and was generally in his road.

Never before at any Council had a Patriarch scored such a victory. The atmosphere was cleared; the triumph of the old Confession of Nicæa and Ephesus (431) which alone was recognised by the pious Greeks as embodying their faith, had been secured; the Christology of Cyril, the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos, had been acknowledged as the true one; those who opposed it had partly been deposed and partly had submitted; arrangements had already been made for securing suitable successors to those who had been deposed, and an Alexandrian priest, Anatolius, was appointed to Constantinople. The Church of the East lay at the feet of the Alexandrian Patriarch and he had attained everything with the concurrence of the Emperor.[4] He had doubtless made use of force; but it was the State in fact which stood behind him; the police and the monks of Barsumas had, to be sure, over-awed the Fathers; but far worse than the terrors of this Council were the calum-

[1] This has reference to the proceedings of the year 448 (Irenæus of Tyre) into which I cannot enter. The Syrian Acts first threw light on them as well as on the Councils of Tyre and Berytus.

[2] See Martin, op. cit. p. 186 sq.

[3] See Martin, p. 196 sq.

[4] The charges brought against him by Egyptians at the third sitting of the Council of Chalcedon (Mansi VI. p. 1006—1035) even after making all due allowance for the calumnies in them, afford interesting proofs of how he disregarded the imperial authority in Egypt and how he weakened the authority of the State there and also of the extent to which he was master of Egypt and now threatened to become master of the State. Tillemont XV. p. 589, very justly says: "Dioscore règne partout." See, above all, p. 1032: *Διόσκορος πάντα ἀκαθοσιώτως πράττων, νομίζων τε ἀνωτέρω πάντων εἶναι, οὔτε τοὺς θείους τύπους οὔτε τὰς μεγίστας ἀποφάσεις συνεχώρησεν ἐκβιβασθῆναι, ἑαυτοῦ τὴν χώραν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι λέγων.*

nies spread regarding it on the part of those who two years later had to extenuate their dastardly treachery. If we consider who were present at the Council we must conclude that Dioscurus, to whom even Theodoret on one occasion (ep. 60) bore favourable testimony, cannot have found it necessary to employ any very great amount of actual force. That Flavian was trampled on and left half dead is anything but certain, and a Council which more than any other gave expression to the tradition of the religious feeling of the time and to what it considered of vital importance, does not deserve the name "Robber-Council" (Leo, ep. 95). Regarded from the standpoint of the Church of the East something of importance had actually been attained, and what had been thus attained had the guarantee of permanence so long as foreign elements did not come in to disturb it.

But Dioscurus had not reckoned on the death of the Emperor which was near at hand, nor with the Roman bishop, nor finally on the widespread aversion felt towards the right wing of his army which was Apollinarian in disguise. He had rehabilitated Eutyches without, however, getting the questionable statements to which the latter had formerly given utterance, proscribed, though the allegation that he endorsed them is a falsehood asserted by his embittered opponents at Chalcedon. This was a blunder in policy which was calculated to bring on a reaction introduced from the outside, and the reaction taking its start from this, might in the state in which matters then were, overthrow the great work which had been accomplished without in appearance abandoning the position gained in the year 431. At first Dioscurus was still master of the situation. While all those who felt themselves injured by him betook themselves to Leo as the only refuge,[1] and while the latter hastened to reject the resolutions of the Council, Dioscurus pronounced sentence of excommunication upon Leo,[2] prepared

[1] See Theodoret's letters 113 and ff. Theodoret speaks in terms of high praise of Leo's ep. dogmatica, and as a matter of fact he had no reason for suspecting it in any way. In letter 121 he expressly says that Leo's letter agrees with τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ἐπ' ἐκκλησίας κηρυχθεῖσιν ἀεί.

[2] See the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon in Mansi VI., p. 1009; the matter

now to measure his strength with the last remaining opponent too, whom he had treated at Ephesus as a nonentity. Leo was in an extremely difficult position, as letters 43—72 prove. If the decree of Ephesus were to become permanent it was all over with his orthodoxy as well as with the primacy of his chair. He assembled a Council and at the same time got all the members of the imperial family of the Western Empire, when they came to Rome, to write letters to Theodosius against the "episcopus Alexandrinus sibi omnia vindicans" (45, 2), against the Council in support of his just claim to be considered supreme judge in matters of faith,[1] and in favour of calling a new Council to meet in Italy. He saw himself under the necessity of repeatedly assuring the Emperor of the East that he also held firmly to the Nicene Faith; he took care not to mention what it was exactly that he found fault with in the dogmatic decrees of Ephesus; he simply insisted on the condemnation of Eutyches as a Manichean and a Doketist, and was slow about recognising the new bishop of Constantinople, the creature of Dioscurus. He yielded nothing as the successor of Peter, but neither did he gain anything. Theodosius stood firm, maintained that the Council had merely defended antiquity against the innovations of Flavian, and coldly replied to the letters of his imperial relations in the West, declining to take any action. A less politic Pope than he was, would have brought on a breach backed up as he would have been by the whole West and by the Emperor of the West, but Leo waited and did not wait in vain.

is, however, not quite certain. It is even probable that Dioscurus did not excommunicate Leo till shortly before the Council of Chalcedon.

[1] Valentinian III. writes to Theod. II. (ep. Leon. 55): "The Faith must get into confusion, ἣν ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων παραδοθεῖσαν ὀφείλομεν μετὰ τῆς προσηκούσης καθοσιώσεως ἐκδικεῖν καὶ τῆς ἰδίας εὐλαβείας τὴν ἀξίαν τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀποστόλῳ Πέτρῳ ἄτρωτον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις χρόνοις διαφυλάττειν, ἵνα ὁ μακαριώτατος ἐπίσκοπος τῆς Ῥωμαίων πόλεως, ᾧ τὴν ἱερωσύνην κατὰ πάντων ἡ ἀρχαιότης παρέσχε, χώραν καὶ εὐπορίαν ἔχειν περί τε πίστεως καὶ ἱερέων κρίνειν. Flavian was right in appealing to him. It is a curious spectacle! Both Emperors are entirely in the hands of their Patriarchs, the one in the hands of Dioscurus, and the other as here in the hands of Leo. Never yet had the State been so much under priestly authority. The Emperors who were powerless to do anything themselves played the one primate against the other.

Theodosius II.[1] died on the 28th of July, 450, and the situation was at once altered. Pulcheria who mounted the throne and offered her hand to Marcian, had always deplored her brother's miserable misrule, and his protégés were her enemies. She specially guided the ecclesiastical policy of the Government, while Marcian fought its enemies outside. The Court resolved to free itself and the State from the Alexandrian despot. This could not be done without the help of Rome, for—and this is a fact of the highest importance—the Council of 449 had really pacified the Church of the East. Of course there were some who were discontented, but they were in the minority. The Court could not in carrying out its new policy reckon on the support of any united and reliable party. It was only in Constantinople that it was able to make way quickly, for there Flavian was not yet forgotten. The Church of the East had enjoyed peace since August. In order that the State might get back its independence, this Church which had been pacified, had to be disturbed anew and reduced to the most lamentable condition.

Marcian, whose recognition as Emperor Dioscurus had sought to prevent in Egypt, at once addressed a letter to Leo. He formally handed over to the latter the primacy with which his predecessor had actually invested Dioscurus, and announced besides his readiness to summon the Council desired by Leo.[2] Soon after an epistle reached Leo from Pulcheria which announced the change of view on the part of the bishop of Constantinople. He had subscribed Leo's dogmatic letter, that sent to Flavian, and had condemned the erroneous doctrine of Eutyches; the Emperor had also ordered the recall of the bishops who had been deposed by the Council, and their reinstatement

[1] He had, however, begun to shew a certain amount of hesitation during the last months, as is evident from the recall of Pulcheria and the banishment of his minister Chrysaphius. See Krüger, op. cit. p. 56.

[2] Marcian ep. in Leon. epp. 73: "Pro reverenda et catholica religione fidei Christianorum tuam sanctitatem principatum in episcopatu divinæ fidei possidentem sacris litteris in principio justum credimus alloquendam... omni impio errore sublato per celebrandam synodum te auctore maxime pax circa omnes episcopos fidei catholicæ fiat!" It was in these terms that Marcian wrote to Leo! But he had in view merely an Eastern Council; see the second letter (ep. 76).

in office was reserved for the Council over which, if possible, Leo was to preside in person and which was to be held in the East. As a matter of fact in the capital itself, after a local Synod had been called, everything was already going as the Emperor, or rather, as the Empress, desired. The wretched toady, the patriarch, the creature and the betrayer of Dioscurus, was prepared to do everything the Court wished. In view of the completely changed circumstances Leo had no longer any wish for a Council, because a Council might always mean action which was dangerous for the Pope. He now took up the position that his letter was sufficient, that the bishops were individually to bind themselves to accept the doctrine set forth in it, and that by their return to orthodoxy and the erasure of the names of Dioscurus, Juvenal, etc., from the Diptychs, the Robber-Council would be rendered powerless for harm. He wished on his own initiative and apart from any Council, but with the assistance of his legates, to act the part of judge and to receive to favour or punish as impenitent each individual bishop; the bishop of Constantinople was to act with him in the matter as his mandatory. He therewith made an actual beginning with the business and it was now fairly on its way. And as a matter of fact Leo may have been naive enough to imagine that the solution of the dogmatic difficulty of the East was contained in his sorry letter, for it seems never to have occurred to the Pope that there could be any other Christologies besides the "correct" one, Doketism, and the doctrine of Paul of Samosata. He had no appreciation of the subtle, though no doubt partly incorrect formulæ of the Greek theologians; but he was sure of his ground, and it was with this feeling that the letters 82—86 were composed, in which the Pope sought at all costs to prevent the calling of a Council as being unnecessary and inopportune.[1] But Marcian required the Council for himself and for the Eastern Church, in which, since the change of rulers, no one knew what he should believe, and in which, for the time, many bishoprics were held by two bishops or had no bishop at all. The Emperor had no desire

[1] The Westerns could not come, he writes, because of the distress occasioned by the Huns.

to surrender to the Pope while claiming his help. He issued an edict ordaining the Council to meet at Nicæa in September 451, and Leo had to acquiesce, though with a very bad grace (ep. 89). He arranged to send four legates and deputed to one of them, Bishop Paschasinus, the duty of presiding in his stead; for Marcian had designated Leo himself as leader of the future Council, and so what Dioscurus had got for himself in 449 after a struggle, the Pope now secured without taking any trouble.[1] Still Leo was extremely uneasy. His numerous letters (89–95) prove that he was afraid of "innovations contrary to the Nicene Creed", *i.e.*, divergences from his doctrinal letter. He accordingly kept constantly counselling mildness and forgiveness; whoever would only condemn Eutyches and recognise the Nicene Creed was to be regarded as orthodox. The controversy regarding the Faith was in no case to be renewed, everything was clear and finally decided. In his letter to the Council (93) he expressly guarded his position by hinting that besides the condemnation of Eutyches, that of Nestorius also in the year 431, must remain in force. This request was rather an act of self-justification than a demand; for there were very few in the East who were disposed to rehabilitate Nestorius, but then there was no actual repudiation of the "heretic" in the *epistola dogmatica*. But all this did not in fine constitute the Pope's greatest anxiety. What he dreaded above all was the restoration of the power of the bishop whom his predecessors in alliance with the Alexandrians had humbled, the bishop of Constantinople, behind whom was Constantius' idea of the State. Now, however, he was at enmity with the old ally and had in fact humiliated him to the dust,[2] but with the downfall of the enemy the support he had given disappeared too. The Pope's anxiety comes out in the precise instructions given to the legates:[3] "You may not permit the constitution set up by

[1] Still the presidency was only an honorary presidency; even Hefele admits that "the official conducting of the business" was looked after by the Imperial Commissioners. As a matter of fact the Romish Legates were merely the first to record their vote.

[2] One of the instructions given by Leo to his legates is to the effect that Dioscurus ought not to have a seat in the Council, but should only be heard as a defendant; Mansi VI, p. 580 sq.

[3] Mansi VII., p. 443.

the holy Fathers (the sixth Canon of Nicæa according to the Roman forgery) to be violated or diminished by any rash action.... and if perchance some trusting to the dignity of their cities shall have attempted to appropriate anything for themselves, this you may check with befitting firmness." ("Sanctorum patrum constitutionem prolatam nulla patiamini temeritate violari vel imminui... ac si qui forte civitatum suarum splendore confisi aliquid sibi tentaverint usurpare, hoc qua dignum est constantia retundatis"). In order to ensure the Emperor's personal presence which the Roman legates insisted upon, the Council was at the last moment transferred to Chalcedon in the neighbourhood of the capital, and was opened on the eighth of October, 451.

As regards the number of those who took part in it—between 500 and 600 and perhaps over 600—no earlier Council can compare with this one, which was "politically and ecclesiastically one of the most important of all",[1] a memorial of the restoration of the authority of the State accomplished by Pulcheria and Marcian, but for this very reason a memorial of the enslavement of the spirit of the Eastern Church which here, in connection with the most important doctrinal question, surrendered to the Western supreme bishop allied with the Emperor. We have no right at all to say that possibly the "authorised moment of truth" of the Antiochian Christology triumphed at Chalcedon over the dogmatic ideas of the Alexandrians and the monks, for the representatives of this Christology had long ere this succumbed to the power of the Alexandrian Confession. The unspeakably pitiful behaviour too of the Patriarchs of Antioch and of the largest section of the bishops who were theologians in sympathy with them,—the Antiochian middle-party which dates from 433—proves that the members of this school conscious of their miserable powerlessness, had of their own free will long ere this renounced all attempts to influence the Church. The disgrace attaching to this Council consists in

[1] Ranke, Weltgesch. IV. 1, p. 324.

[2] Luther, who is, speaking generally, not favourably disposed towards the Chalcedonian Council, says of it (von Conciliis und Kirchen, Erl. Ed., Vol., 25, p. 351): "The Fourth Council of Chalcedon had 630 members, almost as many as all the others, and yet they were quite unequal to the Fathers at Nicæa and Constantinople."

the fact that the great majority of the bishops who held the same views as Cyril and Dioscurus finally allowed a formula to be forced upon them which was that of strangers, of the Emperor and the Pope, and which did not correspond to their belief. Judging by the Acts of the Council we can be in no doubt as regards the following points:[1] (1) that the views of the great majority of the Fathers assembled at Chalcedon agreed neither with those of Leo nor with those of Flavian who represented the Antiochian middle-party, that on the contrary they, and above all the Illyrian, Palestinian, and Egyptian bishops, wished for nothing else beyond the ratification of the Creeds of Nicæa and Ephesus as understood by Cyril;[2] (2) that for this reason the formula, "out of two natures Christ is," with the addition either expressed or understood, that after the Incarnation the God-Logos had only one nature which had become flesh, alone answered to the faith of the Constantinopolitan Patriarch Anatolius and of the majority of the bishops; (3) that far from Theodoret and his friends possessing the sympathy of the majority of the members of the Council, they had to endure the worst forms of abuse, being called "Jews", while Theodoret succeeded in saving his orthodoxy only by allowing his opponents to extort from him the condemnation of Nestorius;[3] (4)

[1] From the Récits de Dioscore (Krüger op. cit. 12 ff. 61—68) we gather—what was hitherto not known—that Dioscurus was to be won over in a friendly way by the Court after he had arrived at Constantinople from Alexandria, accompanied by fewer bishops than he had intended to have with him, in consequence of an intrigue. We now know that he was conducted to a meeting of ecclesiastical notables and that there he also met the Emperor and Pulcheria. Every effort was made to get him to agree to the ep. Leonis; but he remained firm and it is said that by his glowing words against the two natures he for the time being again won over the bishops (Anatolius, Juvenal, Maximus of Antioch and others) as well as the Senate to his doctrine. This is very probable. The story given in Krüger, p. 62, shews by what a spirit of rebellion against the State and Emperor he and his followers were animated. It follows from the Acts that during the first session of the Council of Chalcedon he was still a power.

[2] Those too who held Antiochian views were undoubtedly no small number, namely, bishops from Syria, Asia, Pontus, and Thrace; they could accept Leo's letter: but (1) they were in the minority. (2) Partly by their repudiation of Nestorius and partly by what they did at Ephesus in 449 they had made the *sacrificium intellectus fidei* and were thus spiritually demoralised. Others might without trouble have gained all they wanted so far as they were concerned.

[3] The threatening and abusive language ("Whoever divides Christ ought to be

that the Imperial Commissioners directed all the proceedings and were resolved from the first to get the deposition of Dioscurus carried through at the Council, although they gave the Council the show of freedom; (5) that the Imperial Commissioners had been at the same time instructed to press for the establishment of a new doctrinal formula on the basis of Leo's letter in order to bring to an end the intolerable state of things which had prevailed in the Church of the East owing to the annulling of the resolution of 449; (6) that the Roman legates were at one with the Commissioners in their determination to get the Council to decree the deposition of Dioscurus and the setting up of a dogmatic confession, but that they differed from them so far in that they wished Dioscurus to be described as a heretic, in other words, as a rebel against the Pope, and at the same time exerted themselves simply towards getting Leo's ep. dogmatica accepted in the Church; (7) that Dioscurus had to submit to a judicial process of an extremely disgraceful and unjust kind, that he acquitted himself worthily, and firmly maintained his position as the successor of Athanasius, and that in the end he was in no sense deposed on the ground of heresy, nor on account of murder, but on the ground of certain irregularities, including contempt for the divine canon, and disobedience to the Council,[1] while his deceased opponent Flavian

divided himself; dismember them, cast them out, etc.") used at Chalcedon was not any milder than that used at Ephesus in 449. Theodoret condemned Nestorius at the eighth sitting, Mansi VII., p. 185 sq. From the time of Leo I., moreover, the orthodox and those whose views were more of the type of the school of Antioch, applied the worst term of abuse, "Jew", to the Eutychians (Monophysites) because they ostensibly denied the Incarnation.

[1] Dioscurus protested that he did not assume that there was any mixing of the natures; and nobody was able to prove the opposite against him; see Mansi VI., p. 676: *Διόσκορος εἶπεν· οὔτε σύγχυσιν λέγομεν οὔτε τομὴν οὔτε τροπήν. ἀνάθεμα τῷ λέγοντι σύγχυσιν ἢ τροπὴν ἢ ἄνάκρασιν.* On the other hand he was not refuted when he (p. 683) asserted: "Flavian was justly condemned because he still maintained two natures after the union. I can prove from Athanasius, Gregory, and Cyril that after the union we ought rather to speak only of one incarnate nature of the Logos. I will be rejected together with the Fathers, but I am defending the doctrine of the Fathers, and yield on no point." He approved of the expression "out of two natures"; one can readily understand how as early as the second session he no longer wished to appear at the Council.

was on the other hand rehabilitated;[1] (8) that the bishops who had met together with him at Ephesus at first attempted to make out that the vote they gave there had been extorted by force, but that afterwards when they found they could not prove this they described themselves in the most dishonourable way as erring men who had gone wrong and begged forgiveness, although as a matter of fact they did not deny their faith at Ephesus in the year 449, but now at Chalcedon;[2] (9) that, considering the views of the faith prevailing at the time, the great majority of the bishops were able to comply with a new rule of faith even though it might be expressed in the usual terms, only by doing violence to their consciences, and that they finally deceived themselves by drawing the delusive distinction that it was not a question of an exposition (ἔκθεσις) but of an interpretation (ἑρμηνεία); (10) that spite of all the pressure put on them by the Roman legates and the commissioners, the majority under the guidance of Anatolius while expressly emphasing the fact that Dioscurus was not deposed on account of heresy—Anatolius had always in his heart agreed with the views of Dioscurus—further attempted to set up a doctrinal formula in which the distinction between the two natures was made one *in thought* only, and which made it possible to speak of one nature after the Incarnation,[3] and that three statements particularly, in the third and fourth chapters of Leo's letter to Flavian, (see above) appeared to the bishops

[1] In connection with this affair Juvenal and the Palestinian bishops changed their opinion in the most disgraceful fashion

[2] Some of them had agreed with Flavian in 448, with Dioscurus in 449, and now they agreed with the Council! Even the Imperial Commissioners blamed the bishops for the contradiction in which they entangled themselves when they gave out that their vote of the year 449 had been purely extorted from them; see Mansi VI., p. 637 fin. It has to be noted, moreover, that throughout the proceedings it was much more—in fact it was almost exclusively—a question of persons, of their standing, or of the right or wrong of their condemnation, and therefore as to Nestorius, Cyril, Flavian, Eutyches, Theodoret, Dioscurus, Leo, than a question of the actual matter in hand. In the first place everyone took care not to touch the real point or to have anything to do with constructing formulæ, and in the second place the personal question was with most of them the main thing.

[3] See the proceedings in Mansi VII., p. 97 sq.

to be intolerably Nestorian;[1] (11) that the bishops abandoned their proposed formula only after the most violent threats on the part of the Emperor, among which too was a threat to transfer the Council to Italy, and that they outwardly reconciled themselves to the statements of Leo with which they had found fault by deluding themselves with the false idea that Cyril said very much what Leo said and that both were in agreement; (12) that the new doctrinal formula[2] would nevertheless not have been carried through if it had not finally been established under severe pressure at a secret commission, and that this formula is so far lacking in veracity in that it is intended to contain the genuine doctrine of Cyril and recognises the resolution of the Cyrillian Council of 431, while it gives it the go-bye in so far as it sets aside the unity and union of the *natures*.

The imperial-papal formula was proclaimed and adopted at the fifth sitting.[3] It first of all confirms the decision of Nicæa, Constantinople, and Ephesus, it then explains that the Creed which had been handed down is sufficient in itself, but that on account of the teachers of false doctrine who on the one hand reject the designation *θεοτόκος* and on the other wish to introduce the idea of a confusion (*σύγχυσις*) and mixing (*κρᾶσις*) of the natures, "and absurdly fabricate only *one* nature for the flesh and the Godhead,"[4] and consider the divine nature of the only-begotten to be capable of suffering, the Council has adopted both the letters of Cyril to Nestorius[5] and the Easterns, as

[1] The expression so frequently used by the Westerns, God has assumed "a man", was also found fault with, but not officially.

[2] The formula was probably already drawn up when the Chalcedonian Council began; that commission cannot have got it ready in the short time it had; it even appears to follow from what is said in the Récits de Dioscore that it had already been laid before the Court previous to the meeting of the Council.

[3] See Mansi VII., p. 107 sq.

[4] Rarely had any one to my knowledge expressed himself in this way after Apollinaris (*μίαν εἶναι τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῆς θεότητος φύσιν*), but the Bishops had first to distort the faith which they themselves had avowed and which they now nevertheless rejected, in order to turn it into a heresy. The "Eranistes" of Theodoret, however, attacks those who "make the divinity and humanity into one nature."

[5] The Anathemas of Cyril are also implicitly to be understood as included in these; see Loofs, op. cit. p. 50 f

well as the letter of Leo. It is therefore directed both against those who break up the mystery of the Incarnation into two sons, and also against those who consider the Godhead of the only-begotten to be capable of suffering, who imagine a mingling and a fusion and declare the human substance of Christ to be a heavenly substance: "those who on the one hand assert two natures in the Lord before the union and those on the other hand who imagine one after the union, be anathema." (*καὶ τοὺς δύο μὲν πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως Φύσεις τοῦ κυρίου μυθεύοντας, μίαν δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀναπλάττοντας, ἀναθεματίζει*). (This was the sacrifice of the thought of Faith.) "Following therefore the holy Fathers, we all agree in teaching plainly that it is necessary to confess one and the same Son our Lord Jesus Christ, perfect alike in His divinity and perfect in his humanity, alike truly God and truly man," (*Ἑπομενοι τοίνον τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ. συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, Θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτόν*). This is further developed in detail, then we have: "We acknowledge one and the same Christ in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; nowhere is the difference of the natures annulled because of the union, but on the contrary the property of each of the two natures is preserved; each nature coming together into one person and one hypostasis, not divided or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten, God-Logos." (*ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν . . . ἐν δύο Φύσεσιν*[1] *ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωρίζομεν· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν Φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἰδιότητος ἑκατέρας Φύσεως. καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλὰ ἕνα*

[1] It is here that the difficulty occurs which has been so much discussed, namely, that the Greek text gives *ἐκ δύο φύσεων* and the Latin "in duabus naturis". Judging from all that preceded this, one cannot but hold that Tillemont, Walch, Gieseler, Neander, Hefele and others are right (as against Baur and Dörner) and look for the original reading in the latter phrase. The form in which we have the Greek text is of course not a mere error, but is an ancient falsification. In the period from the fifth to the seventh century the falsification of acts was an important weapon for the defence of what was sacred.

καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν καὶ μονογενῆ, Θεὸν λόγον.). The decree appeals in support of these statements to the Old Testament, to Jesus Christ Himself, and—to the Nicene Creed; at the close it is said that no one is to accept or teach any other creed, that on the contrary only this form of belief is to be handed down in connection with the instruction of Jews, heathen, and heretics.

The Emperor had now got what he wished. He had shewn that he ruled the Church, and he had got a formula according to which he was able henceforth to decide what was orthodox and what was heretical.[1] An end was put to the uncertain state of things which permitted everyone to appeal to the 318 bishops and in doing this to think whatever he liked. In the full consciousness of his triumph Marcian appeared in person along with Pulcheria at the sitting immediately following (6), and addressed the Council, making express reference to Constantine. He was greeted with acclamations from the whole Council: "We all so believe; we are all orthodox; this Faith has saved the world; hail to Marcian, the new Constantine, the new Paul, the new David! You are the peace of the world; Pulcheria is the new Helena!" But the Pope too had got what he wanted, if not everything. His letter had not been

[1] This prospect was indeed a delusive one; for since the Council had expressly appealed both to Cyril and to Leo, its decree could be interpreted according to the views either of the one or of the other, and consequently the old trouble was really there again. The three decrees of February 7th, March 13th, and July 28th, 452, (Mansi VII., pp. 476, 477, 501) are a proof of the energy and vigour with which the Emperor purposed to enforce the Chalcedonian Creed. According to the first of these all controversy was to cease, nobody was to dispute publicly regarding the faith. Whoever does this is looking in broad daylight for a false light, commits an act of sacrilege, insults the holy Council and betrays the secret to the Jews and the heathen. He must accordingly expect severe punishment, which has been already fixed and which will be of different degrees for the separate classes of the community. According to the third edict Eutychians and Apollinarians are forbidden to have pastors; those who contravene this order are to be punished with confiscation of their goods and exile. The right of assemblage, the right of building churches, and of being together in monasteries, is withdrawn from them. Their property is to go to the Exchequer. So too they are deprived of the power of inheriting anything and of bequeathing anything. Eutychian monks are to be treated as Manicheans, are to be driven from their "stalls" and removed from the soil of the Empire. Eutychian writings are to be burned, etc. Eutyches and Dioscurus themselves must go into exile.

given straight off the place of a doctrinal ordinance, but the Conciliar-decree had proceeded from this letter; his dogmatic teaching was acknowledged, and in his address to the Council Marcian had given expression to this fact. The truth is that without the help of the Papal legates Marcian could not have effected anything. But the Church of the East had been deprived of its faith.[1] The ἕνωσις φυσική, the natural union, was not mentioned; no one could any longer unhesitatingly teach that the God-Logos had taken up the human nature into the unity of his unique substance and made it the perfect organ of His deity. The construction of a Christology based on the God-Logos was severely shaken; the "two hypostases (δύο ὑποστάσεις) were not expressly condemned. In the "coming together" (συντρέχειν) each nature continues to exist in its own mode of being; the divinity has not absorbed the humanity nor has the humanity been exalted to the height of the divinity, but the human and divine natures are simply united in the *person* of the Redeemer, and therefore only mediately and in an individual (individuum). No pious Greek who had had Athanasius and Cyril for his teachers could acknowledge that to be "the right mean"; it was not even a formula of compromise like that of the year 433; it was the abandonment of the work of developing the Christological formula strictly in accordance with soteriology. The latter itself now became uncertain. If humanity was not deified in Christ, but if in His case His humanity was merely united with the divinity by the *prosopon* or person, then what effect can a union such as that have for us? That formula can only be of advantage either to the detested "moralism" of the Antiochians, or to mysticism, which bases its hope of redemption on the idea that the God-Logos continually unites Himself anew with each individual soul so as to form a union. The four bald negative terms (ἀσυγχύτως etc.,) which are supposed to express the whole truth, are in the view of the classical theologians amongst the Greeks, profoundly

[1] In respect of its relation to the orthodox faith and of the fact that it owed its origin to the Emperor, the Chalcedonian Creed may be compared with the decrees of the last Councils of Constantius. It is true that orthodoxy afterwards found it easier to reconcile itself to the two natures than to the "likeness". Still perhaps it might have come to terms with the latter also.

irreligious. They are wanting in warm, concrete substance; of the bridge which his faith is to the believer, the bridge from earth to heaven, they make a line which is finer than the hair upon which the adherents of Islam one day hope to enter Paradise. One may indeed say that the Chalcedonian Creed preserved for the East the minimum of historical conception which the Church still possessed regarding the person of Christ, by cutting short the logical results of the doctrine of redemption, which threatened completely to destroy the Christ of the Gospels. But the Fathers who accepted the Creed did not think of that. They in fact accepted it under compulsion, and if they had thought of this, the price which they paid would have been too dear; for a theology which, in what is for it the most important of all questions, has recourse to mere negatives, is self-condemned. Nor is it of any use to point to the fact that the Council merely gave the mystery a definite standing and thereby furthered the interests of the Greek Church and the Greek theology. *The true mystery on the contrary was contained in the substantial union of the two natures themselves.* It was seriously damaged by being banished from its place here, and when in place of it the *conception* of the union, a conception which was supposed at the same time to involve a state of separation, was raised to the position of the secret of faith. The real mystery was thus shoved aside by a pseudo-mystery which in truth no longer permitted theology to advance to the thought of the actual and perfect union. Monophysitism which holds to the statement that, without prejudice to the homo-ousia of the body of Christ with our body, the God-Logos made this body His own body and for this reason took it up into the unity of His substance, is without doubt the legitimate heir of the theology of Athanasius and the fitting expression of Greek Christianity.[1] The proposition, however, which was

[1] We can only adduce one consideration here, namely, that it was essential to this Christianity which had the New Testament beside it, that it should never, just because of this, develop in a logical way as a mystical doctrine of redemption. Understood in this sense no objection can be taken to the statement that the logical development of the monophysite faith even in its least extravagant form, was bound to come into conflict with certain elements of the ecclesiastical tradition, or with certain New Testament passages which could not be given up.

now to pass for orthodox, "each nature in communion with the other does what is proper to it," (agit utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est) actually makes two subjects out of one and betokens a lapse from the ancient faith. That the view we have here expressed is correct is attested by the previous history of the formula of the two natures and the one person. Up to this time scarcely anything had been known in the East of a "nature without hypostasis" (φύσις ἀνυπόστατος), although the Antiochians had distinguished between φύσις and πρόσωπον. It is attested further by the melancholy proceedings at the Council itself, and, as will be shewn, it is attested above all by the history which follows. A formula was now introduced which could ultimately be traced to a legal source and which for that reason could be transformed into a philosophical-theological formula only by a scholastic.

At Chalcedon only a part of the deputation of monks who had approached the Council with the prayer that the ancient faith might not suffer harm, and also the majority of the Egyptian monks, remained firm.[1] We cannot say, however, whether the action of the latter was an instance of the courage of faith. Their request that the Council should not compel them to accept the formula since in this case they would be killed after their return to Egypt, their despairing cry, "We shall be killed, if we subscribe Leo's epistle; we would rather be put to death here by you than there; have pity on us: we would rather die at the hands of the Emperor and at your hands than at home," proves that they were still more afraid of Coptic fanaticism than of the Emperor's police. They were allowed to postpone their subscription till a new bishop should be appointed to Alexandria, since they had explained that without a new bishop they could do nothing. They were not, however, to stir from Constantinople till then.

The Council was to be a Council of peace after the downfall of Dioscurus. All were pardoned, even Ibas himself, and on the other hand, the traitorous associates of Dioscurus at whose head stood Juvenal of Jerusalem. All were restored to their bishoprics so far as that was at all feasible. A series of Canons

[1] See the proceedings of the fourth sitting.

was then issued dealing with the regulation of ecclesiastical matters. The seventeenth Canon asserted in a blunt fashion what was a fundamental Byzantine principle: "let the arrangement also of the ecclesiastical districts follow that of the civil and state places." (*τοῖς πολιτικοῖς καὶ δημοσίοις τόποις καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν παροικιῶν ἡ τάξις ἀκολουθείτω*). The twenty-eighth, under cover of an appeal to the third Canon[1] of 381, struck a blow at Rome by ordaining that the patriarch of Constantinople was to enjoy similar privileges to those possessed by the bishop of Rome, was to be second to him in rank, and was to get an enormous extension of his diocese—namely, over Pontus, Asia, and Thrace. The proceedings in connection with this matter do not belong to the history of dogma, although Leo combated the resolution with dogmatic arguments drawn from tradition. The Roman legates, we may note, entered their protest. The Emperor once more created for himself a patriarch *primi ordinis*, after that the patriarch of Alexandria had had to be overthrown, and it was the bishop of his own capital whom he put alongside of the Roman bishop. The Council had to ask the Pope to confirm the twenty-eighth Canon by way of return, as it was openly put, for the acknowledgment of his dogmatic letter in the East.[2] But the Pope remained firm; his letters 104—107 prove that he had no intention of surrendering the grand success he had secured just in the East. A primacy of the East in Constantinople was the greatest possible danger, and for this reason Leo at once again took up the cause of the chairs of Alexandria and Antioch. In fact he now even shewed some hesitation in giving his approval of the resolutions of the great Councils generally, so that the Monophysites came to be

[1] The Romans before this had no official knowledge whatever of this Canon, and *in praxi* it had not been entirely enforced, even in the East itself, as the Robber-Synod shews.

[2] Leo, ep. 98. The letter is full of flattery of the Pope; see c. I. It follows too from the formally very submissive epistle of Anatolius to Leo (ep. 101) that an attempt had been made to induce Leo by flattery to acknowledge the 28th Canon. We gather from Marcian's epistle to Leo (ep. 100) that the Emperor considered that Canon as the most important ordinance of the Council together with the doctrinal decision. For details see Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 87 ff., where the Canons 9 and 17 are discussed.

under the pleasing delusion that he was inclined to side with them. (l)[1] He soon entirely broke with Anatolius and entered into negotiations with the new bishop of Alexandria (ep. 129) and with the bishop of Antioch (ep. 119) whose position in their patriarchates he sought to strengthen, and whom he begged to send him more frequently information regarding their affairs that he might be able to render them assistance. Soon, however, the Constantinopolitan bishop Anatolius found himself in such a difficult position owing to the new dogmatic controversies, that he preferred to shelve the Canon complained of and once more to seek the friendship of Leo which he did indeed secure.

§ 3. *The Monophysite Controversies and the Fifth Council.*[2]

1. The severest condemnation of the Chalcedonian Creed as decree wrung from the Eastern Churches, is to be found in the history of the next 68 years. These years are not only marked by the most frightful revolts on the part of the populace and the monks, particularly in Egypt, Palestine, and a part of Syria, but also by the attempts of the Emperors to get rid of the decree which had been issued with a definite end in view, and which was a source of difficulty and threatened the security

[1] See ep. 110; the approval followed in ep. 114, with certain reservations because of Canon 28; see ep. 115—117.

[2] The enormous and varied documentary material is given only in part in Mansi VII—IX. The Pope's letters are in Thiel, 1867. Much new in Mai's Script. Vet. Nova Coll.; Joh. of Ephesus (Monophysite) hist. eccl., German translation by Schönfelder, 1862, something different in Land, Anecd. Syr. Information regarding further sources in Möller, Monophysiten (R.-Encykl. X.) and Loofs, Leontius, 1887, (Texte u. Unters. III. 1, 2). Accounts by Tillemont, Gibbon, Walch, Schröckh, Hefele, Dorner, Baur, cf. the articles on the subject by Möller, Gass, and Hauck in the R.-Encykl.: in the same place the special literature in connection with the Theopaschitian, Tritheistic, and Origenist controversies and that of the Three Chapters. The special investigations, however, which had been carried on up till the beginning of the 18th century have rarely been resumed in recent times, but see Gieseler, Comment., qua Monophys. opin. illustr., 2 parts, 1835, 1838; Krüger, Monophys. Streitigkeiten, 1884 and Loofs, op. cit.; Kleyn, Bijdrage tot de Kerkgeschiedenis van het Oosten gedurende de zesde Eeuw, 1891 (from the chronicle of Dionysius of Tellmahre, who made extracts from the Church History of John of Ephesus. Kleyn gives the portions referring to the 6th century; they are identical with the

of the Empire.[1] They were all the more under the necessity of making these attempts, that in the East energetic theologians who could defend the Chalcedonian Creed were entirely lacking. At this period it maintained its position only by means of the great importance given to it by the imposing Council, by the majority of the clergy in the capital, and by the Roman bishop. These were strong forces; but the strength of the opposition to it, which was supported by the increasing aversion to the Byzantine Emperor and his Patriarch, by national aspirations and personal antipathies,[2] was also great. In addition to this the pious-minded felt as much aggrieved by the fact that a new formula had been introduced at all as by what was in the formula itself.[3] The Encyclical letter (ἐγκύκλιον) of the usurper

second and third parts of John's Church History. Kleyn has published for the first time the sections for the years 481—561 [in Dutch]; they are of great importance for the history of Monophysitism, its spread, and the persecution it underwent).

[1] Leo I., Marcian's successor, had already made a beginning with this, though he proceeded cautiously; see Leon. papæ ep. 145—158, 160—165, 169—173. One can see here what trouble it cost the Pope to maintain the Chalcedonian Creed. The opposition parties made the strongest efforts to prove that the Chalcedonian Creed was Nestorian. Of the memorial of Timotheus Aelurus (Heruler? hardly) the Monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria, Gennadius says (de vir. inl. 73): "librum valde suasorium, quem pravo sensu patrum testimoniis in tantum roborare conatus est, ut ad decipiendum imperatorem et suam hæresim constituendam pæne Leonem, urbis Romæ pontificem, et Chalcedonensem synodum ac totos occidentales episcopos illorum adminiculo Nestorianos ostenderet." The fact that the Emperor Leo called for an expression of opinion regarding the Chalcedonian Creed, was a step towards getting rid of it.

[2] Monasticism which was hostile to the State, the aspirations after independence on the part of the Egyptians, and jealousy of the influence of the Byzantine Patriarch, all played a part behind Monophysitism. This feeling of jealousy was shared by the Roman bishop who, however, felt himself under the necessity primarily of guarding the dogmatic formula.

[3] See the opinion of a Pamphylian Council supplied to the Emperor, printed in Mansi VII. p. 573—576. We can see from this that not only was the new definition which went beyond the Nicene Creed felt to be objectionable by the bishops, but that they disapprove too of the distinction of nature and person, prefer to speak with Cyril of one nature and wish to make the Chalcedonian Creed authoritative only in connection with controversies as being a formula which originated in and was rendered necessary by controversy, but not for the instruction of ordinary Christians. The Armenian Church has kept to this position; it is not Monophysite, but Cyrillian; see Arsak Ter Mikelian, Die Armenische Kirche in ihren Beziehungen zur Byzantischen vom. 4—13 Jahrh., Leipzig 1892, cf. Karapet, Die Paulikianer, (Leipzig 1893) p. 54 ff.

Basilikus (476) which abrogated the Chalcedonian Creed and decided in favour of Monophysitism, had certainly only a passing importance.[1] But state-policy was successful in uniting a section of the Chalcedonians and Monophysites by means of a Henoticon (482), which, when issued as an imperial edict by Zeno, virtually annulled the decree of 451.[2] The result was that soon instead of two parties there were three; for not only did the strict Monophysites renounce their allegiance to the Alexandrian patriarch Peter Mongus who had concluded a union with his Constantinopolitan colleague Acacius, but the Roman bishop too, Felix II., (see the epp.) rejected the Henoticon and pronounced sentence of excommunication on Acacius. Old and New Rome, which were already separated by political circumstances, now came to be divided ecclesiastically, and this schism lasted from 484 to 519. Since the Henoticon soon shewed itself to be ineffective, it would have been brought to an end sooner if Rome had not insisted on the condemnation of Acacius by his successors. The Monophysites soon came forward again openly rejecting the Chalcedonian Creed, and those in the Eastern Empire who adhered to it, and also the Henotics, had at first difficulty in preventing the new Emperor Anastasius from formally doing

[1] Basilikus had the ep. Leon. ad Flav. and the Chalcedonian Creed condemned. About 500 bishops of the South and West actually subscribed it, but not Acacius; see Euagr. h. e. III. 4. The decree takes its stand upon the Nicene Creed and the two following Councils, but orders the Chalcedonian canons to be burned. Basilikus afterwards withdrew it (Euagr. III. 7), see also the epp. Simplicii papæ.

[2] The Henotikon (Euagr. III. 14) declares in the first part that the sole authoritative creed is the Nicene-Constantinopolitan, and excludes all the other *σύμβολα* or *μαθήματα*; it then expressly condemns Nestorius and Eutyches while accepting the anathemas of Cyril. Then, however, there further follows a full Christological Confession in which the following statements are specially worthy of note: *ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸν μονογενῆ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱὸν ... ἵνα τυγχάνειν καὶ οὐ δύο· ἑνὸς γὰρ εἶναι φαμὲν τὰ τε θαύματα καὶ τὰ πάθη ἅπερ ἑκουσίως ὑπέμεινε σαρκί ... ἡ σάρκωσις ἐκ τῆς θεοτόκου προσθήκην υἱοῦ οὐ πεποίηκε. μεμένηκε γὰρ τριὰς ἡ τριὰς καὶ σαρκωθέντος τοῦ ἑνός τῆς τριάδος Θεοῦ λόγου ... πάντα δὲ τὸν ἕτερόν τι φρονήσαντα ἢ φρονοῦντα, ἢ νῦν ἢ πώποτε ἢ ἐν Καλχηδόνι ἢ οἵᾳ δήποτε συνόδῳ ἀναθεματίζομεν.* An appeal on behalf of union is then made to the Egyptians to whom the epistle is addressed. Its dogmatic substance is not orthodox; the insincere way, however, in which the Council of Chalcedon is not condemned, but ignored, shews that there was a desire to tolerate Monophysitism. The Emperor indeed cannot be blamed for issuing the edict; in doing this he simply did his *duty*. But Petrus Mongus played a double game, and so too did Acacius.

away with the unfortunate decree.[1] The confusion was now greater than it had ever been. People who used one and the same Christological formula were often further apart and more bitter against one another than were those who were separated by the wording of the formulæ. If the Emperor had not been a capable ruler, things in the Empire would have got out of joint. He was meanwhile always approaching nearer to Monophysitism with which he was personally in sympathy, and on the side of which stood not only the more fanatical, but also the more capable theologians, such as Philoxenus of Mabug, and Severus. In Syria and Palestine the Monophysite cause already triumphed amid terrors of all sorts; but the capital, Constantinople, and Thrace, with the true instinct of self-preservation held to the Chalcedonian Creed against the Emperor, the patron of heretics, and Vitalian,[2] a fierce general, a semi-barbarian, and rebel who was yet the forerunner of Justinian who taught him politics, made common cause with the Chalcedonians against his monarch. The Emperor had to submit to the powerful general; but it was not possible, even by making all sorts of concessions in regard to the dogmatic question, to get Rome, which put forward exorbitant claims, to agree to a policy of oblivion in reference to Acacius. Anastasius did not come to any agreement with the Pope Hormisdas. But what he did not succeed in doing was successfully accomplished by his successor Justin, or rather by the nephew and director of the new Emperor Justin, Justinian, in conjunction with Vitalian. They saw that for the re-establishment of the authority of the Emperor and the state in the Empire, the re-establishment of the Chalcedonian Creed and of the league with Rome, was indispensable. After that the authority of the four Councils had been once more solemnly recognised in Constantinople, everywhere throughout the Empire the orthodox raised their heads. Hormisdas did not himself appear in the capital; but his legates succeeded in getting almost everything he had asked. Again did the Roman bishop, like Leo before him, help the Byzantine State to gain

[1] See Rose, Kaiser Anastasius I., Halle, 1882.

[2] On the importance of the part played by Vitalian, see Loofs, p. 243 ff., and in addition Joh. Antioch. in Müller, Fragm. hist. gr. V., p. 32 sq.

the victory over the ecclesiastical movements. Orthodoxy was again restored and the names of the authors and defenders of the Henotikon, from Acacius and Zeno downwards were erased from the sacred books (519). The purification of Syria and its chair from the monophysite heresy meanwhile created some difficulty. The attempt to get the more determined Monophysites out of the way was, it is true, successful, but as soon it became a question as to who were to be their successors, it at once became evident again that the Chalcedonian Creed was understood in a different way in Rome and in the East respectively, and that the East had not got rid of the suspicion of Nestorianism so far as Rome was concerned.

This difference emerged in a very characteristic form in the so-called Theopaschitian controversy.[1] The formulæ, "God has suffered", "God was crucified", were time-honoured forms[2] of speech in the Church and had never been quite forgotten. But after there had been so much speculation regarding the Trinity and the Incarnation, these formulæ came to be discussed too. Still, even after the formation of the Chalcedonian Creed, it seemed to be impossible to disapprove of them; for if Mary was to be called θεοτόκος this meant that they were approved of. Nevertheless opposition soon shewed itself when the Monophysite patriarch of Antioch, Petrus Fullo, with the approval of his co-religionists, formulated the Trishagion as follows: Holy God, Holy the mighty one, Holy the immortal one who was crucified for us: ἅγιος ὁ Θεός, ἅγιος ἰσχυρός, ἅγιος ἀθάνατος, ὁ σταυρωθεὶς δι' ἡμᾶς. The Emperor approved of this innovation which, however, at once met with opposition in Antioch itself, and which cost one of those who had to do with it his life. In the capital a controversy broke out when some Scythian monks, whose soundness in the faith was unimpeachable, defended the orthodoxy of the formula, "one of the Trinity was crucified —suffered in the flesh" ("unum de trinitate, esse crucifixum—passum carne"), about the year 518. The legates of Pope Hormisdas, bearing in mind Leo's doctrinal letter, opposed it as being incompatible with the Catholic Faith! The Pope him-

[1] See Hauck in the Realencyklop. Vol. XV. p. 534 ff.

[2] See Vol. I., p. 187.

self was now concerned in the matter. A decision was necessarily urgently desired—on the part of the Emperor too; for the relations had become so strained that any sudden movement might throw the whole Church into confusion. Hormisdas hesitated about giving an answer; he neither wished to disavow his legates nor too openly to reject the formulæ. The decision which he finally gave in a letter to the Emperor Justin (521), was to the effect that everything was already decided, without, however, saying what was to be regarded as authoritative. This declaration which shewed his perplexity roused just indignation not only in Constantinople but also in North Africa. Justinian, who at first did not approve of the formula,—so long, that is, as he still followed in the wake of Vitalian,— afterwards held to it all the more strongly, the more he urged the strictly Cyrillian interpretation of the Chalcedonian Creed. When he had the power he got the Popes too to acknowledge it, had the faithful but impolitic partisans of Rome, the Akoimetan monks in Constantinople, excommunicated, and finally got the formula sanctioned at the Fifth Ecumenical Council, that our Lord who was crucified in the flesh, Jesus Christ, was one of the Trinity.[1]

It is apparently necessary to make a sharp distinction between the attempt of the Monophysites to give an extension to the Trishagion in a Theopaschitian sense, and the assertion of the Scythian monks that the doctrinal formula: "One of the Trinity suffered in the flesh", was orthodox. That attempt was rejected because it involved an innovation in worship and because it could be interpreted in a Sabellian sense. Orthodoxy putting this meaning on it, gave the name "Theopaschitian" a permanent place in its collection as a heretical name. On the other hand it was, to begin with, purely owing to Roman obstinacy that the formula proposed by the Scythians, and which, moreover, rather justifies than adopts the monophysite formula, was objected to. But it has been recently very justly remarked[2] that the cause of the offence which the formula gave,

[1] See on the controversy Marcellinus, Euagr. Theophanes, Victor Tun., The Letters of Hormisdas, Mansi VIII. c. IX. Noris, Hist. Pelag. Disser. I. 1702. On the Scythian Monks, see Loofs, pp. 229—261.

[2] See Loofs, op. cit., pp. 53, 231 f., 248 ff., whose splendid investigations have been made use of in what follows.

even to some of the Chalcedonians, is not to be looked for within the Christological, but on the contrary within the Trinitarian, domain. This brings us to a complete change which took place in the theology of that period and which claims the most serious attention.

Attention has been already drawn to the fact, (Vol. III., p. 154 and above p. 126) that in the course of the transition from the fifth to the sixth century Aristotelianism once more became the fashion in science. This revolution helped to bring about the naturalisation of the Chalcedonian Creed in the Church, or what amounts to the same thing, contributed towards reconciling Greek religious feeling to it. While up to the beginning of the sixth century orthodoxy was without any theologians, we come across a man in the first half of the century who both as theologian and student of dogma was as able as he was prolific, and in the case of whom one feels that while he believes and thinks as Cyril believed and thought, his determined defence of the Chalcedonian Creed was nevertheless not in any way forced out of him—Leontius of Byzantium (c. 485—543).[1] When, however, we try to find out by what means he, as a theologian of the school of Cyril, succeeded in accommodating himself to the Chalcedonian Creed, it becomes clear that he was helped to this by the Aristotelian conceptual distinctions, and therefore by scholasticism. Leontius was the first scholastic.[2] While, owing to his faith, he stood in an intimate relation to Greek religious feeling, the Chalcedonian formula presented itself to him as an inviolable doctrine promulgated by the Church. But

[1] Loofs was the first to throw light on his works, his personality, and his history.

[2] This description is to be taken with the qualification that in his theological thinking he still shewed a certain freedom. While the proofs alleged by Loofs in favour of the view that the "Origenist" Leontius is identical with the Byzantine (pp. 274—297) are indeed not absolutely decisive, though to my mind they are convincing, one can see that Leontius held the great master in veneration without following him in his doubtful statements. But nothing is more characteristic of the period upon which the Church had now entered than the fact that even this academic veneration for Origen was no longer tolerated. Leontius was described as "Origenist" and Loofs' conjecture is quite correct (p. 296) that Joh. Damascenus, that in a certain sense the Eastern Church itself, consigned this theologian *of theirs* to oblivion because he was still too liberal.

while he unweariedly defended it against Nestorians, Apollinarians, and Severians, dogmatic and religious considerations were put entirely into the background; their place was taken by an exposition of doctrine based on philosophical conceptions.[1] He treated of substance, genus, species, individual being, of the attributes which constitute the substance, of inseparable accidents and of separable accidents. It was on the result of these discussions that the conceptions of the natures and the hypostasis in Christ were based; the Aristotelian *δευτέρα οὐσία*, or second substance, was given a place of prominence, and thus the Chalcedonian Creed was justified. All the Aristotelian splitting of conceptions did not, it is true, cover the most crucial point of all—namely, the exposition of the unity. Here, however, Leontius had recourse to the idea of the Enhypostasis of the human nature; thus proving in the clearest way that he wished to keep the Chalcedonian definition on the lines laid down by Apollinaris and Cyril and not on those laid down in Leo's doctrinal letter.[3] In the whole way in which Leontius

[1] See Loofs, p. 60: "It is neither exegetical, nor religious arguments which are given a foremost place, but philosophical, and the philosophical theory upon which the arguments of our author rest, has a decidedly Aristotelian and not a Platonic origin. Our author is a forerunner of John of Damascus."

[2] See the explanations given by Loofs of the apparatus of conceptions used by Leontius, p. 60—74. The entire distinction between the Western conception and that which combines the views of Cyril and Leontius is to be found in scientific form in the statement of Leontius: *οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος ... ἀνυπόστατος μὲν οὖν φύσις, τουτέστιν οὐσία, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ*. The Western legal fiction of a distinction between person and nature is here pitched aside. I do not enter into further detail regarding the theology of Leontius because in an outline of the History of Dogma it must suffice to ascertain its tendency and methods. Anything further belongs to the history of theology.

[3] The expedient of the enhypostasis was adopted in order to meet the objection urged by the Monophysite Severus against the Chalcedonian Creed and Leo's doctrine, that two energies necessarily lead to two hypostases. Leontius, following up a hint of Cyril herewith shews that if the relative standards of criticism are once abandoned, all Greeks who start from the doctrine of redemption, must be Apollinarians in disguise. Leontius was the first who definitely maintained that the human nature of Christ is not *ἀνυπόστατις* nor on the other hand an independent *ὑπόστασις*, but that it has its *ὑποστῆναι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*. Leontius refers to the mode of the existence of the *ποιότητες οὐσιώδεις* in the *ousia*. The comparison is naturally defective since these *ποιότητες* do not in themselves constitute a *φύσις*. In fact all comparisons are defective. Neither Plato nor Aristotle is responsible for this philosophy. A pious Apollinarian monk would probably have been able

transferred the Nestorian-Monophysite controversy into the region of Philosophy, we may accordingly see a momentous revolution. This much, however, is certain, that his violent μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος was the condition of the gradual reconciliation of the East with the Chalcedonian Creed[1] and that in intrinsic importance it may be classed along with the method of counting up authorities. Only in this way was it possible for Leontius to accept the formula as authoritative, and, spite of the dry form in which it was put, to regard it with respect from the religious point of view and at the same time to see in it an inexhaustible subject for the display of dialectical skill. It is undeniable that Chalcedonian orthodoxy was first firmly established in the East in the age of Justinian, that is to say, inner agreement with the Chalcedonian Creed was then first secured to any large extent, and this without abandoning Cyril's religious theology, but on the contrary while emphasising it and giving it the preference.[2] If this is so then the only possible explanation of these facts is that supplied by the entrance of Aristotelian scholasticism into the Church. *The Chalcedonian dogma is lost in philosophical theology.* The Faith and the Church were to a certain extent relieved, feeling reassured by the knowledge that the dogma was in safe keeping and in good hands, as it were. One can forget the scruples to which it gives rise, when one is confident that there are scholars who are able by the aid of a definite set of technical terms to make everything right. Here, too, for this reason, the work of the historian of dogma ceases; his place is taken by the historian of theology.

to say with regard to the ὑποστῆναι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ: "Apollinaris says pretty much the same thing only in somewhat more intelligible words."

[1] Loofs, p. 72 ff. shews that the Chalcedonian element is strongly represented in the doctrine of Leontius and that in the efforts he made to do it justice we see the presence of the modern element of personality as distinguished from *physis*, though indeed only as a kind of shadow of it.

[2] The energetic opposition to the Antiochian theology is specially worthy of note in this connection. Up to the beginning of the Sixth Century the Chalcedonians were in such a state of alarm owing to the decree, that they could find no fixed point from which to carry on the old and to them supremely important struggle against the "dismemberment". Leontius was the first to resume Cyril's attack on it and to carry on the interrupted work of repelling the most dangerous of all enemies.

Leontius was himself one of the Scythian monks.[1] The fact that this great opponent of the Monophysites championed the Theopaschitian formula and his criticism of the Antiochian theology, prove how far removed he was from Nestorianism. But the formula by its characteristic difference from the older conception, that of Petrus Fullo, further proves that the introduction of the Aristotelian philosophy into theology called for a restatement of the doctrine of the Trinity. The "unus ex trinitate" is opposed to the "thrice holy" who was crucified for us. Tritheistic tendencies were not wanting at that period, and this is true of both sides in so far as attention was given to the Aristotelian philosophy. That Petrus Fullo, who as a Monophysite so energetically made the Trinity into a unity, was, it is true, no Aristotelian, but neither is his formula in any way typical of Monophysitism as a whole.

The latter on the contrary for the two or three generations after the Chalcedonian Creed, shews that it had in it sufficient life and vigour to be accessible to the influence of the most varied movements and thoughts. It shews during this period that it was the expression of spiritual and theological life in the East generally. The state of petrifaction, barrenness, and barbarism into which it afterwards got, did not yet actually exist, although signs of its approach were evident amongst the fanatical masses and the ignorant monks. It is significant, to begin with, that Monophysitism did not allow itself to be carried to extremes by the blow dealt it by the Chalcedonian Creed. That is a proof of the goodness of its cause and of its power. The Monophysites were strongly bent on keeping clear of "Eutychianism". Anything like mingling or transformation was out of the question, in fact Eutyches himself was abandoned to his fate.[2] Then the readiness shewn by a large section of the Monophysites to come to terms with orthodoxy if only the Chalcedonian Creed and the objectionable dogmatic development in Leo's doctrinal letter were got out of the way, is a proof that they really strictly maintained the position of Cyril. This is true very specially of the most important champion of

[1] See Loofs, p. 228 ff.

[2] See Martin, Pseudo-Synode, p. 53.

Monophysitism—Severus. The attempt has indeed been to draw a distinction, as regards doctrine, between Cyril and Severus, but the attempt does not seem to me to have been successful.[1] Cyril, equally with Severus, would have objected to Leo's assertion that each nature in Christ effects what is peculiar to it, though in conjunction with the other. The emphasis laid by Severus on the one energy is genuinely Cyrillian, and the expression borrowed from the Areopagite, *ἐνέργεια θεανδρική*, "theandric energy", by no means approaches so near the limits of the permissible as the expression *θεοτόκος*. But neither is there any difference in the formulæ, *μία φύσις τοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*, "one incarnate nature of the Logos" and *μία φύσις τοῦ λογοῦ σεσαρκωμένου*, "one nature of the incarnate Logos"; for Cyril too, logically attributed one nature not only to the God-Logos but also to the Christ. The communication of properties according to him, involves in every respect the natures. But there is not even any trace of a theological difference between Severus and Leontius.[2] The difference consists purely in the extent to which each was desirous of accommodating his views to the Chalcedonian Creed and interpreting Leo's doctrinal letter *in bonam partem*, and also in the philosophico-theological termi-

[1] See Loofs, p. 53 ff. The sources of information regarding the Christology of Severus are given there, p. 54. I refrain from giving any account of it (see Gieseler, op. cit. I., Dorner II., p. 166 ff.), since its identity with Cyril's doctrine seems to me to follow from the evidence brought forward by Loofs. It is interesting to note that Severus deduces from the Chalcedonian Creed the hypothesis of two natural energies and two wills, and further employs this deduction against his opponents as an *argumentatio ad absurdum*. No one in the East knew just at that time what was still to come in the succeeding century. The statement of Severus: *οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ ποτὲ φύσις οὐχ ὑφεστῶσα*, from which he concludes that in Leo's view there are two hypostases, is highly noteworthy and is quite in accordance with Cyril's ideas. Gieseler, op. cit. I., p. 9.

[2] See the 30 *κεφάλαια* of Leontius *κατὰ Σευήρου* (Migne 86, 2, p. 1901 sq.). See the notice in Loofs, p. 77 ff. It is highly amusing to notice how two authors whose ideas are exactly the same *appear* to have absolutely distinct views owing to the different terminology, "one nature", "two natures". In Thesis XI. where the Trinity and Christology are treated together in a scientific way, Leontius says: "If, according to Gregory, we have in the case of the Holy Trinity the reverse of what we have in the *οἰκονομία κατὰ τὸν σωτῆρα*, then in the case of the latter we must have two natures and one hypostasis, just as in that of the former we have three hypostases and one nature."

nology employed. The statements of Severus regarding the one composite nature, the μεταστοιχείωσις[1] or transformation etc., express absolutely nothing else than what is found in the formulæ of Leontius which are in part expressed in an entirely different and in fact in an opposite way. Leontius accepts the enhypostasis of the human nature in Christ, and Severus strictly defends himself against the supposition that he teaches that the human nature in any way loses its natural peculiarity in the union. It is simply that unfortunate Chalcedonian Creed which stands between the opponents, and what separates them therefore is the question as to whether the Western terminology is to be followed or not. That this is the case is proved by the attitude taken up by Severus to the Extreme Right of his party. The Henoticon had already split up the Egyptian Monophysites. One section of them had renounced connection with Petrus Mongus (ἀκέφαλοι). But in Syria, too, at the beginning of the Fifth Century we find several tendencies amongst them. The blow dealt them after the restoration of orthodoxy in 519 drove them to Egypt, and there actual splits took place. Even the strictest party amongst them did not put forth the catchword "transformation"; but in seriously reflecting on the problem as to how a human nature must be constituted after a God had made it His own, they arrived at propositions which were perfectly logical and which for this very reason referred back to Irenæus, Clemens Alex., Origen, Gregory Nyss., Hilary, Apollinaris, and to some utterances of Dioscurus and Eutyches. Their leader, Julian of Halicarnassus who was opposed by the Severians, developed the doctrine of the one nature into the doctrine of the identity of the substance and properties of the divinity and the humanity in Christ. The hypothesis of the indestructibleness of the body of Christ from the moment of the *assumptio*, became the shibboleth of the "Julianists" or Gaians, who, now nicknamed Aphthartodoketæ and Phantasiasts by the Severians, retorted with the word "Phthartolatry". The Julianists, whose point of view was determined solely by the thought of redemption, did not shrink from maintaining the perfect glorification of the body of Christ from the very first, and in accordance with this saw

[1] See Gieseler, op. cit. II. p. 3.

in the emotions and sufferings of Christ not the natural—though in reference to the Godhead the voluntary—states consequent on the human nature, but the acceptance of states κατὰ χάριν, which were regarded as having no inner connection with the nature of the Redeemer as that of the God-man. This nature being entirely free from all sin was also supposed to have nothing in common with suffering and death.[1] In opposition to this view the Severians laid so much stress on the relation of the sufferings of Christ to the human side of Christ's nature

[1] The extremely instructive second treatise of Gieseler supplies us with abundant material. Gieseler has brought out two things at the same time (1) that these Julianists (see the sixth anathema of Julius, p. 6) started from the idea of redemption, according to which the Logos assumed our flesh (ὁμοούσιος), but that as it (second Adam) was not subject to sin so neither was it subject to *corruptio*, and that in the moment of the *assumptio* He raised it to the state of the Divine. A homousia of the body of Christ with our body *after* the Incarnation would do away with all the comfort and the certainty of redemption. For the Logos assumed our nature just in order that He might free it from φθορά; if therefore the human nature of Christ had been still subject to φθορά then redemption would be rendered uncertain. Gieseler has shewn (2) that this idea is identical with the idea of the classic fathers of the Church, that while they undoubtedly shewed some hesitation as regards the conclusions to be drawn from it, still all the conclusions drawn by the Julianists, or by Philoxenus, are represented in one or other of the classical witnesses. Above all the Julianist and Philoxenian statement that in the case of Christ all *passiones* were not assumed naturally, but in the strictest sense voluntarily, κατ' οἰκονομίαν or κατὰ χάριν, (Gieseler, p. 7) is merely the vigorous echo of the oldest religious conviction. It was the sharper distinction between the divinity and the humanity in the incarnate one, worked out in the Arian controversy, that first endangered this conviction. Apollinaris sought to give some help here, but it was no longer of any avail. Gieseler very rightly calls attention to the fact that in the Apollinarian school the dispute between the Polemians and Valentinians corresponds exactly to the dispute between the Julianists and Severians, *i.e.*, in the case of the former the same conclusions had been already drawn and had in turn been denied, which the Monophysites afterwards drew. Of these some went the length of assuming the divinity of Christ's blood and spittle (see besides, Athanasius, ad Serap. IV. 14; "Christ spat as a man, and His spittle was filled with the Godhead"), and, strictly speaking, the Church itself never could nor would dispense with this ancient idea spite of its doctrine of the two natures. The very same people who got excited about Aphthartodoketism had never any scruples in speaking about the blood of God, and in thinking of that blood as actually divine. We cannot therefore avoid seeing in Aphthartodoketism the logical development of the Greek doctrine of salvation, and we are all the more forced so to regard it that Julian expressly and *ex necessitate fidei* acknowledged the homousia of the body of Christ with our body at the moment when the Logos assumed it, and rejected everything of the nature of a heavenly body so far as its origin was concerned.

in order to rid them of anything doketic, that no Western could have more effectively attacked doketism than they did.[1] We find in general amongst the Severians such a determined rejection of all doctrinal extravagances—though these are not to be regarded as absurdities, but as signs of the settled nature of the belief in redemption—that we are glad to be able clearly to see how unnecessary it was in the East to adopt the Chalcedonian Creed, and to replace the μία φύσις of Cyril by the doubtful doctrine of the two natures. One section of the Monophysites nevertheless went the length of asserting that the human soul of Christ was not omniscient ("Agnoetæ"), so that as regards the one energy of the God-Man, a distinction is to be drawn even in the sphere of knowledge between what it did as possessed of divine knowledge and what it did as humanly ignorant. This idea yields to none of the Monophysite eccentricities in absurdity,[2] and indeed it differs from them for the worse by the fact of its having no religious thought as its basis. While one section of the Monophysites thus did the work of criticising their own party better than any Chalcedonian could have done without incurring the reproach of Nestorianism, a philosophy of identity made its appearance amongst certain individuals in the party itself, which might have raised the fear that it would turn into Pantheism, if there had been any danger of its doing this at the time. On the mystical side, this had indeed been accomplished long ago, but this was very far from involving an intellectual mode of conceiving of things. Still it is of importance to note that an approach was made in this direction from two sides. First there were Monophysites who took up with the thought that the body of Christ from

[1] The passages are in Gieseler I. p. 20. The distinctions which were made are highly significant in view of the period of scholasticism which was approaching. There are two sorts of φθορά; Christ was subject to the natural πάθη of the body, but not to the φθορά as ἡ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη τὸ σῶμα στοιχεῖα διάλυσις. (Gieseler, p. 4).

[2] Thomasius indeed finds it "remarkable" (p. 375) that the majority of the orthodox teachers of the Church, Jerome, Ambrose, the Patriarch Eulogius, the Roman Gregory, rejected the doctrine of the Agnoetæ and attributed to Christ an absolute knowledge which he concealed temporarily only κατ' οἰκονομίαν. These Fathers had not yet succeeded in doing what the Agnoetæ and the modern theologians can manage and do—namely, to imagine a Christ who at the one and the same time knew as God what he did not know as man and was yet all the while *one* person.

the moment of the *assumptio* was to be considered as uncreated, the view of the Aktistetæ. If the Father can communicate to the Son the attribute of unbegottenness, and at that time no one any longer doubted that he could, why should the Logos not also be able to give His body the attributes of the uncreated; and in fact if it is His body, could He help doing this? Here already we meet with the thought that something created can nevertheless be something eternal. We hear no more of a flesh which was brought hither from heaven, but a kindred idea takes the place of this heretical thought. In the second place there were people, the Adiaphorites,[1] who refused to make any distinction between the divinity and the humanity in Christ, and this denial of all distinction further led some Syrian and Egyptian monks to the speculative idea, or to put it otherwise, gave increased strength to the speculative idea, that Nature in general is of one substance with God (see Vol. III., p. 302), a thought which had points of contact with mystical religious practices.[2] If all these movements illustrate the inner life of Monophysitism which within itself once more passed through old forms of development, the attention it gave to the Aristotelian philosophy and such excellent works as those published by Joh. Philoponus, finally proves too that it did not in any way shrink from contact with the great spiritual forces of the time. The tritheistic controversy was in all essential respects fought out on its own ground, and the boldness and freedom shewn by the scholarly Monophysites, in the face too of tradition,[3] bears witness to the fact that in the Chalcedonian Creed a foreign power had imposed itself on the Church of the East.[4]

[1] See Möller, R.-Encykl. X., p. 248. Stephanus Niobes is mentioned as the originator of this line of thought.

[2] Frothingham in his Stephen bar Sudaili (1886) has now given us information regarding the Syrian Pantheistic thinkers amongst the Monophysites about the year 500 and further down. All Scotus Erigena is in Barsudaili. The Pantheistic mysticism of this Syrian and his friends merits the serious attention not of the historian of dogma, but of the historian of philosophy and culture. Scotus and the Pantheistic Mystics of the Middle Ages stand in closer connection with these Syrians than with the Areopagite. 1 Cor. XV. 28 supplies the central doctrine here.

[3] See Stephanus Gobarus in Photius, Cod. 232. He is also Aristotelian and Tritheist; noteworthy also for his bold criticism of tradition.

[4] On the Tritheists, see Schönfelder, Die Kirchengesch. des Johann v. Ephesus,

2. The restitution of orthodoxy in the year 519 coincides with the successful efforts of the theologians who were skilled in the Aristotelian philosophy, to furnish the Church which clung to the Chalcedonian Creed with a good conscience. *It is possible to accept the Chalcedonian Creed as authoritative and at the same time to think exactly as Cyril thought:* this was the result arrived at by the "new Cappadocians", the "new Conservatives", as Leontius and his friends came to be called, who made terms with the two natures in the same way as the oriental scholars in the Fourth Century did with the ὁμοούσιος; *and it is this conviction which lies at the basis of Justinian's policy in reference both to the Church and the State.* If the efforts of former emperors in so far as they favoured Monophysitism were directed towards getting rid of the Chalcedonian Creed or consigning it to oblivion, the policy of the Emperor, which had the support of the new conservative theology, was to make use of the power which every *fait accompli*, and therefore too a Council, supplies, and at the same time to do justice to the old tendencies of Greek piety. It was the Roman bishop who was hardest hit by such a policy. For the second time he had contributed towards giving the Emperor of the East a firmer position in the country, this time by doing away with the schism. But the friend had not become any more harmless than he was in the year 451. As at that time he was, after having done what was required of him, quietly pushed back within his own boundaries by the 28th Canon of the Council, so on this occasion too he was to get a poor reward for his services. It was not intended that Rome should triumph in the East, but that the Emperor of the East should once more become the Lord of Rome. The dogmatic union with the West represented the terms on which it was to be made ecclesiastically and politically subject to the Emperor.

Justinian's policy has in it an element of greatness. He once more set up the world-empire and pacified the Church, and yet his civil and ecclesiastical policy of conquest was unsound and

p. 267 ff. The works of Philoxenus, Bishop of Hierapolis, who has lately been termed the best Syrian stylist, have been hitherto wholly neglected and still await an editor.

its results lacked permanence. He did not know how to win over the Monophysites, and by his Western policy he did harm to the much more important Eastern policy. Some years after his accession Justinian arranged a grand religious discussion in Constantinople between the Severians and the Theopaschitian Orthodox (531). It is of some importance because it shews the extent of the advances made by the Orthodox towards the Monophysites under the guidance of Hypatius of Ephesus in conformity with the wish of the Emperor.[1] The orthodox held firmly to the Chalcedonian Creed, but allowed that the Council had also approved of the phrase, one incarnate nature (!);[2] on the other hand they rejected as Apollinarian forgeries the testimonies of their opponents in reference to the condemnation of the words "in duabis naturis" on the part of the ancient fathers.[3] About the same time the Emperor issued several edicts regarding the true Faith (533), which *in thesi* were based on the Chalcedonian Creed, but did not reproduce its formulæ; on the contrary they evaded the use of them and contained besides, the addition that it is necessary to believe that the Lord who suffered was one of the Holy Trinity.[4] The Emperor, who had himself an interest in dogma, already here shewed what his policy was, namely, to take back the Church in all that was essential entirely to Cyril, but to allow the Chalcedonian Creed to remain authoritative. Thus as matters stood, the formula: *ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκί*, "one of the Holy Trinity suffered in the flesh", was a henotikon. But the Empress went still further. She had always favoured the Monophysites, one cannot even say secretly; the various threads of the undertaking the object of which was to assist "the pious doctrine" to triumph,

[1] See the Acts in Mansi VIII., p. 817 sq., Loofs, p. 263 f. Leontius took part in the discussion and it was dominated by his theology.

[2] See 823: "Sancta synodus utrosque sermones (two and one natures) *pari honore* suscepit et pertractat."

[3] It was here that the Areopagite was first cited as an authority—by the Severians, p. 820; his writings were, however, described by the orthodox as doubtful.

[4] Cod. Justinian (ed. Krüger), de summa trinit. 6—8. The words: *ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ τε θαύματα καὶ τὰ πάθη, ἅπερ ἑκουσίως ὑπέμεινεν σαρκί... οὔτε τετάρτου προσώπου προσθήκην ἐπιδέχεται ἡ ἁγία τρίας*, are worthy of note. Pope John II., 534, had to approve of the Theopaschitian addition.

all met in her cabinet, and it appeared not impossible that the Emperor might in the end be got also to agree to the formal abandonment of the Chalcedonian Creed and consequently to a new actual henotikon.[1] The appointment of Anthimus, a Monophysite in disguise, as patriarch of the Capital, and the admission of Severus to the Court, prepared the way for the final blow which was to be struck at the Chalcedonian Creed. But once more did the Roman bishop, who was informed of what was going on by Ephraem of Antioch, save orthodoxy. In the year 536 Agapetus appeared at the Court of the Emperor and succeeded in getting Anthimus removed from his post and excommunicated. A Council which was held under the presidency of the new patriarch Mennas at Constantinople in the year 536, after the death of Agapetus who died in the capital, and which has left behind an extensive collection of Acts,[2] put an end to the Monophysitism which was making overtures in an underhand way, acknowledged anew the expression: "*ἐν δύο φύσεσι*", "in two natures", and deposed and anathematised Anthimus. It is important that the Council which followed in the track of the theology of Leontius and upon which Leontius himself had some influence, roundly declared through its leader that nothing whatever ought to be done in the Church contrary to the will and command of the Emperor, but at the same time also added the following: "We both follow and obey the apostolic throne (Rome) and we regard those in communion with it as in communion, and those condemned by it we also condemn": *ἡμεῖς τῷ ἀποστολικῷ θρόνῳ ἑξακολουθοῦμέν τε καὶ πειθόμεθα καὶ τοὺς κοινωνικοὺς αὐτοῦ κοινωνικοὺς ἔχομεν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατακριθέντας καὶ ἡμεῖς κατακρίνομεν.*[3] The days when the names of Marcian and Leo were mentioned together, seemed to have returned. But the Pope at this time was no Leo, and Justinian was more than Marcian. Besides Anthimus, Severus, about whom the very worst calumnies were spread—that he was a heathen in disguise—and the heads of the Monophysite party of conciliation,

[1] Loofs, p. 304 f., has shewn, however, that at this time Justinian was following the lead of Leontius.

[2] Mansi VIII., pp. 877—1162.

[3] P. 970.

were condemned. Justinian confirmed this sentence[1] by a decree (Aug. 536), while he threatened all adherents of the accused with exile and ordered the books of Severus as also those of Porphyry,[2] to be burned. At the first glance it seems paradoxical that the Emperor, who was himself not without Monophysite leanings, was now so genuinely furious at Severus and accused him at once of Nestorianism[3] and Eutychianism. But after what has been remarked above, (p. 241) the charge of Nestorianism is quite intelligible, and we can understand too the aversion felt by the Emperor who had himself an interest in dogma. A Monophysitism, such as that of Severus, which *merely* rejected the Chalcedonian Creed, but which, moreover, in combating Aphthartodoketism got the length of teaching in the most definite way the "division" of Christ, when once it was thoroughly understood, could be regarded only with antipathy by the Imperial theologian who had on the contrary always wished to have the Chalcedonian Creed *and* Aphthartodoketism. A Jerusalem Council repeated the decrees of the Council of Constantinople;[4] but it was impossible to restore tranquillity in Egypt. The Severian Theodosius had to make way for the Julianist Gajanus as Patriarch, and the Patriarch sent by the Emperor so seriously compromised his patron that he had to be excommunicated.[5]

In the measures he took the Emperor, however, never lost sight of his design which was to win over the Monophysites, and it is at this point that the humiliation of the Roman bishop begins, though he was himself undoubtedly mainly to blame. The theology of Antioch was still something highly objectionable in the eyes of all pious-minded persons. It seemed to be favoured by Leo's doctrinal letter and in fact to be put in a place of honour, and yet a large section of the Eastern Orthodox were at one with all Monophysites in holding that the great Antiochians "would have betrayed the secret". People hated it for the same reason that they hate the Li-

[1] P. 1150 sq.
[2] P. 1154.
[3] P. 1151.
[4] Mansi VIII., p. 1164 sq.
[5] Liberat. Brev. 23.

berals in the Church at the present day, and the Emperor certainly did not hate it least, not to speak of the Empress, the patroness of all pious monks. The Antiochians got the blame of "denying the divinity of Christ" and of dividing the one Christ into two. The influential bishop, Theodorus Askidas of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, is said to have advised the Emperor to make use of this widespread hatred in the interest of his ecclesiastical policy. This man, an enthusiastic pupil of Origen, had suffered seriously from the condemnation of the latter [1] to which he had assented against his will, and in order to divert attention from Origen (Euagr. E. H. IV. 38) he got the Emperor persuaded to believe that a great many Monophysites could be won over if a blow was struck at the Antiochians.[2] As a matter of fact what had given most serious offence to the Monophysites in connection with the Council of Chalcedon, was that it pronounced Ibas and Theodoret orthodox and was silent about Theodore.[3] The Emperor, supported by Theodora, who

[1] On this (in the year 544) see the concluding chapter. Since in the conflict with Origenism Christology did not constitute the main cause of offence, we can leave it out of account here. Still it must be admitted that certain features of the Christology of Origen were acceptable to the Monophysites and to the monks with Monophysite tendencies, and the discussions about Origen in the sixth century took their start from here.

[2] Regarding the Three Chapters' dispute and the Fifth Council, there has been a great controversy in the Catholic Church, which dates very far back and which is still continued. We owe this controversy to the writings of the Jesuit Halloix (for Origen; and unfavourable to the Fifth Council); the Augustinian Noris (Diss. historica de synodo V., in favour of the Council) the Jesuit Garnier, in the 17th century, and later, to those of the Ballerini. In more recent times Vincenzi has sought in a big work which falsifies history (In S. Gregorii Nyss. et Origenis scripta et doctrinam nova defensio, 5 Vols. 1864 sq.) to justify the theses of Halloix, to rehabilitate Origen and Vigilius, and on the other hand partly to "remodel" the Council and partly to bring it into contempt. The Romish Church is not yet quite clear as to the position it should take up in reference to the older Antiochians and Theodoret, and further, to Origen and Vigilius. I am not acquainted with the work of Punkes, P. Vigilius und der Dreicapitelstreit, München 1865. The fullest Protestant account is still that of Walch, Vol. VIII. The most thorough study of the chief opponent of the imperial policy, Facundus of Hermiane in North Africa, has been published by a Russian, Dobroklonskij (1880); see on his work Theol. Lit. Ztg. 1880, n. 26.

[3] Theodore had still in the East and even in the monasteries some secret adherents, apart from the Nestorians; see Loofs, pp. 274—297, 304.

had long ago established a Monophysite branch-regime which made its influence felt as far as Rome, issued, apparently in 543, an edict,[1] in which the person and writings of Theodore, the Anti-Cyrillian writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas to the Persian Maris,[2] were condemned. This was the edict of the τρίκ κεφάλαια, the three points or chapters. The orthodox found themselves placed by it in a most painful position. It was a political move on the part of the Emperor forced on him by the circumstances in which he was placed, and a better one could not have been contrived.[3] The faithful adherents of the Fourth Council had to face the alternative either of actually departing from orthodoxy by the rejection of heterodox doctrines—for it was evident that a revision of the Chalcedonian Creed was intended, which limited freedom in the interpretation of it—or of having to defend what was questionable by way of protecting doctrinal unity; for nobody could deny but that Theodore in particular had actually taught heterodox doctrine. At the same time a sort of question *du fait* was to be decided in addition. The question as to the views held by the Council regarding things which it had not discussed, was to be settled. The Emperor dictated what these views were. Distinctions were to be made between what the whole Council had approved of and what had been approved of merely by individual members; for example, in reference to the letter of Ibas. It was plain that all this was bound only to be to the advantage of the Monophysites. It might be easy to point out to the Western oppo-

[1] No longer preserved.

[2] Mansi VIII., p. 242 sq.

[3] Loofs, op. cit. has shewn that Justinian's policy, which struck at once at Origen and at Theodore, was occasioned by the disturbances in the monasteries of Palestine where both had their sympathisers who had already come into sharp conflict with each other. "The explanation of the fact that Justinian pretty much about the same time struck at Origen with the one hand and at the Three Chapters with the other, is to be found not in the ill-humour of Theodorus Askidas, but in the state of things in Palestine." The energetic attack already made by Leontius on Theodore in the years 531—538 had prepared the way for a decree which enjoined that the Chalcedonian Creed must positively not be interpreted in the sense in which it was understood by Theodore; see Loofs, p. 307. The resolution to add the writings of Ibas and Theodoret, seems only to have been come to at the last moment.

nents of the imperial decree that they had been too sharp-sighted in hunting for traces of Monophysite leaven, but as regards the main point they were entirely in the right. The condemnation of the three chapters, so far as its tendency was concerned, involved a revision of the Chalcedonian Creed. But the Emperor was in the right too; for he corrected the conciliar-decree in accordance with the spirit of the Eastern Church, which had been repressed at Chalcedon itself. He destroyed the Western influence; he carried the Chalcedonian Creed back to Cyril; *he restored the dogmatic thought of the two Councils of Ephesus, without meddling with the Creed of Chalcedon.* All four patriarchs of the East took offence at the condemnation of the Three Chapters and all four signed it after a brief hesitation. Thus powerfully did the Emperor make his rule felt in the Church; there had been no such monarch since Constantius and Theodosius I. The patriarchs worked their bishops and they too all submitted, although they felt it difficult to consent to the condemnation of a bishop who a hundred years before this had died at peace with the Church. What, however, they did not feel, was the desolation created by this imperial measure. Origen was already condemned; the condemnation of the Antiochene theology now followed on his. It was now that the Church first fully provided itself with a falsified tradition, by shutting out its true Fathers as heretics under the patronage of Justinian. It is pretended that its theology had always been the same, and any one who at an earlier period had taught otherwise, was no Father and Shepherd, but an innovator, a robber and murderer. This Church tolerated no recollection of the fact that it had once allowed room within it for a greater variety of opinion. Justinian who closed the School of Athens, also closed the schools of Alexandria and Antioch! He is the Diocletian of theological science and the Constantine of scholasticism! In doing this he did not, however, impose anything on the Church; on the contrary he ascertained what were the true feelings of the majority, probably realised them himself, and by satisfying them made the Church obedient to the State; for the World-Church is to be feared only when provoked; when satisfied it will allow any kind of yoke to be imposed upon it.

The outbreak of the controversy of the Three Chapters which followed on this and its history, have an interest for the history of dogma merely owing to the fact that the North African bishops and, speaking generally, most of the Western bishops made such an energetic resistance to the condemnation of the Three Chapters. The conduct of the Africans and especially the work of Facundus "pro tribus capitulis", are honourable pages in the history of the Punic Churches. On the other hand in the conduct of the Roman Bishop we have a tragedy, the hero of which was no hero, but on the contrary a rogue. Vigilius, the creature of Theodora, the intellectual murderer of his predecessor, the man who was Monophysite or Chalcedonian in accordance with orders, constantly changed his opinion in the course of the controversy, according as he considered compliance with feeling in the West or compliance with the commands of the Emperor, the more necessary. Twice over he was forced by the Emperor to appear before the tribunal of the Church as a liar when Justinian produced secret explanations of his which contradicted his public utterances. His conduct both before the great Council and after it was equally lamentable. The poorest of all the Popes was confronted with the most powerful of the Byzantine Emperors.[1]

Justinian considered a great Council to be necessary although he himself, about the year 551, issued a second edict dealing with the affair of the Three Chapters. This edict[2] which was framed by the Emperor himself who was always theologically inclined, contains in the most verbose form the strictly Cyrillian interpretation of the Chalcedonian decree. The Cyrillian formula of the "one nature" is approved of, attention being, however, directed to the fact that Cyril made no distinction between nature and hypostasis. Christ is one "composite hypostasis"—ὑπόστασις σύνθετος. The Antiochian theology is rejected in strong terms, the three chapters are condemned in this connection; but it is asserted that we must abide by the Chalce-

[1] Duchesne, Vigile et Pélage, 1884.

[2] Mansi IX., p. 537 sq. Loofs has briefly indicated the nature of the Emperor's theological writing (p. 310 f.) and has shewn how closely it is related to that of Leontius.

donian Creed. In order to sanction this edict, the Fifth Ecumenical Council was opened at Constantinople in May 553, Vigilius protesting. The patriarch of the capital presided. The Acts have not come down to us in their original form; we have only part of them in a Latin translation. But we know from the proceedings of the Sixth Council that interpolations were put into the Acts in the 7th century (on the part of the Monothelites?) and that these interpolations were traced at the time by means of palæographic investigations, though the documents which had been foisted in were in no sense forgeries. The proceedings of the Council which consisted of about 150 members amongst whom there were very few Westerns, were unimportant; all it had to do was to throw the halo of the Church round the imperial edicts. It condemned Origen, as Justinian desired;[1] it condemned the Three Chapters and consequently the Antiochian theology as Justinian desired; it sanctioned the theopaschitian formula as Justinian desired, and in its 14 long-winded anathemas it adopted the imperial edict of 551 as its own. But amongst those who thus said yes to everything, there were few who spoke contrary to their convictions. The Emperor was really the best dogmatist of his time and of his country—if it is the duty of the dogmatist to ascertain the opinions of the majority. While giving a position of exclusive authority to the interpretation of the Chalcedonian Creed on the lines of the theology of Cyril, he hit upon the sense in which it was understood by the Church of the East, *i.e.*, by the majority in it.[2] The importance of the dogmatic

[1] So with reason Noris, the Ballerini, Möller (R. Encykl. XI., p. 113) and Loofs (pp. 287, 291) as against Hefele and Vincenzi.

[2] The anathemas so far as their positive form is concerned come very near Monophysitism without actually falling into it—the most distinct divergence is in No. 8. No. 7 goes furthest in the direction of meeting Monophysitism: *εἴ τις ἐν δύο φύσεσι λέγων, μὴ ὡς ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι τὸν ἕνα κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν γνωρίζεσθαι, ὁμολογεῖ, ἵνα διὰ τούτου σημάνῃ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν φύσεων, ἐξ ὧν ἀσυγχύτως ἡ ἀδιαιρέτως ἕνωσις γέγονεν, οὔτε τοῦ λόγου εἰς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς μεταποιηθέντος φύσιν, οὔτε τῆς σαρκὸς πρὸς τοῦ λόγου φύσιν μεταχωρησάσης—μένει γὰρ ἑκάτερον ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει, καὶ γενομένης τῆς ἑνώσεως καθ' ὑπόστασιν—, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ διαιρέσει τῇ ἀνὰ μέρος τὴν τοιαύτην λαμβάνει φωνὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου, ἢ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν φύσεων ὁμολογῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σαρκωθέντος, μὴ τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων λαμβάνει, ἐξ ὧν*

finding of 553 ought not to be underrated. In a certain sense the blow which the West gave to the East at the Fourth Council was parried by the Fifth Council—in the fashion in which this is done in general in matters of dogma. Rome had given the formula of the two natures to the East, but a hundred years later the East dictated to the West how this formula was to be understood, an interpretation of it which in no way corresponded to the actual wording of the formula. At first undoubtedly the decree of the Fifth Council called forth serious opposition in the West.[1] But first Vigilius submitted,[2] then five years later the African Church followed his example.[3] Still the position of the successor of Vigilius, Pelagius I., was very seriously endangered in the West. The Churches of Upper Italy under the guidance of Milan and Aquileia renounced their allegiance to Rome. Never in antiquity was the apostolic chair in such a critical condition as at that time. Its occupant appeared to many in the West in the light of a State bishop at the beck of Constantinople and deprived of ecclesiastical freedom. The Lombard conquests set him free and rescued him from his position of dependence on Byzantium. Gregory I. having once more regained strength politically and his help being regarded as indispensable by those in Upper Italy who were threatened by the Arians and the pagans, again gained over the larger part of Upper Italy together with the Archbishop of Milan, though indeed it was at the price of a temporary disavowal of the Fifth Council.[4] Another part stood

καὶ συνετέθη, οὐκ ἀναιρουμένην διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν—εἷς γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ δὶ ἑνὸς ἀμφότερα—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ κέχρηται τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὡς κεχωρισμένας καὶ ἰδιοϋποστάτους ἔχει τὰς φύσεις· ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. Observe how the conception of number too gets a new meaning in Dogmatics and how in the dogmatic sense the conception of number is to be taken in one way in connection with the dogma of the Trinity and again in a different way in connection with the Christological dogma. There we have already the whole of scholasticism! In the same way "θεωρία" is now a conception which has first to get a new form for Dogmatics. All throughout in these conceptions things which are irreconcileable must be shewn to be reconciled.

[1] The opposition in the East was wholly unimportant; see Hefele, p. 903 f.

[2] Two statements of Dec. 553 and Feb. 554. Hefele, 905 ff.

[3] Hefele, p. 913 f.

[4] Gregor I., epp. l. IV., 2—4, 38, 39. Gregory had to make his orthodoxy certain by acknowledging the four Councils. He was silent about the Fifth.

aloof from Rome for a whole century. But in the West too at the same period there was a decay of all independent interest in theological questions; when it once more revived, the Church had the Fifth Council and the Cyrillian Dogmatics. The East had revenged itself.

And yet one may doubt if Justinian's policy was the right one which *in dogmaticis* aimed at a mean between the Western and the Egypto-Syrian dogmatic. It stopped half-way. For the sake of the West and of the basis supplied by the Council of 451, the Emperor had adhered to the Chalcedonian Creed; for the sake of the Monophysites and of his own inclinations he decreed the Theopaschitian formula and the rejection of the Three Chapters. But in doing this he roused the West against the spirit of Constantinople and against the Byzantine State, at the very moment when he was making friendly overtures to it, and yet he did not gain over the Monophysites.[1] He could not find the right dogmatic formula for the World-Empire which he created; what he did settle was the specific formula for the patriarchate of Constantinople and its immediate belongings. He, however, saw that himself; he wished to sanction Aphthartodoketism (564)[2] which was in harmony with his own dogmatic views and which might perhaps win over the Monophysites. His policy was a logical one, and the Emperor set about carrying it out with his wonted energy, beginning as usual by deposing the patriarch of the capital. We cannot now say what would have happened; the opposition of the Bishops, led this time by the Patriarch of Antioch, Anastasius Sinaita, would perhaps have been overcome; but the Emperor died in November, 565, and his successor Justin II. did not continue this policy. Still, under Justin II. the attempts to gain over the Monophysites, by dragonnades and by friendly methods, did not cease.[3] Even at that time the Imperial bishops were throughout kept from acceding to the

[1] It was only temporally that the Melchites, led by some distinguished patriarchs, once more got the mastery in Egypt; see Gelzer, Leontios von Neapolis, Leben des h. Johannes des Barmherzigen, Erzbischofs v. Alexandrien 1893.

[2] Euagr. H. E. IV. 39, 40.

[3] A sort of henoticon of Justin's in Euagr. V. 4; cf. the Church History of John of Ephesus.

extreme demands of the Monophysites by their desire to preserve communion with the West. The vacillation in the imperial policy, its partial success and partial failure, and the divisions among the Monophysites themselves, etc., belong to Church-History. The way was being prepared for renouncing entirely the authority of Byzantium—and here the political-national movement everywhere preceded the other,—and for the organisation in each case of a separate ecclesiastical constitution. These aims were not definitely accomplished till the seventh century, under entirely altered political conditions.[1]

4. *The Monergist and Monothelite Controversies. The Sixth Council and Johannes Damascenus.*[2]

Paul of Samosata equally[3] with the old Antiochians[4] had affirmed the doctrine of the one will (*μία θέλησις*) in reference to Jesus Christ. The statement of the former, "the different natures and the different persons have one single mode of union,—agreement in will, from which it plainly appears that there is a unity as to energy in the things thus joined together," (*αἱ διάφοροι φύσεις καὶ τὰ διάφορα πρόσωπα ἕνα καὶ μόνον ἑνώσεως ἔχουσι τρόπον τὴν κατὰ θέλησιν σύμβασιν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν ἐπὶ τῶν οὕτως συμβιβασθέντων ἀλλήλοις ἀναφαίνεται μονάς*), lies at the basis of the Antiochene Dogmatic even after it had taken definite shape as a doctrine of two natures. They were thus Monothelites. On the other hand, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril, and the Areopagite had taught the doctrine of one energy in Christ,

[1] On the Syro-Jacobite-Monophysite, the Coptic-Monophysite, the Abyssinian Church, as well as on the Armenian Church which continued to be Cyrillian, not Monophysite in the strict sense of word—see the article in Herzog's R. Encykl., and better in the Dict. of Christ. Biog. and in Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 205 ff.; cf. also Sibernagl op. cit.

[2] See the material in Mansi X., XI.; in addition the works of Maximus Confessor, of Anastasius Biblioth., of Anastasius Abbas, and the Chronographs; see also the Lib. pontif. and the works of Joh. Damascenus. Accounts by Combefis (1648), Tamagnini (1678), Assemani (1764), Gibbon, Walch (Vol. 9), Schröckh, Hefele, Baur, and Dorner. Further, Möller in Herzog's R. Encykl. (Art. "Monothel."), Wagenmann, there also, Art. "Maximus Confessor".

[3] See Vol. III., p. 41.

[4] In the "Ekthesis" it is expressly admitted that Nestorius did not teach the doctrine of two wills.

the latter with the definite addition "*θεανδρική*".[1] The Antiochians and those last mentioned meant, however, something different by their respective statements. The view of the Antiochians was that the human nature by placing itself at the service of the divine was wholly filled with the divine will—their *μία θέλησις* was not the product of a physico-psychological, but of an ethical, mode of regarding Christ. The Alexandrians regarded the God-Logos as the subject of the God-Man who had made the human nature His own and used it as his organ; they thus thought of a unity of energy having its roots in the unity of the mysterious constitution of the God-Man. In Leo's doctrinal letter there was what was for the East a new conception of it—"Agit utraque forma quod proprium est", "each nature does what is peculiar to it", though undoubtedly "cum alterius communione"—"in union with the other". This way of conceiving of it was indirectly sanctioned by the Chalcedonian decree. In the century following it gave great offence; it besides rendered it necessary to consider the nature of the energy, the willing and the acting of Christ, and as a matter of fact it was the most serious stumbling-block for the Severians whose thesis "one composite nature" (*μία φύσις σύνθετος*) naturally demanded the "one energy" (*μία ἐνέργεια*). But still owing to the Chalcedonian Creed a theory gradually got a footing in the Church according to which each nature was considered by itself while the unity was consequently conceived of as a product, and the doctrine of the Agnoetæ (see p. 239) which made its appearance amongst the Severians proves that even this party could not avoid what was a sort of splitting up of the one Christ. The neo-orthodox theology of a Leontius and Justinian spite of its Cyrillian character required that Christ should be conceived of as having two energies, although it is going too far to maintain

[1] Dionys. Areop. (Opp. ed. Corderius, edit. Veneta 1755, T. I., p. 593), ep. 4, (ad Caium): *ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν οὐκ ἀνθρωπικῶς ἀφορίζομεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μόνον (οὐδὲ ὑπερούσιος ἢ ἄνθρωπος μόνον) ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς, ὁ διαφερόντως φιλάνθρωπος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπους καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐσίας ὁ ὑπερούσιος οὐσιωμένος ... καὶ γὰρ ἵνα συνελόντες εἴπωμεν οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἦν, οὐχ ὡς μὴ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἀνθρώπων ὑπέκεινα, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπος γεγονώς. Καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ κατὰ Θεὸν τὰ θεῖα δράσας, οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωθέντος Θεοῦ καινήν τινα τὴν θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῖν πεπολιτευμένος.*

that already in the time of Justinian the question had been decided[1] in accordance with the later orthodox view.[2]

One might try to explain the fact that the question was raised in the seventh century at all, from the "inner logic" of the matter; but the dogma in the form in which it was settled under Justinian, still left room for the raising of countless other questions which were not less important. As a matter of fact it was a purely political consideration, the desire, namely, to win back the Monophysite provinces, which conjured up the controversy. The latter accordingly essentially belongs to political history and it will be sufficient here to fix the most important points, since the doctrine of one will equally with that of two wills would have been in harmony with the decisions of the Fourth and Fifth Councils.

The patriarch of the capital, Sergius, advised his emperor, the powerful and victorious Heraclius, (610—641) to secure the conquests he had once more made in the South and East by meeting the Monophysites half way with the formula that the God-Man consisting of two natures effected everything by means of *one* divine-human energy. In support of this doctrine Sergius collected together passages from the Fathers, large numbers of which belonging both to ancient and recent times, lay to hand, won over influential clergy in Armenia, Syria, and Egypt, and succeeded in conjunction with the Emperor in filling the eastern Patriarchates with men whose views were similar to his own and actually laid the foundation of a union with the Monophysites (633). But a Palestinian monk named Sophronius, who was afterwards bishop of Jerusalem, came to Egypt, declared the *μία ἐνέργεια* to be "Apollinarianism", seriously embarrassed the imperial Patriarch, Cyrus, in Alexandria, and impressed even Sergius to whom he had recourse. As on the one hand, how-

[1] Loofs, p. 316.

[2] According to anathema No. 3 of the Fifth Council the active principle in the Redeemer is the undivided person who as such performs miracles and suffers. No. 8 is undoubtedly opposed to this: *μενούσης ἑκατέρας φύσεως, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἡνῶσθαι σαρκὶ νοοῦμεν τὸν λόγον.* The dispute as to whether there was one will or two, dates at least as far back as the beginning of the 6th century; but the assertion of two wills is as a rule charged against the orthodox by their *opponents* as the logical result of their views.

ever, there was a desire not to abandon again the position gained in reference to the Monophysites, and as on the other it was necessary to avoid the appearance of endangering orthodoxy, Sergius now declared that all discussion of the question of energies was to cease, and signified his wish in this matter to his colleagues in Alexandria and to the Emperor himself. He wrote at the same time to Bishop Honorius of Rome.[1] The latter at that time published the celebrated letter which played such an important part in 1870 and the treatment of which in the second edition of Hefele's History of the Councils has justly occasioned so much surprise.[2] Honorius in this letter describes Sophronius as a man who is stirring up new controversies, praises Sergius for his great prudence in discarding the new expression (μία ἐνέργεια) which might be a stumbling-block to the simple, declares that Holy Scripture makes no mention either of one energy or of two energies, that the latter expression is suggestive of Nestorianism and the former of Eutychianism, and incidentally states as something self-evident that "we confess one will of the Lord Jesus Christ" (ἓν θέλημα ὁμολογοῦμεν τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), that is, the one will of the Godhead. This was not yet in any sense a controversial question; but Sergius in his letter to Alexandria had regarded it as likewise self-evident that in putting the question of the energies into the background he could not in any case agree to the doctrine of two wills.[3] Meanwhile Sophronius in his character as the new bishop of Jerusalem had issued a work definitely based on the Chalcedonian Creed as interpreted by Leo's doctrinal letter. Two energies are to be recognised in the one Christ who is in both the same. One and the same Christ followed the energy both of his divine and also of his human nature. Still Sophronius does not say anything of two wills.

[1] Shortly before this the controversy between Rome and Byzantium regarding the title "Ecumenical Patriarch" had been going on; see Gelzer in the Jahrbb. f. Protest. Theol. 1887, p. 549 ff., and Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 111 f.

[2] See S. Theol. Lit. Ztg., 1878, No. XI. The letter is in Mansi, XI., p. 538 sq.

[3] The heterodoxy of Honorius does not certainly amount to much, since he adheres to Leo's doctrinal letter and since nothing was yet decided regarding the energies and the will.

He likewise had recourse to Rome, and Honorius, like Sergius, made an effort to bring about union between the contending parties in the Eastern Church by dissuading them from employing the formulæ. Heraclius gave his support to these efforts and published an edict drawn up by Sergius (638), the Ecthesis, which forbade the use both of μία ἐνέργεια and of "two energies" as equally dangerous expressions. The latter expression, it was maintained, leads to the assumption of two conflicting wills in Christ, while Christ has only one will since the human nature acts only in accordance with the God-Logos who has assumed it.[1] The personality of the Redeemer thus appears, in strict accordance with the theology of Cyril, as built up on the basis of the God-Logos.

But already Rome and the West once more bethought themselves of their dogmatics. Every attempt to meet the views of the Monophysites always brought the Byzantine Emperor into conflict with Rome. Pope John IV. as early as the year 641 condemned Monothelitism at a Roman Council. Immediately thereafter Heraclius died, putting the responsibility of the Ecthesis on to Sergius. The latter had died previously to this; Pyrrhus, who held similar views, took his place. After severe struggles in the palace, which Pyrrhus had to pay for by his deposition, Constans II., a grandson of Heraclius, became emperor. Those at the Court were resolved to maintain the Ecthesis and not to submit to the Roman bishop, Theodore.[2] Meanwhile North Africa had become the second headquarters of the Dyothelites. The Byzantine governor there, Gregory, the patron of the monks, who was on bad terms with the Court, made use of the African dislike of Byzantium and its dogmatics in order, if possible, to detach the Province from Constantinople, and with him sided the most learned Chalcedonian of the East,

[1] Mansi, X., p. 931 sq.: "We must confess one will in our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, implying that at no time did his flesh animated by a reasonable soul accomplish what was natural for it to do, separately, and by its own impulse, in opposition to the suggestion of the God-Logos who was hypostatically united with it, but that on the contrary it acted only when and how and in the way the Logos wished."

[2] John IV. had already, moreover, attempted to hush up the conduct of Honorius, to excuse it, that is.

Maximus (Confessor) and many other Easterns, monks especially, who had fallen out with the Emperor.[1] Pyrrhus too took up his quarters in North Africa and was easily converted to dyotheletism. In Rome he completed his change of opinion and was recognised by Theodore as the legitimate bishop of Constantinople. The Emperor was flooded with addresses from North Africa the aim of which was to induce him to enter the lists on behalf of orthodoxy. But the defeat of Gregory by the Saracens weakened the courage and interfered with the plans of the Anti-Byzantine coalition. Pyrrhus with all possible speed once more made his peace with the Emperor and with the Imperial dogmatics; but the Roman bishop stood firm, condemned Pyrrhus, and pronounced sentence of deposition on Paul who was at the time occupying the Byzantine chair. The Emperor, on the advice of Paul and in order to pacify the Empire, issued in the year 648 the Typus, which bears the same relation to the doctrine of the wills as the Ecthesis does to the doctrine of the energies. It simply prohibits under severe penalties all controversy regarding the question as to whether it is necessary to believe in one will and one energy or in two wills and two energies, and forbids the prosecution of any one because of his position on this question. For the sake of the Westerns the Ecthesis was removed from the principal church of the capital.[2]

But Rome was far from accepting this part-payment as a full discharge. It had wholly different plans. The situation seemed a favourable one for estranging from the Emperor the entire orthodoxy of the East and binding it to the successor of Peter,

[1] Battifol, L'abbaye de Rossano, Paris, 1891, has given us information of first-rate quality regarding the exodus of the Greek monks and priests to (North Africa) Sicily and Calabria. Lower Italy underwent at that time a new Hellenisation.

[2] Mansi X., p. 1019 sq. The form of the Typus as distinguished from the Ecthesis is worthy of note. It no longer speaks the theological language which Justinian above all had naturalised. Constans in fact more and more gave evidence of possessing qualities which make him appear akin in spirit to the iconoclastic Emperors of a later time. Conversely, amongst the most outstanding monks and priests of the seventh century we already meet with that enmity to the State, in other words, that desire to see the Church independent of the State, which occasioned the frightful struggle in the eighth and ninth centuries. In this respect the position taken up by Maximus Confessor who contested the right of the Emperor to interfere in dogmatic questions and disputed his sacerdotal dignity, is specially characteristic.

in order to shew the Byzantine ruler the power of the Apostolic chair. What Justinian had done to the latter was to be requited, although Constans was the Sovereign of Rome. The new Pope, Martin I., who, like many of his predecessors, had formerly been the Papal Apokrisiar in Constantinople, got together a large Council in the Lateran in October 649. Over a hundred Western bishops attended; they were surrounded by numerous Greek priests and monks who had fled from Constans, first to North Africa, and then after the catastrophe there, to Sicily, Calabria, and Rome. The Council was a conspiracy against Constantinople, and he who was at the head of it was raised to the throne without the imperial sanction. We have here a continuation of the policy of Gregory I., but in a more energetic and menacing form. The dyothelite doctrine after a discussion lasting over several sittings, was made a fixed dogma by the help of the huge patristic apparatus contributed by the Greeks,[1] and finally a symbol was adopted which added on to the Chalcedonian Creed the words, "two natural wills" ("duas naturales voluntates") "two natural operations" (duas naturales operationes), without detriment to the unity of the person ("one and the same Jesus Christ our Lord and God as willing and effecting divinely and humanly our salvation"—"eundem atque unum dominum nostrum et deum I. Chr. utpote volentem et operantem divine et humane nostram salutem"), and allowing in fact the validity of the proposition when correctly understood; "one incarnate nature of the divine Logos"—*μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*. The twenty canons attached to the Creed define the doctrine more precisely and cover the whole of Christology. In the eighteenth canon Origen and Didymus are reckoned amongst the other "nefandissimi hæretici". In addition, the fathers of Monothelitism, of the Ecthesis and the Typus, Theodore of Pharan, Cyrus of Alexandria, and also the three Constantinopolitan patriarchs, Sergius, Pyrrhus, and Paul were condemned. Monothelitism was designated as Monophysitism, while the Typus again was described as the godless decree which robbed Jesus

[1] "We have a library, but no manuscripts," wrote the Pope in that same year to Bishop Amandus.

Christ of His will, His action, and consequently of His natures generally. Maximus Confessor too stated this brilliant thought with many variations.[1] When we read the resolutions of this Council the impression produced is that of a polemic encounter arranged with some secret end in view.

Martin now made the most strenuous endeavours to get authority over the Churches of the East by the help of the decision of the Council. Like a second Dioscurus he interfered with Eastern affairs, made use of the desperate state of the Churches in the East which were in part in the possession of the Saracens and consequently were no longer in connection with Constantinople, in order to play the roll of supreme bishop, and accordingly worked in direct opposition to the imperial interests and perhaps even conspired with the Saracens. The Emperor now proceeded to take energetic measures. The first attempt to seize the Pope miscarried, it is true, owing to the faithlessness of the Exarch who was sent to Italy. But the new Exarch succeeded in getting Martin into his power (653). As a traitor who had secretly made common cause with the Saracens and as a bishop who had been illegally appointed, he was brought to Constantinople. Dishonoured and disgraced he was then banished to the Chersonesus where he died in the year 655. At the same time proceedings were taken against the dogmatic theologian of Dyothelitism, the monk Maximus, the mystic and scholastic, who for the sake of scholasticism was unwilling to do without the complicated formulæ of the two natures, two wills, two operations in the one person, and who had actually made a profound study of them. In Rome Eugenius was now chosen as Pope and he was disposed to come to some arrangement. At the same time the most reasonable proposal was made which could possibly have been made in the circumstances: It was allowable to speak of *two* natural wills which, however, in accordance with the hypostatic union, become one hypostatic will. Maximus probably endeavoured to prevent the West from falling into this "heresy", but the successor of Eugenius (+657) Vitalian, gave in without any

[1] The Acts of the Council, which even yet enjoys a special authority in the Romish Church, are in Mansi XI., the Creed, p. 1150; see also Hahn 2, § 110.

explanations and once more restored the communion with Constantinople which had for so long been interrupted. Constans himself visited Rome in the year 663; the peace lasted till the violent death of the Emperor (668) when he was staying at Syracuse. Rome's lofty plans seemed to be destroyed.

The revolution in policy which now followed in Constantinople is not perfectly comprehensible spite of the obvious explanation that the Monophysite provinces were lost and that consequently there was no longer any reason for shewing any enthusiasm on behalf of Monothelitism or for opposing the establishment of Dyothelitism. Then we may reflect further that, as a matter of fact, the Chalcedonian Creed the more it was regarded from the outside demanded the doctrine of two wills, and that this doctrine alone possessed in Maximus a theologian of weight. But these considerations do not entirely clear up the facts of the case. Constantine Pogonatus seems really to have held the memory of Pope Vitalian in honour because the latter had supported him in putting down the usurpers. For this very reason he hesitated to comply with the wish of the Eastern Patriarchs that Vitalian's name should be erased from the diptychs—the bishop of Constantinople could never desire to enter into alliance with Rome.[1] It was perhaps a real love of peace or still more a perception of the fact that Italy must not be lost to the Empire, and that Italy, moreover, could be retained only by an alliance with the Roman see, which induced the Emperor to arrange a meeting and a conference of the opposing parties. In the year 678, taking up an entirely impartial attitude, he requested the Roman bishop to send representatives to the capital to attend a gathering of this kind. Rome, *i.e.*, the new bishop Agatho, said nothing at first; why is not quite clear. At any rate he once more set afloat in the West certain declarations in favour of the doctrine of two wills. Meanwhile the Patriarch Theodore of Constantinople and Macarius of Antioch who, however, resided in the Capital, succeeded in getting the Emperor's sanction for erasing Vitalian's name from the diptychs. Finally, Agatho sent the desired deputies,

[1] There was once more friction between Rome and the patriarch of Constantinople, and this threatened to make the old controversy a pretext for quarrelling.

together with a very comprehensive letter which was modelled in imitation of Leo's doctrinal letter, and in which at the same time the infallibility of the Roman see in matters of faith was expressed in a supremely self-conscious fashion.[1] From this time onwards the Emperor was resolved to yield to the Pope in everything (why?). By means of an edict addressed to George, the new patriarch of the Capital, who had shewn himself pliable, he now summoned a Council to meet, which though it was not originally intended by the Emperor himself to be ecumenical, did nevertheless come to be this. It lasted from November 680 to September 681, had 18 sittings and was attended by about 170 bishops. (The Byzantine East was already very seriously curtailed owing to the Mohammedan conquests.) It was presided over by the Emperor, or, what is the same thing, by the imperial representatives, while the Roman Legates voted first. It may be called the Council of antiquaries and palæographists; for really dogmatic considerations were hardly adduced. On the contrary, operations were conducted on both sides by the help of the voluminous collections of the Acts of earlier Councils and whole volumes of citations from the Fathers, which, however,—and this is in the highest degree characteristic—were after delivery *sealed* until the exact time when they were to be read out, so that they might not be secretly falsified at the very last moment. Moreover, palæographic investigations were conducted which were not without result.[2] Monothelitism had not a few supporters; the most energetic of these was the Patriarch of Antioch, Macarius, who amongst other things appealed to Vigilius, but was forbidden to do so; the letters, it was alleged, were tampered with, which was not the case. Other fathers expressed a desire that it should not be permissible to go beyond the conclusions of the Five Councils in any direction. A proposal was also made at the sixteenth sitting to grant two wills for the period of Christ's earthly life, but to allow of only one after the Resurrection.[3] But the new "Manichean" and "Apollinarian" was promptly expelled from

[1] Mansi XI., pp. 234—286.

[2] The Acts of the Council in Mansi, XI.

[3] Mansi XI., p. 611 sq.

the place of meeting. The experiment made by another Monothelite and which he carried on for two hours, of laying his creed on the body of a dead person in order to restore him to life and thus to prove the truth of the doctrine of one will, miscarried.[1] The Council knew what the will of the Emperor was, and following the lead of the Patriarch of the Capital, placed itself at the disposal of "the new David" who "has thoroughly grasped the completeness of the two natures of Christ our God"! Vitalian's name was restored; in accordance with the wish of Agatho a long series of Constantinopolitan patriarchs from Sergius downward together with Macarius and other Monothelites were condemned, *amongst whom Pope Honorius too was put.*[2] Finally a creed full of coarse flattery of the Emperor was adopted,[3] and this completed the triumph of the Pope over Byzantium. Two natural θελήσεις ἤ θελήματα were acknowledged and two natural energies existing indivisibly (ἀδιαιρέτως), unchangeably (ἀτρέπτως), undividedly (ἀμερίστως), unconfusedly (ἀσυγχύτως) in the one Christ. They are not to be thought of as mutually opposed, on the contrary, the human will follows the divine and almighty will and far from resisting or opposing it, is in subjection to it. The human will is thus not done away with; but there is on the other hand a certain interchange; it is the will of the divine Logos, just as the human nature without being done away with has nevertheless become the nature of the divine Logos. The Conciliar epistle to Agatho extols the latter as an imitator of the prince of the Apostles and as the teacher of the mystery of theology.[4] The Monothelites who had been condemned by the Council were handed over to him to be further dealt with—an unheard of act hitherto. In the West the decrees were universally accepted—in Spain too, where, soon after, the Augustinian interpretation of the Chalcedonian Creed was advanced yet a stage further (as we see

[1] Fifteenth Session, Mansi XI., p. 602 sq.

[2] For the mode in which this "problem" is treated by Roman theologians, see Hefele III., pp. 290—313.

[3] Mansi XI., p. 631 sq.

[4] Mansi XI., p. 658 sq.

in Adoptianism). In the East again the adoption of Dyothelitism which, backed up by the authority of Rome had gained the victory, did not by any means proceed smoothly. Not only did a Monothelite reaction ensue, which was, however, definitely disposed of[1] in the year 713, but there was, above all, a reaction against the penetration of the Roman spirit into the East. This which began with the second Trullan Council in 692 was continued in the age of the iconoclastic Emperors and of Photius. Apart, however, from the controversy about the "filioque" which was dragged in and which has already been treated of above p. 126, it belongs entirely to political history, or to that of worship and discipline.

It is incontrovertible that Rome at the Fourth and Sixth Councils permanently gave *her* formula to the East and that this formula admits of a Græco-Cyrillian interpretation only by the use of theological artifice. But this interpretation had been given to it already at the Fifth Council and had an effect on Rome herself, who from this time onward had to tolerate *also* the μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη—the one incarnate nature of the divine Logos.[2] This circumstance explains on the one hand the strange lack of vigour shewn by the Easterns in combating Dyothelitism, and on the other hand the paradoxical fact that the ablest of the Eastern theologians, even the Mystics, supported the doctrine of the two wills. But in order to explain the action of the Mystics it is necessary further to point to the fact that it was no longer possible to do without the scholastic theology of the neo-orthodox, Leontius and Justinian, which had the "duality" as its presupposition, and in conjunction with Mysticism presented a subject for endless speculations. To this was added the fact that the Eucharist and the whole system of worship, already satisfied in a much more certain and more living way than did the system of dogma which had become purely "sacred antiquity", the feeling of the Church as to what was of direct concern and of supreme

[1] On the Maronites, see Kessler in Herzog's R.-Encykl. IX., p. 346 ff.

[2] Why in accordance with this the use of the formula ἓν θέλημα θεανδρικόν was not allowed together with the doctrine of the two wills, is a point that is not easily understood. It was owing to Romish obstinacy.

importance in the past—namely, the thought of deification. This is shewn by the nature of the discussions in the Sixth Council. The impression we get that at that time believing thought, in the sense of a direct and living interest in the spiritual and religious substance of the Faith, had been entirely blighted, very strongly induces us to look for the life of this Church in some other sphere. And if we ask where we are to look for it, the image-controversies on the one hand, and the scholastic investigations of Johannes Damascenus on the other, supply the answer. The dogma which had been already settled at the Fifth Council and which at the Sixth Council had been once more revived and—not without danger—meddled with, embodied itself in cultus and science.

The Christological propositions which are worked out in the Dogmatics of Johannes Damascenus, especially in the third book, are—even according to Thomasius—stated in "what is pretty much a scholastic form". It is the idea of distinction which dominates the method of treatment. Christ did not assume human nature in its generic form—for John as an Aristotelian is aware that the genus embraces all individuals—but neither did he unite himself with a particular man; on the contrary he assumed the human nature in such a way that he individualised what he assumed and what is not a part but the whole. This is the kind of cross which had already been recognised by Leontius, which has no hypostasis of its own and yet is not without it, but which possessing its independent existence in the hypostasis of the Logos is enhypostatic. Thus Christ is the composite hypostasis. The "centaur" and "satyr" against which Apollinaris had warned the Church, have thus not been avoided The hypostasis belongs to both natures and yet belongs wholly to each of them. But the divine nature preponderates very considerably (cf. the old deceptive analogy of the relation between soul and body in man, III., 7) and it has been correctly remarked that with Johannes Damascenus the Logos is at one time the hypostasis and then again the composite being of Christ as something between. In any case the humanity is in no way considered as formally entirely homogeneous with the divinity. This is shewn too in the

doctrine of the interchange (*μετάδοσις*), appropriation, exchange, (*οἰκείωσις, ἀντίδοσις*) of the peculiarities of the two natures, which John conceives of as so complete that he speaks of a "coinherence or circumincession of the parts with one another"—*εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν μέρων περιχώρησις*. The flesh has *actually* become God, and the divinity has become flesh and entered into a state of humiliation. This exchange is to be conceived of as implying that the flesh also is permitted to permeate the divinity, but this is allowed only to the flesh which has itself first been deified; *i.e.*, it is not the actual humanity which permeates the divinity; hence the Logos too remains entirely untouched by the sufferings. Everything is accordingly in this way assigned to the two wills and the two operations. The religious point of view of the whole system is that of Cyril, but this point of view cannot be perfectly realised by means of the "duality" already laid down in the dogma. Just for this reason a certain amount of room is left for the human nature of Christ and for the work of the philosophers. That is why the Christology of Johannes Damascenus has become classical.[1]

[1] It is characteristic of the way in which John works out the doctrine, that his arguments throughout are based on passages quoted verbally from the Fathers, though the names of the authors are frequently not given. A mosaic of citations lies at the basis of the scholastic distinctions; Leontius is most frequently drawn upon, but he is never mentioned by name. John is also dependent to a very great extent on Maximus. How scholasticism has stifled theology is most strikingly shewn in proposition III. 3 (ed. Lequien 1712, I., p. 207): *ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν τοῖς αἱρετικοῖς τὴν πλάνην, τὸ ταὐτὸ λέγειν τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.* I imagine that as late as the fifth century any theologian who would have drawn the inference of heresy in this fashion, would have made himself ridiculous. That was the achievement of the neo-orthodox, the Aristotelians from Leontius onwards. A detailed description of the Christology of the Damascene belongs to the history of theology. But it may not be without use to mention the topics which he dealt with here: III. 2: How the Word was conceived and concerning his divine incarnation. 3: Of the two natures in opposition to the Monophysites. 4: On the nature and mode of the antidosis. 5: On the number of the natures (*ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὐ διαιρέσεως αἴτιος πέφυκεν*, p. 211). 6: That the whole divine nature in one of its hypostases united itself with the whole human nature and not a part with a part. 7: On the one composite hypostasis of the divine Logos. 8: Against those who say that the natures of the Lord must be brought under the category either of continuous or discrete quantity. 9: An answer to the question whether there is an enhypostatic nature (here, p. 218, the enhypostasis). 10: On the Trishagion. 11: *περὶ τῆς ἐν εἴδει καὶ ἐν ἀτόμῳ θεωρουμένης φύσεως καὶ διαφορᾶς, ἑνώσεώς τε καὶ*

σαρκώσεως καὶ πῶς ἐκκλητέον, τὴν μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην (one of the main chapters from the scholastic point of view). 12: On θεοτόκος as against the Nestorians. 13: On the properties of the two natures. 14: On the wills and the αὐτεξούσια of Christ (the fullest chapter together with 15: On the energies which are in Christ). 16: Against those who say: as man has two natures and two energies, so we must attribute to Christ three natures and the same number of energies—a very ticklish problem. 17: On the deification of the nature of the flesh of the Lord and of His will. (As is the case throughout the discussion here starts from the *contradictio in adjecto* and conceals it under distinctions: the flesh has become divine, but in the process has undergone neither a μεταβολή, nor τροπή nor ἀλλοίωσις nor σύγχυσις; it has been deified κατὰ τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν οἰκονομικὴν ἕνωσιν or κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἀλλήλαις τῶν φύσεων περιχώρησιν. The old image of the glowing iron). 18: Once more regarding the wills, the αὐτεξούσια, the double-understanding, the double-gnosis, the double-wisdom of Christ. 19: On the ἐνέργεια θεανδρική. 20: Of the natural and blameless feelings (Christ possessed them, but the number of them given is very limited). 21: Of the ignorance and servitude of Christ (because of the hypostatic union neither ignorance nor servitude can be attributed to Christ relatively to God). 22: On the προκοπή in Christ (as a matter of fact the idea of προκοπή is plainly rejected: the "increase in wisdom" is explained: διὰ τῆς αὐξήσεως τῆς ἡλικίας τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ σοφίαν εἰς φανέρωσιν ἄγων. This is genuine docetic Monophysitism; to this it is added that "he makes man's advance in wisdom and grace his own advance." John is here in the most patent perplexity). 23: Of fear (the fear which Christ had and which he did not have. He had natural fear "voluntarily"). 24: Of the Lord's praying (He prayed, not because there was any need for Him to do it, but because He occupied our place, represented what was ours in Himself, and was a pattern. Thus the prayer in Matt. XXVI. 39 was meant merely to convey a lesson; Christ wished at the same time to shew by it that He had two natures and two natural but not mutually opposed wills—this is just the explanation formerly given by Clemens Alex. when he stated that Christ, whom he himself conceived of in a docetic fashion, voluntarily did what was human, in order to refute the Docetae. Christ spoke the words in Matt. XXVII. 46 purely as our representative). 25: On the οἰκείωσις (this chapter too begins, like most of them, with the distinction, that there are two forms of assumption, the φυσική and προσωπική or σχετική. Christ assumed our nature φυσικῶς, but also σχετικῶς, *i.e.*, took our place by way of sympathy or compassion, took part in our forlorn condition and our curse and "in our place uttered words which do not suit His own case"). 26: Of the sufferings of the body of the Lord and of the absence of feeling in His godhead. 27: That the divinity of the Word was not separated from the soul and the body even in death, and continued to be an hypostasis. 28: Of the corruption and decay (as against Julian and Gajan; but here again a distinction is drawn between two kinds of φθορά). 29: Of the descent into Hades. The contents even of the Fourth Book are still Christological, but this may be due to an oversight. One may admire the energy and formal dexterity of Johannes, but still what we have is merely one and the same method of distinction, which, once discovered, can be easily and mechanically employed, as the application of a new chemical method to an indefinite number of substances. Even this brief synopsis will, however, have brought out one thing, if it was still necessary that this should be done—namely, that in Greek Dogmatics in their *religious* aspect *Apollinaris* had triumphed. The

moderate docetism which the latter expressed in a plain, bold and frank way forms the basis of the orthodox idea of Christ, though it is indeed concealed under all sorts of formulæ. As regards these, orthodoxy approaches much nearer to the Antiochians than to Apollinaris; but as regards the matter of the doctrine, all that was preserved of the Antiochian doctrine was the statement that Christ had a real and perfect human nature. This statement came to have a great importance for the future, not of the East, but of the West; but, if I am not mistaken, it helped to preserve the Byzantine Church too from getting into that condition of desolation into which the Monophysite Churches got, though it is true that in the case of the latter other causes were at work.

C. *THE ENJOYMENT OF REDEMPTION IN THE PRESENT.*

CHAPTER IV.

THE MYSTERIES AND KINDRED SUBJECTS.

THERE is an old story of a man who was in a condition of ignorance, dirt, and wretchedness and who was one day told by God that he might wish for anything he liked and that his wish would be granted. And he began to wish for more and more and to get higher and higher, and he got all he wanted. At last he got presumptuous and wished he might become like God Himself, when at once he was back again in his dirt and wretchedness. The history of religion is such a story; but it is in the history of the religion of the Greeks and the Easterns that it came true in the strictest sense. They first wished to have material goods by means of religion, then political, æsthetic, moral, and intellectual goods, and they got everything. They became Christians and desired perfect knowledge and a supra-moral life. Finally they wished even in this world to be as God in knowledge, bliss, and life, and then they fell down, not all at once, but with a fall that could not be stopped, to the lowest stage in ignorance, dirt, and barbarity. Any one who at the present day studies the condition of Greek religion amongst the orthodox and the Monophysites, and not merely the religion of the untrained masses, but also the ritual of worship and the magical ceremonies practised by the ordinary priests and monks and their ideas of things, will with regard to many points get the impression that religion could hardly fall lower.[1]

[1] That an honest and genuine faith can live and does live within these husks is not to be denied.

It has really become "superstitio", a chaos of mixed and entirely diverse but at the same time rigidly fixed maxims and formulæ, an unintelligible and long-winded ritual of a patchwork kind, which is held in high esteem, because it binds the nation or the tribe together or unites it to the past, but which is still a really living ritual only in its most inferior parts.[1] If we were to imagine that we knew nothing, absolutely nothing, of Christianity in its original form and of its history in the first six centuries, and had to determine the genesis, the earlier stages, and the value of the original religion from a consideration of the present condition, say, of the Jacobite or of the Ethiopian Church, how utterly impossible this would be.[2] What we have here is a forbidding and well-nigh dead figure of which only some members and these not the principal members are still living, whose nobler parts are so crusted over that so far as their essence is concerned they defy any historical explanation.[3] Islam which swept violently over Christianity in this form was a real deliverer; for spite of its defects and barrenness it was a more spiritual power than the Christian religion which in the East had well-nigh become a religion of the amulet, the fetish, and conjurers, above which floats the dogmatic spectre, Jesus Christ.[4]

[1] Even in these, as experience teaches us, religion may still continue to live for some. Thus the symbol and cult of the Cross in the Greek Church keeps alive a feeling of the holiness of the suffering of the righteous one and a reverence for greatness in humility.

[2] This impossibility may serve as a warning to us in regard to the interpretation of other religions, of their mythologies and ritual formularies. We know most religions only in the form of "superstitio", *i.e.*, in the form in which they have come down to us they are for the most part already in an entirely degenerate state, or have become petrified. Who therefore would make bold to set about explaining these forms in the absence of all knowledge of the previous stages? It is an audacious undertaking.

[3] This judgment must stand although much that is ancient, genuine, and edifying is contained in the prayers and hymns of the liturgies of all the peoples belonging to the Greek Church. But it has become a formula and as a rule is not understood by the people. In this respect the orthodox churches are in a more favourable position, and much is now being done in order to make the liturgy more intelligible.

[4] See Fallmerayer, Fragmente aus dem Orient, 1877, further the descriptions of the Easter festivals kept by the different ecclesiastical parties in Jerusalem and

Many factors contributed to this final result, and above all, the stern march of political history and the economic distress. Closely connected with this was the abolition of the old distinctions between aristocrats, freemen, and slaves, and following upon this the penetration into the higher ranks of the religious and intellectual barbarism which had never been overcome in the lower ranks. Christianity itself contributed in the most effective fashion towards the decomposition of society; but having done this, it was not able to elevate the masses and to build up a Christian Society in the most moderate sense of the word, on the contrary it made one concession after another to the requirements and wishes of the masses. The fact, however, that it thus soon became weak and allowed the "Christian religion of the second order" which originally had been merely tolerated, to exercise an ever increasing influence on the official religion, is to be explained from the attitude which the latter itself had more and more come to take up.

The general idea of redemption which prevailed in the Greek Church had an eschatological character; redemption is deliverance from perishableness and death. But in Vol. III., pp. 163—190, attention was drawn to the fact that at all periods of its history the Greek Church was aware of possessing a means of salvation which already exists in the present and had its origin in the same source from which future redemption flows—namely, the incarnate person of Jesus Christ. The conception of this present means of salvation was originally of a spiritual kind; the knowledge of God and of the world, the perfect knowledge of the conditions attached to the future enjoyment of salvation, and the power of doing good works, in short "teaching of dogmas and good works" (*μάθημα τῶν δογμάτων καὶ πράξεις ἀγαθαί*) (Cyril of Jerus.), and in addition power over the demons (Athanasius). True, however, to the general mode of conceiving things and also to the heathen philosophies of religion of that period, this knowledge in reference to divine things soon came

their image worship. By the Mohammedans too the Christian priest is frequently regarded as a conjurer and when they happen to be living in the same place with Christians, and are in dire distress, they visit the holy places and have recourse to the miracle-working reliques and images.

to be regarded not as in its nature a clear knowledge, or as having an historical origin, or as in its working something to be spiritually apprehended, but on the contrary as a sophia or wisdom, which being only half comprehensible and mysterious, originates directly with God and is communicated by sacred initiation.[1] The uncertainty which in consequence seemed to attach to the content of this knowledge was more than counterbalanced by the consciousness that the knowledge so acquired and communicated, establishes a fellowship amongst those possessed of it and leads to real union with God and is thus not merely individual reflection.

This magical-mystical element which attaches to knowledge as the present possession of salvation, is certainly also to be considered as a clumsy expression of the view that the *summum bonum* is higher than all reason.[2] But the truth which the Eastern Christians wished to grasp and to retain, was not securely established by mystical rationalism. The combination, however, of the natural theology which had never been given up with mysticism,[3] with the magical and sacramental, entailed above all this serious loss that less and less attention was given to the positive moral element, while the downfall of pure science made it possible for the theologians to take up with all sorts of superstition. It was not that the *superstitio* of the masses was simply forced upon them; in their own theology they endeavoured in ever increasing measure to reach a transcendental knowledge which could be enjoyed, as it were, in a sensuous way. Like their blood-relations the Neo-Platonists, they were originally over-excited, and their minds became dulled, and thus they required a stronger and stronger stimulant. The most refined longing for the enjoyment of faith and knowledge was finally changed into barbarity. They wished to fill themselves with the holy and the divine as one fills oneself with

[1] The beginnings of this transformation are, it is true, to be found far back in the past. We can already trace them in Justin, and perhaps in fact even in the Apostolic Age missionaries like Apollos regarded religion in this way.

[2] See Vol. I., p. 111, Vol. II., p. 349, n. 2.

[3] See Vol. III., p. 253, and p. 272 f. Mysticism as a rule is rationalism worked out in a fantastic way, and rationalism is a faded mysticism.

some particular kind of food. In accordance with this the dogma, the *μάθησις*, was embodied in material forms and changed into a means of enjoyment—the end of this was the magic of mysteries, which swallows up everything, the sacred images, the sacred ritual. Christianity is no longer *μάθησις* and *πράξεις ἀγαθαί*, it is *μάθησις* and *μυσταγωγία*, or rather for the great majority it was to be only *μυσταγωγία*. The image-controversy shews us where the supreme interests of the Church are to be looked for.

The development of what belongs to the sphere of mysteries and of cultus from the time of Origen to the ninth century, does not form part of the History of Dogma. Together with the conceptions of baptism, the Lord's Supper, sacraments, and images it constitutes a history by itself, a history which has never yet been written,[1] and which runs parallel with the History of Dogma. In the Greek Church there was no "dogma" of the Lord's Supper any more than there was a "dogma" of grace. And quite as little was there up to the time of the image-controversy a "dogma" of the saints, angels, and images; it was the *θεοτόκος* only that was found in the Catechism. But ritual was practised here with all the more certainty. There was a holy ritual; it was already firmly established in the days of Athanasius when the State united with the Church, and it was closely followed by a mystagogic theology. This mystagogic theology starting from a fixed point moved with the greatest freedom in the direction of a definitely recognised goal.

The fixed starting-point it had in common with dogma. It was the idea that Christianity is the religion which has made the Divine comprehensible and offers it to us to be possessed and enjoyed. The definitely recognised goal was the establishment of a system of divine economy of a strictly complete kind as regards time and place, the factors of which it was composed and the means it employed, and which, while existing in the midst of what is earthly, allows the initiated by the help

[1] The best treatment of the subject is in von Zezschwitz, System der Kirchl. Katechetik, Vol. I.; see also his article "Liturgie" in Herzog's R.-Encyckl., 2nd ed., and cf. the investigations of the *disciplina arcana* by Rothe, Th. Harnack and Bonwetsch.

of sensuous media to enjoy the divine life. Those who above all developed this system did so with a certain reservation—it was not absolutely necessary. He who has speculation and ascetic discipline has in these as a personal possession, means which render it unnecessary for him to go in quest of sensuous signs and initiation in common. This was the view of Clemens and Origen, and after them the same opinion was expressed by the most important mystagogues of the earlier period, that is, by all those who created mystagogy; for no one creates anything without having the consciousness of being above his creation. But the Epigoni receive everything which has come to be what it is under the form of authority, and accordingly it becomes more and more impossible for them to distinguish between end and means, actual things and their substitutes, between what occupies a ruling place and what is subordinate. The spiritualism which, partly in self-protection and partly following its craving for fantastic creations and sensuous pictures, creates for itself in the earthly sphere a new world which it fills with its own ideas, is at the last menaced and crushed by its own creations. But then the spirit which has been artificially enclosed in it vanishes too, and there is nothing but a dead, inert remainder. On it accordingly that veneration is ever more and more bestowed which formerly was supposed to belong to the spirit which had been confined within the matter. Herewith polytheism in the full sense of the word is once more established, it matters not what form dogmatics may take. Religion has lost touch with spiritual truth. When for it a definite *space* is sacred—in the strictest sense of the word,—and in the same way a definite *place*, definite *vehicles*, bread, wine, images, crosses, amulets, clothes, when it connects the presence of the Holy with definite persons, vessels, ceremonies, in short with the exact carrying out of a carefully prescribed ritual, then though this ritual may have the form it always had and may even include in it the most sublime and exalted thoughts, it is played out as spiritual religion and has fallen back to a low level. But this was the final fate of the religion of the Greeks, which adorns itself with the name "Christian". The private religion of thousands of its adherents, measured by

the Gospel or the Christianity of Justin may be genuinely Christian,—the *religio publica* has only the incontestable right to the Christian *name*,—and in possessing the Holy Scriptures it has what cannot be lost, the capability of reforming itself. Its fundamental dogma, which in the end determined its entire practice, namely, that the God-man Jesus Christ deified the human substance and in accordance with this attached a system of divine forces to earthly media, did not enable it to overcome the old polytheism of the Greeks and barbarians, but on the contrary rendered it incapable of resisting this.

This is not the place to discuss the question as to the extent to which religion succumbed to it and the consequences of this, nor as to the influence exercised by the Neo-Platonic ecclesiastical science and by the ancient religions and mysteries respectively. All we can aim at doing is to establish the fact that the μυσταγωγία which the μάθησις had in view, gradually brought about the decay of the latter. It is only now that we are able perfectly to understand why such a determined resistance was made in the Greek Church to all fresh attempts to give dogma a fixed form, a resistance which could be overcome only by the most strenuous efforts. It was not only the traditionalism native to all religions which thus offered resistance, but the interests bound up with the ritualistic treatment of dogma and to which serious injury was done by the construction of new formulæ. If the practical significance of dogma lay not only in the fact that salvation was attained hereafter on the basis of this Faith, but also in the fact that on the basis of this Faith Christians were already initiated in this world,—in worship,—into fellowship with the Godhead and were able to enjoy the divine, it was necessary that the expression of this truth should be raised above all possibility of change. The liturgical formula which is constantly repeated, is what can least of all stand being altered. Accordingly it is only when we consider how dogmatic controversies have necessarily always been controversies about words which demanded admission into the liturgy, as was the case with the foreign Nicene catchwords, the θεοτόκος, the theopaschitian formula etc., and finally the "filioque", that we can understand the suspicion which they

necessarily roused. We can still see in fact from the state of things in our own churches at the present time how such a liturgy or such a book of praise which in no way corresponds to the creed, causes no difficulty, while even the best innovation has a most disturbing effect. The value of the ritual of worship lies always in its antiquity, not in its dogmatic correctness. Thus the μυσταγωγία which rested on the fundamental thoughts of the μάθησις, and which in fact issued from it, was the stoutest opponent of a *doctrina publica* which was advancing to greater precision of statement. In the end it actually reduced it to silence. In the controversy of Photius with Rome in reference to the Holy Spirit the charge brought against the West of having altered the *wording* of the Creed was urged quite as strongly as the charge of having tampered with the doctrine. One may in fact say that the Greeks regarded the former as worse than the latter. This is the most telling proof of the fact that the daughter became more powerful than the mother, that the μυσταγωγία had come to occupy a place of central importance. This, however, took place long before the days of Photius. The dogmatic controversies of the seventh century are in truth only a kind of echo of no importance, which merely gave dogma the illusory appearance of an independent life. The nature of the controversy makes it evident to any one who looks at the matter more closely, that the dogma had already become a petrifaction and that the kindred ideas of antiquity and of the stability of worship already dominated everything. It is the age of Justinian which brings the independent dogmatic development to an end. At that time the liturgy too received what was practically its final revision. The final completion of dogma ensued under the guidance of scholasticism which now established itself in the Church. Mystagogic theology, which now first began to spread widely, followed the completed liturgy. In this connection we may mention Leontius on the one side and Maximus Confessor who belonged to the seventh century on the other. Dogma as treated in the scholastic and ritualistic fashion is no longer μάθησις at all, in the strict sense of the word. It is, like the Eucharist or the "authentic" image, a divine marvel, a paradoxical, sacred

datum,[1] which scholasticism labours to elevate to being μάθησις, and which mysteriosophy exhibits in worship as something to be enjoyed.

We might content ourselves with these hints regarding the fate of dogma. It will, however, be proper to select two subjects from the rich and complicated material of the history of worship and the mysteries and by means of them to give a somewhat more precise outline of the course of development. These are the ideas of the Lord's Supper in connection with which we have to pay attention to the mysteries in general, and the worship of angels, saints, the Virgin Mary, martyrs, relics, and images. As regards the latter, *the* action ensued in the eighth and ninth centuries which brings to an end the history of dogma or the history of religion in the Eastern Church generally. From this date onwards it has had merely an outward history, a history of theology, of mysticism, and ritualism.

§ I.

At the beginning of the Fourth Century the Church already possessed a large series of "mysteries" whose number and limits were, however, not in any way certainly defined.[2] They are τελεταί, mystic rites, which are based on λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ, words of God; amongst these Baptism, together with the practice of anointing which was closely connected with it, and the Lord's Supper,[3] were the most highly esteemed; while

[1] The description of the doctrine, *i.e.*, the *fides quæ creditur*, as μυστήριον (sacrament), dated back to ancient times, hence too the practice of keeping the Creed secret.

[2] See Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 393 ff. "The mysteries represent by their form the dogma"... "It is in this connection too that the comparison of the details in the Liturgy with the life of Jesus as known to us from the Gospel and for which Sophronius of Jerusalem had already prepared the way, first appears in the true light. The arrangement of the Liturgy represents the history of the Incarnation. In this way the whole form of the Liturgy came to share in the value attached to the dogma. Only he who acknowledges the orthodox Liturgy is a Chalcedonian."

[3] There are many passages which prove how closely Baptism and the Lord's Supper were linked together, and regarded as the chief mysteries. What Augustine de pecc. mer. et remiss. remarks (24, 34) can hardly be held to apply only to the

from them a part of the other mysteries had also been developed. Symbolic acts, originally intended to accompany these mysteries, got detached and became independent. It was in this way that Confirmation originated[1] which is already reckoned by Cyprian as a special "Sacramentum", which Augustine designates[2] a "Sacramentum Chrismatis", and which is called by the Areopagite a "mystery of the mystic oil" (*μυστήριον τελετῆς μύρου*). Augustine too knows of a "Sacramentum Salis" as well as many others,[3] and the Areopagite makes special mention of six mysteries: of enlightenment (*φωτίσματος*), of coming together or communion (*συνάξεως εἴτ' οὖν κοινωνίας*), of the mystic oil (*τελετῆς μύρου*), of priestly consecrations (*ἱερατικῶν τελειώσεων*), of monastic consecration (*μοναχικῆς τελειώσεως*), and the mysteries in reference to the holy dead (*μυστήρια ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶς κεκοιμημένων*).[4] This enumeration is not, however, in any way typical, and its author can hardly have intended it to be taken as absolutely complete. "Mysterium" is every symbol, any material thing, in connection with which anything sacred is to be thought of, every action done in the Church, every priestly performance.[5] These mysteries correspond to the heavenly mysteries which have their source in the

Punic Christians. "Optime Punici Christiani baptismum ipsum nihil aliud quam 'salutem' et sacramentum corporis Christi nihil aliud quam 'vitam' vocant, unde nisi ex antiqua, ut existimo, et apostolica traditione" etc. It was chiefly through the Lord's Supper that the element of mysteries found an entrance into the religion of spirit and truth. This way of treating the elements used in it, which are nevertheless expressly described as symbols, supplied the point of departure for the development of the greatest importance.

[1] Cypr. ep. 72. 1. We find it first amongst the Gnostics alongside of Baptism and the Lord's Supper; see Excerpta ex Theodoto, the Coptic-gnostic writings and the ritual of the Marcianites. Cf. on this sacrament Schwane, Dogmengesch. II., p. 968 ff.

[2] C. litt. Petiliani II., c. 104, 239.

[3] De pecc. merit. II., 42.

[4] See de eccles. hierarch. 2—7. To the author the most of these mysteries are not separate mysteries, but represent a whole series of different mysteries. The last mentioned has nothing to do with extreme unction, but designates certain practices in connection with the treatment of the corpse.

[5] The "aliud videtur, aliud intellegitur" (Augustine) is the best definition of the sacrament or mystery.

Trinity and in the Incarnation.[1] As every fact of revelation is a *mysterium* in so far as the divine has through it entered into the sphere of the material, so conversely every material medium, and thus too the word or the action, is a *mysterium* as soon as the material is a symbol or vehicle of the divine. But even in the earliest times no strict distinction was made between symbol and vehicle. The development consists in this that the symbol more and more retreated behind the vehicle, that new heathen symbols and ritual actions were adopted in increasing numbers and that finally the vehicle was no longer conceived of as a covering for or outward embodiment of a truth, but as a deified element, as something essentially divine.[2]

It is obvious that this way of regarding the "mysteries", amongst which the sign of the cross, relics, exorcism, marriage, etc., were reckoned, made it impossible to think of them as having a marked and lofty *dogmatic* efficacy. The rigid dogmatic even forbade such an assumption. As Greek theology regards the Church as an institute for salvation only when it is thinking of heathen and lapsed members or members who are minors, because the doctrine of freedom and redemption does not allow of the thought of a saving institute or of a community of believers chosen by God, in the same way and for the same reasons it knows nothing of a means of grace for those who are already believers, so far as by this is meant the sin-destroying, reconciliatory activity of God attached to a material sign and always strictly limited in its range, and which has for its object the re-establishment of justice and charity or of the filial relation. The ancient Church knew nothing of such means of grace. Accordingly since it desired to have mysteries, believed it possessed them in actions which had been handed down, and was strongly influenced by the dying heathen cultus, it had

[1] The orthodox Greek Church came to reckon the sacraments as seven owing to the influence of the West, *i.e.*, gradually from the year 1274 onwards. Still the number seven never came to have the importance attached to it in the West.

[2] In Athanasius we already meet with both modes of expression: (1) "The Logos became flesh, in order that he might offer his body for all, and we by participating in his spirit may be made divine" (de decret. synod. Nic. 14); (2) "We are made divine inasmuch as we do not participate in the body of a man, but receive the body of the Logos Himself" (ad. Maxim. phil. 2).

to content itself with the *inexpressibleness* of the effect of the mysteries. This conception forms the basis even where, following the directions of the New Testament,[1] regeneration, the forgiveness of sins, the bestowal of the spirit, etc., are deduced in rhetorical language from separate sacraments. The assumption that the sacramental actions had certain inexpressible effects—the doctrine of freedom prevented the magical-mystical effects which were specially included under this head from being embodied in a dogmatic theory—logically led, however, to these being performed in such a way that the imagination was excited and the heavenly was seen heard, smelt, and felt, as for example in incense and the relics and bones of martyrs. The enjoyment of salvation on the part of him who participated in these rites, was supposed to consist in the elevating impression made on the imagination and the sensuous feelings. He was supposed to feel himself lifted up by means of it into the higher world, and in this feeling to taste the glory of the super-sensuous, and for this reason to carry away the conviction that in a mysterious fashion soul and body had been prepared for the future reception of the immortal life. Such being the theory it was an easy step from this to combine all the mysteries into one great mystery in worship, and this was what actually took place. With this as the starting-point the "Church" too accordingly became a holy reality, the institution for worship, the holy mechanism, which supplies the believer with heavenly impressions and raises him to heaven. The idea of the Church which had the most vitality in the East was that of something which, regarded as active, was "the lawful steward of the mysteries ("ὁ γνήσιος τῶν μυστηρίων οἰκονόμος") and conceived of as passive, was the image of the "heavenly hierarchy."

In strict logical fashion it developed from beginnings which already foreshadow the end. Although the beginnings are characteristically different, we find them in Antioch as well as in Alexandria and thus in both the centres of the East. In the case of the former of these cities the beginnings are to be

[1] Here already at this early stage the difficult question emerges which even at the present day troubles many amongst ourselves, as to whether the ceremonies of the Old Testament, circumcision for instance, were sacraments.

looked for in Ignatius, the author of the Six Books of the Apostolic Constitutions, the editor of the Eight Books, and in Chrysostom, and together with them in Methodius. In the case of the latter the starting-point was supplied by Clemens, Origen, (Gregory of Nyssa) and Macarius. In the former everything from the first was intimately associated with the bishop and with worship, in the latter with the true Gnostic originally, then next with the monk. In the former the bishop is the hierurge and the representative of God, the presbyters represent the apostles, and the deacons Jesus Christ. This is the earthly hierarchy, the copy of the heavenly. Already with Ignatius the cultus dominates the entire Christian life; the holy meal is the heavenly meal, the Supper is the "medicine of immortality"—*φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*. By means of the *one* Church-worship we mount up to God; woe to him who takes no part in it. All this is put in a stronger form in the Apostolical Constitutions, and is developed in a worthy and sensible fashion in the work of Chrysostom *περὶ ἱερωσύνης*. But in all this the attitude of the laity is a passive one; they make no effort, they allow themselves to be filled.[1] The influential Methodius viewed the matter from a different standpoint. Although he is the opponent of the Alexandrians, he does not deny the influence which he had received from them. His realism and traditionalism are, however, of a speculative kind. They constitute the substructure of the subjectivity of the monkish mysticism. Christ must be born "rationally" (*νοητῶς*) in the believer; every Christian must by participating in Christ become a Christ. Methodius knew how to unite the ideas of a powerful religious individualism with the Mysticism which attaches itself to objective traditions. While protecting these latter against the inroads of a heterodox idealism, he nevertheless intended that

[1] I here leave out of account the Syrian mysticism of the fifth and sixth centuries of which we first really got some idea from the admirable work of Frothingham, Stephen bar Sudaili, 1886. The philosophico-logical element is not entirely absent from the views of these Syro-Monophysite mystics who had relations with Egypt too, but still it always was kept in the background. We have in their case Pantheism of a strongly marked character represented by the consubstantiality of God and the universe, and in accordance with this they had a fondness for the "Origenistic" ideas of the history of the universe and of the restoration of all things.

they should merely constitute the premises of an individual religious life which goes on between the soul and the Logos alone.'

This was the fundamental thought of the great theologians of Alexandria. But they rarely connected the substructure of their theosophy with earthly worship, and still more rarely with earthly priests. Nevertheless their substructure was of a much richer kind than that of the Antiochians. There is probably no single idea connected with religion or worship, no religious form, which they did not turn to account. Sacrifice, blood, reconciliation, expiation, purification, perfection, the means of salvation, the mediators of salvation,—all these, which were connected with some symbol or other, played a *rôle* in their system. It was the hierarchical element alone which was kept very much in the background, nor was much prominence indeed given to the idea of the ritual unity of the Church which was a leading one with the Antiochians. Everything is directed towards the perfection of the individual, the Christian Gnostic, and everything is arranged in stages, a feature which is wanting in the system of the Antiochians. The Christian does not merely allow himself to be filled with the Holy; on the contrary he is himself here always engaged in independent effort inasmuch as he advances from secret to secret. At every stage some remain behind; each stage down to the last presents a real thing and the covering of a thing. Blessed is he who knows the thing or actual fact, still more blessed he who presses on to the next stage, but he too is saved who grasps the thing in its covering only. But with the stages of the mysteries the stages of the knowledge of the world further correspond. He who makes the mysteries his own, *thinks* at the same time on the progressively ordered world. He advances from the external world upwards to himself, to his soul, his spirit, to the laws of the world and the world-spirits, to the one undivided Logos who rules the universe, to the incarnate Logos, to the highest Reason, which lies behind the Logos, to what is above all reason—to God. The Cosmos, the history of redemption, the Bible are the great graduated, ordered mysteries which have to be traversed: all divine things and all human things—*πάντα θεῖα καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπινα*. When we have

once reached the end aimed at, all helps may be dispensed with. There is a standpoint viewed from which every symbol, every sacrament, every thing that is holy, which appears in a material covering, becomes profane, for the soul lives in the Holiest of all. "Images and symbols which set forth other things were of value so long as the truth was not present, but when the truth is present, it is necessary to do the things of the truth and not of the image or representation of it," (*αἱ εἰκόνες καὶ τὰ σύμβολα παραστατικὰ ὄντα ἑτέρων πραγμάτων καλῶς ἐγίνοντο, μέχρι μὴ παρῇν ἡ ἀλήθεια· παρούσης δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας δεῖ ποιεῖν, οὐ τὰ εἰκόνος*). This holds good of the aspiring theologian; it holds good also in the main of the humblest, barbarous monk. But Christianity would not be the universal religion if it did not present salvation in the symbolic form at all stages. This thought separates the ecclesiastical theosophs of Alexandria from their Neo-Platonic and Gnostic brethren. In it the universalism of Christianity finds expression, but the concession is too great. It sanctions a Christianity which is bound up with signs and formulæ, the Christianity of the "*εἰκόνες*". The most sublime spiritualism, as happened in expiring antiquity, made terms with the grossest forms of the religion of the masses,—or rather, here is expiring antiquity. That it could do this is a proof that a naturalistic or polytheistic element was inherent in itself. Because it did it, it was itself stifled by the power which it tolerated. The issue reveals the initial capital blunder.

The mystical cultus of Antioch which culminates in the priest and divine service, and the philosophical mysticism of Alexandria which has ultimately in view the individual, the gnostic and the monk, already converge in Methodius and the Cappadocians;[1] they next converge in the works of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.[2] It was owing to Maximus Confessor

[1] Gregory of Nazianzus (in laud. Heron. c. 2) thus speaks from the altar to Hero "Approach hither, near to the Holy places, the mystic table and me, *τῷ διὰ τούτων μυσταγωγοῦντι τὴν θέωσιν, οἷς σε προσάγει λόγος καὶ βίος καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ παθεῖν κάθαρσις.*"

[2] The article by Möller in Herzog's R.-Encyklop. III., p. 616 ff. enables us to understand how the Dionysius question stood in the year 1878 (the best analysis is by Steitz, in the Jahrbb. für deutsche Theol., 1866, p. 197 ff; there are valuable if not quite convincing discussions by Hipler, 1861 and in the Kirchenlex. 2 III.,

that in this combination they became the power which dominates the Church.

Everything was grouped round the Lord's Supper,[1] and as

p. 1789 ff., cf. the work of Engelhardt, Die angebl. Schriften des A. Dionysius, Sulzbach, 1823). Within recent years, however, several new publications based on the sources, and discussions, have appeared, which shew that nothing has really yet been certainly established; see Pitra, Analecta Sacra III., on this Loofs in the ThLZ., 1884, Col. 554 f.; Frothingham, Stephen bar Sudaili, the Syrian Mystic and the Book of Hierotheos, 1886; in addition Baethgen in the ThLZ, 1887, No. 10; Skworzow, Patrologische Untersuchungen, 1875; Kanakis, Dion. d. Areopagite, 1881; Dräseke (Ges. Patrist. Abhandl., 1889, p. 25 ff.; Dionysios v. Rhinokolura, in addition Gelzer in the Wochenschrift f. Klass. Philol., 1892, separate impression); Jahn, Dionysiaca, 1889; Foss, Ueber den Abt Hilduin von St. Denis und Dionysius Areop. in the Jahresbericht des Luisenstädt. R.-Gymnasiums z. Berlin, 1886. The most ancient testimony to the existence of these works is to be found in the Church History attributed to Zacharias of Mitylene (Land, Anecd. Syr. III., p. 228). Severus quoted them at a Council at Tyre which cannot have been held later than the year 513. Still older would be Cyril's testimony in the work against Diodorus and Theodore, which even if it ought not to be attributed to Cyril, belongs to the fifth century. "Although the manuscript reading in Liberatus Brev. 10 is corrupt still it ought probably to be emended thus: Dionysii Areopagitæ, (Dionysii) Corinthiorum episcopi" (Gelzer). Hipler, Pitra, Dräseke, Möller, Kanakis (who wishes to fix the date of the writings definitely for about 120) have pronounced against the old assumption of a (pious) fraud, and have referred the writings to the second half of the fourth century. They have besides sought to shew that we ought probably to make a distinction between the several works which now bear the name of Dionysius, and that the oldest of the writings bearing this name are in all probability not forgeries, though forgers and interpolators did seize upon them in the fifth or sixth century, and that therefore, as is so frequently the case, it was not the author, but tradition which first committed the forgery. But if Frothingham is right, the writings ought to be put later, and Gelzer as against Dräseke has advanced some very strong arguments in favour of the idea of an original *pia fraus*—after the analogy of the Neo-Platonic interpolations—that is in support of the hypothesis "that the author of these writings purposely intended from the first to secure a loftier authority from them than they would otherwise have had by means of the prestige attaching to works contemporary with the Apostles." "The author of the Dionysian writings was merely following the usages of the schools, in transferring his works to the apostolic age." The question of date is consequently not yet settled, (second half of the fourth and fifth century). The period previous to 400 seems to me the more probable, but there are so many points connected with these writings which are still obscure that one must refrain from pronouncing an opinion until a new, thorough, and comprehensive investigation has been made.

[1] Baptism may be left out of account; for the views held regarding it did not undergo any actual development within the period we treat of (see Vol. II., 140.) Naturally the general and changing ideas of the mysteries exercised an influence upon baptism, but it was rarely studied *ex professo*. It besides occupied an isolated position since it could never be brought into intimate connection with worship.

was the case in an earlier period, it still continued to be regarded from a twofold point of view, the sacrificial and the

What was certain was that baptism actually purifies from sins committed previous to it, *i.e.*, destroys them, and consequently constitutes the beginning of the process which makes the mortal man imperishable. It is thus the source and beginning of all gifts of grace. But as was the case in regard to the other mysteries, so here too there were theologians who, in imitation of Origen, held the view that there was a mysterious purification of the soul, and regarded the water as a symbol, but all the same as the absolutely necessary symbol, which just for this very reason is not simply a "symbol" in the modern sense of the word (see the Cappadocians). The intellectualism of these theologians and their inability to believe in an actual forgiveness of sins, led them in the case of baptism to prefer the idea of a φωτισμός—the primitive designation of the sacrament—and thus of a physical purification (κάθαρσις) or else to think of the proof it gave of such a purification. Other theologians, however, from the days of Cyril of Alexandria downwards, in accordance with their ideas of the Lord's Supper with which, following John XIX. 34, baptism was always ranged (Johannes Damascenus still gives prominence to these two sacraments only), assumed that there was an actual μεταστοιχείωσις of the water into a divine material, which took place by means of the descent of the spirit which followed the invocation of God. Tertullian (de bapt.) and Cyprian had already taught similar doctrine in the West. Cyril of Jerusalem too (cat. III. 3, 4) held the view that there was a dynamic change in the water. But it is Cyril of Alexandria (Opp. IV., p. 147) who first says: Διὰ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνεργείας τὸ αἰσθητὸν ὕδωρ πρὸς θείαν τινὰ καὶ ἀπόρρητον μεταστοιχειοῦται δύναμιν, ἁγιάζει δὲ λοιπὸν τοὺς ἐν οἷς ἂν γένοιτο. Still the Church did not get the length of having distinct and definite formulæ for the sacramental unity of water and spirit, for the moment, and for the means whereby this unity was produced. Although the statement held good that baptism was absolutely necessary to salvation, still people shrank more from the unworthy reception of it than from the danger of definitely dispensing with it. In the fourth century people kept postponing it repeatedly—so as not to use this general means till the hour of death. Baptism was accordingly regarded by many *in praxi* not as initiation into the Christian state, but as the completion of it. Some very characteristic passages in Augustine's Confessions, *e.g.*, show this (*e.g.*, Confess. VI. 4): it was possible in the fourth century to rank as a Christian, though one was not yet baptised. But the great Church-Fathers of the fourth century defended the practice of infant-baptism which had been already handed down, and this was established in the fifth century as the general usage. Its complete adoption runs parallel with the death of heathenism. As regards baptism by heretics, the view held in the Eastern Church at the beginning of the fourth century was that it was not valid. But it gradually, though hesitatingly, receded somewhat from this position (see the decisions of 325 and 381). A distinction was made between those sects whose baptism was to be recognised, or was to be supplemented by the laying on of hands, and those whose baptism had to be repeated (this is still what we have in the ninty-fifth canon of the Trullan Synod 692). The Church did not, however, arrive at any more fixed view on the matter, since just those fathers of the fourth century who where held in the highest esteem generally demanded re-baptism. Whether one ought to re-baptise the heretic or to

sacramental.[1] The mystery with which it came to be increasingly surrounded and the commemorations which took place at its celebration, preserved to the Lord's Supper in wholly altered conditions within the world-Church which embraced the Empire, its lofty and at the same time familiar, congregational character.[2] No rigidly doctrinal development of the Lord's Supper followed on this. But probably the presence of changes in the conceptions formed of the Lord's Supper both in its sacrificial and in its sacramental aspect, might be proved. These changes, however, take place throughout within the limits which were already fixed in the third century. The blend of a sublime spiritualism and a sensuous realism was already in existence in the third century. Any progress which took place could consist only in this, that religious materialism advanced further and further and forced spiritualism to retire. Its advance was, however, furthered above all by the fact that the dogma of the Incarnation was brought into connection with the Lord's Supper. This is the most important fact connected with this development, for now the Lord's Supper became, as it were, the intelligible exponent of the entire dogmatic system, and at the same time the hitherto vague ideas regarding the kind and nature of the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper, came to have a firmly fixed form. If previous to this Christians had never of set purpose thought of the body of the historical Christ when speaking of the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper, but of His spirit, His word, or the remembrance of His body offered up, or of something inexpressible, something glorified which

anoint him or merely to lay the hand upon him, is a point that is not certainly decided up to the present time. The Greek Church very frequently still repeats baptism at the present day; see Höfling, Sacr. der Taufe, 1848; Steitz, Art. "Ketzertaufe" in Herzog's R.-Encykl. 2nd ed.; Kattenbusch, op. cit. I., p. 403 ff.

[1] See Vol. II., p. 136, and p. 146.

[2] It is very worthy of note that already in the fourth century the Lord's Supper was regarded as the expression of a particular form of Confession. Philostorgius (H. E. III. 14) tells us that up to the time of Aëtius the Arians in the East had joined with the orthodox in prayers, hymns, etc., in short in almost all ecclesiastical acts, but not in the "mystic sacrifice." In the commemorations from that time onwards connection with the Church found public expression. Cancelling of Church membership was regularly expressed by erasure of the name in the commemoration from the diptychs.

passed for being His body, now the idea emerged that the material element which is potentially already the body of Christ according to Gregory of Nyssa, is by priestly consecration or more correctly, by the Holy Spirit who also overshadowed Mary, changed with the real body of Christ or else taken up into it. The Incarnation is not repeated in the Lord's Supper, but it is continued in it in a mysterious fashion, and the dogma is practically attested in the most living and marvellous way through this mystery. The priest is here, it is true, the minister only, not the author; but in connection with such a transaction to be the servant who carries out what is done, means to be engaged in an inexpressibly lofty service which raises one even above the angels. The whole transaction, which is based on the Incarnation, is thus beyond a doubt itself the mystery of the deification (*θέωσις*). The connection is exceptionally close; for if the act gets its essence and its substance from the Incarnation, while the latter again has in view the deification, it is itself the real means of the deification. It is the same thought as that which had already been indicated by Ignatius when he described the holy food as the "medicine of immortality" (*Φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*); but it is only now that this thought is taken out of the region of uncertain authority and has fixity given to it by getting a thoroughly firm foundation. But perhaps the point that is most worthy of note is, that in reference to the elements phrases were used by the Greek Fathers of a later period, which, as applied to the dogma of the Incarnation, had to be discarded as Gnostic, doketic, Apollinarian, or Eutychian and Apthartodoketic! People speak naïvely—up to the time of Johannes Damascenus, at least—of the changing, transformation, transubstantiation of the elements into the Divine. No attempt is made to form definite ideas regarding the whereabouts of their material qualities; they are wholly and entirely deified. In a word, the views held regarding the Lord's Supper were for a long time Apollinarian-monophysite, and not dyophysite. But this makes it once more perfectly plain that what was regarded by the Greek Church as of real importance from the religious point of view, was adequately represented only by the teaching of Apollinaris and Monophysitism, and that the

reasons which finally led to the adoption of Dyophysitism had no strict connection with the dogmatic system.

As regards the sacrificial aspect of the holy action, the most important development consists in the advance made in the transformation of the idea of sacrifice, for which the way had been already prepared in the third century. The offering of the elements, the memorial celebration of the sacrifice of Christ in the sacrifice of the Supper, the offering of the gifts (*προσφέρειν τὰ δῶρα*) and the offering of the memorial of the body (*προσφέρειν τὴν μνήμην τοῦ σώματος*) was changed into an offering of the body, (*τὸ σῶμα προσφέρειν*) a propitiatory memorial sacrifice. "The sacrifice of His Son on the Cross was, as it were, put before God's eyes and recalled to memory in order that its effects might be communicated to the Church." Thus, owing to the influence of the heathen mysteries and in consequence of the development of the priestly notion, the idea crept in that the body and blood of Christ were constantly offered to God afresh in order to propitiate Him. And the more uncertain men became as to God's feelings, and the more worldly and estranged from God they felt themselves to be, the more readily they conceived of the Supper as a real renewal of the Sacrifice of Christ and of His saving death. Christians had formerly made it their boast that the death of Christ had put an end to every sort of outward sacrifice; they had spoken of the "bloodless and rational and gentle sacrifice" (*ἄναιμος καὶ λογικὴ καὶ προσηνὴς θυσία*) or of the "immaterial and mental sacrifice" (*θυσία ἀτώματος καὶ νοερά*). These modes of expression continued to be used in the third and fourth centuries, but the desire for a sensuous expiatory sacrifice, which had been present, though in a hidden form, at an early date, became stronger and stronger, and thus "flesh and blood"—namely, the flesh and blood of Christ—were described as sacrificial offerings. Thus men had once more a bloody sacrifice, though indeed without visible blood, and what it seemed not to have certainly accomplished when offered once, was to be accomplished by a repetition of it. And thus, as the act regarded as a sacrament was connected in the closest way with the Incarnation, and appeared as a mysterious, real representation of it, as something

to be enjoyed by the believer, so, regarded as a sacrifice, it was now finally brought into the most intimate connection with the death of Christ, but in such a way that in it the saving sacrificial death likewise appeared to be continued, *i.e.*, repeated. Is it possible to give the sacramental act a loftier position than this? Assuredly not! And yet it was nothing but pure Paganism which had brought this about. Since these developments took place most of the Churches of Christendom in the East and West have been fettered and enslaved by a "doctrine of the Supper" and a "ritual of the Supper", which must be reckoned amongst the most serious hindrances which the Gospel has experienced in the course of its history. Neither the calling out of elevated feelings, nor the superabundance of intellectual force, of acuteness and "philosophy" which has been expended in connection with this, can undo the mischief which has been incalculable and which is still going on. And as in the fifth and sixth centuries the Supper was conceived of as the resultant of the system of dogma as a whole (the Trinity and the Incarnation), and was supposed to be equivalent to it, and to give a lively representation of it, so the same is still the case at the present day. The "doctrine" of the Supper has been treated in such a way as in the first place to sanction the dogma of the Incarnation, and in the second place to gather up to a point the entire confessional system of doctrine and the conception of the Church. In the whole history of religions there is probably no second example of such a transformation, extension, demoralisation and narrowing of a simple and sacred institution!

Sure and logical as was the course of the development of the ritual and doctrine of the Supper in the Greek Church, no dogma in the strict sense of the word was set up, because there was no controversy unless about points of no importance. But just for this very reason the doctrinal pronouncements scarcely ever get beyond the stage of unfathomable contradictions and insoluble oracles. Christians felt so comfortable in the darkness of the mystery; they laid hold of this or the other extravagant form of expression without being afraid of being corrected or being forced to pay respect to a fixed form of words sanctioned by ecclesiastical usage. Anything that sounded

pious and edifying, profound and mysterious, could be freely used in connection with the mystery. And since the words which were used in this connection, such as spirit (πνεῦμα), spiritually (πνευματικῶς), flesh (σάρξ), body (σῶμα) had a threefold and a manifold meaning[1] in ecclesiastical usage, since Scripture itself supplied various allegories in connection with this matter, using flesh of Christ as equal to the Church, flesh of Christ as equal to His words, etc., since John VI. as compared with the words of institution supplied endless scope for speculation and rhetoric, since the consequences and the terminology of the dogma of the Incarnation were on the same lines,—and in addition, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and certain ideas of the Church,—since finally the sacramental and sacrificial elements were at one time kept strictly separate and at another ran into one another, the utterances of the Greek Fathers in reference to the Supper constitute as a rule the most forbidding portions of their works. But to give a logical solution and orderly reproduction of their thoughts is not at all the historian's business, for in attempting such a task he would constantly be in danger of missing the meaning of the Fathers. For this reason we here renounce any such attempt. It will be sufficient to note the tendency and progress of the development in the Fathers who are to be referred to in what follows.[2] That the increasingly complex

[1] Let any one take a proposition such as this from Athanasius: πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν ἡ σάρξ ἐστι τοῦ κυρίου, διότι ἐκ πνεύματος ζωοποιοῦ συνελήμφθη, in order to form an idea of how one may twist and turn the words.

[2] In the essays by Steitz on the doctrine of the Supper in the Greek Church (Jahrbb. f. deutsche Theol. IX., pp. 409—481; X., pp. 64—152, 399—463; XI., pp. 193—253: XII., pp. 211—286; XIII., pp. 3—66) we possess an investigation of the subject which is as comprehensive as it is thorough. The author, however, does not seem to me always to have hit the mark in the judgments he passes. He makes too many distinctions, and in particular his view as to the existence of a strictly distinct symbolic doctrine of the Supper is hardly tenable in the form in which he seeks to develop it. A purely symbolic conception of the Supper never existed, for it was always harmoniously united with a ritual which was based on a very realistic way of conceiving of it. What we now call "symbol" is something wholly different from what was so-called by the ancient Church. On the other hand, after the sacramental magic in its coarsest form had found its way into the Church, "symbolic" statements were always tolerated because the symbol was really never a mere type or sign, but always embodied a mystery; see Vol. II., p. 143. On the doctrine of the Supper cf. further the monographs by Rückert, Kahnis, Ebrard.

form taken by doctrine was of no advantage to real religion may be inferred from the one fact that the effects of the Supper were always described in an absolutely vague fashion. Nor did the θεώσις, that process to which was attached this high-sounding name, really mean anything, for it was impossible to understand it in any serious sense. The idea that freedom was the basis of all that was good, was in the way of this. This θεώσις, which is experienced in imagination, threatened, in the case of the Greeks themselves, to change into a mere play of fancy; for as soon as they realised that they were moral beings, they thought of nothing else save of the exalted God, of His demand that they should renounce the world and do good, and of the duty which lay upon man of living a holy life in order to die a blessed death. For this very reason they were also unable to reach any complete confidence in the promise of the forgiveness of sins given in the Supper. In place of this, however, religious materialism went to absurd lengths, while at the same time the ascetic theosoph was always free respectfully to ignore the whole transaction.

Only a few hints regarding the course taken by the development of the doctrine can fitly be given here: Origen supplies the starting-point. "In his view the eucharistic body was only the Word of God or of the Logos as being a substitute for his appearance in the flesh; the shew-bread was for him the type of the Word in the old Covenant; for as this was placed, as it were, before the eyes of God as a propitiatory memorial object, so the Church also puts a bread before God which has a great propitiatory power—namely, the commemoration, the word regarding His passion and death with which Christ introduced and founded the Supper. But the bread of blessing was in his view the symbol only of this word, only of His eucharistic body, but not of His body offered up on the Cross, and if he does once call the latter "the typical and symbolic body", he did this only in the sense referred to. This is just what is peculiar and characteristic in his standpoint, that whenever he speaks of the Supper or indeed in a more general

sense of the eating of the flesh or of the drinking of the blood of Christ, he does this without any reference to the body which He had as man or to the blood which flowed in the veins of this body." [1] The body and blood of Christ are knowledge, life, and immortality, not, however, as a mere thought or as a symbol, but in inexpressible reality. In Eusebius we already note an advance, and in fact in the "Demonstratio" and in the work "de eccles. theologia" he has several new categories. In his case already the offering of the memorial of the body (*μνήμην τοῦ σώματος προσφέρειν*) passes over into the offering of the body (*τὸ σῶμα προσφέρειν*). He has the propitiatory memorial sacrifice. But from the sacramental point of view the consecrated elements are still for him symbols of the *mystical* body of Christ, *i.e.*, of His word: only from the sacrificial point of view do they already possess the value of mysterious symbols of the actual body, the body which was once offered up. [2] It is impossible to extract a doctrine from the confused statements of Athanasius, nor will it do to make him a "symbolist". [3] Probably, however, Athanasius comes nearer to Origen in his conception of the Supper than in any other part of his doctrine. [4] The statement of Basil (ep. 8, c. 4) is genuinely Origenist: "We eat the flesh of Christ and drink His blood in that by His Incarnation and His life which was manifest to the senses, we become partakers of the Logos and of wisdom. For he described His whole mystical appearance as flesh and blood and thereby indicated the doctrine which is based on practical, physical, and theological science, and by which the soul is nourished and is meanwhile prepared for the vision of the truly existent." But the Cappadocians likewise had already advocated a theurgy of the most palpable kind—in all the Fathers the spiritualistic amplifications of the doctrine occur, always with reference to John VI. As regards the doctrine of the Supper, "Realism" and Real Presence of the true body of Christ (or transubstantiation) are for us at the present day equivalent. In

[1] Steitz X., p. 99.

[2] Demonstr. ev. I. 10; de eccles. theol. III. 12; Steitz X., p. 97 ff.

[3] So rightly Thomasius I., p. 431 ff. as against Steitz X., p. 109 ff.

[4] See ad Serap. IV., espec. c. 19 and the Festival-letters.

ancient times, however, there was a "realism" which had no reference whatever to that real presence, but which on the contrary regarded a spiritual mystical something as really present. Hence the controversy on the part of historians of dogma and of ecclesiastical parties regarding the doctrine of the Supper held by the Fathers. They are "Symbolists" in respect of the real presence of the true body; indeed as regards this they are in a way not even symbolists, since they had not that body in their minds at all. But they know of a mystical body of Christ which is for them absolutely real—it is spirit, life, immortality, and they transferred this as real to the celebration of the Supper.[1] According to Macarius too, Christ gives Himself and the soul to be eaten spiritually (hom. 27, 17), but this spiritual eating is the enjoyment of something actual. Macarius, however, while he had the individual soul in view always thought of the Church; for to this noteworthy Greek mystic who, moreover, knew something of sin and grace, as to Methodius, the soul is the microcosm of the Church and the Church is the macrocosm of the soul. But the statements made by him and Methodius in respect to this point, were not further followed out.[2] The influence of the sacrificial conception of the consecrated elements, as being the antitypes of the broken body of Christ, on the sacramental conception, can be traced already in Eustathius and in the Apostolical Constitutions;[3] its presence is perfectly apparent in the mystagogic catechetics of Cyril of Jerusalem. But I suspect that in their catechetical instruction Basil and Gregory did not express themselves differently from him. Besides the many other passages having reference to the subject, Catech.

[1] On Basil Steitz X., p. 127 ff., on Gregor Naz. the same, p. 133 ff. From Basil's ninety-third letter in particular we see that for him spiritualism was in no sense opposed to the most superstitious treatment of the Supper. Quite correctly Ullmann, Gregor, p. 487: "It is difficult to determine what Gregory understood by eating and drinking the blood of Christ, and in any case no dogma which may be regarded as peculiarly belonging to Gregory can be deduced from it." In him we find the expression for the consecrated elements "*ἀντίτυπα τοῦ τιμίου σώματος καὶ αἵματος*", an expression which Eusebius in his day might have used and which Eustathius did use (Steitz X., p. 402).

[2] On Macarius, see Steitz X., p. 142 ff.

[3] Steitz X., pp. 402—410.

V., 7 is specially important. "And next after we have sanctified ourselves (through prayer), we pray the gracious God that He will send down His Holy Spirit on the elements presented, in order that He may make the bread into the body of Christ and the wine into the blood of Christ; for what the Holy Spirit touches is wholly sanctified and transformed (*μεταβέβληται*)." Here therefore we have a plain assertion of the *μεταβολή* which is effected by the Holy Spirit in the Supper, and Cyril in fact appeals to the miracle of Cana. At the same time "Cyril is the first church-teacher who treats of baptism, the oil, and the Eucharist, in their logical sequence, and in accordance with general principles." The element which may be termed the symbolic, or better, the spiritual element, is nowhere wanting in his theology, and in fact it still quite clearly constitutes its basis; but we see it supplemented by that "realism" which already regards the details of the act of ritual as the special subject of instruction. The epiklesis or invocation, brings with it a dynamic change in the elements in the Supper as in all mysteries. By partaking of the holy food one becomes "a bearer of Christ"; the flesh and blood of Christ is distributed amongst the members of the body. In Cyril's view the elements in their original form have after consecration wholly disappeared. "Since now thou art taught and convinced that the visible bread is not bread, although to the taste it appears to be such, but the body of Christ; and that the visible wine is not wine, although to taste it seems to be such, but the blood of Christ, comfort thine heart," (Catech. V., 9). But still we might make a mistake if we were to attribute to the theologian what is said by the catechist. Extravagances of this sort still belonged at that time to the liturgical and catechetical element, but were not a part of theology.[1] But the miracle of Cana and the multiplication of the bread now became important events for teachers, as indeed is evident from the sculpture of the Fourth Century, and even such a pronounced Origenist as Gregory of Nyssa for whom indeed *σύμβολον* was equivalent to *ἀπόδειξις* (a setting forth) and *γνώρισμα* (mark or token) and who laid down the principle "Christianity has its

[1] On Cyril, see Steitz X., pp. 412—428.

strength in the mystic symbols" (*ἐν τοῖς μυστικοῖς συμβόλοις ὁ χριστιανισμὸς τὴν ἴσχον ἔχει*),[1] as catechist propounded a *physiological* philosophically constructed theory regarding the spiritual nourishing power of the elements which were changed into the body of the Lord, which in religious barbarity far outstrips anything put forward by the Neo-Platonic Mysteriosophs. It makes it plain to us that in the fourth century Christianity was sought after not because it supplied a worship of God in spirit and in truth, but because it offered to men a spiritual sense-enjoyment with which neither Mithras nor any other god could successfully compete. Gregory wished for a spiritual and corporal "communion and mixing" (*μετουσία καὶ ἀνάκρασις*) with the Redeemer. The only help against the poison which has crept into our body is the antidote of the body of Him who was stronger than death. This antidote must be introduced into the body. It accordingly transforms and alters our body (*μεταποιεῖν καὶ μετατιθέναι*; *μετάστασις, μεταστοιχείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις*). The actual body of Christ as immortal is thus the remedy against death; it must therefore, like other sorts of good, be partaken of *bodily*. This partaking takes place in the Supper; for through the act of consecration the bread and wine are changed into the flesh and blood of the Lord (*μεταποίησις*) in order that through partaking of them our body may be transformed into the body of Christ (*μεταστοιχείωσις*; see Justin). These transubstantiations are proved by a philosophical exposition of matter and form, potentiality and actuality; at this point Aristotle had already to be brought forward to furnish the necessary proof. The paradox was held to be not really so paradoxical. The body of the Logos, it was affirmed, itself consisted of bread; the bread was virtually (*δυνάμει*) the body etc. But more important than these dreadful expositions of a pharmaceutical philosophy was the close connection which Gregory formed by means of them between the Eucharist and the Incarnation. He was the first, so far as I know, to do this. The older Fathers also, indeed, while by the eucharistic body they understood the word and the life, always regarded the Incarnation as the fundamental condition, which alone made that

[1] C. Eunomium XI., T. II., p. 704.

use of it possible. But since they did not entertain the idea of the real body of Christ, the Incarnation and Eucharist—apart from some attempts by Athanasius—still remained unconnected.

It was otherwise with Gregory. *For him the transformation of the consecrated bread into the body of Christ was the continuation of the process of the Incarnation.* "If the existence of the whole body depends on nourishment while this consists of food and drink; if, further, bread serves for food, and water mixed with wine for drink, and if the Logos of God, as has been already proved, is united (*συνανεκράθη*) in his character as God and Logos with human nature, and, having entered our body, produced no different or new constitution for human nature, but rather sustained his body by the usual and fitting means and supported life by food and drink, the food being bread; then, just as in our case, he who sees the bread to some extent perceives the human body therein, because when the bread enters the latter it becomes part of it, so in that case the body which conceals God within it, and which received the bread is to a certain extent identical with the bread... for what is characteristic of all was also admitted regarding the flesh of Christ, namely, that it was also supported by bread, *but the body was by the residence in it of the Divine Logos transformed* (*μετεποιήθη*) *to a divine sublimity and dignity.* We accordingly are now also justified in believing that the bread consecrated by the word of God is transformed into the body of the God-Logos. For that body was also virtually bread, but was consecrated by the residence in it of the Logos, who dwelt in the flesh. Accordingly as the bread transformed in that body was invested with divine energy we have the same thing happening here. For in the former case the grace of the Word sanctified the body which owed its existence to, and to a certain extent was, bread, and similarly, in the present instance, the bread, as the apostle says, is made holy by God's Word (Logos) and command; not that it is first changed into the body of the Logos by being eaten, but that it is at once transformed into his body by the Logos (by its consecration) in accordance with the saying of the Logos, 'This is my body'." Gregory argues similarly as regards the wine and blood, and

then continues: "Since then that flesh which received God also received this portion (wine, blood) into its substance, and God made manifest by that means interfused himself in the perishable nature of men, in order that by communion with deity the human might be deified; therefore he implants himself in all who have believed in the dispensation of grace, by means of the flesh whose substance consists of both wine and bread, condemning himself to the bodies of believers, so that by union with that which is immortal man also might become a participator in immortality. And these things he grants to the power of the blessing, having therefore transformed the nature of the phenomena (Ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος [wine, blood] ἡ θεοδόχος ἐκείνη σὰρξ πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν ἑαυτῆς παρεδέξατο, ὁ δὲ Φανερωθεὶς Θεὸς διὰ τοῦτο κατέμιξεν ἑαυτὸν τῇ ἐπικήρῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων Φύσει, ἵνα τῇ τῆς θεότητος κοινωνίᾳ συναποθεωθῇ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, τούτου χάριν πᾶσι τοῖς πεπιστευκόσι τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ τῆς χάριτος ἑαυτὸν ἐνσπείρει διὰ τῆς σαρκός ἧς ἡ σύστασις ἐξ οἴνου τε καὶ ἄρτου ἐστὶ, τοῖς σώμασι τῶν πεπιστευκότων κατακρινάμενος, ὡς ἂν τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἀθάνατον ἑνώσει καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀθανασίας μέτοχος γένοιτο. Ταῦτα δὲ δίδωσι τῇ τῆς εὐλογίας δυνάμει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μεταστοιχειώσας τῶν Φαινομένων τὴν Φύσιν). It was henceforth impossible for any other theory to outbid this one, which followed the practice. It is the foundation for all farther developments, especially the liturgical, and is responsible for nominally Christian heathenism. *It sprang from Gregory the "spiritualist", the disciple of Origen!* It explains why all purer science necessarily ceased. No independent theology could long hold its ground side by side with such an intoxicating speculation.[1] For the rest, Gregory did not teach transubstantiation in the later Western sense. According to him only the form (εἶδος) of the elements, not the substance, was changed. His theory is therefore rightly described as one of transformation. Nor was he quite clear about the relation of the eucharistic to the real—transfigured—body. He did not entertain the idea of a complete identity, but only of a qualitative unity. The consecrated elements were qualitatively identical with the body, which the Logos had employed as his organ.

[1] Catech. magna 37, Steitz X., pp. 435—446.

Chrysostom, on the contrary, spoke of a complete identity, and did not shrink from the boldest and most repugnant expressions. "In proof of his love he has given us the body pierced with nails, that we might hold it in our hands and eat it; *for we often bite those whom we love much.*"[1] "Christ permits us to glut ourselves on his flesh." Chrysostom won't remove our horror of cannibalism by spiritualising the rite. "In order then that the disciples might not be afraid, he drank first, and thus introduced them undismayed into the Communion of his mysteries; therefore he drank his own blood." "Reflect, that the tongue is the member with which we receive the awful sacrifice." "Our tongue is reddened by the most awful blood." "He has permitted us who desire it not merely to see, but to touch and eat and bury our teeth in his flesh, and to intermingle it with our own being." The fact that at the same time the benefit contained in the Lord's Supper is described as being perceived by the mind, a *νοήτον*, hardly affects the result, for of course the body, however real, of a God is a *νοητόν*. Like Gregory, Chrysostom speaks of a refashioning and transforming (*μεταρρυθμίζειν* and *μετασκευάζειν*) of the elements, which Christ, the Holy Ghost, effects through the priest by means of the invocation—not of the words of institution which do not constitute the medium among the Greeks. Very instructive, moreover, is the reference to the Incarnation. "The Church sees the Lord lying in the crib wrapped in swaddling-clothes—an awful and wonderful spectacle; for the Lord's table takes the place of the crib, and here also lies the body of the Lord, not wrapped in swaddling-clothes, but surrounded on all sides by the Holy Ghost." Chrysostom, accordingly, went decidedly farther in this point also than Gregory, with whom he agreed in the assumption of an essentially corporeal effect of the participation.[3]

[1] Hom. 24 in 1 ep. ad. Cor. c. 4.

[2] Hom. de beato Philogono 3; see Steitz X., pp. 446—462, from whom also the above quoted passages are taken.

[3] Compare also the offensive expressions of Theodoret (Interpret. in cant. cantic. c. 3, Opp. II., p. 89 Schulze): *οἱ τοίνυν ἐσθίοντες τοῦ νυμφίου τὰ μέλη καὶ πίνοντες αὐτοῦ τὸ αἷμα τῆς γαμικῆς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνουσι κοινωνίας.* But the same author

To Dionysius, who was thoroughly Neoplatonic, the ethical central notion consists in mystical union [= θέωσις (deification) = ἀφομοίωσις (likeness) + ἕνωσις (union)]. The complicated "hierarchies" in heaven and in the Church—"purifying, illuminating, perfecting" = deacons, priests, and bishops—act as intermediaries. This they accomplish by the mysteries which likewise are graded; to the bishops is reserved the consecration of the priests, the consecration of the anointing oil and of the altar. So the Lord's Supper, as in the case of Cyril of Jerusalem, is no longer treated apart; it has its place along with five other mysteries. Dionysius was enabled to evolve a mystical doctrine dealing with each mystery by a close examination of its ritual performance. A deeper sense is given to each little detail; it has a symbolical significance; "symbolical" is indeed not a strong enough term. There is really a mystery present; but this conception does not prevent the expert in mysteries from after all regarding everything as the covering of a single inner process: the return of the soul from multiplicity to unity, from finitude and disunion to the ocean of the divine being. The Eucharist which accompanies and completes the process contributes to that which was begun in baptism. The liturgical performance is rendered symbolical in every part. Moreover, the consecrated elements are themselves treated as symbols. The realistic view of Chrysostom is not found in Dionysius. *The realism consists, so to speak, in the fixity and integrity of the liturgical performance.* Otherwise it is true of the Lord's Supper, what Dionysius says generally of all mysteries: "The majority of us do not believe in what is said regarding the divine mysteries; for we only see them through the sensible symbols attached to them. We ought to strip the symbols off and behold them by themselves when they have become naked and pure; for thus seeing them we should revere the spring of life pouring into itself, both beholding it existing by itself and being a kind of single force, simple, self-moved, self-acting, not abandoning itself, but furnishing the science of all sciences, and

writes (Dial. Inconfus.): *οὐδὲ γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἁγιασμὸν τὰ μυστικὰ σύμβολα τῆς οἰκείας ἐξίσταται φύσεως. μένει γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ ὁρατά ἐστι καὶ ἅπτά, οἷα καὶ πρότερον ἦν.*

ever itself seen by itself."[1] And it is characteristic that it was precisely the consecration of the monk which constituted the highest mystery. Nothing but the tradition of the Church prevented Dionysius ranking it actually above the Eucharist. Dionysius does not discuss the Eucharistic sacrifice at all.[2]

The following period was set the task of combining the crass realism of Gregory of Nyssa and Chrysostom with the ritualism of Dionysius, without at the same time wholly destroying the hidden spiritual element which depreciated all rites in comparison with the inner feeling and exaltation. But from the beginning of the fifth century conceptions of the Eucharist were very decidedly influenced by the Christological differences. If the conception of the Eucharist was connected with that of the Incarnation, then it could not be a matter of indifference to the former, whether in the latter the two natures were held to be fused in one or to remain separate. *Monophysites and Orthodox, however, had always been and remained of one mind regarding the Lord's Supper.* Cyril argued over and over again from the Lord's Supper in support of the Incarnation and *vice versâ*, and it was strictly due to him that the Church learned the connection between the two and never lost it. Even Leo I. can discuss it.[3] Nay, the incorruptibility of the Eucharistic body was now accepted without question, while this view, when applied to the Incarnation, was called, at least in later times, Aphthartodoketism. Cyril had no fixed doctrinal formula for the Lord's Supper; he did not go so far as Chrysostom.[4] But since the body was to him, because of the one

[1] Dionys. ep. 9, 1 ed. Corder (1755) I., p. 612: "'Απιστοῦμεν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς περὶ τῶν θείων μοστηρίων λόγοις· θεώμεθα γὰρ μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τῶν προσπεφυκότων αὐτοῖς αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀποδύντας αὐτὰ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν γυμνὰ καὶ καθαρὰ γενόμενα ἰδεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν θεώμενοι σεφθείημεν πηγὴν ζωῆς εἰς ἑαυτὴν χεομένην καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἑστῶσαν ὁρῶντες καὶ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, ἁπλῆν, αὐτοκίνητον αὐτοενέργητον, ἑαυτὴν οὐκ ἀπολείπουσαν, ἀλλὰ γνῶσιν πασῶν γνώσεων ὑπάρχουσαν, καὶ ἀεὶ δι' ἑαυτῆς ἑαυτὴν θεωμένην.

[2] Mönchsweihe de eccles. hierarch. I. 6, Abendmahl l. c. I. 3, pp. 187—198; on Dionysius' whole teaching on the Sacraments, see Steitz XI., pp. 216—229.

[3] Ep. 59.

[4] On the doctrine of the Lord's Supper as held by Theodore, Theodoret, Nestorius, and Pseudo-Chrysostom, see Steitz XII, pp. 217—435. Theodoret can be described with most reason as a believer in the symbolical character of the rite.

nature made flesh (μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη), God's body, it was in the full sense of the term "life-giving" (ζωοποιός). Accordingly he also maintained that it was not, as Nestorius taught, the body of a man that lay on the altar, but the body of God.[1] When we partake of the flesh of Christ, he implants it in us; he does not thereby become man in us—this mystical inference is rejected,—but our body is transformed and becomes immortal. We do not yet find in Cyril, however, the contention that the real body of Christ is present in the eucharistic body; it is rather only an operative presence that is meant; the eucharistic body is identical in its effects with the real.[2] It was the strict Monophysites who could bring the eucharistic and the earthly body quite closely together, because they also held the earthly body to be imperishable;[3] while the Severians still kept the two apart. But even the strict Monophysites did not, so far as is known, advance beyond identity in operative power.[4] The decisive step was taken in the age of the orthodox renaissance under the shield of Aristotle, accordingly by the scholastics of the sixth century. Here we have above all and first to name Eutychius, Patriarch of Constantinople in the time of Justinian. He based his view "on the conception derived from the system of Dionysius, that the cause exists by itself apart from its effects, but multiplies itself potentially in them and enters wholly into each, and proved that the ascended body abides complete [in substance] and undivided in itself [in heaven], and yet is received completely by each communicant in the portion of bread dispensed to him." Eutychius teaches a real *multiplication of one and the same body of Christ* in its antitypes—for as such he still describes the consecrated elements; but this

Yet on the other hand it was maintained in the school of Theodore, in order to separate deity and humanity in Christ, that in the Lord's Supper the humanity of the Redeemer is received. This was very stoutly and acutely opposed by Leontius (in Mai, Vet. Script. nova coll. VI., p. 312) and that as a deification of man.

[1] Ep. 12 ad Cœlest.

[2] On Cyril, see Steitz XII., pp. 235—245. Nilus held the same view, l. c., pp. 245—248.

[3] Anastasius Sinaita made experiments to refute them, demonstrating that the consecrated host actually did decay; Steitz XII., pp. 215, 271 f.

[4] Steitz XII., pp. 248—256.

multiplication is not one of substance, but of power. At any rate the separate existence of the eucharistic body side by side with the real is here for the first time given up.[1] Even before this, Isidore of Pelusium had demonstrated that the eucharistic body passed through the same stages of deification (θέωσις) as the real. "It is partaken as capable of suffering and mortal; for it is broken and is bruised by our teeth; yet it is not destroyed, but is transformed in the communicant into the immortal body."[2]

John of Damascus settled this question also.[3] In the 13th chapter of Book IV. of his system of doctrine he gave a theory of the mysteries—Baptism and the Lord's Supper—based on that of Gregory of Nyssa, but at the same time he was the first to perfect the conception of the identity of the eucharistic and the real body of Christ. John begins with the corruption of humanity and the Incarnation. From the latter we obtain the new birth and the twofold food, that we may become sons and heirs of God. The birth and food required to be spiritual as well as corporeal, for we are both. As regards the food, he himself in the last night ate the ancient passover, and then gave the New Testament. God is all powerful and creates by word and spirit. As he sent forth the light, as his spirit formed a body from the flesh of the virgin and without seed, so the same spirit, falling like rain on the field, changes bread and wine into the flesh and blood of Christ; an analogy drawn from the process of nourishment as in Gregory of Nyssa. We may ask here as Mary did: How can that be? And we must once more answer: The Holy Spirit comes upon it. And in fact God has taken for his purpose the commonest things that we through the common and natural may be transplanted into the supernatural. But he now writes: "The body is truly made one with the deity, *the body which came from the holy virgin,*

[1] Steitz XII., pp. 214, 256—262.

[2] Steitz XII., pp. 215, 262 ff.

[3] On the mystics before him and after Dionysius, and their in part significant modification of the ideas of Dionysius under the influence of Aristotle, see Steitz. XI., pp. 229—253. How closely the Trinity, Incarnation, and Eucharist were conceived to be connected, in the 7th century, may be seen from the Confession of Macarius of Antioch at the sixth Council, Mansi XI., p. 350 sq.

not that the body which was assumed comes down from heaven, but the very bread and wine are transformed into the body and blood of God. And if you ask how this happens, it is enough for you to hear that it is by the Holy Spirit, just as the Lord also by the Holy Spirit assumed flesh for himself and in himself."[1] In what follows the view is expressly rejected that it is a different body of Christ that is in question: there are not two bodies, but one. Further: "The bread and wine are not types of the body and blood of Christ; not so, but the very body of the Lord deified."[2] The bread of the communion is not simple bread, but is united with the deity; it has accordingly two natures. The body united with the deity is, however, not one nature, but the one is that of the body, the other that of the deity combined with it, so that the two together constitute not one nature but two. Only the not yet consecrated elements, moreover, are to be called "antitypes"; in this way Basil also used the word (!). The mystery, however, is called "participation" because through it we possess a share in the deity of Jesus, but "communion" first, because we have communion with Christ, and secondly, because by the holy food we are united with one another, one body of Christ, members in his body, and therefore of one another. Therefore we have anxiously to watch lest we "participate" with heretics, or allow them to "participate" with us. Finally, it is still to be noticed that, according to John, the sacred food was not subject to the natural processes in the body.

This is the classical doctrine of the Lord's Supper in the Greek Church up to the present day. By the Holy Ghost bread and wine are received into the body of Christ. The eucharistic body is that which was born of the virgin, not, however, by a transubstantiation, as if the body of Christ descended suddenly from heaven and took the place of the elements, but by trans-

[1] Σῶμά ἐστιν ἀληθῶς ἡνώμενον θεότητι, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου σῶμα, οὐχ ὅτι τὸ ἀναληφθὲν σῶμα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατέρχεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος μέταποιοῦνται εἰς σῶμα καὶ αἷμα Θεοῦ. εἰ δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἐπιζητεῖς, πῶς γίνεται, ἀρκεῖ σοι ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐξ τῆς ἁγίας θεοτόκου διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁ κύριος σάρκα ὑπεστήσατο.

[2] Οὐκ ἔστι τύπος ὁ ἄρτος καὶ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ σώματος καὶ αἵματος Χριστοῦ· μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κυρίου τεθεωμένον.

formation and assumption, just as in the Incarnation. The bread-body is received into the real body and is thus identical with it.[1] That is the last word of the Greek Church—only now was the mystery perfect. Only now was the real presence of the true body originated, the doctrine which the Churches of to-day, except the Reformed, wrongly assign to antiquity, nay, to the Apostolic age itself. It is true that Scholastics and Mystics have taught much that was original on the Lord's Supper in the Greek Churches since John; spiritualism also was not abolished; but the history of dogma can give no place to these individual pronouncements.[2] The sacrificial character and the reference to the crucifixion, which are so strikingly neglected by John, were again made prominent in after times.[3] The physical and liturgical miracle was never, however, so logically analysed or reduced to the categories of being and phenomenon, substance and accident, in the Greek Church as in the West. Attempts at this were made; but they never obtained any far-reaching importance in the official doctrine. The second Nicene Council of A.D. 787 took its stand on the conception of John. The last exclamations of the assembled Fathers were: "Whoever does not confess that Christ, on the side of his humanity, has an unlimited form, let him be anathema. May the memory of Germanus (of Constantinople) and of John (of Damascus) endure for ever."[4]

[1] Steitz XII., pp. 216 f., 275—286.

[2] See Steitz XIII., pp. 3—66. The two controversies about the Lord's Supper of 1155 and 1199 are relatively the most important.

[3] The magical view of the Lord's Supper is also seen in the practice of children's communion, which first attested by Cyprian (by Leucius?), became the rule in the East, after infant Baptism had been established. Participation in the Lord's Supper was even held to be absolutely necessary; so already Cyprian, Testim. III. 25. See the Art. "Communion of Children" by v. Zezschwitz in Herzog's R.-Encykl., 2nd ed.

[4] See Mansi XIII., p. 398 sq. and Hefele III., p. 473. On the present doctrine and practice of the Greek Churches as regards the Eucharist, see Gass, Symbolik, pp. 252—277.; Kattenbusch l. c. I., p. 410 ff. There as also in the Index of Hefele's Conciliengesch. (esp. Vol III. under "Abendmahl", "Messe") we obtain information also as to the numerous detailed decisions bearing on the rite (leavened bread, etc.); compare Heineccius, Abbildung der alten und neuen griechischen Kirche, 1711.

§ 2. *Christianity of the Second Rank.*

There existed in Christendom, ever since there was a *doctrina publica, i.e.*, from the end of the second century, a kind of subsidiary religion, one of the second rank, as it were subterranean, different among different peoples, but everywhere alike in its crass superstition, naïve doketism, dualism, and polytheism. "When religions change, it is as if the mountains open. Among the great magic snakes, golden dragons and crystal spirits of the human soul, which ascend to the light, there come forth all sorts of hideous reptiles and a host of rats and mice." Every new religion invigorates the products of the ancient one which it supersedes. In one aspect of it we know very little of the "Christianity" of the second rank, for it had no literary existence;[1] in another we are thoroughly familiar with it; for we only need to set before us, and to provide with a few Christian reminiscences, the popular conditions and rites with which Christianity came in contact in different provinces,[2] as also the tendencies, everywhere the same, of the superstitious mob, tendencies inert in the moral sphere, exuberant in the realm of fancy. Then we have this second-class Christianity. It consisted in worship of angels—demigods and demons, reverence for pictures, relics, and amulets, a more or less impotent enthusiasm for the sternest asceticism—therefore not infrequently strictly dualistic conceptions—and a scrupulous observance of certain things held to be sacred, words, signs, rites, ceremonies, places, and times. There probably never was an age in which Christendom was free from this "Christianity", just as there never will be one in which it shall have been overcome. But in the fully formed Catholic Church as it passes over into the Middle Ages, this Christianity was not only dragged along with it as a tolerated, because irremovable, burden, but it was to a very large extent legitimised, though under safeguards, and fused with the *doctrina publica*. Catholicism as it meets us in Gregory the Great and in the final decisions of the seventh

[1] Yet some of the apocryphal Gospels, Acts of the Apostles, Apocalypses, etc., come under this head.

[2] The works of Usener and Dieterich (*Νεκυια*, Leipzig, 1893) are valuable.

Council, presents itself as the most intimate union of Christianity of the first order with that subterranean, thoroughly superstitious, and polytheistic "Christianity"; and the centuries from the third to the eighth mark the stages in the process of fusion, which seems to have reached an advanced point even in the third and was yet reinforced from century to century to a most extraordinary extent.

It is the business of the historian of the Church and of civilisation to describe these developments in detail, and to show how in separate provinces the ancient gods were transformed into Christian saints, angels, and heroes, and the ancient mythology and cultus into Christian mythology and local worship. This task is as æsthetically attractive as that other which is closely allied to it, the indication of the remains of heathen temples in Christian Churches. The temple of Mithras which became St. George's Church, proves that St. George was Mithras; in St. Michael the ancient Wotan had been brought to life again, just as Poseidon in St. Nicholas; the different "mothers of God", who were honoured with all sorts of sacred offerings—one preferred fruits, another animals—only show that Demeter, Venus, Juno, and countless other great mothers and holy or unholy virgins, had merged in the one mother.—The provincial calendars and various "Church Years" conceal significant reminiscences from the old heathen times. Here, however, we are only interested in the questions of principle, how far all this had forced its way into the *doctrina publica*, and how it was possible for that religion, whose strong point had once been a horror of idols, to admit this stuff as something sacred.

As regards the second question, the points of contact existed in the *doctrina publica* itself. The following may have been the most important. In the first place, the *doctrina* had been constructed by the aid of Greek and Roman intellectual culture and philosophy. These, however, were connected by a thousand ties with mythology and superstition, which were not got rid of by assigning a "noumenon" to everything. We need only recall the single instance of Origen to see that the father of free and spiritual theology was at the same time the patron of

every superstition that would admit of receiving the least grain of spiritual contents. Secondly, the *doctrina publica* sanctioned the Old Testament. Before this, indeed, and even to some extent in the time of the conflict with Gnosticism great pains had been taken to prove that the Old Testament was a Christian book, and to allegorise all its ceremonial features. But the power of interpretation had weakened more and more in comparison with the strength of the letter. What a wealth was embraced in the book of material drawn from the most varied stages of religious history! This material was sacred. No one indeed now got circumcised, or offered bloody sacrifices, or refrained from eating pork, but what did that signify if everything else gradually came somehow or other to be accepted? From the third century the Church needed infinitely more than a *doctrina publica*; it needed a sacred constitution, holy priests and a holy ritual. The Old Testament from which pretty nearly anything can be legitimised also legitimised this. Thus, side by side with revelation in the form of sacred doctrine, there arose an indefinitely increasing mass of sacred things which could be justified from the Old Testament alone. For its sake the old strict exclusion of the literal meaning of the book and of its ceremonies was abandoned, slowly indeed, but surely. At first the attempt was made to proceed circuitously, and to attribute the ceremonial decrees to the Apostles, because men were still unwilling to appeal directly to the Old Testament commands; but they then became bolder, and finally felt no scruple about using the Old Testament down to matters of detail, the special points of the Temple ritual—the cherubim being cited, for example, in support of the right to worship pictures.

Thirdly, the sacred rites of Baptism, and especially of the Eucharist, offered points of contact for the intrusion of Christianity of the second rank into official Christianity. The public doctrine had already, at a very early date, treated and regarded these rites as mysteries in the ancient sense. Thus the door was thrown wide open to the inrush of everything of the character of a mystery, magic, liturgical miracles, and fetishes. Fourthly, devils and angels had played a great part even in primitive Christianity. The official doc-

trine, however, at first paid comparatively little heed to them; yet they had always employed the imagination even of the most enlightened. Round these traditions the popular conceptions now gathered, and the *doctrina publica* was almost defenceless against them. When in the fourth and fifth centuries the masses streamed into the Church, it was not in a position, in spite of catechetical instruction, to exercise any control over them, or to examine the (mental) luggage of those desiring admission. Nay, more, the monks, who in the same period had with such extraordinary rapidity obtained full charge of piety, moved in this world of demons and angels, and cherished the ancient mythology under a Christian name. To live in the sphere of pure and impure spirits, to be visited, refreshed, strengthened by the former, and to be tempted and assailed by the latter, soon was held to be a sign of a heroic Christianity; and to this the official doctrine had to accommodate itself. Besides the cultus, men obtained their edification from a pious light literature whose dualism and exotic character might lead the critic to assign it wrongly to the Gnosticism of the second century.[1] But the Church was perhaps even more strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic doctrine of spirits. In devoting itself to a lofty intuition, and, like the Gnostics of old, seeing between God and the world hosts of graded æons (angels) who as the "heavenly hierarchy"—in reality as cosmical powers —reduced the many to the one, this doctrine legitimised the superstitious and barbarous conceptions of demigods and genii. The one God, whom the people had never understood, threatened to disappear, even in the views of refined theologians, behind the whole complicated intermediaries who appeared more tangible and therefore more trustworthy. Who can wonder that now the cultured Christian, if a mystic, also preferred in his religious difficulties to resort to these courts rather than to turn directly to God? If the supreme God had appointed and set these courts between himself and his world, then it would

[1] To the monks there fell as a rule in the East the role of mediators between Christianity of the first and second rank. They perhaps contributed most strongly to the transference of catchwords of the former into the latter, and of the spirit of the latter into the former.

be presumption and aimless effort to ignore them. Only the strict ascetic might venture that. But he also would rather dwell in fancy in the magnificent, beautifully ordered world of spirits, where the golden buckets ascend;[1] he would rather picture the fulness and variety of the immortal life than dwell for ever on the desolate and terrifying thought of the One, who was so incomprehensible, that not even his Being could be conceived.

Fifthly, as a residuum of the idea that all Christians were "saints", and that the Church possessed apostles, prophets, and spiritual teachers, the conviction had remained that there had been a Heroic Age, and that those who had then won a name for themselves were "saints". They were added to the Patriarchs and Old Testament Prophets, and they continued to receive successors in the martyrs and great ascetics. The most cultured theologians had already set up theories of the power of these heroes to intercede with God, and of their special relation to Christ. The anniversaries of the birth or death of the saints were celebrated, and thus they offered themselves in the most natural way to take the place of the dethroned gods and their festivals. They fell into line with the angelic powers, and were held to be more trustworthy than the latter. Among them Mary came to the front, and the course of the development of dogma specially favoured her, and her alone. A woman, a mother, made her appearance in proximity to the deity; and thus at last it became possible to include in Christianity the recognition of that which had been most foreign to primitive Christianity—homage paid to sex, the sacred, the divine, in a female form. The Gospel to the Hebrews had already, indeed, made the Lord say, "My mother the Holy Ghost"; but this thought was yet sexless, so to speak, and was besides never made use of in the great Church. Mary now became the mother, the bearer, of God.

Sixthly, from the earliest times the Christians had looked on death as holy; it was the birth-hour of the true life; for in this world life meant for the Christians to practise dying, and to have died was to live in immortality. Accordingly, every-

1 The Manichæans held a similar doctrine.

thing connected with blessed death, had already been touched by the breath of immortality. The martyrs exhaled this breath; therefore their very bones were more precious than gold or jewels. The worship of the dead began early, and only a few opposed it. The heathen use of fetishes and amulets revived in the cultus of the dead and of relics; in this form it was destitute of the æsthetic charm which antiquity knew how to give to its amulets and little sanctuaries, and for this reason the refined taste of enthusiastic Epigoni rose in disgust against the veneration of bones and corpses (see Julian's attacks). But the Christians satisfied themselves from the contrast between the sensuous appearance and its religious value that their faith was unique and elevated, since it found the divine in the very dust and fragments of death. Therefore they were certain of not being heathen in revering those amulets and relics; for heathenism sought and found its sacred things in the bloom of life, but Christianity in death. With the service of the relics was most intimately connected the veneration of the saints, and the two led to the veneration of pictures and idols.

For, seventhly, the *doctrina publica*, as has been shown in our whole account, contained to an increasing extent the impulse to transform the μάθησις (doctrine) into mysteries; this impulse it followed continually in the treatment of the Eucharist. But in doing so, it opened up the way to the boundless desire to enjoy the holy everywhere and with the whole five senses, and it then obeyed this desire itself. The Lord's Supper became the centre of an ever extending circle of material sacred things which could be seen, heard, tasted, smelt, and touched. The religious was much more closely connected with the material than with the moral. That, however, meant the relapse to religious barbarism and the worship of images. This might be transfigured in poetry—everything now showed a trace of God; it could even be spiritualised pantheistically—God is the world, and the world is the deity revealed; but within Christianity it was nothing but apostasy. But further, the senses which seek to perceive and therefore do perceive that which is holy, become dull and blind in presence of that which is actually perceptible, and dazzle the reason. The reason became

accustomed to a fabulous world of wonders, and more and more lost all rational standards. Even the most cultured Fathers from the fifth century ceased to be capable of distinguishing between the real and unreal; they were defenceless against the most absurd tales of the miraculous, and lived in a world of magic and enchantment. Then there once more emerged practices which date from the earliest age of civilisation. Sooth-saying, auguries, examination of sacrifices, inquiries at oracles of every sort:— they had lost their name and their ritual, but they were now revived in all that was essential as Christian, though in new forms. Bibliomancy, questioning the Bible like a book of oracles, arose. Synods at first denounced it, but even great doctors of the Church favoured the evil habit. Ordeals, which were by no means originated by the Germans, came into vogue. Two clerics of North Africa were suspected of a scandalous act; both denied the charge; one must have been guilty; Augustine sent them over sea to the grave of S. Felix of Nola. There they were to repeat their assertions; Augustine expected that the saint would at once punish the liar. At the sixth Council a Monothelite offered to prove the truth of his confession by writing it and placing it on the breast of a dead man, when the dead would rise up. *The Fathers of the Council accepted the test.* In cases of sickness questions were addressed to this or that saint; the patient slept in his chapel; on certain days lodging in the chapel was more effective than on others, etc., etc. The sources of the fifth to the eighth century contain hundreds of such cases; not only did the foolish multitude take part in them, but, as the above passages have shown, the spiritual leaders themselves. The impulse to mystagogy, and the misguided craving to feel the proximity of the deity, without being or becoming a new man, were to blame for this decline and fall. Only two points can be cited. First, the better Christians still continued to seek and find an object of thought (*νοητόν*) in the thousand liturgical sacred things, the thought and its envelopment interchanged with each other in an attractive play. Thus these men defended themselves against the charge of worshipping idols. Secondly, the honour to be assigned to idols was and continued to be

uncertain; it was not equal to that of God or of Jesus Christ or to the authority of Holy Scripture, and one might even finally disown them; any one might confine himself to the *doctrina publica*, and privately interpret in his own way its sensuous and magical portions, if only he did not attack them. But the poor common people knew nothing of this secret privilege of the learned, nor might they share in it. And even scholars were themselves burdened with an immense amount of stuff to which they had to dedicate their piety. It is the same to-day. The pious regard which is required by the whole complex of ecclesiasticism, intimately interwoven as it is with nationality, restricts the capacity to win independent power in religion, and to take earnestly and devoutly what is really earnest and holy. No religion gains anything through time; it only loses. If a hurricane does not pass over it and purify it again and again, it gets stifled in its own withered foliage. No hurricane has yet swept over the Churches of the East. And yet they possess in the Gospel, which they too read, an element of movement which perhaps in some future time will bring life to the dry bones.

On the worship of angels, see Vol. III., Chap. IV. and Schwane, Dogmengeschichte II., pp. 299—328. The seventh general Synod decided that angels must also be portrayed because they were finite in form, and had appeared to many in a human shape. The theologoumenon of Dionysius, who was not the first to teach it, concerning the nine choirs of angels, obtained general acceptance. The conception of the manifold guardian ministry of the angels became more and more important. Even Schwane confesses here: "the doctrine that every man possessed such a guardian spirit appears to have been allied to the old heathen idea of genii, but was also founded on Holy Scripture" (p. 315). The worship and invocation of angels became established; but the Church held in principle to the position that the angelic cultus was not identified with the worship of God.[1]

[1] On the extension of angel-worship we have an interesting bit of evidence as early as the fourth century in Didymus, De trinit. II. 7, p. 250 (ed. Mingarelli): *Διὸ μετὰ τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ οἶκοι εὐκτήριοι τῷ Θεῷ τῆς προηγορίας ὑμῶν* (scil. of

In reference to the Saints, Cyril says in his fifth mystagogic catechism (c. 9); "Then we also remember those who have already fallen asleep, first the Patriarchs, Prophets, Apostles, and martyrs, that God through their prayers and intercession may accept our supplication." So also Augustine. This circle was extended after the fifth century by the addition of holy bishops, monks, and nuns. The power of the Saints to intercede was always the reason why honour and invocation (*τιμὴ καὶ ἐπίκλησις*) were due to them. The ancient little martyr-chapels of the saints now became great Churches. The complete apotheosis of the saints was denied in principle. The offerings brought on the anniversaries of Saints and Martyrs were always meant for God. But the connecting of the service of the Saints with the eucharistic sacrifice gave the former an extraordinary value. Banquets were regularly held on their anniversaries—a genuinely heathen custom, and in vain did men like Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory of Nazianzus inveigh against them. The ideas of the communion of the Saints, and its typical import—every class gradually obtained its Saint—were certainly very valuable, and in this sense the worship of the Saints was not entirely unjustifiable; but the harm was greater than the benefit. The worship of God suffered, and crass superstition was introduced, especially in connection with the relics. This was first perceived by the Gallican priest Vigilantius who had witnessed the gross disorder prevalent at the sacred sites of Palestine.[1] Vigilantius (end of the fourth century) went to the roots of the worship of the Saints with his criticism, not only disputing the power of their intercession, but denying its existence, since the Saints were not yet in heaven with Christ. Against him Jerome maintained (c. Vigil. 6) a "ubique esse" of the saints, Apostles, and Martyrs, since they were wherever

the angels) *ἐπώνυμοι, ᾧ εὐάρεστος ξυνωρὶς ἀρχαγγέλων, οὐκ ἐν μόναις ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ στενωποῖς ἰδίᾳ καὶ οἰκίαις καὶ ἀγροῖς ἱδρύθησαν, χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ ἢ καὶ ἐλέφαντι κοσμηθέντες· ἴασίν τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀπωτέρω τῆς ἐνεγκαμένης αὐτοὺς χωρία τὰ ἔχοντα οἷον ὡς πρυτάνια ἐπιτευγμάτων τὰ εὐκτήρια προβεβλημένα, οὐκ ὀκνοῦντες καὶ πέλαγος διαλαβεῖν ἣν δέοι μακρόν... ὡς πειραθησόμενοι πλείονες εὐνοίας μὲν τῆς περὶ τὴν πρεσβείαν ἀπὸ ὑμῶν, μετουσίας δὲ τῆς τῶν φιλοτιμουμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ εὖ ἀγαθῶν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

[1] Jerome c. Vigilant. and ep. ad Riparium.

Christ was. Augustine also, who refers to similar contentions, showed that the Saints continued to have the power and the will to participate in earthly things. Vigilantius had rightly perceived the danger of an actual fusion of the service of God and of the Saints, and his attack resulted, at least, in a sharper distinction being drawn in theory. This was also, however, done by the Greeks; they reserved worship (λατρεία) to God, and described the veneration of the Saints, in language already used by Cyril of Alexandria, as a becoming honour (τιμὴ σχετική).[1]

Most offensive was the worship of relics.[2] It flourished to its greatest extent as early as the fourth century, and no Church doctor of repute restricted it. All of them rather, even the Cappadocians, countenanced it. The numerous miracles which were continually wrought by bones and relics seemed to confirm their worship. The Church therefore would not give up the practice, although a violent attack was made upon it by a few cultured heathens, and besides by Manichæans. Moreover, in the Church itself a scanty opposition arose here and there. The strict Arians (Eunomians) appear to have been more backward about this worship (c. Vigil, 8), and Vigilantius assailed the worshippers of relics, with Julian-like acuteness, though he was moved by the thought of the divine worship in spirit and truth. He called the adorers of relics "suppliants to refuse and servants of idols." He would have nothing to do with the lights kindled before relics, the praying and kissing, or the pomp with which they

[1] Worship was more and more paid to the saints as ascetics and workers of miracles. Men wished to receive from the miracle-workers what they praised in the ascetics; for the worship was not platonic, but was always covetous. The great patterns for biographies of ascetics were the Life of Anthony by Athanasius, and the Lives of the Egyptian monks by Jerome. These were followed in the West by the saintly novels on Martin of Tours by Sulpicius Severus, and the Egyptian Tales of Johannes Cassianus. Comprehensive works soon appeared in the East, of which the φιλόθεος ἱστορία of Theodoret, the Historia Lausiaca of Palladius, and the corresponding sections of Sozomen's Church History, deserve special mention. The ἀποφθέγματα of Macarius are uniqne. The biographies of saints and martyrs of the Jacobites, Copts and Abyssinians are, thanks to a gloomy and desolate fancy, particularly repulsive. We need only here mention the collection (Simeon Metaphrastes) and the ritual use of the biographies (Menaen, Synaxarien, etc.).

[2] On the differences between East and West in the cultus of the relics, see Sdralek, Art. Reliquien in Kraus, Realencyklop. der Christl. Alterthümer.

were surrounded (c. 4). But that did as little good as his unsuccessful attacks on pilgrimage to the holy sites of Palestine. Men continued to seek the living among the dead, and soon it was enjoined as an universal command—and first in the West—that every altar must have its relics; see Canon 17 of the 6th Synod of Carthage, and Canon 2 of a Parisian Council in Hefele III., p. 70. The altar was no longer merely the table of the Lord, but at the same time the memorial of some Saint or other. Yet in France it was still necessary for a long time to defend the practice against Vigilantius who had obtained no ally in Augustine, although that great theologian well knew that God required a spiritual service.[1] In the East, after Constantine Copronymus had attacked the relics along with the images, their worship was expressly enjoined by the seventh Synod; see the transactions at the fourth and seventh sittings (Hefele III., pp. 466, 472) as also the seventh Canon of the Council: "As every sin is followed by others in its train, the heresy of the iconoclasts dragged other impieties after it. They have not only taken away the sacred pictures, but they have abandoned other usages of the Church, which must now be renewed. We order therefore that relics be deposited with the usual prayers in all temples which have been consecrated without possessing any. But if in future a bishop consecrates a Church not having relics he shall be deposed." On the worship of saints and relics in the modern Greek Church, see Gass, Symbolik, p. 310 ff., Kattenbusch l. c. I., p. 465 f. Along with relics and pictures the sign of the cross—this from an early date: see even Justin—the volume of the Gospels, the eucharistic vessels and many other things were held to be especially holy. On the cross and the form in which it was to be made, on which great stress is placed, see Gass, p. 184 f.

Mary takes the first place among the saints. She came into

[1] On the continued influence of Vigilantius in France, see the tractate of Faustus of Reji de symbolo (Caspari, Quellen IV., p. 273); "Ut transeamus ad sanctorum communionem. Illos hic sententia ista confundit, qui sanctorum et amicorum dei cineres non in honore debere esse blasphemant, qui beatorum martyrum gloriosam memoriam sacrorum reverentia monumentorum colendam esse non credunt. In symbolum prævaricati sunt, et Christo in fonte mentiti sunt, et per hanc infidelitatem in medio sinu vitæ locum morti aperuerunt."

notice even in the first three centuries.[1] So early began the legends and aprocryphal narratives that dealt with her; her place in the Symbol next the Holy Spirit insured a lofty position to her for all time. Pierius, Alexander of Alexandria, and Athanasius, already called her mother of God, and her virginity was maintained before, during and after the birth, the birth itself being embellished with miracle, as in the case of the Gnostics. But Mary obtained her chief, her positively dogmatic significance from the fact that the dogma of the Incarnation became the central dogma of the Church. Even the arguments of Irenæus are in this respect very significant (Mary and Eve); but it was only from the fourth century that the consequences were drawn. It would lead us too far to give here a history of mariolatry even in outline.[2] The orthodox Fathers of the Greek Church in the fourth century were still comparatively reserved. Ambrose and Jerome, above all, in their controversy with Jovinian, initiated the Church in the worship of Mary.[3] Ambrose who exerted so strong an influence upon Augustine is especially to be mentioned as patron of this worship. He taught that Mary took an *active* share in the work of redemption, and already applied Gen. III., 3 to the holy virgin. In his time, again, the fables about Mary, which had long been in existence, began to be recognised as authoritative in the Church. All that had been sung in her praise by extravagant Latin, Greek, and Syrian poets and novelists, was consolidated into a kind of doctrine. It was believed as early as the end of the fourth century that Mary had not died,

[1] See Vol. I., p. 258; II., p. 277.

[2] A good review is given by Benrath, "Zur Gesch. der Marienverehrung", reprinted from the Theol. Studien und Kritik., 1886. A list is given in it of Catholic literature, in which the works of Marraci, Passaglia, Kurz (1881), Scheeben (1882), and von Lehner (1881, also a 2nd ed.) are especially noteworthy. Art. "Maria" by Steitz in the R.-Encykl., Rösch, Astarte Maria (Stud. u. Krit., 1888, pp. 265—299). Kattenbusch, l. c. I., p. 464 f.

[3] Jovinian, so passionately handled by Jerome, had, in keeping with his depreciatory view of virginity in general, denied among other things the perpetua virginitas of Mary. But other Western writers, like Bonosus and Helvidius, held the same view, and found supporters in their own time in Illyria. Bonosus held heterodox views, besides, of the person of Christ (compare the Art. on him in Herzog's R.-Encykl.).

but had been removed from the earth by a miracle. Yet the Arabian Collyridians, who presented her with offerings of bread-cakes, as if she had been a goddess, were anathematised (Epiph. H. 78). The Nestorian controversy brought Mary into the centre next Christ. She was the rock from which was hewn the deified body of the God-Logos. Nestorius cried in vain to Cyril, and with him to the whole Church, "Don't make the virgin into a goddess"; at Ephesus Cyril exalted her for ever in the Catholic Church above all creatures, above Cherubim and Seraphim, and set her at the right hand of the Son. He started the *permutatio nominum* by which everything held true of the Son might be said to a great extent of the mother, because without her there would have been no God-man. She now really became a factor in dogma, which cannot be said of any saint or angel; for the name "she who bore God" (bride of the Holy Spirit) was thoroughly meant. It may be said in many respects that the orthodox now taught regarding Mary what the Arians had taught regarding Christ; she was a demi-god mediating between God and men. John of Damascus summarised the Greek theory in De fide orth. III., 12 and in the three homilies devoted to Mary. "The name 'Bearer of God' represents the whole mystery of the Incarnation. The Holy Spirit purified Mary with a view to the conception." John adopted the whole mass of legend up to the Ascension. Her share in the work of redemption is strongly emphasised; her body remained uncorrupted. Yet it is noteworthy that John was much more cautious in his dogmatic work than in his homilies.

The Synod of A.D. 754, hostile as it was to saints and pictures, did not venture to interfere with mariolatry; indeed it expressly avowed its orthodoxy on this point; but that was not enough for the opposition. Theodorus Studita described the iconoclasts as opponents of the worship of Mary—see his ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὴν κοίμησιν of Mary; and it was only by the Synod of 787 that feeling in the East was satisfied. But in spite of all the extravagances with which she was honoured—the successive rise of numerous festivals, the annunciation, birth, death, reception, introduction into the temple—she is only recognised after all in Greek dogmatics as the great patroness and inter-

cessor for men. There is not a word of her having been free from the stain of original sin. It has been rightly said that she soon took a much more independent position in Western piety. "The prayers to Mary in the Greek Euchologion have a very uniform tone, because they dwell persistently on the desire for support and help." (Gass, l. c. p. 183). In a word, although she is also called "Lady" by the Greeks, she is not the "Queen" who rules Christendom and the world, and commands in heaven. She is not the "Mother of sorrows"; that itself gives a different meaning to the feeling in the two Churches. But the superstition which is practised among the masses in connection with her pictures is perhaps worse in the East than in the West.

The distinctive character of the Greek Church was most clearly expressed in the worship of pictures, in the form in which it was dogmatically settled after the controversy on the subject.[1] There had been pictures from early times, originally for decorative purposes, and afterwards for instruction, in the grave-yards, churches, memorial chapels, and houses, and fixed to all sorts of furniture. Opposition had existed, but it came to an end in the Constantinian age. The people were to learn from the pictures the histories they depicted; they were looked on as the books of the unlearned.[2] At the same time the

[1] On the controversy about images, see Mansi XII.—XIV., and the works of John of Damascus, Theodore Studita, Theophanes, Gregory Hamartolus, Cedrenus, Zonaras, Constantine Manasses, Michael Glycas, Anastasius and others. Works by Goldast (1608), Dallaeus (1642), Maimbourg (1683), Spanheim (1686), Walch (Vol. X. of the Ketzergesch.), Schlosser (1812), Marx (1839), Hefele (Concil. Gesch. III. 2, p. 366 ff.; IV. 2, p. 1 ff.), Schenk, Kaiser Leo III. (Halle, 1880). On the relation of Armenia to the image-controversy, see Karapet Ter Mkrttschian, Die Paulikianer (Leipzig, 1893), p. 52 ff., and there also the part on the controversies and the history of the sects, p. 112 ff., etc.; see especially the K.-Gesch. of Hergenröther. Gass, Symbolik, p. 315 ff. Kattenbusch l. c. I., p. 467 ff., and the monograph by Schwarzlose, Der Bilderstreit, ein Kampf der griechischen Kirche um ihre Eigenart und ihre Freiheit, 1890.

[2] But at the same time, some ranked the pictures much higher than exegesis, as is shown by the interesting letter of Bishop David of Mez-Kolmank on images and drawings to John Mairogomier (translated by Karapet, l. c., p. 52):... "This sect arose after the time of the Apostles, and first appeared among the Romans, wherefore a great Synod was held at Cæsarea, and the command was given to

picture was to adorn holy places. But still another interest gradually made itself felt, one that had formerly been most strenuously resisted by early Christianity. It is natural for men to desire relics and images of venerated beings, to withdraw them from profane use, and to treat them with deep devotion. Christianity had originally resisted this impulse, so far as anything connected with the deity was concerned, in order not to fall into idolatry. There was less repugnance, however, to it, when it dealt with Christ, and almost none from the first in the case of martyrs and heroic characters. From this point the veneration of relics and pictures slowly crept in again. But from the fifth century it was greatly strengthened, and received a support unheard of in antiquity, through the dogma of the incarnation and the corresponding treatment of the Eucharist. Christ was the image (εἰκών) of God, and yet a living being, nay, a life-giving spirit (πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν); Christ had by the incarnation made it possible to apprehend the divine in a material form, and had raised sensuous human nature to the divine: the consecrated elements were εἰκόνες of Christ and yet were his very body. These ideas introduced thought to a new world. It was not only the Areopagite and the mystics who saw in all consecrated finite things the active symbol of an eternal power, or perceived the superiority of the Christian religion to all others in the very fact that it brought the divine everywhere into contact with the senses. They merely raised to the level of a philosophic view what the common man and the monk had long perceived, namely, that everything secular which has been adopted by the Church became, not only a symbol, but also a vehicle of the sacred. But amid secular things the image, which bore as it were its consecration in itself, appeared to be least secular. Pictures of Christ, Mary, and the saints, had been already worshipped from the fifth

paint pictures in the House of God. These painters became arrogant, and sought to have their art placed above all other ecclesiastical arts. They said: "Our art is light, for, while few read the Holy Scriptures, it enlightens equally old and young." This and other passages by Armenius show, besides, that there were "iconoclastic heretics" long before the Emperor Leo. The Marcionites (Paulicians) also rejected pictures and crosses.

(fourth) century with greetings, kisses, prostration, a renewal of ancient pagan practices. In the naive and confident conviction that Christians no longer ran any risk of idolatry, the Church not only tolerated, but promoted, the entrance of paganism. It was certainly the intention to worship the divine in the material; for the incarnation of deity had deified nature (Φύσις). A brisk trade was carried on in the seventh and beginning of the eighth century in images, especially by monks; churches, and chapels were crowded with pictures and relics; the practice of heathen times was revived, only the sense of beauty was inverted. It was not fresh life that seemed fair, but, though a trace of the majestic might not be lacking, it was the life consecrated to asceticism and death. We do not know how far artistic incapacity, how far the dogmatic intention, contributed to the Byzantine ideal of the saints. "Authentic" pictures were in existence, and numberless copies were made from them. By their means, monkish piety, engaged in a stupid staring at sacred things, ruled the people, and dragged Christianity down to deeper and deeper depths.

But this monkish piety, which prevailed from the Bishops down, had become more and more independent in relation to the State. None of his successors had mastered the Church, like Justinian; and it was the aim of the iconoclastic emperors to reduce it to complete subjection to the State, to make it a department of the State. They sought at the same time to have a State Church into which they could force the sects, Jews and Mohammedans, without imposing what was most obnoxious to them, that which made official Christianity into heathenism —the worship of images. They meant therefore to decide what was Christian, and how the cultus ought to be framed, and in doing so they were aided by the fact that it could be shown without any difficulty that the worship of images was something relatively novel and alien. We cannot say more; for they themselves were violent and rude barbarians, military upstarts, who depended on the sword. They had abandoned the idea of the Church as the chief support of the empire; it was to be the chief servant. Instead of priests they had soldiers. They merely wished that the Church should not give trouble, and that it

should be possible in any given case to make whatever use of it the State might require. Image-worship may look like religious barbarism; but it was associated with all the spiritual forces still possessed at that time in Christendom. The iconoclastic imperial power was much more barbarous, though we have to admit that Constantine Copronymus possessed brilliant gifts as a ruler. However, the emperors found bishops who made common cause with them, and it cannot be denied that some of these had religious motives for attacking the images. Here and there the hostility of the Jews and of Islam may have set them thinking about the matter; others sought for means of winning or conciliating the Mohammedans. Their opponents described the Arabians as the teachers of the iconoclastic emperors.

In A.D. 726 Leo the Isaurian took the matter in hand.[1] A general opposition at once arose. "The king must not decide concerning faith" (*μὴ δεῖν βασιλέα περὶ πίστεως λόγον ποιεῖσθαι*). This general idea accompanied the whole dispute. From the days of Maximus Confessor, the leaders of the Greek Church insisted on the independence of the Church in relation to the State, and the Roman Bishops supported them in their efforts. They were for that very reason on the side of image-worship, just as, conversely, Charlemagne and his Franks were averse

[1] Schwarzlose (l. c., p. 36 ff.) has anew examined the origin of the controversy, in order to determine the external causes. But the matter has not yet been made clear. The following points fall to be considered. (1) Lesser reactions against the worship of images, which proceeded from the bosom of the Church even before the outbreak of the controversy, but which were only locally important. (2) Accusations by the Jews that the Christians ran counter to the prohibition of images in the Old Testament; the intervention of an Arabian Khalif, A.D. 723 (Jezid II.), against the Christian worship of images and of Mary (influenced by Judaism?); influence of the Jews on Leo the Isaurian (?). (3) A theological iconoclastic party in Phrygia, gathered round the Bishop of Nacolia [on this Schwarzlose, as it seems to me rightly, lays particular stress]; this party perhaps took its stand on ancient Montanistic and Novatian reminiscences—the Paulicians are also said to have been inconoclasts; Leo's contact with the above party in his time of military service. (4) The resolve of the Emperors no longer to depend for support on the spiritual power of the Church, but on the army, yet on the other hand to perfect the imperial papacy—after the pattern of the Khalif: *βασιλεὺς καὶ ἱερεύς εἰμι*. Karapet, l. c., lays stress on the part played by Islam, but will have nothing to do with Jewish influences. The Emperor wished to play the same part as the Khalif.

from it. At the same time the influence of other motives than those of ecclesiastical politics should not be denied.[1] It was perhaps the greatest and the least expected crisis ever experienced by the Byzantine Church.[2] The issue deprived it of any further independent history, of middle ages, or of a modern era. The image-worshippers, with the Pope at their head, replied to the imperial edict by referring to express divine statutes, to the Labarum of Constantine, and to the great Fathers of the fourth century, who had taught that the worship passed from the image to its prototype.[3] They appealed to a picture at Paneas of which Eusebius had spoken, but above all to the incarnation of the Logos. "Had God not become man, we would not portray him in a human form." The prohibitions of the Old Testament signified nothing to the contrary; for idols are only pictures of things which do not exist. We do not worship idols like the golden calf. He who makes use of the Old Testament in the Jewish fashion and charges the Church with idolatry is a reprobate Jew. Besides, Israel had possessed divine images of its own; it only refused to value them—Moses' rod, the golden pitcher, the cover of the ark etc.; had it worshipped these, it would not have fallen down before idols. All sculpture made in the name of God was venerable and holy.[4] These were the most important arguments.

But the Emperor appointed a Patriarch favourable to him in Constantinople, and sought to get the Pope of Rome into his power. The latter, in his letters to him[5] defending the images, emphasized the points, first, that there were *χειροποίητα* (images made with hands) which had been prompted by God, and were therefore sacred and, secondly, *ἀχειροποίητα* (not made with hands),

[1] Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufkläring in MA. I., p. 10 ff.

[2] On the external course of the controversy in detail, see Schwarzlose, l. c., p. 51 ff.

[3] A passage from the works of Basil was especially important (*δι' εἰκόνος ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἀρχετύπου γίνεται*); but Funk (Quartalschr., 1888) has shown that while Basil certainly uttered this saying, his meaning was different from that of the later image-worshippers; by *εἰκών* he meant Christ himself to whom the worship passed.

[4] Gregory II. Ep. ad German. in Mansi XIII., p. 91 sq.

[5] Mansi XII., pp. 959 sq., 975 sq.

as *e.g.*, the picture which Christ had sent to Abgar. The latter, the ἀχειροποίητα, played a great, indeed the decisive, role in the Church of the East. Moreover, we see from the Pope's letters that the imperial edict not only affected image worship as the veneration of idols, stones, walls, and boards, but also the veneration of martyrs as polytheism, and that the military Emperor plumed himself on his likeness to Josiah (Hezekiah). Thereupon the Pope wrote him that the dogmas of the Church were the affair of Bishops and not of the Emperor; as the former might not interfere in civil matters, so neither might the latter in ecclesiastical. The Emperor replied that he was at once Emperor and Priest. But Gregory was not to be dismayed; his second letter was even more forcible than his first. John of Damascus, securely protected by a Khalif, also raised his voice in three apologies on behalf of the images.[1] In these the adoration of images is made to form an integral part of the dogmatic theory of the Incarnation. We adore the Creator who became a creature; with him is inseparably connected the purple garment of the body. Therefore, while God himself cannot be portrayed, the incarnate God can. The Mosaic law only forbade the 'adoration of service' (προσκύνησις λατρείας), but not adoration (προσκύνησις) in general. Images are visible forms representative of the invisible; the Son alone indeed is a perfect (identical) copy; but other images are also connected with the subject they portray, and from eternity one of every creature has existed in the presence of God. Gregory and John have a very great deal in common in their arguments, so that we see clearly how dependent the former was on Greek writers,[2] but not only is the whole subject more thoroughly treated in John, but it is more strictly based on dogmatics. He even goes so

[1] Opp. ed. Lequien I., pp. 305—390; see Langen, Joh. von Damasc., p. 129 ff. Schwarzlose (l. c., pp. 202—223) has described very thoroughly the theology of the supporters of images. On the third of the Damascene's apologies, see l. c., p. 103 ff., on the spurious letter to the Emperor Theophilus, p. 109 ff.

[2] Apparently this opinion is not yet sufficient. Following doubts already expressed by Semler, Rössler, Malfatti, and Duchesner, Schwarzlose (l. c., p. 113 ff.) has brought forward reasons worth considering for holding that Gregory's two letters in their present form cannot have come from the hand of Gregory II. Interpolations have been inserted by a Greek.

far as to see in the rejection of images Manichæism, the contempt of matter which the God-Logos had hypostatically united with himself. We find a frightful confusion of ideas in an apparently simple and solid argument. All dogma, wherever John lays his hands on it, culminates in the images. The doctrines of the Holy Ghost, of death, unction and the cross, all require this worship.

But the freedom of the Church from the State was also strongly emphasised by the subject of the Khalif, so that once more the parallelism with Gregory's letters is striking, so much so as almost to cast doubt on the genuineness of the latter or of John's apologies. It was the prerogative not of Emperors but of Councils to control Church affairs. The power of binding and loosing had been granted not to Emperors, but to Apostles, Bishops, and Doctors. In the second address John assails the Emperor still more sharply. At the same time, he now maintains that the Church is governed by the written and unwritten institutions of the Fathers; the worship of images belongs to the latter. It was difficult to produce proof from tradition, and many patristic passages could be instanced against it. Hence "unwritten" tradition. The adoration of the cross and of relics was always embraced in the defence, and even the Old Testament analogy was cited in its support. In the third address it is again declared that adoration is due only to God and the body united with the Deity, and that the incarnate God is alone to be portrayed. Then the abandonment of Scriptural evidence for images is made up for by an indirect proof. Here it occurs to the apologist, that in fact all the catchwords of orthodox dogma do not exist in the Bible. Next, we have a detailed philosophy of images: the Son is the perfect resemblance of God, and the Holy Ghost of the Son. Images are the ideas of things; man is the likeness of God: the word is the image of thought; recollection of the past and representation of the future are images. Everything is an image, and the image is everything. The saints themselves are worshipped in their pictures. This is followed by the treatment of the Eucharist, next by a long section on the degrees of worship; it is abasement in presence of the object revered.

To this is appended the mention of the curative shadow of the Apostles, the handkerchief, and the boys who ridiculed Elisha. Thus we are led up to relics, saints, and pictures, the crib, Golgotha, the cross, nails, sheets, swaddling-clothes, and vesture, and again to books of the Gospels, sacred vessels, candlesticks and crosses etc. in the Church. Even the adoration of princes is recalled. Numerous patristic passages, some of them forged, are quoted.

After the death of Leo, and the overthrow of an anti-emperor supported by those friendly to images, the son of the former, Constantine Copronymus, carried out his father's policy with an iron hand. He summoned the general Synod, already planned by his father, to Constantinople A.D. 754. Three hundred and thirty-eight bishops assembled, but the Patriarchs were absent. Archbishop Theodosius of Ephesus presided.[1] The proceedings are only in part known, through those of the seventh general Council.[2] In the decision (ὅρος) of the Synod Christianity is abruptly contrasted with idolatry, but the veneration of images is idolatry. There were hardly many Bishops who could or dared use such language honestly or from the heart. The majority played the hypocrite from dread of the emperor in declaring that the veneration of images was a work of Satan, introduced into the Church of the pure doctrine, in order to seduce men from the lofty adoration of God, or in describing painting as the sinful art by which the incarnation of Christ was blasphemed. But it sounds strangest of all to hear that these Bishops charged the image worshippers at once with Nestorianism and Eutychianism. They were Nestorians since it was of course only possible to represent the humanity of Christ, and thus his divinity and humanity were sundered; and they were Eutychians in so far as they sought at the same time to represent his divinity and accordingly confounded it with his humanity. The only image allowed—and this is an

[1] Schwarzlose (l. c., pp. 76—101) has well described the iconoclastic party and its whole system. "The iconoclasts rejected the religious use and adoration of pictures, because not only according to their view were they contrary to Scripture, tradition, and dogma, but also seduced the Church into heresy and heathenism."

[2] Mansi XIII., p. 205 sq.

important declaration—were the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper. Starting from the prohibition of the portrayal of Christ, images in general were argued against. Further, Christianity rejected along with heathenism not only sacrificial, but pictorial, worship. The saints live with God; to recall them to earthly life by means of a dead art was blasphemy. Men ought to continue to worship and invoke them, but to condemn their pictures. No reference seems to have been made to relics. We have now a series of excellently chosen passages from the Bible and the Fathers. In conclusion, stringent penalties were attached to the worship of images, and a string of anathemas crowns the whole. "We also believe that we speak apostolically and have the Holy Spirit." They had in fact uttered fine propositions, and used words which had ceased for centuries to be heard so distinctly in the Greek Church; but did they themselves believe in these words?

They were under the yoke of the Emperor. The clergy obeyed when the decrees were published; but resistance was offered in the ranks of the monks. Many took to flight, some became martyrs. The imperial police stormed the Churches, and destroyed those images and pictures that had not been secured. The iconoclastic zeal by no means sprang from enthusiasm for divine service in spirit and in truth. The Emperor now also directly attacked the monks; he meant to extirpate the hated order, and to overthrow the throne of Peter. We see how the idea of an absolute military state rose powerfully in Constantinople, how it strove to establish itself by brute force. The Emperor, according to trustworthy evidence, made the inhabitants of the city swear that they would henceforth worship no image, and give up all intercourse with monks. Cloisters were turned into arsenals and barracks, relics were hurled into the sea, and the monks, as far as possible, secularised. And the politically far-seeing Emperor at the same time entered into correspondence with France (Synod of Gentilly, A.D. 767) and sought to win Pepin, History seemed to have suffered a violent rupture, a new era was dawning which should supersede the history of the Church.

But the Church was too powerful, and the Emperor was not

even master of Oriental Christendom, but only of part of it. The orthodox Patriarchs of the East (under the rule of Islam) declared against the iconoclastic movement, and a Church without monks or pictures, in schism with the other orthodox Churches, was a nonentity. A spiritual reformer was wanting. Thus the great reaction set in, after the death of the Emperor (A.D. 775), the ablest ruler Constantinople had seen for a long time. This is not the place to describe how it was inaugurated and cautiously carried out by the skilful policy of the Empress Irene,[1] cautiously, for a generation had already grown up that was accustomed to the cultus without images. An important part was played by the miracles performed by the re-emerging relics and pictures. But the lower classes had always been really favourable to them; only the army and the not inconsiderable number of bishops who were of the school of Constantine had to be carefully handled. Tarasius,[2] the new Patriarch of Constantinople and a supporter of images, succeeded, after overcoming much difficulty, and especially distrust in Rome and the East, after also removing the excited army, in bringing together a general Council of about 350 bishops at Nicæa, A.D. 787, which annulled the decrees of A.D. 754.[3] The proceedings of the seven sittings[4] are of great value, because very important patristic passages have been preserved in them which otherwise would have perished; for at this Synod also the discussions turned chiefly on the Fathers. The decision (ὅρος) restored orthodoxy and finally settled it. The first six Synods with their anathemas and canons were first confirmed, and it went on: "We decide with all precision and fitness to set up, along with the form of the precious and life-giving cross, the august and holy images made with colours or of

[1] See Phoropulos, Εἰρήνη ἡ Ἀθηναία αὐτοκράτειρα Ῥωμαίων. Μέρος ά ann 769—788. It is important that the iconoclastic emperors belonged to Asia Minor, while Irene was Athenian.

[2] Heikel (Helsingfors, 1889) has published in Greek for the first time the Vita Tarasii, written by Deacon Ignatius.

[3] A first attempt to hold a Synod failed A.D. 786, since the majority of the bishops were still adverse, and were supported by the army.

[4] See Mansi XIII., pp. 992—1052. The quotations in the Libri Carolini furnish many problems.

stone or other suitable material, in the holy churches of God, on sacred vessels and garments, on walls and tablets, in houses and on the streets: both the image of our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and of our undefiled Lady, the holy mother of God, and of the august angels, and all saintly and pious men; for the prototypes being constantly seen represented in images, the spectators are excited to remember and long for them, and to bestow reverence and due veneration on the images, not indeed the true worship according to our faith which is due to God alone; but (as it becomes us) to make an offering of incense and lights in their honour to the form of the precious and life-giving cross, to the holy Gospels, and the other sacred erections, as was the pious custom of the ancients; for the honour paid to the image passes to the prototype; and he who adores the image adores in it the being or object portrayed." [1]

Just as at Trent, in addition to the restoration of mediæval doctrine, a series of reforming decrees was published, so this Synod promulgated twenty-two canons which can be similarly described. The attack on monachism and the constitution of the Church had been of some use. They are the best canons drawn up by an Œcumenical Synod. The bishops were enjoined to study, to live simply and be unselfish, and to attend to the care of souls; the monks to observe order, decorum, and also to be unselfish. With the State and the Emperor no compromise was made; on the contrary, the demands of Maximus

[1] Ὁρίζομεν σὺν ἀκριβείᾳ πάσῃ καὶ ἐμμελείᾳ παραπλησίως τῷ τύπῳ τοῦ τιμίου καὶ ζωοποιοῦ σταυροῦ ἀνατίθεσθαι τὰς σεπτὰς καὶ ἁγίας εἰκόνας, τὰς ἐκ χρωμάτων καὶ ψηφῖδος καὶ ἑτέρας ὕλης ἐπιτηδείως ἐχούσης ἐν ταῖς ἁγίαις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκκλησίαις, ἐν ἱεροῖς σκεύεσι, καὶ ἐσθῆσι, τοίχοις τε καὶ σανίσιν, οἴκοι τε καὶ ὁδοῖς· τῆς τε τοῦ κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰκόνος, καὶ τῆς ἀχράντου δεσποίνης ἡμῶν τῆς ἁγίας θεοτόκου, τιμίων τε ἀγγέλων, καὶ πάντων ἁγίων καὶ ὁσίων ἀνδρῶν· ὅσῳ γὰρ συνεχῶς δι' εἰκονικῆς ἀνατυπώσεως ὁρῶνται, τοσοῦτον καὶ οἱ ταύτας θεώμενοι διανίστανται πρὸς τὴν τῶν πρωτοτύπων μνήμην τε καὶ ἐπιπόθησιν, καὶ ταύταις ἀσπασμὸν καὶ τιμητικὴν προσκύνησιν ἀπονέμειν, οὐ μὴν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν ἡμῶν ἀληθινὴν λατρείαν, ἣ πρέπει μόνῃ τῇ θείᾳ φύσει· ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον τῷ τύπῳ τοῦ τιμίου καὶ ζωοποιοῦ σταυροῦ καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις εὐαγγελίοις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναθήμασι, καὶ θυμιαμάτων καὶ φώτων προσαγωγὴν πρὸς τὴν τούτων τιμὴν ποιεῖσθαι, καθὼς καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις εὐσεβῶς εἴθισται· ἡ γὰρ τῆς εἰκόνος τιμὴ ἐπὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον διαβαίνει· καὶ ὁ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, προσκυνεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ ἐγγραφομένου τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

Confessor and John of Damascus are heard, though in muffled tones, from the canons.[1] Still, though the Byzantine Church possessed in the next period an abbot—Theodorus Studita[2]—who championed, as none but a Nicholas or Gregory could, the sovereignty over princes of God's law and the Church, it did not win freedom and independence. However, the repeated and for decades successful attempts made by military Emperors in the ninth century to get rid of the image-worship which had only brought defeat to the State, were finally frustrated.[3] The great Theodore maintained the orthodox cause unflinchingly against Leo the Armenian and Michael the Stammerer. Their successor Theophilus was a relentless foe to images and the monks. Then came an Empress, Theodora, who finally restored the worship. This took place at the Synod held at Constantinople A.D. 842. This Synod decreed that a Feast of Orthodoxy (ἡ κυριακὴ τῆς ὀρθοδοξίας) should be celebrated annually, at which the victory over the iconoclasts should be regularly remembered. Thus the whole of orthodoxy was united in image-worship.[4]

In this way the Eastern Church reached the position which suited its nature. We have here the conclusion of a development consistent in the main points. The divine and sacred, as that had descended into the sensuous world by the incarnation, had created for itself in the Church a system of material, supernatural things, which offered themselves for man's use. The theosophy of images corresponded to the Neo-platonic conception, connected with that of the Incarnation, of the one unfolding

[1] See the Canons 3, 6 and 12. Theodorus Studita a few years later triumphantly asserted the famous 3rd Canon: "Any choice of a bishop, priest or deacon emanating from a secular prince is invalid."

[2] See Thomas, Theodor von Studion, Leipzig 1892.

[3] The superstition indulged in by the image-worshippers is shown by the epistle of Michael the Stammerer to Ludwig the Pious (Mansi XIV., p. 399); see Hefele IV., p. 40.

[4] See also the decision of the 8th general Synod, sessio X. (Mansi XVI., p. 161). An Oriental Christian—an Armenian, but in this question all Orientals are agreed—writes at the present day: A Christianity which is stunted and disguised in pictorial forms, if it belongs to the Church, *i.e.*, if it is determined by the history and the spiritual genius of a people, is much stronger and more justified than any conceptions coloured by sectarianism or rationalism, however much these may appeal to modern taste (Karapet l. c., p. 116).

itself in a plurality of graded ideas (original types) down to the earthly. The theme had, as the image-worshippers said, been already touched on by Basil ("the knowledge of the prototype comes through the image": δι' εἰκόνος ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἀρχετύπου γίνεται); Gregory of Nazianzus ("it is the nature of the image to be a copy of the prototype and of what is said": αὕτη εἰκόνος φύσις μίμημα εἶναι τοῦ ἀρχετύπου καὶ οὗ λέγεται); the Areopagite ("truly visible images are the seen [representatives] of the unseen" ἀληθῶς ἐμφανεῖς εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τὰ ὁρατὰ τῶν ἀοράτων); Theodoret ("sin alone has no copy") and others.[1] All that had been wanting was a correct understanding and a bold carrying out of the truth. And lastly, that nothing be left out, Aristotelian scholasticism found its account here also. It had been maintained long ago, and supported by reference to the pictures "not made with hands" (ἀχειροποίητα), that not painting, but the tradition and law of the Church created the types—see also the decision of the seventh Council. But Theodorus Studita went still further.[2] To him the picture was almost more important than the correct dogmatic formula; for in his view the relation of the copy to the original was a necessary one, and there was complete identity in so far as while the material was different, the form (the hypostasis) was the same. Theodore maintained that the material was indifferent, but that in the form of the authentic pictures one possessed the real Christ, the real Mary, and the real saints. They all bore their prototype in themselves, and this prototype was independent of the personal impress; it went on imprinting itself from picture to picture, at first spontaneously—for these men caught at the absurdity of images not made with hands (εἰκόνες ἀχειροποίητοι), then through the artist, if he reproduced the type faithfully.[3]

With this science of images composed of superstition, magic and scholasticism we may fitly close the development. The

[1] See passages in Gass, p. 319 f.

[2] See Opp. Theodori ed. Sirmond T.V. Here we have collected the Antirrhetic. (I.—III.) c. Iconomachos, Confutatio Poematum Iconomachorum, Quæstiones propositæ Iconomachis, the Capita VII. adv. Iconom., and the Ep. ad Platon. de cultu ss. imag. The two books of epistles (l. c.) contain abundant material regarding the images.

[3] The chief passages are collected in great abundance and are well arranged by Sirmond T.V. sub voce "Imagines" in the index.

Greek Church has almost entirely excluded plastic representations, and its practice of art has, in consequence of the ban placed on it by the "authentic" picture, never been anything but stunted. No one can deny that the image-worshippers had some justification in their controversy with the iconoclasts; and for Greek Christianity, as it was, image-worship was a vital question. But in the great conflict waged for a century by the Byzantine Church with the State, not only did its distinctive character, but its freedom, depend on the issue. Great monks had tried to educate the Church up to the idea of freedom. In the fight to retain its character it was victorious; but in that for liberty it succumbed.

CHAPTER V.

APPENDIX.—SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE GENESIS OF THE ORTHODOX SYSTEM.

ORIGEN had drawn up a system of Christian theology based on the four principles, God, the world, freedom, and Holy Scripture, and depending on the old Catholic Church doctrine. It is the only original scientific system ever produced by the Greek Church. The conception of a scientific system of truth is in itself philosophical; it has not come from religion which consists rather in faith in revelation. But the science of the time had conceded a lofty place within itself to this very belief in revelation, and, on the other hand, it was an innate instinct of the Christian faith to give an account of itself.

Origen's undertaking and the manner in which he carried it out contained as many repellent as attractive features for his Christian contemporaries and the future. As a whole it held its ground only in the narrow circle of friends and followers;[1] but its effects were nevertheless incalculable. If Origen had recast the whole faith (Pistis) into a science (Gnosis) the immediate consequence, by no means intended by him, was that some of his gnostic (theological) propositions were introduced into the faith, and that conversely others were amended in accordance with the language of the antignostic Catholic Kerygma. The system was thus dislocated, and with good reason; for it was a system, simply because in spite of its scrupulous regard for the Bible, history, and freedom, it had transformed history into a natural process. In opposing the notoriously heterodox points of the system—the pre-existence of souls, pre-temporal

[1] Theognostus, Origen's disciple, made a new attempt at constructing a system, see Vol. III., p. 96.

fall of souls, eternal creation of the world, the doctrine of the transfigured body, and Apokatastasis—an attack was made, if not always consciously, on its principles which became conspicuous in these points. For the above doctrines were not appendages which could be deleted; they rather expressed most clearly the fundamental thought of the system, that God is all in all, and that the doctrine of the Church was dealing with wholly inadequate symbols in concerning itself with the conceptions of the creation of the world in time, the historical fall and redemption, the judgment, and a twofold final destiny. Men desired science, and there was, as in all ages, only one science; then it was simply that which Origen had represented. But at the same time none would abandon the traditional tenets as absolutely valid truths, partly in the interest of conservatism, partly because it was vaguely felt that scientific theology did not do justice to the distinctive character of Christian faith. That was the dilemma; but in one point all thinkers were agreed with Origen, viz., that the final aim of faith and of the theology accompanied by asceticism, was participation in the knowledge and consequently the life of the Deity. They were all intellectualists, even, so far as we are acquainted with them, the earliest opponents of Origen, including Methodius.[1] And theology brought about in the case of nearly all of them a loss to faith incalculable in its consequences—the fading of moral responsibility and of the conception of the judgment. No doubt the "Judgment" was maintained as before, and that against Origen; but the thought had lost and continued more and more to lose its all-commanding position in doctrine.

At the beginning of the fourth century,[2] Christianity was, again in consequence of the theology, on the point of disruption. Eusebius has himself admitted the danger in the outward organisation, and it was a result of the cleavage in thought. Bishops spoke authoritatively in the East who had learned from Origen all sorts of ideas that put the doctrine of the Church in danger of running to seed. A compact school was in the

[1] Besides him the earliest opponents—after Demetrius—were Peter of Alexandria and Eustathius of Antioch. Pamphilus and Eusebius wrote against Origen's enemies.

[2] See the details in Vol. III., pp. 121—162.

field that, while it considered itself very scientific and genuinely biblical, yet without knowing or intending it, secularised Christianity. Constantine on the one hand, and Athanasius on the other, saved Christendom. Athanasius was no follower of Origen; he was more akin to Irenæus. In giving the central place to the thought of Christ's essential unity with God, and in carrying it out, he also set the theology of the future, as it seems, on a new, or rather on the old Irenæan basis. But he was no theologian, or, better, he ceased to be one from the moment when he perceived the central significance of the above conception of faith. He hardly touched, let alone solved, the problem of correlating it with all the other results of contemporary knowledge, with the whole of natural theology. He had enough to do in showing that a conception still alien, at any rate to the majority, and clothed in an unfamiliar word, was scriptural, traditional, and fundamental, and in obviating objections. A kind of system was rather constructed by the strict Arians—Aëtius and Eunomius—by means of Aristotelian philosophy. Every professed system up till past the middle of the fourth century was heterodox, with the sole exception of that of Marcellus; but while he made a bold front against the whole doctrine of Origen, he seemed to fall into long refuted errors. His fate itself proves that one thing, in whose assertion orthodox and Arians were agreed, was already inseparably bound up with the Christianity of the cultured, viz., the Neo-platonic doctrine of God and his revelation. The one party—the Arians—might supplement it with Aristotelianism, the other might give the widest scope to the conception of salvation embodied in Jesus Christ, but in the above fundamental thought both were agreed, and the common veneration of Origen is proof of this.[1] Cyril's catechisms show the procedure followed in the catechetic instruction of the cultured. They are based on the Symbol, and its separate points are proved from Scripture. Agreement with Scripture is sufficient; it also guarantees, so to speak, the unity, or, better, it suppresses the craving for strict unity. Revelation, as contained in the oracles of Scripture, was to satisfy all wants. The catechist did not indeed renounce rational argument in

[1] On Arians and orthodox, see Chap. I.

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fourth century which can be compared
cipiis"; but it contains a much narro
is by no means, even in Gregory's ow
on dogma.[2] Next to the Cappadocians
is to be named as a disciple of Orig
importance that, just before complete
the Church, these men took up the cat
in Origen's sense, further, that at thi:
found in the West to communicate the vi

[1] The reservations are, certainly, not unimport
Origen's starting-point, viz., the antithesis of the spi
yet he had a more distinct grasp of the notion of c
stand the sensuous as a necessary side of human
also regards the whole development explored by Cl
process; only the process does not appear so mani
had also, judging from Clement of Alex., introduce

[2] Everything in the "Great Catechism" is ration
pounding the doctrine of the Trinity as the just mea
and heathen polytheism. He also shows that it
(c. 1—4). Then follows the account of the doctrine
which forms the subject proper of the Catechism
varied sides; the reason, nature, and result of the in
proved from the essential attributes of God as well
shown, that on the one hand it

ıd Didymus to their native land, and, finally, that the Byzanne Church never ventured to condemn the works of the appadocians—of Gregory of Nyssa. The last is especially a ıct which cannot fail to excite astonishment; but what would ave been left to the Greek Church from the sixth century down, to the condemned doctors of the Church and their writings e had further to add the main works of Gregory of Nyssa. ince, however, the Church has steadily acknowledged the rthodoxy of the Cappadocians,[1] Origen himself has after all een always looked at as only half a heretic. Up to the present ay the members of the two Catholic Churches do not know xactly how they ought really to regard him. He has remained thorn in the flesh of the Church.

At the close of the fourth century it was settled that the ogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation constituted the faith; ɔr they were most intimately connected, and the former was xed in terms of the Incarnation. The great Apollinaris, a ystematic theologian and besides an opponent of Origen's ıethod, and the Cappadocians established this conviction. By ıis means an immense gain was made on the one hand, but n the other not much; for what good did it do to confess ıese doctrines, as long as it was possible by means of philosohy to furnish very different versions of them, or while the ıfinite number of other tenets, which fell within the range of ıeology and required absolutely to be discussed in terms of ıe Symbol or of Holy Scripture, were destitute of any fixed ɔrm? We must again, or, rather still conceive the state of ıatters during the whole of the fourth century on to its close s being *mutatis mutandis* the same as when Gnosticism flourished, ıough a consensus of opinion was not wanting in the Church.

[1] The Cappadocians were always held to be the foremost among theologians. hus Theodore of Studion says (Antirrhet II. adv. Iconom., p. 123, edit. Sirmond.): *ει δὴ ἀκουσόμεθα τῶν κορυφαιοτάτων πατέρων, Γρηγορίου μὲν τοῦ θεολόγου... ασιλείου δὲ τοῦ μεγάλου*, and of the former (Iamb. 67, p. 766): *Βρονθῶν τὰ θεῖα ῇ βοῇ τῶν δογμάτων, Ἠχήσας ὄντως τὴν ὑπουράνιον, μάκαρ· Καὶ πάσας ἀπριξ ωράνας τὰς αἱρέσεις, Τον κόσμον ἐστήριξας ἐν τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις.* From the sixth entury Gregory of Nyssa put his admirers in a precarious position by his manistly heterodox doctrines. They were hushed up; yet their author is not placed y the Greeks of to-day on quite the same high level as Basilius and Gregory of Nazianzus.

There was no recognised conception of the nature of the Incarnation, after the bold and sanguine attempt of Apollinaris had been rejected as heretical, and the hundred and one "doctrines" which floated round the Trinitarian and Christological dogma were as fickle and uncertain as the waves of the sea. It was not known what belonged to the "faith", whether to include psychology, or natural science. Everything offered itself, and nothing could be declared indifferent without danger; it was uncertain, too, in what form it did belong to faith. No one knew how the Bible was to be interpreted, whether literally, or typically, or spiritually; no form of interpretation could be wholly accepted or wholly rejected. It was not known what was to be expected in a future state; and as much doubt prevailed about the beginning as about the end of things. Conceptions still existed of God, the earth, heaven, Christ, the glories of Paradise and the horrors of the judgment, like those prevalent among the old "Saints" of the second century, and they were firmly held with less sanctity, but the same fanaticism, by the new saints, the monks.

On the other hand, both among monks and others, conceptions existed such as Origen cherished from which the many-coloured pictures and dramatic scenes had disappeared: men believed in eternal worlds, the original affinity of the human spirit with God, in the one unfolding itself into the many, and the many necessarily returning into the one. And in the fourth century Christians, and even clerics, went beyond Origen. To them the coverings and masks into which he had transformed the realistic doctrines of the Church were still more transparent. A man was now a Christian because every one was or was becoming one; but he would not cease being a philosopher. It was hardly necessary to come to terms with the doctrine of the Trinity, for, one or two points being set aside, it was held to be correct, rational, and Platonic. The Incarnation caused greater difficulty, but the Cappadocians themselves had shown how it could be understood rationally. A still further step was taken; the humanity assumed by God was dealt with in a free and easy manner. Speculation found plenty of expedients by which to pare down the paradox and to reduce it to the level of the intelligible.

But once one had formulated, somehow or other, his assent to the Trinity and Incarnation he was really free and could apply Greek learning (Ἑλληνικὴ παιδεία) as much as he pleased to Christian truth, interpreting its myths.[1] Moreover, there were Christianised philosophers who succeeded by an artifice in uniting the sublimest spiritualism with superstition; they inculcated a ritualistic immanence of the pneumatic in material, if consecrated, things, and transformed the whole world and history into a descending series of types and symbols, which appeared at the same time as effective vehicles of the divine. Creation was the evolution of the one into a world of ideas, symbols and types—every potency being the copy of a higher, and the pattern for a lower one; and redemption was completed in the mysteries of thought and the cultus, which led from type to type, from potency to potency, up to the all-embracing One. Thus Iamblichus had taught; Neoplatonic philosophers of the fourth and fifth centuries followed him, and as they were in a position to conserve heathen mythologies and cults by this view, Christians transferred the conception and method to Christianity. To them the Incarnation no longer appeared as an isolated paradox; it was a special instance, or the verification, or necessary result, of the cosmical process. The great Unknown, who probably belonged to Alexandria, and who is called Pseudo-Dionysius, "in an elaborate conception of the world, smuggled into the Greek Church and its theology the Neoplatonism into which the other doctors of the Church had only dipped timidly, (?) and on this foundation he constructed his theory of the heavenly hierarchy, and its copy, the hierarchy of the Church."[2] Diony-

[1] Nothing is more instructive here than the study of the noble Synesius. Thousands must have held the same views as he at the transition from the fourth to the fifth century; but few possessed the honesty of this Bishop or the clearness of his mind; see above all his letter to his brother Euoptius, when confronted by the question whether he should or should not accept the bishopric offered him. He was then still a Neoplatonist, and, though he afterwards modified his views to some extent, he never ceased to be one. But he openly declared that while he would not give up science, he would accept outwardly the mythical wrapping (τὰ δ' ἔξω φιλομυθῶν), since the people did not endure the clear light.—Even at the end of the fourth century, Church Fathers found it necessary to oppose the idea first broached by Celsus, that Christ had borrowed from Plato.

[2] Steitz, Jahrbb. XI., p. 195.

sius seems to be a realist in the sense of the Church; he lets everything realistic stand; but it is all in fact simply a wrapping; nothing is and nothing happens which is not self-evolved in the process of the Cosmos. At the same time it is unmistakable that, though the form by which it is expressed is not satisfactory, the nature of the good is perceived—it consists in inner union with God.[1] It was of inexpressible importance that

[1] On the system of Dionysius, see Steitz l. c., pp. 197—229. The fundamental thought of Dionysius is the absolute transcendence of God; but God is to him, at the same time, absolute causality; as causality he still stands outside of the world (the many), but yet the forces emanating from him can on the other hand be regarded as a self-reduplication (*πολλαπλασίαζεσθαι*). Thus the attempt was made to combine the thought of the transcendence of the One with Pantheism. This One is force and movement in virtue of the *ἔρως* (*ἀγάπη*) dwelling in it, and thus it issues from itself in order to return to itself. This emanation, however, is identical with the fixing of *προορισμοί* and *παραδείγματα*; *i.e.*, the finite conceived as pure forms exists from eternity in God himself, nay, treated and conceived as one, it is himself. In him and belonging to him the forces are always immaterial, undivided, identical. From the standpoint of God, accordingly, the whole process of the world is simply pure self-movement; but viewed from beneath it is one of unfolding, division, and descent, and again of ascent, unification, and return to the One. We must always maintain both, rest and movement, transcendence and immanence, unity and multiplicity. To this correspond the kataphatic and the apophatic theologies. The former descends from God to things in order from the effects to draw conclusions as to the absolute, inexhaustible, nature of the One. The latter rises from things to God, in order to deny regarding him all that may be conceived, and to find him exalted above the antithesis of error and truth, of not-being and being. The latter is to Dionysius the more appropriate, but the two methods ought not to contradict each other; for the Deity is placed even above the antithesis formed by the statements of the apophatic and kataphatic theology. In his fifth Epistle, Dionysius says (I., p. 594, ed. Corder): *ὁ θεῖος γνόφος ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπρόσιτον φῶς*—how often since that has been repeated by mystics!—*ἐν ᾧ κατοικεῖν ὁ Θεὸς λέγεται· καὶ ἀοράτῳ γε ὄντι διὰ τὴν ὑπερέχουσαν φανότητα καὶ ἀπροσίτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ὑπερουσίου φωτοχυσίας, ἐν τούτῳ γίγνεται πᾶς ὁ Θεὸν γνῶναι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἀξιούμενος αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ ὁρᾷν μηδὲ γινώσκειν, ἀληθῶς ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ ὅρασιν καὶ γνῶσιν γιγνόμενος.* The thought of God's transcendence was the decisive point. To the unmoved mover every spirit, nay, everything in its own way strives to rise. "A nameless longing passes through all the veins of nature;" God himself comes not nearer; but men can force themselves up to him. Evil consists in being separated from him; it is a pure negation; it does not exist in relation to God; for it is a negative in the sphere of the many, which yet in view of God constitute a non-material unity: it is the unnatural, that which does not correspond to the nature of the various beings and things, each taken in its distinctive character. In so far as these *are*, they are good; but in so far as they are not what they ought to be, they contain evil in themselves. It remains obscure, however, how they cannot be what they ought. Is it due to the

from and after the sixth century the writings of the Unknown, which also betrayed the influence of Aristotle, were held to be the works of an Apostolic personage. Neoplatonism and the mysticism of the Cultus were thus declared to be part of classic Christianity.

The representatives of the "common sense" of the Church at the end of the fourth century were quite aware of the

multiplication in itself, or to an unknown hindrance? In any case the good is union with God. At this point begins the most characteristic work of Dionysius, its mystical and scholastic feature. This union, like everything else, has its stages; it is consummated by purification, illumination, and perfecting. As the sun dispels darkness, then fills everything with light, and brings it to perfection, so also does the Deity. And everything in the Cosmos contributes to this process; it is the object and agent of redemption; it is a universe of symbols which lead to God, but which cannot be entirely transcended in this world; for we only see through a mirror in a dark saying. The process itself is no pure process of thought; thinking is only its accompaniment; it is a process of the action of being upon being; therefore the symbol and the rite which offer themselves to the feeling of the soul that is passive and yields itself up to them. Accordingly we have, at the close, the passive intuition, in which man no longer participates in anything external, is no longer conscious of anything positive, but negativing all things, loses himself in the inscrutable. Yet there is no negation from which it would not be necessary to separate the Deity by a ὑπέρ; the imagination must cast anchor before the portals of the inscrutable and incomprehensible. The purifying, illuminating, and perfecting rites are imparted to men by the heavenly and ecclesiastical hierarchies. But between these and the Deity Dionysius has placed the Church doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The former has been outwardly treated orthodoxly on the whole, yet in such a way that it after all merely assumes the form of a Trinity in revelation; *i.e.*, the persons are regarded as the first stages in the multiplication of the Deity which is continued in the heavenly hierarchy; however, this way of looking at the matter is disguised from view. As regards the Incarnation, the system has naturally no room for it; for regard for the transcendence of the Deity prevents it from recognising any incarnation, and in consequence of his immanence the whole process of the Cosmos itself is the materialising and manifestation of the Deity in the world. Yet the Incarnation is maintained; but, since this was impossible, it is not made the central point, but serves as the foundation of various speculations, and the illustration of valuable thoughts. The result of the Incarnation in Jesus is conceived as a raising of human nature to its highest power, and not properly as a fusion of two natures (yet we have the expression: καινὴ θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια); for even in the manifestation of Jesus the Deity remains concealed and incomprehensible. Like all symbols and phenomena the Incarnation is in a certain sense a disguising of the Deity. With Jesus Dionysius also connects a few realistic Church doctrines as to redemption, victory over the demons, and θεογενεσία; but the Incarnation really is the representation of God's unfolding of himself in general. As regards the actual redemption of individuals the main stress is placed in this system on the two hierarchies and the mysteries. These hierarchies are genuinely Neo-platonic. The heavenly was formed by the graded choirs of angels (Triads, see Vol. III., Chap. 4) which themselves consecrated severally by the higher, consecrate

heterodoxies which existed in spite of, and side by side with, the confession of the Trinity and Incarnation; some of them indeed were themselves not content with the generally received doctrine. They desired a God with eyes, ears and limbs, a resurrection of the identical body, and a visible glorious kingdom of Christ at the end of the world. Even an exceedingly cultured exegete like Apollinaris made common cause with them in the last point. A founder was sought for heterodoxies; it was impossible to blame Manichæism for everything. Ἑλληνικὴ παιδεία was held to be the culprit, and therefore also Origen, the man who was said, not without reason, to have introduced it into Christian theology. A passionate opposition was raised in Egypt among the Scetian monks, and in Palestine where Origen had many admirers. It was, above all, the narrow but honest Epiphanius who saw in Origen the father of Arianism and many other heresies. The comprehensive chapter against him in the former's Panarion (H. 64) is the first polemical writing we possess of ecclesiastical traditionalism against Origen; it is by no means unskilful; it does not confine itself to details, but disputes *e fundamento* the title to a place in the Church of a theology such as Origen offered.[1] The "Expositio fidei catholicæ ecclesiæ" appended to the Panarion shows, indeed, the complete inability of Epiphanius to give an account of the faith; it loses itself as usual in irrelevant discussions, and the positive contents are extraordinarily scanty. But the attack on Origen (compare also the somewhat earlier "An-

severally the lower; the historical Christ even had his place among them. The ecclesiastical hierarchy consisted of the bishops, priests, and deacons; and the means which acted from beneath upwards were the six mysteries (see Chap. IV.). In the work on the ecclesiastical hierarchy these mysteries are minutely explained. Every openly heterodox opinion is, as generally, once more avoided. "The Areopagite has given the Church an exposition of all the mystic rites, such as it had not possessed till then, in which every act of the cultus has its peculiar, deeper reference and secret meaning. His exposition attaches itself in form to Christian dogma, and could therefore serve as a pattern to the Church theologians of the following centuries. As regards the matter, indeed, the case is different; for the Christian dogmas themselves merely appear as the dress of Neo-platonic ideas, to which the inflexible form offers a stubborn resistance."

[1] H. 64 c. 73; Σύ, Ὠριγένη, ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας τυφλωθεὶς τὸν νοῦν ἐξήμεσας τὸν ἰὸν τοῖς πειθεῖσί σοι, καὶ γέγονας αὐτοῖς εἰς βρῶμα δηλητηρίου, δι' ὧν αὐτὸς ἠδίκησαι ἀδικήσας τοὺς πλείους

coratus") opened the first great controversy over the question whether scientific theology as understood by Origen was legitimate or not. Walch has described the history of this controversy with his usual thoroughness. It is acknowledged how disagreeably the action of Epiphanius disturbed the circle of Origen's monkish admirers, who were congregated in Palestine under the protection of the like-minded John, Bishop of Jerusalem. The dream that one might be both a pillar of the Church and a theologian like Origen was dissipated. Jerome preferred to remain a pillar and to abandon Origen. After his desertion and his betrayal of his friend Rufinus, he became the father of the "science of the Church." To some extent he is a type of this "science" up to the present day. It lives on fragments of the men whom it declares to be heretics. It accepts just as much from them as circumstances permit, and retains of the old what it can maintain with decency. It cultivates a little literalness, a little allegory, and a little typology. It attacks all questions with a parade of freedom from prejudice; but anything inconvenient it surrounds with a thousand invented difficulties. It is proud of its free-thought in matters of no importance, and hides itself finally, when hot pressed, behind a brazen stare. It characterises its friends as "well-disposed", *homines boni*, and slanders its opponents. Where evasion is no longer possible, it states the inexorable historical fact as a major premise; to this it adds a minor taken from its prejudices, and then it solves the syllogistic problem by the aid of piquant conceits.[1] It can be incredibly frivolous and again pedantically learned, just as it suits. Only one question does not occur in its catechism, and it is always hard to drive it home, viz., what is historical truth? That is the science of—Jerome.

[1] For a parallel to this characterisation compare Luther, Vom Papstthum zu Rom wider den hochberühmten Romanisten zu Leipzig (Weimarer Ausgabe, Vol. VI. 304): Lieber Romanist, wer hat daran gezweiffelt, dass das alt Gesetz und seine Figuren mussen ym Neuen erfullet werden? man durfft deiner Meisterschaft hirynnen nichts Aber hie soltestu dich lassen sehen und beweysen deine hohe Kunst, das die selb Erfulling durch Petrum odder denn Bapst gescheh: Da schweygestu wie ein Stock, da zu reden ist, und schwetzist da nit not zu redenn ist. Hastu dein logica nit bass gelernet? Du probirst die maiores, die niemant anficht, und nympst fur gewiss die minores, die ydermann anficht, und schleussist was Du wilt.

Epiphanius' breach with John led to the intervention of the Alexandrian Bishop Theophilus, who, at the time, still refused to yield to the "anthropomorphists", and adhered to Origen's party. Rome also took part in the dispute which, settled as between the bishops, broke out anew between the two scholars. Rufinus was only able to defend Origen's orthodoxy by the doubtful assumption that "heretics" had corrupted his works But that helped neither him nor Origen. Origen was condemned and Rufinus censured in Rome in A.D. 399 by the ignorant Anastasius. The errors charged against Origen (see Hieron. ad Pammach.) were, a subordinationist doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the preëxistence of souls and their condemnation to enter into bodies, the view of the future conversion of the devil and the demons, the interpretation of the skins in Gen. III. to mean the body, the spiritualising of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, the explanation of Paradise as spiritual, and the too extensive use of the allegorical method, etc. Not only, however, did Rome renounce Origen, but Alexandria also. Theophilus saw that his power in Egypt would be shaken if he did not rely upon the masses of stupid and fanatical Coptic monks, the anthropomorphists, in whose circles a material God was defended in doggerel rhymes, and the ancient apocalyptic literature was greedily read. Theophilus wheeled round, abandoned, and that with strong personal feeling, the admirers of Origen among the monks, and, with the approval of Rome, hurled his anathemas against him. Jerome, ever on the alert to blot out the stain that attached to him from having once venerated the great theologian, translated into Latin Theophilus' slanderous Easter epistle against Origenism, although he must have seen through its calumnies. In Constantinople, however, the fight waged by Theophilus against his former friends, the Nitrian monks, was followed by that agitation of which Chrysostom was a victim. It was the first violent attempt of the Alexandrian Patriarch, who by his alliance with the masses had won a secure position in his own diocese, to get possession of the Constantinopolitan patriarchate, the capital, and whole Church of the East.

Meanwhile it was only in the West that the influence of

Origen was really deeply shaken by these endeavours. Jerome persuaded the Western Church that Origen was the father of Pelagianism; Vincentius of Lerinum held him up as an example along with Apollinaris and other heretics; Leo I. considered him a heretic, and Gelasius insisted that Jerome's criticism should be maintained in dealing with his works.[1] Orthodoxy held its ground unshaken as regards all the points of doctrine touching on the dogmas of the Trinity and Incarnation, which in the West were hardly ever subjects of controversy. Jerome now became the standard theologian and exegete. Everything ancient and distinctive, even where it did not lie in the direction of Origenism, disappeared more and more in the West. The Western Church became the Church of Jerome; but it became also—to its lasting benefit—the Church of Augustine (see Vol. V.).

It was different in the East. The transformation of the controversy about Origen into a conflict between two great Patriarchs, in which Origen was soon lost sight of, and the rehabilitation, belated indeed, of Chrysostom, favoured the impugned reputation of the great theologian. But even apart from this, his influence was too deeply rooted to be upset by a single bishop, no matter how powerful. His individuality represented the Ἑλληνικὴ παιδείκ, with which men would not dispense. They were willing to recognise the dogma of the Church, *i.e.*, the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation; but they sought besides freedom to interest themselves in (theological) science. The Church History of Socrates shows the undiminished influence of Origen—see above Vol. III., p. 146 and elsewhere; even before Socrates, the celebrated Evagrius of Pontus had sturdily defended him, and Sozomen himself, monkish and narrow as he was, was no opponent of Origen. The outbreak of the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies as to the nature of the Incarnation soon thrust everything else into the background, and procured for Origen's cause a temporary peace.

It is fitting that we should here take a glance at the Patri-

[1] The so-called decree of Gelasius, which obtained a far-reaching importance in the West is also otherwise important from the condemnation it passed on the whole of earlier Christian literature. The orthodox Church was determined to vilify and then to bury its own past in order to maintain undisputed the fiction that it had always remained the same.

archate of Antioch and its neighbouring territories. The circumstances there were wholly peculiar. The East swarmed with old and new sects. All sorts betook themselves thither, and, beside the official Christianity only to be met with in Greek cities, there existed an assortment of the most varied Christian communions. Even in the fifth century the Bishops had to face conflicts there which had almost died out in Rome, Byzantium, and Alexandria, as early as the third century. Therefore the Bishops living in or sprung from that quarter still possessed the lofty conviction that they were constantly fighting the battles of the Lord, and hastening from victory to victory. Nestorius, Theodoret, and others plume themselves in their correspondence with their Western brethren on their merits as antagonists of heretics;[1] even Chrysostom was their inexorable enemy. As a matter of fact, the continuance of these conflicts was of vast consequence to the whole Church. Gnosticism and Manichæism dogged the steps of the Eastern Bishops, and compelled them to adhere strictly to the ancient *regula fidei* with its antignostic impress. They could not, as in Alexandria and Constantinople, confine their interest to the Incarnation. They had to defend the doctrine, point by point, in its whole extent, and were thus prevented from casting themselves into the arms of one transcendent idea. They were pious after the monkish fashion, like the Egyptians; nay, their Bishops outdid those of Egypt in asceticism; they were not less realistic in what belonged to the Cultus than the rest; they were as much to the

[1] The later antignostic writings and compendiums, those of Ephraem, Epiphanius, Theodoret, Esnik, etc., are all, in so far as they are not mere extracts from older works, from the East. Mohammedans, besides the later Nestorian and Jacobite scholars, confessedly turned their attention to the Christian sects still existing in the East, to one of which Islam owes the best of its teaching. Theodoret is full of self-praise over his actions, and sports them over and over again to prop up his imperilled orthodoxy. In Ep. 81 (IV., p. 1141, ed. Schulze) he writes: *κώμας ὅκτω τῆς Μαρκίωνος καὶ τὰς πέριξ κειμένας, ἀσμένας πρὸς τὴν ἀληθειαν ἐφοδήγησα· ἄλλην κώμην Εὐνομιανῶν*—we see that the sects are tabulated according to their origin—*πεπληρωμένην καὶ ἄλλην Ἀρειανῶν τῷ φωτὶ τῆς θεογνωσίας προσήγαγον. καὶ διὰ τὴν θείαν χάριν οὐδὲ ἓν παρ' ἡμῖν αἱρετικῶν ὑπελείφθη ζιζάνιον.* Ep. 145 (IV., p. 1246) he tells how he fought steadily against Greeks, Jews, Arians, Eunomians, Apollinarians, and Marcionites; ibid, p. 1252: *πλείους ἢ μυρίους τῶν τοῦ Μαρκίωνος πείσας προσήγαγον τῷ παναγίῳ βαπτίσματι.* In Hæret. fab. I. 20 he records that he had confiscated more than 200 copies of the Diatessaron.

front when it was necessary to defend an old doctrine. But their scientific theologians—Palestine stands by itself—were not followers of Origen, and in their fights with heretics they could not use his teaching. They used a more liberal and, again, a more rational, a less flighty, exegesis, and a sober philosophy. Both these were given them by Lucian, and it was, lastly, one and the same school which extended from Lucian to Theodoret, and stretched far beyond the latter into the Christian schools of the Persian kingdom.

The character and significance of this school have been discussed above in various chapters—see especially Vol. III., ch. 3. It sharply contested Origen's hermeneutics, but did not vilify the great man. Its own exegetical and biblical-theological method, with some admirable features, indeed, omitted, and a little of the literal and allegorical added, gradually became, in consequence of its appropriateness and thanks to the influence of Chrysostom, the ruling one. And the use of Aristotelian philosophy in the Antiochene school was an indication for the future. But the ablest of the Antiochenes finally came under censure on account of his Christology, and, over and above his Christology, he was charged with various heresies, especially Pelagianism. In fact, his whole system, and he possessed a system to a greater extent than any other after Origen, was a rational one; it was natural theology without any transcendentalism. He is therefore a source of great difficulty to the Church up to the present time; it declines to go further in condemning him than the fifth Council, indeed it only recognises conditionally the censure of the "chapters". Theodoret's work is without the boldness of Theodore, his anthropology and his doctrine of grace as well as his Christology approximating to the traditional teaching. Among other things, he appended to his compendium of heretical fables a fifth book, "θείων δογμάτων ἐπιτομή" (an epitome of divine dogmas), *which must be described as the first attempt at a system after Origen*, and which apparently exercised great influence on John of Damascus. This "epitome" has a lofty significance. It combines the Trinitarian and Christological dogma with the whole circle of the doctrines connected with the symbol. It reveals an attitude

as markedly biblical as it is ecclesiastical and rational. It throughout observes the "just mean". It is almost complete, the Last Supper being omitted, and it especially takes realistic Eschatology once more into account.[1] It has adopted none of the obnoxious doctrines of Origen, and yet he himself is not treated as a heretic.[2] An actual system this epitome is not; but the consistent sobriety and lucidity in the discussion of details, and the careful biblical proof lend to the whole a stamp of unity. It could not yet indeed give satisfaction, firstly, because of the personality of its author, and, secondly, because there was an entire absence of mysticism and Neoplatonism from his doctrinal conception.

In the second half of the fifth century everyone was occupied with the decree of Chalcedon. Cyril of Alexandria, the Christologian whom bishops and monks had understood best, had to reconquer his whole influence side by side with the creed of Chalcedon. The only two great theologians whom the Eastern Church has possessed—Origen and Theodore, the former a follower of Plato, the latter of Aristotle, both biblicists though in very different ways,—were discredited, but not condemned. It was on the soil of Palestine, and among the monks there, that admiration for Origen came into collision with that for Theodore. We are well informed as to the living spiritual movements in the cloisters of Palestine at the beginning of the sixth century. Origenism experienced a regular renaissance, although it had never died out.[3] Its "peculiar doctrines", which had sprung from rational mysticism, were in particular taken up again, or at least declared to be arguable. The Cappadocians were

[1] Theodoret discusses (1) the First Principle and the Father, (2) the Son, (3) the Holy Spirit and the divine names, (4—9) creation, matter, æons, angels, demons, and man, (10) providence, (11—15) the Incarnation, and that in general as well as in reference to separate points of doctrine, *e.g.*, the assumption of a real body of a soul, and generally of the complete human nature, and the resuscitation of this nature, (16) the identity of the just and beneficent God, (17) God is the author of both Testaments, (18) Baptism, (19) the resurrection, (20) the judgment, (21) the promises, (22) the second advent of Christ, (23) Antichrist, (24) virginity, (25) marriage, (26) second marriage, (27—29) fornication, penitence and continence.

[2] Theodoret has not introduced him into his catalogue of heretics.

[3] Walch l. c., p. 618 ff.; Möller in the R.-Encykl. XI., p. 112 f.; Loofs, Leontius, p. 274 ff.; Bigg, l. c.

appealed to in support of their validity. Origenism was defended under very different shades. There was an extreme right, and even pillars of orthodoxy were found on this side,[1] and there was a left, which surpassed even Origen in daring. He led some of his admirers over to the Areopagite and the Neo-Platonists. The works of the Unknown were brought out, studied, and, as it appears, edited. Some went the length of undisguised Pantheism, like Stephen bar Sudaili, or the author of the book of Hierotheus, "On the hidden mysteries of the Deity."[2] No Gnostic of the second century had erected a nihilistic philosophy on the ground of Christianity so boldly as this writer.[3]

But the admirers of Origen met with opponents in Palestine, not only among the dull herd of monks and the traditionalists, but also among the adherents of the sober science and Christ-ology of Theodore of Mopsuestia. And, in addition, there was rising up a new power, Aristotelian scholasticism, which took possession of the monophysite as well as the orthodox dogma, but only concluded a firm alliance with the latter, through Leontius, the great opponent of Nestorianism and of Theodore —see above, p. 232 f. The Antiochene school was smitten with its own weapons. The great dogmas of the Church, hallowed by age, seemed to receive their sanction from the re-invigo-

[1] Leontius, as Loofs has shown.

[2] See the analysis of this extraordinarily interesting work, not yet printed, in Frothingham's Stephen bar Sudaili, 1886, p. 92 f.; the writer ably calls attention also to the connection with the renaissance of Origenism.

[3] Frothingham rightly says, p. 49 f.: "His system was openly pantheistic, or, to speak more philosophically, Pan-nihilistic; for, according to him, all nature even to the lowest forms of animal creation, being simply an emanation from the Divinity-Chaos, finally returns to it; and, when the consummation has taken place, God himself passes away and everything is swallowed up in the indefinite chaos, which he conceives to be the first principle and the end of being and which admits of no distinction." The contents of the five books are according to Fr. as follows: I.—On God, the Universal Essence and distinct existences. II.—The various species of motion, the ascent of the mind towards God, during which it must endure the sufferings of Christ. III.—The resurrection of the mind, the vicissitudes of its conflict with the powers of evil, and its final identification with Christ. IV.—The mind becomes one, first with Christ, then with the Spirit and the Father, and finally becomes absorbed. V.—All nature becomes confounded with the Father; all distinct existence and God himself passes away; Essence alone remains.

rated Aristotelianism, because they were peculiarly adapted for dialectical treatment. Thus the age of Justinian shows the Church of the East in a state of the liveliest spiritual agitation. All the great powers of the past, Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, Origen and Theodore, were again living forces; a new combination was drawing near, and all efforts to stifle by conciliar decrees the living spirit in the Church seemed to have been vain. But the movements were but limited in extent and energy; the "new combination" was in truth the death of real science—a thinking which started in the middle of its subject, and for which that which was alone worth reflection was held to be beyond the range of discussion. Trifling monks, who excommunicated and denounced each other, talked big; and there sat at Constantinople an emperor who, himself a theologian, thirsted for the fame of creating a uniform science as well as a uniform belief. The dispute of the Palestinian monks and the scholasticism of a theologian like Leontius gave him his chance. The Emperor did not need to publish an edict requiring the followers of Origen and Theodore to annihilate one another; they took care of that for themselves. The spectacle of the two "sciences", of Origen and the Antiochenes, tearing each other to pieces, in the age of Justinian, has something tragi-comical about it, recalling the tale of the two lions. The fifth Council confirmed this, after the Emperor had himself, in his epistle to Mennas, declared, and Vigilius—with other Patriarchs—had repeated, the condemnation of Origen. The fifteen anathemas against Origen,[1] on which his condemnation at the Council was based, contained the following points. (1) The preëxistence of souls and Apokatastasis; (2) the doctrine of the upper world of spirits, their original equality, and their fall; (3) the view that sun, moon, and stars belonged to this world of spirits, and had also fallen; (4) the doctrine that the differences in the bodies of the spirits was a consequence of this fall; (5) the opinion that the higher spirits become lower ones, or men, and *vice versâ*; (6) Origen's doctrine of creation, and that it was not accomplished by the Trinity; (7) the Christo-

[1] Compare with this the ten anathemas in the epistle to Mennas and the Vitæ Sabæ, Euthymii and Cyriaci, Loofs l. c, p. 290 f.

logy which taught that Christ became for all grades of spirits —each in its own form—that which he had become for men through the Incarnation, so that he assumed different bodies and received different names; (8) the contention that the Logos was only to be called Christ by a misuse of language (κατα-χρηστικῶς), that accordingly a distinction was to be drawn between them; (9) the opinion that not the Logos, but a creaturely mind (νοῦς) which he had assumed became man; (10) the assertion of the spherical and ethereal form of the resurrection-body, and of the annihilation of the material body; (11) the interpreting of the judgment to mean this annihilation, and the view that at the end of the world there would only exist non-material nature (spirit); (12) the view that the Logos united with every man and spirit as he had done with the νοῦς he had assumed: heresy of the Isochristians who appealed to Origen, see, besides, Methodius; (13) the assertion of the similarity of the νοῦς, called Christ, to all other rational beings; (14) the view of the ultimate cessation of all plurality of persons and of multiplicity of knowledge (gnosis), the doctrine of reversion to unity and of apokatastasis; (15) the view of the identity of the pretemporal with the final life of spirits.

Since the "Three Chapters" were condemned at the same time, Origen and Theodore were both got rid of.[1] The latter found more energetic defenders than the former; but the majority of his admirers held aloof. The fact that the Augustinian West took up his cause best shows that we must not overvalue this championship. The condemnation of the "peculiar doctrines" of Origenism meant much more. Henceforth buoys were laid down, which marked off the Neo-platonic channel in which men moved under the guidance of the "apostolic" Dionysius. Origen's doctrines of the consummation, and of spirits and matter might no longer be maintained. The judgment was restored to its place, and got back even its literal meaning. The mysticism of the Cultus was carried continually further; it received a new impetus; but it adhered much more closely to

[1] The religious policy of Justinian and the fifth Council had accordingly the same significance for the (orthodox) East as the so-called Gelasian decree for the West. In the former as in the latter history was extinguished and theology fettered.

tradition. The anti-gnostic *regula fidei* was finally restored, and the great cultus-mystic of the seventh century not only respected it, but worked within its lines. Maximus Confessor held the same relation to the Areopagite, as did the Cappadocians to Origen, and Theodoret to Theodore.[1] But he was not only a mystic; he was also a scholastic and dialectician. There were no longer any theologians who reflected independently "de principiis." God, the world, freedom, Christ, and Scripture were no longer the first principles, but, instead, the fixed doctrines regarding them drawn from tradition. Science took for granted the foundations guarded by the Church, and passing to the upper story went on building there. A latent free thought, indeed, still remained. If everything was symbolical and figurative, then, no matter how closely the spiritual might be combined with the material, the idea could not perish that the theologian who was in a position to grasp the subject matter did not require figures. While mysticism and scholasticism might not shrink from a figurative philosophy in the most daring sense of the term, they could not stifle the view that took every sort of figure and all history as a covering, nor could they blame the self-criticism of the Christian who was ashamed of being confined in this body.[2]

For learning (*μαθήσις*) the Cappadocians (the two Gregorys, next to them Athanasius and Cyril) were regarded as the principal authorities; for mystagogy (*μυσταγωγία*), the Areopagite and Maximus; for philosophy, Aristotle; and for homiletics (*ὁμιλία*), Chrysostom. The man, however, who embraced all that, who had transferred the scholastic dialectic method, which had been brought by Leontius to bear on the dogma of the Incarnation, to the whole sphere of the "divine dogma" as that had been fixed by Theodoret, was John of Damascus. Through him the Greek Church gained the orthodox system, but not the Greek Church alone. John's work was no less

[1] See on him the Art. of Wagenmann in the R.-Encykl. and Steitz XI., p. 209; on the Cultus-mystics Sophronius of Jerusalem and Germanus of Constantinople, see Steitz XI., pp. 238 f. and 246 f.

[2] The saying is due to Porphyry who has used it of Plotinus (Vita I.): *Πλωτῖνος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐῴκει μὲν αἰσχυνομένῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματί εἴη.*

important to the West.[1] "He was the cope-stone of antiquity and the transition to a new age, because his writings, translated into Latin, became confessedly a foundation of the mediæval theology of the West." He was above all a scholastic. To him each difficulty was but an incitement to split up notions artificially, and to find a new one to which nothing in the world corresponds except that very difficulty which the new notion was meant to remove. John even put the fundamental question of mediæval science, that as to nominalism and realism; and he solved it by a modified Aristotelianism. All doctrines were in his view given already; he took them from findings of the Councils and the works of recognised Fathers. He held it to be the task of science to edit them. In this way the two chief dogmas were introduced into the circle of the doctrines of the old antignostically interpreted Symbol. A very modest use was made of the allegorical explanation of Holy Scripture. The letter ruled wholesale, at any rate much more thoroughly than in the case of the Cappadocians. In consequence of this, natural theology was shut out from sight; it was hedged round by extremely realistic Bible narratives confidingly accepted.[2] But the most serious fact was that the close connection which in Athanasius, Apollinaris, and Cyril of Alexandria had united the Trinity and Incarnation, or dogma in general, with the thought of salvation, was completely loosened. This process had begun with the Council of Chalcedon, and John had a mass of dogmas which it was necessary to believe; but they had ceased to be clearly subordinate to a uniform conception of their purpose. The object which dogma once served as the means remained; but the means had changed. Instead of dogma, we have the Cultus, the mysteries, into which Book IV. enters (IV. 17—25 are to be regarded as appendices). In consequence of this the system is destitute of inner vital unity.[3] It is really

[1] See Bach, Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters I., p. 49 ff. Bach begins with good reason, pp. 6—49, with Dionysius and Maximus.

[2] Yet the rational method was by no means given up; on the contrary, it was retained; see, *e.g.*, the rational arguments for the Trinity, I. 6, 7.

[3] The plan of the work is as follows: Book I. discusses the Deity, the Trinity and the attributes of God; Book II. the creation, angels, paradise, and man, giving an elaborate psychology; Book III. the Incarnation, the two natures, and Christo-

not an account of faith, but of its presuppositions, and its unity depends on the form of treatment, the high antiquity of its doctrine, and Holy Scripture. The dogmas had become the sacred inheritance from the classic antiquity of the Church, but they had, as it were, fallen to the ground. The worship of images, mysticism, and scholasticism ruled the Church. The two latter bore much fair fruit in after times; for the spirit which strives towards God cannot be stifled by anything, and is capable even of constructing a restricted science. But the history of dogma came to an end in the Greek Church a thousand years ago, and its reanimation cannot easily be conceived. A reformation could only set in in the cultus. The adoption of a few Catholic or Protestant *theologumena* in later catechisms and books of doctrine has hitherto been without effect, and will in the future hardly obtain any.

Independent theology had been extinguished in the churches of the East; but alongside these churches there arose all the more energetically, from the seventh century, the sects, old enemies in new forms, Marcionites (as Paulicians) and Manichæans, and in addition many other curious bodies, the necessary products of religious movements among tribes falling into barbarism, and but little trained by the Church. On the shaping of the dogmas of the Church these sects exerted not the slightest influence; and for that very reason they do not belong to the history of dogma. [1]

logy—see above, Chap. 3, conclusion; Book IV. continues the Christology up to Chap. 8 and then discusses—very characteristically—baptism, including the μῦρον, faith, the sign of the cross and faith, adoration towards the East, the mysteries (the Eucharists), Mary the mother of God and the genealogy of Christ, the veneration of the saints and their relics, pictures and, only then, Scripture. To the chapter on Scripture a series of chapters are appended containing hermeneutical rules for the exposition of Scripture, dealing with the statements regarding Christ—where we have a precise distinction made between the τρόποι of the hypostatic union—those concerning God in his relation to evil, the apparent existence of two principles, the law of God, and the law of sin and the Sabbath. The conclusion consists of chapters on virginity, circumcision—the position of these headings is reversed—on Anti-Christ and the resurrection.

[1] Besides the old researches of Engelhardt (1827), Gieseler (1829, 1846, 1849), see now Döllinger, Beitr. z. Sectengesch. des Mittelalters (1890) and Karapet Ter Mkrttschian, Die Paulikianer (1893).

Again, this history has nothing to say about the scientific life of the Byzantine Church, or the many theories and disputes which arose out of it, and, on the other hand, from mystical speculations; for all that had little or no effect on dogma. No doubt an isolated theological question was decided at this or that Synod; or individual theologians elaborated in a praiseworthy fashion theological conceptions, as *e.g.*, in reference to the crucifixion of Christ, atonement, and substitution; no doubt another rather important dispute—the Hesychastic controversy—agitated the Church in the fourteenth century; but dogma, and to some extent the Church itself, remained ultimately unaffected. For centuries the intellectual work of the Church consisted in the development of Church legislation, and its theologians either wrote on exegesis, history, and biography, following traditional patterns, or composed ascetic books.

Finally, to the history of dogma belongs neither the development of the schism with the West, nor the silent process, in which the Eastern Church has taken over, since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a great deal from the ecclesiastically more vigorous West. Apart from the "filioque" discussed above, the development of the schism was not determined by dogmatic factors, and the silent process[1] which lasted up to the end of the seventeenth century, and to which the Church owes, *e.g.*, the settling of its Canon of the Bible, the doctrine of the seven sacraments, a kind of doctrine of transubstantiation, a more certain doctrine of purgatory, development of the doctrines of sin and grace, a more sharply defined theory and practice of the sacrament of penance etc., has come to an end at a time when we have accurate knowledge, and will perhaps never be fully explained. The only definite dogmatic interests shown in it are anti-protestant.

[1] Compare as to this Kattenbusch, Vergleichende Confessionskunde I. passim. The general intellectual life in Eastern Rome is best discussed in the excellent work of Krumbacher, Gesch. d. Byzant. Litteratur, München, 1891.



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